



# A SAFE AND SECURE LIFE

GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION ON  
THE INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY  
5 OCTOBER 2017

*Suomi*  
*Finland*  
**100**

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PUBLICATIONS 27/2017



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Internal Security

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<p>The Internal Security Strategy is a road map for ensuring that Finland will be the safest country in the world for living, working and entrepreneurship, as envisaged in the Government Programme of 29 May 2015. In the Strategy, internal security refers to those aspects of society that ensure everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disorder, accidents or national or international events.</p> <p>The Strategy also includes a foresight section describing the forces of change that are likely to influence internal security in Finland in the near future. The Strategy's action plan has eight sets of measures and a total of 39 actions for managing these forces of change and thus enabling the objective of the Strategy to be achieved.</p> <p>Good internal security consists of numerous different elements. The Strategy is a government resolution intended to complement the previous decisions and policy outlines on security, ensuring that these sufficiently address the forces of change recognised in the strategy work. Therefore, the Strategy does not cover all internal security issues. The Strategy will be implemented as part of the operational and financial planning and performance management of the various administrative branches of central government. In respect of other parties involved, the implementation will take place on partnership basis through networked cooperation.</p>			
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<p>Sisäisen turvallisuuden strategia on tiekartta, jonka avulla pyritään siihen, että Suomesta tulee hallitusohjelman 29.5.2015 vision mukaisesti maailman turvallisin maa elää, asua, yrittää ja tehdä työtä. Sisäisellä turvallisuudella tarkoitetaan strategiassa niitä yhteiskunnan ominaisuuksia, joiden johdosta väestö voi nauttia oikeusjärjestelmän takaamista oikeuksista ja vapauksista ilman rikollisuudesta, häiriöistä, onnettomuuksista ja kansallisista tai kansainvälisistä ilmiöistä johtuvaa pelkoa tai turvattomuutta.</p> <p>Strategiassa on ennakointiosuus, jossa kuvataan Suomen sisäiseen lähitulevaisuudessa vaikuttavat muutosvoimat. Strategian toimenpideohjelmassa on kahdeksan toimenpidekokonaisuutta ja yhteensä 39 toimenpidettä, joilla nämä muutosvoimat hallitaan niin, että strategian tavoite saavutetaan.</p> <p>Hyvä sisäinen turvallisuus koostuu lukuisista eri osatekijöistä. Strategia on valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös, joka täydentää aiempia turvallisuutta koskevia päätöksiä ja linjauksia niiltä osin kuin nämä eivät riittävällä tavalla vastaa strategiatyössä tunnistettuihin muutosvoimiin. Näin ollen strategia käsittelee ainoastaan osaa sisäiseen turvallisuuteen liittyvistä kysymyksistä. Strategia toimeenpannaan valtionhallinnossa osana eri hallinnonalojen toiminnan ja talouden suunnittelua sekä tulosohjausta. Muiden vastuutahojen osalta toimeenpano toteutetaan kumppanuusperusteisesti verkostoyhteistyössä.</p>			
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<b>Nyckelord</b>	inre säkerhet, principbeslut, polisen, invandring, gränsförvaltning, civilskydd		
<p>Strategin för den inre säkerheten är en färdplan som har gjorts upp för att Finland, enligt visionen i regeringsprogrammet 29.5.2015, ska bli världens tryggaste land när det gäller levande, boende, företagande och arbete. Med intern säkerhet avses i strategin de egenskaper hos samhället som gör att befolkningen kan åtnjuta de rättigheter och friheter som rättssystemet garanterar, utan att känna sig rädd eller otrygg på grund av brottslighet, störningar, olyckor eller nationella eller internationella företeelser.</p> <p>Strategin innehåller en prognos som beskriver de förändringskrafter som inom en nära framtid kan påverka den interna säkerheten i Finland. Åtgärdsprogrammet för strategin innefattar åtta åtgärdsdelar och sammanlagt 39 åtgärder för att hantera dessa förändringskrafter så att målet för strategin kan uppnås.</p> <p>En bra intern säkerhet utgörs av flera olika delfaktorer. Strategin är statsrådets principbeslut som kompletterar tidigare beslut och riktlinjer för säkerheten till den del dessa inte tillräckligt bra svarar mot de förändringskrafter som har identifierats i strategiarbetet. Strategin behandlar med andra ord endast en del av frågorna kring den interna säkerheten. Strategin genomförs i statsförvaltningen som en del av verksamhets- och ekonomiplaneringen och resultatstyrningen inom olika förvaltningsområden. När det gäller de övriga ansvariga parterna genomförs strategin i ett partnerskapsbaserat nätverkssamarbete.</p>			
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# INTERNAL SECURITY IS CREATED THROUGH COOPERATION

**In 2013, the parliamentary Administration Committee noted in its report (HaVM 7/2013 vp) that there were very serious reasons for submitting to Parliament a separate report on internal security that would enable an extensive and comprehensive examination of the status of internal security and the various questions and development measures associated with it.**

In May 2016, the Government submitted to Parliament an Internal Security Report for the first time in Finnish history. The Report assessed the new challenges emerging in our security environment, especially from the perspective of the Ministry of the Interior's administrative branch and the services it provides.

This Internal Security Strategy document continues the work initiated in the Internal Security Report. Whereas the Report had a special focus on assessing the activities and needs of internal security authorities in a changing environment, this Strategy document looks at internal security from the perspective of a broader concept of safety and security.

While the Internal Security Strategy was being drafted, the parliamentary Administration Committee submitted a report on the Internal Security Report (HaVM 5/2017 vp) and on this basis, Parliament adopted a Communication on the Internal Security Report (EK 8/2017 vp). In April 2017, the Government additionally published its Action Plan for 2017–2019, in which security has a high profile. Following a consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, the Administration Committee also issued a statement (HaVL 22/2017 vp) on aspects that should be addressed in the Strategy. The policies adopted in these documents were taken into account in this Strategy.



The preparation of the Internal Security Strategy began in autumn 2016. As predicted in the foresight work carried out for the Strategy, the world around us has already changed a great deal since the Government Report on Internal Security was adopted. Recent development and events have shown that ensuring safety and security is more important than ever.

The Strategy stresses that almost all social policy related decision-making is also relevant to security, and the security authorities' actions are not alone sufficient to create and maintain Finland's internal security; for this, multisectoral cooperation in a society built on trust is required. Collaboration at all levels of administration is at the core of preparing and implementing the Internal Security Strategy and the related action plan.

Some 100 experts who represent more than 30 organisations, including public authorities, NGOs and the business sector, contributed to the preparation of the Strategy. Its measures were prepared by three expert groups. Expert group proposals were discussed by the Strategy's steering group (Appendix 1), and on this basis, the ministerial working group on internal security and administration of justice adopted a draft action plan. A resolution to adopt the Strategy was made at a government session.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Paula Risikko', with a stylized flourish at the end.

**PAULA RISIKKO**

*Minister of the Interior*





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# 1. THE OBJECTIVE OF INTERNAL SECURITY: FINLAND IS THE SAFEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD

**The Internal Security Strategy, A Safe and Secure Life, is a roadmap for ensuring that Finland will be the safest country in the world for living, working and entrepreneurship, as envisaged in the Government Programme of 29 May 2015.**

Relying on studies and reports, the foresight section of the Strategy (Chapter 2) identifies megatrends and drivers of change that will have an essential impact on Finland in the years to come. At the end of the foresight section, the Strategy examines how these drivers will be manifested now and in the near future as topical security threats. The strategic action plan (Chapter 3) consisting of eight sets of measures, on the other hand, describes the measures through which Finland will respond to and prepare for key drivers of change and security threats that will play a major role in internal security. The objective of the action plan is to improve the effectiveness of efforts to promote safety and security by drawing on cooperation and trust, which are central resources of Finnish society, and by improving network-based operating models. In total, the action plan contains 38 measures. The action plan's set of measures on Powers and capability will also improve the internal security authorities' capabilities in keeping with the priority area of security adopted in the Government Action Plan 2017–2019. This Strategy and its measures replace the group strategy for the Ministry of the Interior's branch of government and the earlier cross-administrative Internal Security Programme.

