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National CBRNE Strategy 2017

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

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Abstract

On 2 February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a working group to prepare a national CBRNE Strategy. The overall aim of the Strategy is to continuously improve the prevention of and preparedness for CBRNE threats and incidents in order to safeguard society and secure the functions vital to society.

CBRNE threats refer to hazardous incidents caused by chemical substances (C), biological pathogens (B), radioactive material (R), nuclear weapons (N) and explosives (E) as well as by the misuse of expertise related to these.

The Strategy describes the current state and the duties and responsibilities of key CBRNE actors, identifies the most important areas of development and puts forward an action plan for implementing the areas of development and the objectives of the Strategy. The Strategy also aims to improve national coordination between different actors and guide national CBRNE planning.

The Strategy focuses on the following areas of development and measures:

- Improving the coordination of CBRNE activities
- Maintaining common situation awareness
- Further developing the risk-based approach to supervision
- Ensuring up-to-date legislation on CBRNE activities
- Detecting and preventing intentional actions
- Enhancing the capacity for cooperation
- Identifying, managing and investigating CBRNE incidents
- Making communications part of the management of CBRNE situations.

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Sisäministeriö asetti 2.2.2015 CBRNE-strategiatyöryhmän laatimaan Suomen kansallisen CBRNE-strategian, jonka tavoittteena on CBRNE-uhkien ja tilanteiden ennaltaehkäisyn ja valmiuden jatkuva parantaminen yhteiskunnan ja sen elintärkeiden toimintojen turvaamiseksi.

CBRNE-uhalla tarkoitetaan kemiallisista aineista (C), biologisista taudinaiheuttajista (B), radioaktiivisista aineista (R) ja ydinaseista (N) sekä räjähteistä (E) sekä näitä koskevan tietotaidon väärinkäytöstä johtuvia vaaratilanteita.

Strategiassa kuvataan nykytila, keskeisten CBRNE-toimijoiden tehtävät ja vastuut sekä esitetään tärkeimmät kehittämiskohteet ja toimintasuunnitelma kehittämiskohteiden ja strategian tavoitteiden toteuttamiseksi. Tavoitteena on kehittää kansallista koordinaatiota eri toimijoiden kesken sekä ohjata kansallista CBRNE-suunnittelua.

Strategiassa nostetaan esiin seuraavat kehittämiskohteet ja toimenpiteet:
- Kehitetään CBRNE-toiminnan koordinaatiota
- Ylläpidetään yhteistä tilannetietoutta
- Kehitetään riskitietoista valvontaa
- Varmistetaan CBRNE-toimintaan liittyvien säädösten ajantasaisuus
- Paljastetaan ja estetään tahallinen toiminta
- Parannetaan yhteistyövalmiuksia
- Tunnistetaan, hallitaan ja tutkitaan CBRNE-tilanteet
- Viestintä osaksi CBRNE-tilanteiden hallintaa.

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Inrikesministeriet tillsatte den 2 februari 2015 en CBRNE-strategiarbetsgrupp för att utarbeta en nationell CBRNE-strategi för Finland. Syftet med strategin är att kontinuerligt förbättra förebyggandet av och beredskapen inför CBRNE-hot och CBRNE-situationer för att trygga samhället och dess vitala funktioner.

Med CBRNE-hot avses risksituationer som beror på kemiska ämnen (C), biologiska patogener (B), radioaktiva ämnen (R), kärnvapen (N) och explosiva ämnen (E) samt på missbruk av kunnande om dessa.

I strategin beskrivs nuläget och de viktiga CBRNE-aktörernas uppgifter och ansvar samt presenteras de viktigaste utvecklingsobjekten och handlingsplanen för att genomföra utvecklingsobjekten och uppnå strategins mål. Målet är att utveckla den nationella samordningen mellan olika aktörer och styra den nationella CBRNE-planeringen.

I strategin lyfts fram följande utvecklingsobjekt och åtgärder:
- Samordningen av CBRNE-verksamheten utvecklas
- Gemensam situationsmedvetenhet upprätthålls
- Tillsyn som uppmärksammar riskerna utvecklas
- Tidsenligheten hos författningar som gäller CBRNE-verksamheten säkerställs
- Uppsåtlig verksamhet avslöjas och förhindras
- Samarbetsförmågan förbättras
- CBRNE-situationerna identifieras, hanteras och undersöks
- Kommunikationen blir en del av hanteringen av CBRNE-situationer.

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FOREWORD

On 2 February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a working group to prepare Finland's national CBRNE Strategy. There are several actors involved in CBRNE work at the national level and it was found necessary to establish shared objectives for them as regards threats and preparedness for them alike.

A group of organisations working across a broad range of CBRNE themes was assembled for this purpose. For the strategy formulation work, a group of authors was set up, and the sections of the working group (operational section, industry section, and research, development and training section) participated actively in the work. In addition to authorities, research institutions and enterprises were also represented in the sections.

The Strategy describes the current state and the duties and responsibilities of the key CBRNE actors. Eight areas in need of development emerged in the actual strategy work, and proposals for the development measures required were formulated. Activities must be developed with a determined approach and on the basis of commonly agreed objectives.

The Strategy was considered at the Security Committee meeting of 11 December 2017.

Now that the Strategy is completed, I would like to thank the members of the working group, those who participated in the sections' work and, in particular, the group of authors for the successful completion of the work.

Esko Koskinen

Chairperson of the working group
Director General for Rescue Services

1 Aim of the Strategy

CBRNE threats refer to hazardous incidents caused by chemical substances (C), biological pathogens (B), radioactive material (R), nuclear weapons (N) and explosives (E) as well as by the misuse of expertise related to these.

On 2 February 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a working group to prepare Finland's national CBRNE Strategy. In CBRNE strategy work, national objectives for the various actors are set as regards CBRNE threats and related preparedness. The aim is to improve national coordination between the various actors and guide national CBRNE planning.

The overall aim of this CBRNE Strategy is to continuously improve the prevention of and preparedness for CBRNE threats and incidents in order to safeguard society and secure the functions vital to society. The Strategy presents the most important areas of development. It also puts forward an action plan for implementing the areas of development and the objectives of the Strategy. The various actors' awareness about CBRNE risks and preparedness for their prevention will increase through the measures identified. In addition to the needs identified in collaboration between the authorities, the Strategy has been formulated against the backdrop of, for example, the implementation of the Security Strategy for Society, Finland's National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, National Risk Assessment, the EU CBRN Action Plan, Decision No 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health, the obligations of the WHO's International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) binding on Finland and the recommendations of Finland's Joint External Evaluation (WHO/JEE) of public health risks. The target group of the Strategy document consists of the authorities responsible for guidance and supervision and actors in the fields of healthcare, research, training, industry, trade, import and export relating to the CBRNE domain.

2 Description of current state

In Finland, the development of collaboration to counter CBRNE threats has arisen from practical needs. Before the turn of the millennium, cooperation focused mainly on preparedness for activities in emergency conditions. Changes in the operating environment have shaped cooperation between the authorities towards preventing CBRNE threats in normal conditions and developing activities in the event of incidents. In addition, when Finland acceded to the European Union, a new European guidance element was introduced to activity-related guidance and cooperation, providing Finland with new binding action programmes and legal instruments.

Various civilian and military actors have cooperated nationally and internationally in the CBRNE domain to develop CBRNE threat prevention and their preparedness and capabilities to respond to various CBRNE threats. In 2015, the Ministry of the Interior appointed a CBRNE strategy working group acting at the Government level to harmonise the various measures. In addition, CBRNE cooperation has taken place in a cross-administrative CBRNE cooperation forum on criminal activity established in 2008 and headed by the Police. As regards preparedness for and prevention of biological threats, the Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (BUOS) combines the resources of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) and the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) also concerning intentional release. As regards chemical threats, the Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health forms a cooperation network for various experts.

Internationally, the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials is controlled under a variety of agreements, arrangements and political initiatives. Instruments including conventions on the restriction or prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, export control arrangements and various strategies provide states with obligations and a framework for preparedness for CBRNE threats.

On 6 November 2007, the Council of the European Union communicated the Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, and on 12 November 2009 it adopted the EU CBRN Action Plan to counter CBRN threats. The EU Action Plans aim to reduce the threat of and possible consequences for citizens arising from CBRNE incidents by means of coherent cooperation involving all relevant stakeholders. Threats and related preparedness measures are also determined in the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the CBRNE strategies of NATO and many of Finland's important partner countries.