No single, firmly established or unambiguous definition for internal security exists. In a traditional dichotomy, security in society is divided into internal and external security. Among government actors, the Defence Forces see to external security, while the Police are mainly responsible for internal security. In the narrowest sense in the early days of the Republic of Finland, internal security was seen through the duties of the Ministry of the Interior and its agencies as "maintaining public order and security, or fighting perils that threaten society and private individuals through the state's powers and enforcement actions"<sup>1</sup>. As Western society and the Nordic welfare state and rule of law evolved, the general concept of internal

security has expanded to cover not only fighting threats but also individuals' and organisations' possibilities of enjoying their full fundamental and human rights. At the same time, the concept has evolved to include other elements besides the security task and field of actors of the Ministry of the Interior's branch of government. We can thus say that the changing concept of security mirrors general societal development.

In this Strategy, internal security refers to those aspects of society that ensure everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disorder, accidents or national or international events. This definition contains two factors. On the one hand, it describes issues that are seen as potential threats to internal security — crime, disorder, accidents and national or international events. On the other hand, it examines elements that cause or at least may cause fear or insecurity. While in earlier times, good internal security could be regarded as an absence of threats, today the way we experience different phenomena is also part of internal security. The Strategy starts from the premise that numerous internal and external drivers of change continuously threaten both our society and what we consider an acceptable security environment for it. One manifestation of this is that while the core areas of internal security, including public order and security and the right to life, physical integrity and protection of property, remain more or less unchanged, different aspects are emphasised at different times when we talk about security. Regardless of a decrease in annual traffic deaths during the last decade, for example, the number of these fatalities remains almost double the number of homicide victims; however, concerns and fears related to violence are more prominent in our conversations.

Good internal security is created as the sum of many different factors. Safety and security are promoted by such elements as a safe home, living and working environment, well-functioning basic services, equality of all people, a well-designed transport environment, access to help when it is needed and a certainty that those guilty of offences will be held liable for their acts. In other words, decisions and actions that affect internal security are taken in almost all areas of social policy. Especially the root causes of security problems, or the numbers and types of different security problems that emerge in our society, go back to other decisions than those primarily associated with security. The actual security-related decisions in most cases are more likely to influence the manner in which the existing security problems are responded to. Events taking place and decisions made outside Finland's borders also have an increasing impact on internal security. In some areas of internal security, the development is fully dependent on the international situation.

Due to the diversity of the components of internal security, it would not be appropriate or even possible to attempt to address them all in this Strategy. For this reason, the focus of the Strategy is on phenomena in which risks affecting everyday safety and security have exacerbated significantly compared to previous years or which, without timely interventions, are expected to affect negatively the safety and security of the entire society or a large segment

of the population in the near future. The Finnish security authorities have capabilities for good responsiveness, and one of the Strategy's priorities is securing these capabilities also in a changing world. As a slight exaggeration, however, we can say that reactive actions are always too late. This is why the Strategy also emphasises the importance of identifying and understanding the root causes. The best and most cost-effective way of maintaining society's safety and security is to implement preventive measures that address the root causes. While decision-making related to root causes is not within the remit of this Strategy, the Strategy's measures will promote the assessment of security impacts and help to take account of them in decision-making of this type. In addition, the Strategy contains measures that, through improved cooperation, will be able to prevent risks stemming from the root causes and identified as heightened in the foresight work. These

include the risks cited in the set of measures on *Everyday security*: offences arising from social exclusion, the safety and security of older and young people as well as segregation risks in growth centres.

**Measured by many indicators and in different assessments, Finland already is the safest country in the world. However, this sense of security has eroded in recent years.**

The Internal Security Strategy was adopted as a government resolution. Prime Minister Sipilä's Government has decided to reduce the number of government-level strategies to

ensure the implementation and impact of their policies. Safety is the backbone of a stable and thriving society which is why this Strategy will be one of the most central security policies adopted by the Government. As discussed above, safety and security should be examined from a number of different perspectives. Consequently, this Strategy does not replace prior policies and decisions on security in force that partly address the same issues. Another feature of this Strategy thus is that its sets of measures *complement* or modify prior decisions, structures and measures to the extent that they do not adequately respond to developments ensuing from identified drivers of change or topical security threats. All ministries have duties associated with the safety and security of society within their remits, and this Strategy does not propose to change them. All ministries additionally have duties that are relevant to the aforementioned root causes of internal security. In recent years, decisions have been made on numerous sectoral and cross-sectoral measures aiming to promote security, which are still up to date. Due to the complementary nature of this Strategy, its action plan does not reiterate all of these measures, even if they are of great importance for the whole. These include Parliament's policies on the development of internal security, the Security Strategy for Society, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism, the Action Plan against the Shadow Economy and Economic Crime, the Cyber and Information Security Strategies, the action plans on asylum policy and migration, the road safety strategy, government decisions on security of supply, the National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights, the

National Crime Prevention Programme, government policies on reducing social exclusion among young people, and alcohol policy outlines.

Measured by many indicators and in different assessments, Finland already is the safest country in the world<sup>2</sup>. As indicated by statistics, development over the last twenty years has been highly positive. This is a consequence of the long-term and systematic work carried out in Finland to build a safe and competitive welfare society. However, the sense of security is at the core of internal security, also according to the definition used in this Strategy, and this sense of security has eroded in recent years. In addition to the actual security situation, the sense of security is affected by wider societal changes and, in particular, instability factors. In the face of the recent economic recession, Finnish society has evolved in a stable and predictable manner since the turn of the millennium. This situation changed clearly in the mid-2010s, however, as a result of the altered situation of world politics. Without exception, all surveys measuring the sense of security in recent years have reflected this change — the sense of security is eroding. In addition to sweeping changes and uncertainties, national and international crises, disasters and large-scale acts of violence have an even greater impact on the sense of security in today's networking world. Some of the security threats that are new to Finland, including terrorism and influencing through information, strive specifically to exploit this fact. We must be able to respond to the eroded sense of security. Another challenge associated with measuring security is that recurring safety and security problems in everyday life accumulate very strongly on a small share of the population. In this situation, an examination based on averages and total numbers does not provide the full picture. For example, less than five per cent of the population commit more than one half of all offences, while ten per cent of the population experience more than two thirds of all violence. Additionally, the victims and perpetrators of offences often are the same persons in different situations and life stages. Due to this tendency for accumulation, we must be able to deliver more targeted safety and security in the environments and for the population groups most severely affected by the security problems.

**Recurring safety and security problems in everyday life accumulate very strongly on a small share of the population.**

Large-scale incidents tend to be relatively minor exceptions in the running of our society, and the development of internal security is more frequently influenced by slow and imperceptible changes in society. Regardless of this, preparedness for accidents and everyday incidents is also a key part of internal security. Consequently, this Strategy examines not only drivers of change but also topical security threats, and it contains some measures related to preparedness. The preparedness measures will be implemented following the cooperation model for comprehensive security adopted in the Security Strategy for Society.

The authorities responsible for maintaining internal security are the Police, Customs, the Border Guard and the rescue, judicial and prison service authorities, but in keeping with the broad concept of safety and security that underpins this Strategy, social and health, transport and communications, education, culture and youth as well as labour and environmental authorities have important duties associated with the internal security sector. NGOs also promote people's wellbeing and safety in many ways through their activities. They deliver activities and services that are important in terms of safety both independently and as partners for the authorities. The business sector provides the majority of the products and services people need every day. The security of business activities thus is both an important part of everyday security and a factor in our national competitiveness. The Strategy focuses

on measures through which these *actors* can respond to identified drivers of change and security threats.

**In addition to the authorities' operational activities, such elements as the role of municipalities, cooperation with NGOs and between different administrative branches, as well as the significance of the business sector and research will be stressed more than before.**

Finland's security environment has undeniably become more complex. The authorities need appropriate capabilities to face the new challenges and duties. No indications of the accustomed duties of the authorities becoming redundant came up in the course of the foresight work for this Strategy. The authorities' dwindling resources will continue to be tied up in managing the established critical basic duties. The same limited resources will be used

to respond to new, diverse security threats. This challenging situation will require a careful reassessment of the authorities' resources. In addition to the authorities' operational activities, such elements as the role of municipalities, cooperation with NGOs and between different administrative branches, as well as the significance of the business sector and research will be stressed more than before.

In order to achieve its purpose — ensuring that Finland is the safest country in the world for living, working and entrepreneurship — the following goals have been selected for the Strategy on the basis of the key drivers of change:


- Ensuring that analyses of the security environment and anticipation of changes in it are up-to-date and effective
- Preventing insecurity that results from social exclusion in all its forms
- Ensuring efficient and productive security structures and processes
- Improving the crisis resilience of individuals and society through cooperation.

The strategy measures serving these goals are to be implemented before the next Internal Security Report is submitted to Parliament in 2020. Some of the measures involve contin-




uous activities, and their implementation will continue after that milestone. The purpose of the measures is to control the security impacts of the phenomena identified in the foresight section, ensuring that Finland will be the safest country in the world for living, working and entrepreneurship as envisaged in the Government Programme also after 2020 and that the goals set by Parliament for internal security will be reached by 2025.

The Internal Security Strategy will be implemented as part of the operational and financial planning and performance management of the various administrative branches of central government. In respect of other parties involved, the implementation will take place on a partnership basis through extensive networked cooperation. The objectives and measures outlined in the Internal Security Strategy will be taken into account in local and regional security plans. An implementation plan prepared for the measures will contain concrete timelines, the parties taking part in the implementation of the measures, procedures and funding. The implementation plan and its monitoring indicators will be adopted by a cross-administrative strategy steering group that will be appointed separately. The steering group will regularly report on strategy implementation to the ministerial working group on internal security and administration of justice.




1 Finland's Administrative Court, Ståhlberg, 1915  
 2 e.g. World Internal Security and Policy Report (WISP) and the World Economic Forum's The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017

# INTERNAL SECURITY



# A SAFE AND

# SECURITY STRATEGY




# SECURE LIFE



## 2. SAFETY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD

It is characteristic of security-related discussions and examinations that they focus on topical threats and concerns. However, trends and changes in the field of security are not areas detached from the rest of human and societal development. What we regard as safety and security and the values we attach to them are rather a consequence of other social, technological, economic, ecological and political development. For this reason, this chapter looks at global megatrends recognised in studies and reports, followed by a discussion of their significance for the development in Finland.

### 2.1 GLOBAL MEGATRENDS



## GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY

The world's economies are linked by interdependency, which we can to a great extent thank for the fact that today's world is more equal, wealthier and safer than ever before. There has been a reduction in traditional wars between states, armed conflicts and violence.

The interdependency between states, societies and communities continues to intensify, even if separatist tendencies are also emerging. People, capitals, goods, ideas and services move across borders.

The emphasis of the world economy has shifted from both sides of the Atlantic to Asia. China and India are significant economic powers. No clear turn for the

better is in sight for the economic downturn in Europe.

During its history as an independent state, Finland has never been isolated from the global operating environment. So far, globalisation has benefited us, even if it has meant tougher competition and forced us to look for new ways of increasing productivity.

An economy dependent on exports, Western value networks, communication technology and international cooperation have been among Finland's success factors, especially over the last thirty years. An ability to operate in an interdependent environment is a lifeline for a small national state.<sup>3</sup>

## SUSTAINABILITY CRISIS

The limited nature of natural resources is becoming increasingly evident. Global demographic growth continues, and climate change and dwindling natural resources will make humankind's dependence on its environment more and more critical. Energy, water, arable land and living space are limited resources that will be shared by a greater number of people. The status of the environment will challenge our lifestyles, attitudes, local and international decision-making and technologies.

The greatest question of the world economy is decoupling economic growth from overuse of natural resources and emissions.

Differences in the standards of living of the poor and the rich are a key challenge to humankind and an important background factor for global migration.<sup>4</sup>

## TECHNOLOGY

Ubiquitous information technology supports and directs our daily lives but also shapes our attitudes and beliefs. The future of an open global information network is not something we can take for granted, however. Its use and expansion may be limited by security aspects and political factors.

The interface between technology and humans will become blurred. Automation and robotisation will shape educational needs and the world of work. Many occupations will disappear, while completely new ones emerge.

Ethical and moral questions associated with technology will become significant and divide opinions.

## FATIGUE OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

The fatigue of representative democracy has been talked about in Western countries for years. Voting turnout rates and political parties' membership keep declining. General welfare, equality, confidence, education, social capital, well-functioning institutions, employment and the economy are essential for the realisation of democracy and inclusion. In egalitarian and affluent societies, there is greater democracy. For the time being, Finland has fared well in international comparisons of the state of democracy and society.

The rapid development of technology and globalisation are the most significant dynamics affecting the realisation of representative democracy. Technology has led to fundamental changes in power structures, allowing people easy access to information via the internet. The volume of information and mounting challenges will make it increasingly difficult to find straight answers. Expectations related to direct exertion of influence will challenge conventional democratic decision-making. New ways of exerting influence are being created at an ever-increasing speed.<sup>5</sup>

3 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now  
 4 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now  
 5 Sitra Megatrends 2017: Nordic update



## 2.2 DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND

### SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT

In Finnish society, work has guaranteed livelihoods, levelled out social differences and prevented social exclusion. This will also hold true in the near future. Over longer term, there will be changes in the possibilities of earning a livelihood, society's organisation around work, the significance of work for people's identities and the definition of work and meaningful duties. Work will not necessarily operate as a mechanism that equalises the distribution of income any longer. Economic wellbeing will become polarised<sup>6</sup>. It is likely that people's livelihoods will be less and less based on the production and consumption of goods — and more on human activity and interaction. Digitalisation will open up new possibilities for producing value and earning livelihoods.<sup>7</sup>

An intense generation gap can be seen across Europe. Unemployment has been particularly harsh on young people. Solutions to sustaining the pension system appear to favour current pensioners over future generations of pensioners.<sup>8</sup>

The equality is a resource and a glue that holds society together in Finland. However, there is a threat of increasing *polarisation* for both social and technological reasons. Social

**The equality is a resource and a glue that holds society together in Finland. However, there is a threat of increasing polarisation for both social and technological reasons.**

exclusion and underprivilege risk being accumulated. Radicalisation and problems affecting the functioning of political systems are also reflections of this. There are indications that the share of young adults at risk of social exclusion is growing in Finland: according to an OECD study<sup>9</sup>, more than one out of five Finnish men aged between 20 and 24 are not in employment, education or training. The proportion of young people outside education, training or employment has been increasing in Finland since 2011. The reason for their

exclusion often lies in mental health problems. However, the risk of permanent social exclusion is not realised for all. According to the Research Institute of Finnish Economy ETLA's estimate<sup>10</sup>, approximately 10% of this cohort are at risk of social exclusion. The average age of the population is increasing more rapidly in Finland than in any other EU country. It is estimated that in 2030, there will be more than 1.4 million people aged over 65 in Finland, or twice as many as in 2000<sup>11</sup>. On the other hand, the birth rate is declining. The sustainability gap challenges the operating logic of an industrial society.