3 CBRNE operating environment and CBRNE threats

In broad terms, CBRNE incidents may involve not only CBRNE substances produced for actual weapons use, but also hazardous incidents and communicable disease epidemics caused by hazardous substances and other materials. As regards the various actors, CBRNE incidents may relate to the transport, use, possession or storage of hazardous substances. In the context of preparedness, CBRNE threats are examined broadly in this Strategy because, as a general rule, the preparedness measures concerning them are the same, regardless of whether the incident is unintentional or intentional. As regards threat scenarios, however, there is a greater focus on CBRNE incidents arising from deliberate intention to cause harm. (This Strategy refers to intentional incidents as 'CBRNE threat situations'.)

Changes in the foreign and security policy operating environment are continuing in Finland's neighbouring areas and also globally. New challenges and uncertainties such as conflicts and migration in Europe's neighbourhood, climate change and consequent natural disasters are testing society's crisis resilience. Global mobility is increasing the probability of communicable disease epidemics. Violent extremism and extreme ideologies and weak or failed states provide a breeding ground for international terrorism. Threats also include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related hazardous materials and expertise. Science and technology advances also create challenges as regards preparedness for diverse CBRNE threats.

Terrorist organisations and networks undergo transformations and are capable of utilising other forms of cross-border crime as well as new technology, including information networks and materials used in weapons of mass destruction. The threat of terrorism against Finland has increased and diversified. The potential combined use of CBRNE substances with conventional explosives cannot be ruled out.

Terror attacks elsewhere in Europe may set an example for similar attacks in Finland, too. The possibility of such strikes carried out by these perpetrators, who often act alone, is increased by the easy access to CBRNE substances and their precursors and the abundance of

online instructions on how to make them. The threat scenario regarded as the most probable involves attacks that aim to cause personal injuries or fatalities, but which are likely to remain rather limited in terms of the affected area and may also have underlying motives other than ideological or religious ones. The most commonplace types of CBRNE risks may feature vandalism, threats or disruptive behaviour involving non-hazardous or harmful substances. The most extreme risk is serious criminal activity involving CBRNE substances. The possibility of a military CBRNE threat must also be considered in preparedness work.

In normal conditions, CBRNE incidents can be caused by accidents or natural communicable disease epidemics, vandalism, criminal use of CBRNE substances or a terror attack. Growing military threat aimed at our country may result in the use of CBRN measures or CBRN weapons for pressurisation, attacks against vital targets or disruption burdening the entire society. An intentional CBRNE attack may be targeted at an individual, building, public transport vehicle or an extensive area. Targets may also include food and drinking water and related infrastructure. Depending on the intended impact, the target is affected by contamination with or exposure to a selected substance or pathogen, release of a substance that is similar to the actual substance but non-hazardous, or a threat of CBRNE substance use issued at the target. Depending on the substance used and the intended impact, there may be major variation in the equipment and methods employed to release the substance and deliver it to its target.

In addition to unintentional CBRNE incidents, cases classified as intentional CBRNE threat situations occur regularly in Finland. The annual number of accidents involving hazardous substances exceeds 300 in Finland. Serious incidents have been rare so far.

CBRNE substances and their impacts

CBRNE substances and their impact mechanisms differ significantly from each other. Depending on the substance and method of use, impacts can be slight or serious. Due to their extensive impacts, CBRNE weapons are also called weapons of mass destruction. Unpredictability of the dispersion patterns and impacts of CBRNE substances, mental images associated with the topic and poor sensory detectability of substances may cause strong psychological impacts.

In this context, examples of chemical substances (C) include chemical warfare agents, biological toxins, incapacitating agents, riot control agents and toxic industrial chemicals. Symptoms caused by chemical substances may appear within a few seconds or only after several hours from the time of exposure. A person or target exposed to a chemical substance may cause the further spreading of the contaminant. Depending on the chemical substance and its spreading method, the danger zone varies from a few tens of meters to up to tens of kilometres.

In this context, biological substances (B) are modified microorganisms (bacteria, viruses or protozoa) capable of inducing infection and disease mostly occurring naturally in the environment and organisms. A pathogen may also have been artificially modified in order to produce a more serious disease or make treatment more difficult by, for example, increasing antibiotic resistance. Impacts may appear within several hours, days or even weeks. In a B incident, the immediate danger zone and duration and extent of impact in the population varies a great deal from a few short-term cases of ill health to long-term cross-border epidemics.

Radioactive material (R) emits radiation that has two types of adverse health effects, deterministic effects and stochastic effects. Impact of radioactive material may be experienced by people through exposure to external radiation or intake of radioactive material.