The ageing of the population will not happen evenly across the country. Younger people move to larger cities, in particular, for work and studies. The population in the sparsely populated areas is getting older. This will set particular challenges for the provision of services by society, including the security authorities.

The central government and municipalities will depend more heavily on NGOs, companies and other organisations for organising services. Scarcity of resources will make it necessary to find new operating methods. Co-ownership and sharing will become more common in such areas as housing, motoring and provision of wellbeing services.

Lifestyle differences between generations will increase. Young people have a more natural relationship with the information society than their elders. Especially in large cities, young people grow up in a more diverse environment than the older generations did, and their relation with multiculturalism will thus also be more straightforward. Traditions and customs will lose their significance from generation to generation. The role of authorities is transforming, and power will be divided in new ways. The aim is at an individual lifestyle, however looking to communities for support. Sub-cultures will be born, grow and disappear, often at a fast rate. People will be less inclined to identify themselves with the Finnish national state and civic society. In younger generations, this may be replaced by identification with models originating in other countries and cultures.

Conflicts, demographic growth, insecurity, poverty, a desire to study and work as well as climate change will drive migration. Migration will shape cultures. Influences will spread from one country or person to another. Human communities will diversify, while distrust, xenophobia and integration problems will also raise their heads. In the geographic sense, international phenomena are already finding a concrete expression across Finland.

The joint impact of several factors will make Finnish society more pluralistic. The *fragmentation* of shared values may encourage juxtapositions.

Uncontrolled migration to Europe is associated with security risks, including terrorist links, *rise of xenophobic extremist movements* and different forms of crime. Extremely deep divisions between the EU Member States may emerge in their responses to the refugee crisis and the growing number of immigrants. The root causes of this migration — different conflicts, crises and unstable societies — cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future, which will also influence the associated security risks.

The cultural diversification caused by *migration* will not affect all areas in Finland in the same way, and this will accentuate regional differences. The strongest impacts of immigration will be felt in large cities. It is estimated that one fifth of the population in the Helsinki region will be foreign-language speakers in 2030.

In terms of immigrants' quality of life, the manner in which they are accepted as part of communities, the speed at which this takes place, and the status allotted to them will be crucial. Access to education, training and the labour market is often crucial. The immigrant's personal initiative in the integration process is vital and promotes integration.

The welfare challenges of Western societies will increasingly be associated with mental wellbeing, social capital and lifestyle diseases. Sustainable wellbeing means expanding the concept to the area of mental wellbeing, in which belonging to a community, happiness, a good life and meaningful activity are in an important role. The mental resilience of individuals and society has links to these factors of wellbeing.

## TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Technological development continues and appears to be speeding up. The trend shaped by the digitalisation of production, automation, robotics, the Industrial Internet and artificial intelligence is often called the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Actors and societies that create innovations, new products, services and business models will benefit from this trend. At the same time, it is likely that digitalisation and other technological advancement will also result in social exclusion.

Some of it is about a conscious decision to opt out from undesirable development.

**Technology may radically change the economy, democracy, administration, human practices and even humans as a species.**

In the administration and politics, using big data and artificial intelligence may help to produce better solutions for a large group of people. Data collection may make it possible to address the experiences and needs of high numbers of people.

*Technology may radically change the economy, democracy, administration, human practices and even humans as a species. Understanding technological development and its impacts on society, work, the economy and humans is a new civic skill that will enable people to participate fully in discussions on future.*

Technical infrastructure and information networks and systems are closely interlinked. As we utilise technology more extensively, we will also be more vulnerable to natural disasters and deliberate acts. Questions of the cyber environment have become increasingly elemental parts of the foreign, security and defence policy.

Media and free journalism are vital actors for society. Communication improves people's possibilities for being aware of the state of the world and humankind. Social media, which was born from digitalisation, has rapidly become an interactive and participatory environ-

ment. It enables increased awareness and constructive discussion but also the fuelling of conflicts. Fast-spreading false information can be used for destructive purposes, and it is easy to abuse and threaten people online with no fear of any restrictions placed by the legal system. The public opinion has never been clear-cut as a concept, but the social media may distort it further.

The relationship between humans, the environment and technology is changing. The significance of local communities will be highlighted when technology is used for maintaining social relationships.

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The world's economies are linked by interdependency. Capitals, goods, services and people move across borders. So far, Finland has been one of the winners of globalisation. The emphasis of the world economy has shifted to Asia, however, and no obvious solutions to Europe's economic problems are in sight. In addition to the global downturn, Finnish economy has been hit by a reduced demand for wood processing industry products and electronics industry exports as well as a decline in the Russian trade due to a variety of reasons. This will have extensive local impacts, especially in those areas where some form of export industry has been the driver of the economy. Maintaining a welfare society during a prolonged economic downturn is the most significant challenge to Finnish society, especially as the Finnish population is ageing faster than in other EU Member States. The dependency ratio will deteriorate, the number of working age population has been declining since 2009, and while the figures have improved recently, the unemployment rate continues to be high. Finland is a small, open economy and highly dependent on exports. Changes in an interdependent economic environment can have a dramatic impact on Finland; these changes may include strong turbulence in the eurozone, the deepening economic crisis in Russia, or the global financial crisis. Finland's competitiveness kept declining for a number of years. In 2014, the public debt exceeded 60% of GDP, and the ratio of general government expenditure to GDP in Finland is the highest in the OECD<sup>12</sup>. However, the Finnish export economy has recently shown signs of an upturn.

**Finland is a small, open economy and highly dependent on exports.**

*General government finances* will remain in deficit at the end of the decade despite adjustment measures introduced by the Government and a recovery of economic growth. The economic upturn will not resolve the structural problems of general government finances, nor will it alone suffice to strengthen them sustainably in the long term. The public debt to total economic output ratio will remain high. Major structural reforms and cutbacks in the public

economy are generally considered unavoidable<sup>13</sup>. These changes will affect the services and benefits that people receive and also the public mood.

## ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

The humankind is battling over the sufficiency of natural resources. Water, arable land, clean air and different minerals and other natural resources are at risk of being exhausted because of unsustainable use. The scientific community unanimously agrees on the inevitability of climate change. Climate change and the insufficiency of natural resources will have dramatic, long-term consequences for the natural environment, human living conditions, world politics and economy and society. The need to transition from the fossil economy to a bioeconomy and the use of renewable natural resources has been recognised globally, but the joint commitment of different states on the targets will affect the rate of the change.

The Middle East, Africa and parts of Central Asia will be most prone to security risks caused by climate change. In the north, security is shaken up by the impacts of climate change on melting Arctic regions, clearly affecting regional geopolitical dynamics.

Between 2008 and 2015, an average of 22.5 million people have left their homes because of natural disasters every year. Of these people, 95% are living in developing countries. Estimates say that the amount of climate refugees by 2050 could be anywhere between 50 and 200 million<sup>14</sup>.

The impacts of ecological changes are not yet likely to be significant during the time span of this Strategy. However, sustainable development solutions are essential. At the same time, Europe should prepare for the strongly increasing migration caused by climate changes.

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

While interdependency will continue to be central for global economic development, national interests and traditional power politics have made a comeback in international relations. The foreign policy of great powers is more visibly guided by needs arising from internal politics, which makes their actions less predictable. Respect for Western democratic values is eroding, and practices based on compliance with agreed rules are under pressure. While there is growing awareness of global problems, the operating capabilities of the UN and its subordinate organisations appear to be limited compared to the expectations placed on them. Their future is uncertain, and their failure to offer global leadership will maintain multipolarity in the world. Authoritarian ideologies and nationalism have emerged as a challenge to existing structures which, in the Western countries, rely on liberalism. This has been enabled by experiences of liberal values and policies being unable to solve global problems that are increasingly present in people's everyday lives.

A strong transformation in the foreign and security political operating environment will continue in Finland's neighbouring areas and also globally. Typical aspects of Finland's changing security environment will include a fast pace of change and unpredictability.

The complex power struggles in the Middle East and North Africa are resulting in phenomena whose duration and effects will still be seen in Europe and all other parts of the world for decades to come. The current political order is facing serious challenges in the Middle East.

In the next few years, the European Union will have to resolve a number of major issues related to such aspects as immigration to Europe, the Union's cohesion as the geopolitical conflicts around it exacerbate, slow economic growth and eurozone stability. The full impacts of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom on the European Union will only be seen over a longer time span. Uncontrollable migration and terrorist attacks put the Schengen agreement to test. Divisive forces are stemming from the internal development in certain EU Member States. Nationalism and nationalist politics have gathered increasing support in many of them. Growing immigration has also fuelled the extreme right and populism in Europe. These factors will erode the EU's ideological basis and threaten its position as a community of shared values.

All Member States of the Union were hit by economic problems as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Total economic output in the eurozone continues to be clearly less than before the crisis. Unemployment rates have reached record heights, public economies show severe deficits, and public debt rates have grown significantly. Especially in crisis countries, trust in political institutions has collapsed, and different populist and nationalist movements have gathered momentum. Also in Finland, 40% of the general public report that they are unsatisfied with the *functioning of democracy*<sup>15</sup>.

**The direction that the European Union will take is one of the big questions for Finland. The security situation requires the Member States to engage in closer cooperation.**

The direction that the European Union will take is one of the big questions for Finland. The success or failure of the EU will have direct impacts on all of its Member States. The security situation requires the Member States to engage in closer cooperation. The EU is striving to intensify its activities in the area of internal security, which will put the Member States' authorities under pressure.

A key feature of the Russian administration system is interlinked political and economic power based on networks and unofficial relations. Official institutions are weak, and the legal system is not independent. Rather than being able to reform the economic and social order, the

administration system produces uneven regional development, weak economic growth and non-linear policies. The financial outlook is increasingly dim, and the market mechanisms are dysfunctional, which puts stability at risk and makes the development difficult to predict.

In addition to evolving military means, political, economic and military pressure, forms of information and cyber warfare, their combinations and other means of hybrid influencing are used in the world to further political ends.

Even in normal circumstances, these types of influencing can be launched quickly. The objective is to expose the target to pressure, damage, uncertainty and instability. Hybrid influencing has also been used against Finland. An open society offers opportunities for turning even internal discussion into a crisis and attempting to manipulate the societal climate. Influencing the public opinion in Finland may be difficult, however, due to the high education level in our country and historical reasons.

Terrorist organisations and networks are able to exploit not only different types of cross-border criminality but also new technologies, including information networks and materials for weapons of mass destruction. Their power stems from extreme ideologies and flourishes in conditions characterised by social exclusion, unemployment and lack of prospects, weak or failed government and a lack of security mechanism that respects fundamental freedoms and human rights, as well as violence and inequality.

## **DIFFICULTY OF SECURITY FORESIGHT**

In conventional security thinking, security has been seen as a separate entity that only needs attention when something that threatens it has already happened. Changes in the security situation will be increasingly likely in the future, however, and preparing for them in advance will be difficult.

The security thinking must grasp the causes of the problems before the consequences escalate into security challenges. Especially in social and intoxicant abuse policy, decisions may be made that will significantly advance the security of society — but also security decisions that have negative impacts, even immediately.

An individual's personal actions and choices are the cornerstone of security in society. Experiences of being in control of one's life, meaningful activity, opportunities for exerting influence and experiences of togetherness contribute to the feeling of security. All these can be supported. Finland's strength has lied in being a small country with a relatively good level of equality that has maintained cohesion, coped with unexpected crises and been successful. Trust creates security. Finnish people also trust the authorities. The direction in which this trust will develop is a crucial question for a small country such as Finland. Finland is a country

with an extensive surface area, and the drivers of change do not affect all of its parts in the same way. However, the common direction of change in Finnish society is towards diversity. Complex relations of dependency create hybrid identities put together with many influences. Social and economic background direct choices of living areas, schools and careers.

The world is also less predictable in terms of security needs. Consequently, complex security challenges require resilience: the ability of systems to operate flexibly in emergencies, recover quickly and, in the aftermath of a crisis, develop by learning from it. Preparing for the future will be ever more difficult. This is why it makes sense to anticipate and chart possible futures and the ways in which they can be tackled.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The operating *environment of internal security in Finland* is now more complex than before, and it is also affected by factors outside the country. Changes in the security environment may take place at an extremely fast pace. Preparing accurate predictions is not possible even for a relatively short term.
2. The *key internal security challenge in Finland* is expanding social exclusion in all its forms. It exacerbates the risk of societal disruptions and to a great extent determines the need for reactive services produced by the security authorities. Radicalisation and the strengthening of extremist movements are the ultimate consequences of social exclusion in all its forms.
3. *The status of Finnish public finances* put public administration structures under severe pressures to renew, which may have security impacts. The high levels of education, security and technological development in our country are a significant international competitive factor. The security of high technologies is a particular challenge in terms of resources and competence.
4. *The crisis resilience of Finnish society* is based on the systems' ability to operate in incidents, preparedness for incidents as well as individuals' mental resilience. External attempts to influence opinions are becoming more common and also seek to influence societal decision-making.

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6 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now

7 Sitra Megatrends 2017: Nordic update

8 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now

9 OECD Education at a Glance 2016

10 ETLA memorandum: *NEET-nuorten tulkinassa korjattavaa* (R. Asplund, P.Vanhala, 2016)

11 Population forecast 2015 – 2065, Statistics Finland

12 <https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm>

13 *Economic Survey, Summer 2017* (Ministry of Finance Publication 28a/2017)

14 Sitra Megatrends 2016

15 *Kenen mitta on täysi?* (V. Pitkänen, J. Westinen / Ajatuspaja e2 2016)

## 2.3 DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND THREATS AFFECTING INTERNAL SECURITY

**Seven drivers of change related to internal security can be derived from global trends and Finland's development. This strategy seeks to respond to these drivers to prevent the realisation of the threats arising from them.**

### DIVERSE POLARISATION

If the current development continues, economic wellbeing of population groups and regions will become polarised. Social, cultural and health-related polarisation development will also challenge a safe and secure welfare society. Inequalities and social exclusion are the most important background factors for conventional security threats, including crime and becoming a victim of crime. In the phenomenon of social exclusion, different problems, including socioeconomic, intoxicant abuse and mental health problems, often accumulate on the same persons. In proportion to the size of their cohort, young men commit the most offences, and the share of young adults threatened by social exclusion is growing. The average age of the population is increasing more rapidly in Finland than in any other EU country. Rather than happening evenly across the country, the ageing of the population particularly affects sparsely populated areas. The number of safety and security problems related to ageing will thus grow in Finland and become visible in different ways in various areas. In growth centres with a high level of economic wellbeing, the increasing wellbeing and income gaps at the local level will be a challenge that may lead to the segregation of living areas.