Radioactive material dispersed with the explosive method (a dirty bomb) may contaminate a maximum area of a few square kilometres to the effect that urgent protection and decontamination measures are required. A strong radiation source left in a living environment without its protective cover may affect the health of those within around 100 metres and expose those within up to hundreds of metres. A serious accident in a nuclear power plant could cause a radiation incident requiring protection measures only in case of serious reactor damage or non-functioning of safety functions as planned.

The extreme destructive impact of a nuclear weapon (N) is mainly due to the blast and thermal radiation as well the electromagnetic pulse created by the explosion. Radioactive material is also created in the explosion. The radiation danger zone depends on factors including the size and explosion altitude of the nuclear weapon: impacts range from a few kilometres to several thousands of kilometres; in the worst case scenario, unprotected persons may experience radiation sickness symptoms even at distances of a few hundred kilometres from the explosion site.

Even small amounts of explosives (E) may cause major destruction in unprotected targets. In such cases, injuries and fatalities are primarily caused by fragments spread by the explosive. Damage from pressure impact would require considerably larger amounts of explosives. Explosives can also be used to spread hazardous substances or organisms.

4 Prevention and control of CBRNE threats

The starting point and objective of the authorities' and other actors' CBRNE countermeasures is to be able to prevent CBRNE incidents. Despite preventive measures, preparedness is also created for CBRNE accidents and threat situations. In any CBRNE incidents, the authorities' cooperation aims to identify the nature of the incidents, minimise the impacts of the incidents, launch rescue and investigation measures, normalise the situation and take care of timely communications of the right kind as required. The objective is also to ensure security of supply in all circumstances.

Powers and command relationships are determined in accordance with the nature and scope of the incident. The responsible authorities and other actors have their respective duties and roles in all CBRNE incidents (unintentional and intentional). Cooperation plays a key role.

Due to the seriousness and potentially large-scale impacts of CBRNE incidents, there is a need to act in cooperation with international partners and/or actors and request for international assistance where the situation so requires.

CBRNE incident prevention and preparedness

The starting point and objective is to prevent the emergence of CBRNE incidents. Finland advances the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related hazardous substances and expertise as well as illicit arms trafficking through political means and supervision and control conducted by authorities. In addition, the objective is to improve global heath security through preventive measures.

CBRNE threat assessment and situation picture formulation take place in national and international cooperation between the various authorities and actors. Cross-border CBRNE threats are mapped using intelligence, criminal intelligence, military intelligence, information exchange between health authorities and through other authorities' international information exchange channels and cooperation. National cooperation maintains the CBRNE threat assessment and situation picture. The up-to-dateness of legislation and

other norms and guidelines is ensured through national measures and by influencing EU legislation. CBRNE activities are regulated by measures such as restrictions on import, export, purchase, use, transport and possession, authorisations and land use planning, and international prohibition agreements and arrangements. CBRNE operators' safety and security arrangements and supervision and control conducted by authorities protect CBRNE substances against illegal activities. The level of regulation varies between the sectors.

The capability of the responsible authorities to detect and identify CBRNE substances and persons suspected of their possession and unlawful use, particularly at international borders, transport hubs and other important locations, plays a key role. CBRNE protection is maintained at critical locations. Capabilities and conditions for detection vary depending on the substance.

The operating conditions required for response to CBRNE incidents are created through joint planning, material preparations, training and exercises as well as preparedness arrangements between authorities and the various CBRNE actors.

CBRNE incident management

Identifying abnormal events as CBRNE incidents is required to launch the correct measures. The correct level of measures is ensured by dynamic, incident-specific threat and hazard assessments.

If a CBRNE incident materialises, damage is minimised and threat expansion is prevented. Actions taken to achieve these include CBRNE incident assessment and decision-making, CBRNE substances intelligence and identification, dispersion assessment, warning the public and other actors, rendering CBRNE substances and explosives harmless, rescue and decontamination measures, prehospital emergency medical services, evacuation, isolation, quarantine, treatment and care measures, and protection of the environment. Response actions are focused on saving human lives, stopping the activity causing a hazard and preventing any further damage. Any threat still potentially existing on the scene and the requirements of crime scene investigations must be taken into account in all actions.