### FRAGMENTATION OF SHARED VALUES

Finnish society is becoming more pluralistic as a result of the joint impact of several factors. Lifestyle differences between generations will increase. International ideological communities and sub-cultures have a presence in Finland through contacts and communication enabled by information networks. The role of authorities is transforming, and power will be divided in new ways. Diversification of the population due to migration will increase the number of groups with shared values based on different cultures, beliefs and common life experiences in society. The diversity of value communities in society is a resource that may promote the development of Finnish society, but the actual or subjective fragmentation of shared values may also pull people apart and fuel confrontations and conflicts between groups. A society with a fragmented value base is also a more vulnerable target for tendentious influencing through information based on false information that aims to encourage confrontations.



## SECURITY IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION

While immigration is a question of resources for Finland in terms of such aspects as the population's age structure, employment and thus the country's competitiveness, its scope and nature are also difficult to predict and control. Immigration must stay under control. Bi-directional migration shapes cultures but also affects internal security. Immigration from conflict zones to Finland may increase the presence of criminal and terrorist organisations in this country. While the threat of terrorism in Finland and Europe is not a consequence of migration, there are individuals prone to violent radicalisation among immigrants coming from conflict zones, which affects the phenomenon as a whole. This will require improved capabilities of the authorities. Migration also affects everyday safety and security. Distrust, offences and violent extremism that targets immigrants are exacerbating security threats in the era of growing immigration. In addition to immigrants, these security threats also concern a broader group of Finns who are ethnically or culturally different from the mainstream population. Some immigrant groups are statistically over-represented as suspects of certain types of offences, and the viewpoint of security adds to the pressures to ensure immigrant integration. In particular, foreign nationals who are illegally staying in the country or waiting for removal from the country are vulnerable to violent radicalism, liable to perpetrate offences and prone to becoming victims of crime.



## **EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS AND IDEOLOGIES**

Polarisation, fragmentation of values, disinformation and the establishment of support networks for international terrorism in Finland will increase the visibility of extremist movements and their activities in Finnish society. These movements and ideologies are born in conditions characterised by social exclusion, unemployment and lack of prospects. In addition to preventing criminal activity of violent extremist movements, societal decision-making must be geared to ensuring that no areas or population groups susceptible to the rhetoric and recruitment efforts of such movements emerge in Finland.

## **ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION**

Technological development continues and appears to be speeding up. Technological development will also create social exclusion. The cyber environment will be an increasingly important part of foreign, security and defence policy but also daily life as smart and online features become a component of more and more devices and processes that we use every day. Technical infrastructure as well as information networks and systems are closely interlinked. While we use technology more and more extensively, improving the efficiency of both enterprising and daily life, we will also become more at risk of, and vulnerable to, natural disasters and intentional activities.

Digitalisation and social media are changing the practices of journalism and the sources in which people look for information. They will enable not only increased awareness and constructive discussion but also the fuelling of conflicts.

## **SLOW RECOVERY OF PUBLIC FINANCES**

While Finland has benefited considerably from globalisation, maintaining a welfare state during a prolonged economic downturn is a significant challenge. Finland's competitiveness has been declining for a number of years. The dependency ratio is deteriorating, the number of working age population has been declining since 2009, and the unemployment rate continues to be high. Cutbacks in the public economy and major structural reforms are generally considered unavoidable. Indirectly, these changes have a major influence on the public mood, with crucial impacts on internal security and especially the feeling of security. Pressures of public finances will lead to a situation where maintaining internal security merely by increasing the security authorities' resources no longer will be possible.

## GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The prioritisation of national interests and traditional rhetoric of power politics have made a comeback in international relations. The operating capabilities of international institutions appear to be limited compared to the expectations placed on them, and both states and individuals have reservations about their ability to resolve problems of world politics. The power policy exercised by states may be manifested in many and difficult-to-predict areas of life and societal activity that have close links with internal security and the uninterrupted operation of a democratic society.







PÖLIISI

"Iartför  
Paris,  
vi har  
ju Åbo"

### 3. ACTION PLAN



#### SET OF MEASURES 1: **ANALYSIS AND FORESIGHT**



#### OBJECTIVE

Continuous analyses and foresight information based on studies, reports and statistics at the level of individual phenomena will be produced on internal security for the public administration, the business sector and the third sector. The purpose of the foresight activities will be responding to complex security problems earlier and more proactively with proportionate and more cost-effective action.



## RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Global security environment, diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, security impacts of migration, technology, public finances, extremist movements and ideologies*

## SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:

*Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness  
Efficient security structures and processes*

## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE

1. A strategic analysis and foresight function relevant to internal security will be established to support government-level management, societal decision-making and network-based cooperation on internal security.  
The analysis and foresight function will collect, analyse and report information on internal security phenomena identified as being of key importance. The function will also engage in continuous foresight work related to internal security phenomena and produce assessments based on studies and reports on the impacts of different actors and areas of decision-making on security-related phenomena. The function will have close links with the research coordination and funding cooperation related to internal security, and its activities will be coordinated with the Government's extensive foresight work and the activities of the comprehensive security foresight network.
2. Structures and practices for research and funding cooperation will be put in place between the Ministry of the Interior's branch of government and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE) with special focus on mental crisis resilience issues.

## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)


**The Ministry of the Interior** - The function will be established within the Ministry of the Interior, where it will operate in collaboration with the Government, the internal security authorities as well as other key internal security actors. In addition to decision-makers, its services will be provided for those participating in internal security network cooperation, including authorities, regional and local government, NGOs as well as the business sector.

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**SET OF MEASURES 2:**

# POWERS AND CAPABILITIES

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The set of measures will implement the objectives of the priority area of security in the Government Action Plan 2017–2019. A separate implementation plan has been drafted for this set of measures.

## OBJECTIVE

The core functions and service level of the security authorities will be safeguarded. Changes in the security environment will be responded to by improving the security authorities' situation awareness, updating their powers and enhancing their capabilities.

At the moment, there is an untenable discrepancy between society's possibilities of responding to threats to national security and the damage that the threats would cause if realised. New manifestations of the threats include terrorism as well as hybrid and cyber threats, which may also be used as instruments of power policy.

It will be ensured that all actors participating in protecting national security are kept abreast of the overall situation picture of the Ministry of the Interior and the Government and of information obtained through civilian intelligence.

The preparedness and capabilities of the security authorities will be improved in step with the requirements of the changing operating environment by developing their powers, preparedness, operating models and resources.

Security actors' competence related to strategic security communications will be improved. Through cooperation between the authorities and other actors, the negative security impacts of intentional and tendentious spreading of false information will be reduced.

## RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Global security environment, diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, security impacts of migration, technology, extremist movements and ideologies*

## SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:

*Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness*  
*Efficient security structures and processes*  
*Crisis resilient individuals and society*

## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE

### **The authorities' powers and capabilities**

1. The authorities' long-term resource planning will be ensured.
2. The authorities' powers in normal and emergency conditions as well as executive assistance procedures will be reviewed, and legislative projects will be implemented to prepare for the threats of hybrid and information influencing, deal with illegal entry as well as ensure preparedness for and response to terrorism, extremist movements and cyber and economic crime. The Counter-Terrorism Strategy will be updated.
3. Reserves that will also be available in normal conditions will be created for the Police and the Border Guard, and their members will be trained. The required legislative amendments will be prepared.
4. A development plan will be drawn up to meet the personnel's competence needs, the internal security authorities' core tasks and needs for more efficient cooperation will be determined, policing activities will be prioritised, and a minimum competence requirements will be determined for emergency response centre personnel, ensuring that these requirements will be met.
5. Procurements of equipment and systems needed by the internal security authorities to respond to major accidents, terrorism, hybrid threats, cybercrime and other threats arising in the changing operating environment will be made.