The need for leadership coordination between the various authorities is emphasised in CBRNE incidents. Incident command responsibilities depend on the nature of the incident. The other authorities and actors support the commanding authority in the joint incident organisation. Maintaining a common situation picture and shared communication system is crucial. Key roles are also played by coordinated communications by the responsible authorities to convey accurate information and prevent the spread of and correct any false information.

Communications help to ensure the provision of accurate and timely information relating to CBRNE substances and the incident to the authorities and the population to enable the correct protection measures and prevent any further damage and psychological impacts.

The management of cross-border, large-scale and long-term incidents calls for international exchange of information, cooperation or arrangements and possible international assistance if the incident so requires.

5 Areas of development and measures required

The following development needs and measures to achieve the Strategy objectives were identified in the strategy work.

5.1 Improving the coordination of CBRNE activities

National, regional and local guidance and cooperation are to be improved comprehensively in CBRNE activities, taking science and technology developments into account. The authorities and private sector actors and international cooperation are to be taken into account in the activities.

Measure	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Appoint a permanent CBRNE coordination group in 2018.	**Ministry of the Interior**
Ensure the national compatibility of operating methods and systems.	CBRNE coordination group
Improve the conditions for cooperation in CBRNE projects.	CBRNE coordination group
Increase awareness of international CBRNE cooperation between actors.	CBRNE coordination group
Review and utilise joint funding opportunities for research, development and other activities.	CBRNE coordination group
Evaluate the implementation of the CBRNE Strategy and develop it on the basis of the evaluation.	CBRNE coordination group

5.2 Maintaining common situation awareness

A common understanding among all actors of CBRNE threats, the situation picture concerning the operating environment and the grounds for the various actors' preparedness is to be ensured. Intelligence cooperation is to generate information for CBRNE threat assessment. The common understanding of threats is to lay the foundation for preparedness planning, training and exercises and development of activities.

Measure	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Maintain the authorities' common understanding of threats through regular threat assessment work.	**Ministry of the Interior**/CBRNE coordination group
Improve communication of threat assessment, situation picture and intelligence information between administrative branches.	Ministry of the Interior, Government Situation Centre/ministries, CBRNE coordination group
Improve awareness of operators and research institutions of CBRNE threats and security risks.	Responsible authorities, cooperation partners
Increase the efficiency of utilising the results of international exchange of information in cooperation between the authorities and development of activities; strengthen international cooperation networks.	Ministries, expert institutions, CBRNE coordination group

5.3 Further developing the risk-based approach to supervision

Permit systems, supervision and safety and security arrangements are to be employed to prevent access to CBRNE substances and information beyond the scope of lawful activities. The authorities will provide regulations and instructions, information and training. Operators will also carry out self-initiated preventive work. The operator will always be responsible for the implementation of instructions and regulations and the safety of its own activities. CBRNE management will be part of the operating culture and risk management of operators, enterprises and research and education institutions.

Measures	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Identify locations critical to safety and security.	Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes), National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)/ responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group, operators
Target the surveillance of CBRNE locations using the risk-based approach.	Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes), National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)/ responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Guide, support and commit operators towards active development of in-house monitoring and protection.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group, operators
Review and clarify the supervision duties of the authorities and increase supervisory cooperation.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group

5.4 Ensuring up-to-date legislation on CBRNE activities

There is variation in the level of legislation and other norms and guidelines concerning the various sectors of CBRNE activities. Shortcomings and needs for amendments in legislation on CBRNE activities and any other need for norm-based guidance are to be identified and assessed. In addition, other guidance is to be developed instead of further administrative obligations. Amendments of key importance as regards the prevention of CBRNE threats are to be made.

Measures	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Assess and propose development needs concerning legislation: import and export legislation, transfer and possession, and authorisation procedures.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group

5.5 Detecting and preventing intentional actions

The aim is to prevent CBRNE incidents through prevention. The detection and prevention of CBRNE threats and opportunities to address intentional actions are to be developed.

Measures	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Improve international and national exchange of information concerning CBRNE threats between safety and security authorities and other authorities.	Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Police, Customs, Defence Forces, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, including Finland's missions abroad, other responsible authorities, CBRNE cooperation forum
Take CBRNE threats into account as part of other measures to counter terrorism, extremism and serious crime.	Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Police, Customs, Finnish Border Guard, Defence Forces, CBRNE cooperation forum
Develop the capabilities of the authorities to identify CBRNE substances and persons suspected of their possession and unlawful use in customs and border control.	Finnish Border Guard, Customs, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Police, other responsible authorities
Ensure that operators have access to a mechanism for reporting any abnormal observations to the authorities.	Police

5.6 Enhancing the capacity for cooperation

Training and exercises are to be used to ensure the competencies and capacity for cooperation of all actors, and the effectiveness of activities in CBRNE incidents are to be evaluated. National and international training opportunities are to be taken into account in the activities.

Measure	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Determine the national training level requirements for each sector.	CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
Develop training, taking national, regional, sectoral and collaborative requirements and international cooperation opportunities into account.	CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
Systematise exercise activities at the various levels; standardise cooperation exercises. Take international cooperation into account in exercises.	CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities
Coordinate the implementation of improvements to be carried out on the basis of cooperation exercises.	CBRNE coordination group, responsible authorities

5.7 Identifying, managing and investigating CBRNE incidents

Identifying a situation as a CBRNE incident is crucial for incident management. CBRNE incident management is to take place to minimise damage and prevent any further damage or damage expansion and restore normal conditions. Investigations are to be conducted to establish what has happened and whether the incident is an intentional CBRNE threat situation and to identify the perpetrators.

Measures	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Improve the ability to identify CBRNE incidents as quickly as possible.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Ensure the existence and availability of sufficient capacities for CBRNE incident identification, management and investigation locally, regionally and nationally.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Develop systems used and operating models applied in the detection, identification and incident management relating to CBRNE substances with a view to national compatibility.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Ensure sufficient technical capacity for field and laboratory analyses and identification as well as expertise, including first response units' measuring equipment, concerning CBRNE substances.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Ensure sufficient capacities of healthcare and other authorities for CBRNE incidents.	Ministry for Social Affairs and Health, health and social services actors, National Emergency Supply Agency, CBRNE coordination group
Conduct a national CBRNE capacities analysis and review areas in need of development using methods including scenario planning.	CBRNE coordination group
Describe the general operating models for CBRNE incidents.	CBRNE coordination group

5.8 Making communications part of CBRNE incident management

Communications are an important part of the prevention and management of CBRNE incidents nationally and internationally. Appropriate communications are to provide timely and accurate information about incidents and their impacts, prevent the dissemination of false information and support incident management.

Measures	**Main responsible actor**/Other responsible actor(s)
Develop coherent, effective and structured communications concerning CBRNE threats and incidents.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Improve the conditions for joint communications relating to CBRNE incidents.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group
Practise joint communications of authorities and other actors in preparation for CBRNE incidents.	Responsible authorities, CBRNE coordination group

6 Preparation and implementation of the Strategy

The preparation of the national CBRNE Strategy was steered by a CBRNE strategy working group appointed by the Ministry of the Interior in which all key authorities were represented (Appendix 1). Government reports and strategies from recent years, such as the 2016 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, the 2017 Government's Defence Report, the Security Strategy for Society 2017, the 2016 Government Report on Internal Security and the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy for 2014–2017, were taken into account in strategy formulation.

The CBRNE coordination group will monitor and update the Strategy regularly. Changes in the operating environment, including those affecting the roles and responsibilities of the actors, will be taken into account in the maintenance and implementation of the Strategy. The main responsible actors will launch and monitor the implementation of the Strategy concerning the measures for which they are responsible and report on them as agreed to the CBRNE coordination group to be established. Where necessary, the CBRNE coordination group will report to the Security Committee on the implementation of the Strategy. The implementation will require preparation and more detailed phasing by administrative branches. CBRNE threats and required preparedness should also be brought up in other security strategies and corresponding guidance documents. All responsible actors must incorporate the objectives of the Strategy into their activity and resource planning.

The CBRNE coordination group will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the measures and take further measures where necessary. Some of the measures and projects under this Strategy may require further resource allocation. These resource impacts and the ways in which these resources could be secured will be specified in detail during their preparation. Where necessary, any needs for further resources will be addressed in conjunction with government spending limits and budget procedures.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Strategy working group

The strategy working group appointed by the Ministry of the Interior consisted of the following actors:
Ministry of the Interior
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
Ministry of the Environment
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment
Ministry of Defence
Finnish Border Guard
Emergency Services College
Helsinki City Rescue Department
Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi)
National Police Board
Finnish Security Intelligence Service
National Bureau of Investigation
Helsinki Police Department
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes)
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
Customs
Finnish Transport Agency
Suomen pelastusjohtajat (association of chief executive officers of regional rescue services)
Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)