Decisions on the funding of the new functions and procurements will be made as the General Government Fiscal Plan and the Budget are prepared. Central government funding required for the measures will be provided within the spending limits by reallocating appropriations if necessary.

## PREPAREDNESS AND READINESS

6. Surveillance and border control on the eastern border and the visibility and capabilities of the police will be enhanced by ensuring that there are adequate numbers of police officers, the preparedness plans will be updated, and cooperation with Frontex will be intensified.
7. The operating models for preparedness at all levels will be improved by further developing inter-authority cooperation, national risk assessment, storage methods,



letters of intent and stand-by agreements between public and private actors and readiness for major accidents as well as by organising sufficient training exercises associated with these areas.

8. Between the Government Situation Centre, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, other ministries and the Security Committee, an operating model for maintaining real-time situation awareness will be specified as stated in the government bill on the Government Situation Centre.
9. The needs to update the Emergency Powers Act will be assessed from the viewpoints of different administrative branches.
10. The Ministry of the Interior will carry out a cross-administrative self-assessment of the status of civilian preparedness to identify key development areas. International criteria will be used in this assessment.

Hybrid influencing will be identified, and strategic communications will be used to bolster a sense of security.

11. The efficiency of information exchanges between the authorities in the Ministry of the Interior's administrative branch and the Government Situation Centre will be improved in the context of observations of incidents that can be deemed to be associated with potential attempts at hybrid influencing.
12. Strategic security communications will be developed as part of the authorities' normal and crisis communications in cooperation with private and third sector actors. Strategic security communications means that correct information from the right actor and at the right time reaches those who are vulnerable to different types of messages which erode the feeling of security. In these activities, topical security phenomena that are associated with tendentious dissemination of false information will be prioritised.

## CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE

13. Full use will be made of civilian intelligence in order to protect national security against terrorism, illegal intelligence activities and other threats. Permanent cooperation structures will be created that will enable all actors that can prevent and fight threats to national security to access the information they need, to facilitate multi-lateral information exchanges and to agree on any measures together as indicated by the duties and responsibilities of the various actors.

## CYBER SECURITY

In addition to the implementation plan of the Finnish National Cyber Security Strategy 2017–2020, the following measures will be implemented:


14. An action plan for activities aiming to prevent cybercrime will be prepared. The needs to develop national legal aid legislation to ensure more efficient fight against cross-border criminality, especially regarding cybercrime, will be investigated.

### RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)

**The Ministry of the Interior**, the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Finance, other ministries and authorities, the Security Committee

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## SET OF MEASURES 3: EVERYDAY SECURITY



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### OBJECTIVE

Coordination between the authorities' and the justice system's activities and services that strive to prevent offences will be ensured to reduce the number of offences committed by socially excluded people as efficiently as possible.

Early multiprofessional intervention will be made in the social exclusion of young people.

Active measures will be taken to improve the safety and security of older people, children and young people and to reduce geographic segregation in growth centres.

### RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Diverse polarisation, security impacts of migration, fragmentation of shared values, extremist movements and ideologies*

### SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:

*Combating insecurity caused by social exclusion  
Efficient security structures and processes*

## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE


1. An operating model for reducing crime associated with social exclusion will be prepared, in which the activities of the different authorities and other stakeholders providing preventive services are integrated in the criminal procedure in a coordinated manner and addressing the needs of the individual. Regarding the authorities subordinate to the Government, the operating model will be put to practice by means of guidance, whereas cooperation practices will be put in place with the other actors.
2. An operating model and guidelines will be created for mutual information exchanges on security threats between the authorities, the business sector and NGOs, especially in multiprofessional work. Seamless cooperation between the security authorities and healthcare will be ensured in order to prevent violence and crime caused by mental health problems. Any needs for legislative amendments will be investigated, and the amendments will be implemented.
3. School health surveys will be used systematically to improve the safety and security of young people and to prevent security problems caused by social exclusion.
4. The safety and security programme for older people (2011) will be updated. The recommendations and solutions of the programme will be integrated in the security planning of the counties and municipalities. Particular attention will be paid to older people's opportunities for equal participation in issues related to security.
5. Cities' capabilities for preventing segregation tendencies within their areas will be enhanced by diverse methods. Operating models will be created for building good relations between population groups in local communities. By means of promoting good relations between population groups, people's sense of wellbeing and security will be built up, and tensions between population groups will be defused and offences will be prevented.

## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholders in bold)

**The Ministry of Justice**/the National Council for Crime Prevention and the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations, **the Ministry of the Interior**, **the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health**, **the Ministry of the Environment**, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, the Police, the Prosecution Service, the criminal sanctions authorities, the Regional State Administrative Agencies, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, the National Institute for Health and Welfare, the counties, the municipalities and NGOs.

**SET OF MEASURES 4:**

**SECURITY KNOWLEDGE  
AND CRISIS RESILIENCE**



**OBJECTIVE**

Finnish society will consist of crisis resilient individuals who have versatile security knowledge and skills and who are prepared for different everyday incidents. Crisis resilience means that individuals have capabilities for facing different incidents that cannot be completely prevented or anticipated, even through good capabilities of the authorities, and to recover from them quickly.

The crisis resilience of society and individuals will be improved by network-based cooperation between the Government, NGOs, associations and the business sector. The third sector plays a major role in improving individuals' crisis resilience. The NGOs work close to people and offer many types of opportunities for learning, participation and exerting influence.

In particular, the security knowledge of children and young people, and those working with them, will be improved, taking the needs and strengths of the different target groups into account. Security culture in early childhood education and care and at schools and educational institutions will be promoted. The security knowledge of early childhood education and care staff and teaching staff at educational institutions will be strengthened through basic level and continued training.

**RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:**

*Diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, global security environment, technology, public finances, extremist movements*

**SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:**

*Efficient security structures and processes  
Crisis resilient individuals and society*


## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE

1. An action plan on improving people's crisis resilience will be prepared and implemented in cooperation with authorities and NGOs.
2. Solutions and recommendations relevant to the capabilities, skills and knowledge of individuals and organisations when preparing for different security situations will be produced following the 72-hour concept and drawing on the results of programmes related to everyday safety and security. In particular, the focus will be on promoting mental crisis resilience and topical challenges to security skills, including protection from information and hybrid influencing. In this work, the preparedness and readiness work linked to the Security Strategy for Society will be taken into account where appropriate. The particular target for this measure will be groups who have previously been side-lined in preparedness activities, including women and young people.
3. Continuing education aimed for building up the security skills of early childhood education and care staff and personnel in the teaching sector will be targeted especially at directors of early childhood education and care services and principals of schools and educational institutions. Children and young people's security skills will be built up through instruction, and their multiliteracy skills will be improved. Multiliteracy supports the development of critical thinking and learning skills and has strong links with ICT skills. Children and young people's opportunities for participating in decision-making related to everyday security will be improved.
4. Research-based knowledge of terrorism, violent radicalisation and hybrid threats that is significant for Finland's security will be built up.

## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)

**The Ministry of Education and Culture**, the Finnish National Agency for Education, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Justice, the Security Committee, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, the Regional State Administrative Agencies, the counties, the municipalities, the National Institute for Health and Welfare, Finance Finland, the Finnish Red Cross, the Finnish National Rescue Association and other NGOs

## SET OF MEASURES 5: SECURITY INNOVATIONS



### OBJECTIVE

The internal security innovation programme will implement the objectives of the Government's key project on digitalising public services and research, development and innovation activities that improve competitiveness and productivity.

The goal is using new technologies innovatively in security work and providing innovative services. New technologies will be key when striving for digital public services and practices that will improve productivity and profitability.

Finnish innovations and public sector reference customers will facilitate the creation of successful Finnish export products and services. Cooperation between the authorities and, in particular, small and medium new technology enterprises will be increased.

### RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Technology, public finances*

### SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:

*Efficient security structures and processes*

### MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE


1. A joint internal security innovation programme of the internal security authorities and the Finnish business sector will be prepared and implemented. In its preparation, international models and good practices will be taken into consideration.
2. The take-up of innovations will be incorporated in the performance guidance system of the Ministry of the Interior's branch of governments.
3. Innovative public procurement tools and processes will be used to promote innovation cooperation between authorities and companies.

## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)

**The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment**, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the internal security authorities, the Regional State Administrative Agencies, the counties, companies and the business sector, Sitra, Tekes

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## SET OF MEASURES 6: STEERING OF INTERNAL SECURITY




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### OBJECTIVE

An interoperable, phenomenon-based steering system will be created to respond to new and complex internal security phenomena.

The increasingly complex security environment, new security challenges and their root causes do not respect the old boundaries between administrative branches. Many of the problems require simultaneous and coordinated action from several branches of administration to offer a response that is cost-effective for society. This will require phenomenon-based and cross-administrative knowledge and skills related to internal security and its steering at different levels.

### RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Global security environment, diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, security impacts of migration, technology, public finances, extremist movements and ideologies*

### SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:

*Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness  
Efficient security structures and processes*

## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE

1. Based on continuous foresight work, fixed-term cross-administrative goals for internal security will be defined.
2. When determining the means for achieving these goals, network-based cooperation across administrative boundaries will be stressed, and the different steering models and structures of the authorities and other security actors will be taken into account.
3. The activities of the internal security authorities will be prioritised, addressing phenomena that can be the most effectively influenced by each authority's own and joint measures.
4. Process-like steering of the criminal justice system will be developed to optimise the collaboration and impact of criminal investigation and prosecution authorities, the courts and the Criminal Sanctions Agency on the basis of analysed, research-based knowledge.
5. Cross-administrative competence in steering the authorities' activities will be improved by developing procedures for appointing public officials to their posts, job rotation and career paths to support the development of multisectoral competence.


## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)

**The Ministry of the Interior** in cooperation with the internal security authorities and other key actors (monitoring system), all ministries for their own part (steering).

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### SET OF MEASURES 7:

# SECURITY WORK IN COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES



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## OBJECTIVE

Security planning, preventive security work and preparedness are some of the tasks that the new counties will see to. The counties will also have the possibility of steering security work carried out in municipalities.



Everyday security will be improved in the regional government reform by ensuring that security cooperation structures where the authorities, the business sector and NGOs work in extensive and cross-sectoral cooperation will be put in place.

In the counties' and municipalities' security work, the individual can also be taken into consideration in an equal and participatory manner.

## RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Diverse polarisation, security impacts of migration, fragmentation of shared values, global security environment, technology, public finances, extremist movements*

## SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS

*Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness*

*Efficient security structures and processes*

*Combating insecurity caused by social exclusion*

*Crisis resilient individuals and society*

## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE


1. Recommendations on including internal security in the counties' and municipalities' strategies will be produced, and the security planning in counties and municipalities will be harmonised and incorporated in electronic wellbeing reports. This work will be based on the Ministry of the Interior's publication *Päätöksiä turvallisuudesta* (Decisions on security, 2014) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health's recommendations *Tunnista, turvaa ja toimi* (Identify, safeguard and act, 2008). The outputs of a project on the organisation and preparation of regional level coordination of preparedness in the counties will be utilised.
2. Indicators that produce appropriate information on the status of internal security in municipalities and counties will be specified.
3. The organisation of the counties' internal security duties will be supported and promoted. The operating models of tried and tested good practices, including the Security network in Lapland and the Pirkanmaa security cluster, will be utilised. Through cooperation networks, regional information exchange and problem-solving networks will be created between the authorities, companies, educational institutions and NGOs, and the creation of new products and services that improve security will be promoted.

## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)

**The Ministry of the Interior**, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Security Committee, the counties, the municipalities, the National Council for Crime Prevention, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, the National Institute for Health and Welfare

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## SET OF MEASURES 8: MONITORING



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### OBJECTIVE

The implementation and monitoring of the Internal Security Strategy will be carried out in an open and interactive manner, using a digital service channel.

At the core of the internal security work will be a common knowledge base, structured and analysed information, and the communication of this information to all stakeholders of internal security work in a versatile manner. The knowledge base will rest on up-to-date, verified and essential information that will be obtained not only from the current sources but also through the analysis and foresight function to be established under this Strategy.

### RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:

*Diverse polarisation, security impacts of migration, fragmentation of shared values, global security environment, technology, public finances, extremist movements*

### SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:

*Efficient security structures and processes  
Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness  
Crisis resilient individuals and society*

## MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE

1. An internal security service channel will be set up that serves as an interactive cooperation platform for experts, stakeholders and civic society and also as a channel for monitoring strategy implementation.
2. While the main responsibility for administrating the service channel will rest with the Ministry of the Interior, its content production will be seen to by a broad-based cross-sectoral group in which all actors relevant to internal security strategy work will be represented (authorities, the business sector, NGOs, research institutes).
3. The projects, experiments, operating models, information, social media and research related to the Internal Security Strategy will be collected in this service channel. The contents, which will also include information on different networks and seminars, will follow a phenomenon-based structure.

## RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)

**The Ministry of the Interior**, the Ministry of Finance, the Government ICT Centre Valtori, a large group of actors participating in internal security network cooperation, including the business sector and NGOs

# ATTACHMENTS

## *Composition of the Strategy's steering group*

Nerg Päivi	Ministry of the Interior	Permanent Secretary, steering group chairperson
Aaltomaa Kauko	Ministry of the Interior	Director General
Eloranta Jarkko	SAK	Chairperson
Fjäder Sture	Akava	Chairperson
Gustafsson Jari	Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment	Permanent Secretary
Hartikainen Antti	Customs	Director General
Hasari Marko	SPEK	Managing Director
Himberg Kimmo	Ministry of the Interior	Project Manager, steering group secretary
Häkämies Jyri	EK	Managing Director
Järvikare Terhi	Ministry of Finance	Director General
Karhunen Minna	AVI Southern Finland	Director General
Karhunen Risto	Finance Finland	Head of Security
Koivuranta Eija	Family Federation of Finland	Managing Director
Koskinen Esko	Ministry of the Interior/ Dept. for Rescue Services	Director General
Koskinen Jari	Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities	Director General
Kosonen Mikko	Sitra	President
Kumpula Kristiina	Finnish Red Cross	Secretary General
Laitinen Ilkka	Border Guard	Deputy Chief
Lankinen Timo	Prime Minister's Office	Permanent State Under-Secretary
Lehikoinen Anita	Ministry of Education and Culture	Permanent Secretary
Lehmus Pasi	Valtori	Managing Director
Luoma Raimo	National Emergency Supply Centre	Chief Executive Officer
Mannila Heikki	Academy of Finland	President
Martikainen Harri	Ministry of the Interior	Director of Strategic Steering and Development
Parkkonen Jari	Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities	Regional Mayor
Penttilä Risto E.J.	Finland Chamber of Commerce	CEO
Raijas Tiina	Ministry of Defence	Ministerial Adviser
Sillanaukee Päivi	Ministry of Social Affairs and Health	Permanent Secretary
Soini Pekka	Tekes	Director General
Stenlund Peter	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Secretary of State
Vestala Leena	ELY Centre	Director General

Vilkkonen Laura	Ministry of Transport and Communications	Director General
Vuorio Jorma	Ministry of the Interior/ Migration Department	Director General
Välimaa Asko	Ministry of Justice	Permanent Secretary

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