Appendix 2. Key CBRNE actors and responsibilities/ responsibility areas

Responsible actor	Responsibility area
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for multilateral agreement arrangements relating to CBRNE issues, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Ministry is also responsible for various multilateral political initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), nuclear safety cooperation (IAEA and other international initiatives) and G-7 Global Partnership. In addition, the Ministry's responsibilities include the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons and matters relating to the 1540 Committee. Representatives of other authorities also take part in the cooperation. Export control is a key measure in the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and several authorities participate in this. The Ministry acts as the authorisation authority for the processing of export authorisations of dual-use items in Finland and coordinates Finland's participation in related activities in the EU and in the context of international arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group.
VERIFIN	Operating under the University of Helsinki, the activities of the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) are based on the Convention and national legislation. The institute operates under the guidance of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as the National Authority referred to in the Convention. VERIFIN is a designated laboratory (for environmental and biomedical samples) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and receives and analyses samples submitted by the OPCW. VERIFIN is an accredited testing laboratory (FINAS T073) with real-time preparedness for the verification of chemical weapons and toxins of biological origin from environmental and material samples and samples obtained from victims.
Ministry of the Interior	The Ministry of the Interior guides and supervises police, rescue service and emergency response centre activities and drafts relevant legislation. The Ministry drafts legislation relating to border security and maritime search and rescue and is responsible for the performance management of the Finnish Border Guard.
Rescue services	The rescue services prepare for CBRNE threats by allocating the necessary equipment, training personnel and contributing to supervision. CBRNE risks have been taken into account in the operational planning of the rescue services. During CBRNE incidents, the rescue authorities direct and carry out emergency operations. In such cases, emergency operations may include hazardous substance intelligence and identification, leak elimination or substance collection, and decontamination, treatment, care and evacuation of injured and exposed persons. In addition to these, the rescue authorities issue orders for evacuation, protective evacuation and the sheltering indoors of persons.
Police	The police have an extensive responsibility area relating to CBRNE threats and incidents. This includes intelligence and preventive measures, incident identification and management measures, technical and tactical incident investigations, including forensic laboratory examinations, and provision of information about incidents. The police operate as part of the national representation in EU programmes and committees to prevent threats relating to CBRNE substances. CBRNE threat developments and the CBRNE situation picture are monitored through INTERPOL and Europol connections and databases. The police monitor the situation picture within their mandate 24/7 on the basis of information collected by the Helsinki and Oulu command centres and the Police, Customs and Border Guard (PCB) Criminal Intelligence Centre of the National Bureau of Investigation. Following a criminal CBRNE threat, incident command responsibility is transferred to the police once any emergency operations have been completed. As appropriate for the incident in question, the police use other authorities in the CBRNE cooperation network in incident identification and management measures. The police are responsible for tactical and technical investigations into cases. The police are also responsible for forensic laboratory examinations, supported by special competencies of other authorities where necessary. In addition, the police are responsible for providing information relating to cases, supported by other authorities.

Finnish Security Intelligence Service (Supo)	The Finnish Security Intelligence Service conveys information it has obtained through its intelligence and international cooperation for the coordination group's CBRNE situation assessments and threat assessments.
Finnish Border Guard	The Finnish Border Guard prevents CBRNE threats by taking part, in conjunction with its core duties, in the control of CBRNE substances and conducting border checks in passenger traffic. During CBRNE incidents, the Border Guard is responsible for the rescue of persons at sea and supports the responsible authorities in their duties. The Border Guard maintains preparedness for CBRNE activities in accordance with its core duties in all circumstances.
Ministry of Defence	The Ministry of Defence is tasked with the preparation and implementation of the defence policy and with military national defence. The Ministry's duties also include matters such as arms control and disarmament, export control of military equipment, and armaments cooperation. CBRNE threats and related preparedness are also included in the Ministry's duties.
Finnish Defence Forces	The Finnish Defence Forces maintain preparedness for CBRNE incidents in all security situations. The Defence Forces have personnel, equipment and troops suitable for detection and identification, sampling and analysis, decontamination of persons and materials, and explosive ordnance disposal. The Defence Forces also have special competencies relating to CBRN laboratory analytics, CBRN protection and explosives.
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health	The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health guides and supervises activities in accordance with legislation including the Communicable Diseases Act (583/1986), the Health Care Act (1326/2010), the Radiation Act (292/1991), the Chemicals Act (599/2013) and the Gene Technology Act (377/1995) and drafts relevant legislation.
National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL)	The National Institute for Health and Welfare is the national expert institute for the prevention of communicable diseases dangerous to human health and for environmental health: it supports the Government and health and social services actors through its risk assessments concerning infection and environmental threats, monitoring, reference laboratory activities, preparedness, prevention and control duties. Where necessary, the THL provides recommendations for action and supports the administrative branch of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in communications relating to special situations. The THL is the National IHR Focal Point under the WHO's International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) and the national competent authority under Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health, operating the 24/7 Early Warning and Response System intended for national and international authorities. The THL maintains and coordinates national microbiological diagnostic preparedness, including through intergovernmental agreements, for threats of serious and unforeseen infectious diseases.
Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (BUOS)	The Centre for Biothreat Preparedness (BUOS) is a joint expert organisation of the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) and the Defence Forces, which combines the resources of the THL and the Defence Forces in the prevention of and preparedness for biological threats, particularly regarding intentional release.
Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats	The Centre of Excellence for Serious Chemical Threats is a cooperation network for various experts in chemical threats set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and coordinated by the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health. The Centre of Excellence maintains a 24/7 expert service and a database on analytics providers and preparedness.
Poison Information Centre	The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has assigned the Poison Information Centre with the responsibility for action as regards chemical poisonings, mass poisonings and other rare poisonings. The Poison Information Service operates a 24/7 telephone helpline for questions relating to the prevention and treatment of acute poisonings. The Centre provides a nationwide service, with advice available to the general public and healthcare professionals. The Centre also acts as a source of information for the authorities and media.
Health and social services actors	Health and social services actors in the health sector (including municipal health and environmental health authorities, hospital districts and Regional State Administrative Agencies) are responsible in their respective areas for preparedness for CBRNE threats and for the organisation of prehospital emergency medical services. During CBRNE incidents, emergency medical services duties include assessing the need for treatment and care of exposed persons, and providing emergency patients with prehospital care and transport to hospital. Local and regional health and social services actors participate in risk assessment and take care of any isolation, quarantine and hospital care of persons who are injured, affected by a disease or exposed.

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority	The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) supervises the safety of the use of nuclear power and radiation and operators' safety and security arrangements in case of unlawful activity. STUK is in charge of the national implementation of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which also covers sensitive information and technology. STUK coordinates and conducts research into and development of radiation and nuclear safety from the perspectives of national needs. STUK maintains a 24/7 on-call service and preparedness to launch response to accidents or unlawful activity relating to nuclear power plants or radiation sources. STUK assesses the potential impacts of the incident, analyses and interprets radiation observations made by first-response authorities on the basis of the remote support concept established for the use of authorities including the Police, Customs and the Finnish Border Guard, conducts supplementary on-scene measurements where necessary, and provides recommendations for radiation protection measures. STUK participates in international cooperation and exchange of information in the field of nuclear and radiation safety.
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment	The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment is in charge of the supreme supervision, guidance and legislative drafting concerning the production, warehousing, storage and use of hazardous chemicals and explosives. The Ministry is responsible for the performance management of the National Emergency Supply Agency and the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency.
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes)	Tukes is a licensing and supervisory authority that supervises the safety of products, services and chemicals and implements related legislation in C and E matters in particular. Tukes does not have an operational role in CBRNE incidents. Instead, its role focuses on preventive activities carried out in conjunction with the supervision of operators. The focus of legislation and supervision is on promoting safety, but in some respects provisions also take into account some threats arising from intentional, criminal or terrorist activity. Preparedness for such threats includes requirements imposed on location, enclosure and locking and procedures restricting access to explosives and their precursors. These include the transfer certificate procedure restricting the acquisition of explosives, the explosives identification and traceability system, and restriction and authorisation procedures concerning precursors.
National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA)	In cooperation with hospital districts, NESA holds security stockpiles of key healthcare supplies, such as cannulae, infusion devices and hypodermic syringes. Antivirals are stockpiled for use in the event of pandemics (B). Importers of medicinal products and pharmaceutical plants have a statutory obligation to stockpile an amount of medicinal products covering normal consumption for 3–6 months. NESA pays compensation for capital committed to compulsory stockpiles of medicinal products.
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira	Evira's responsibility area covers chemical and biological risks relating to food, animals and plants (including food fraud and zoonotic, animal and plant diseases). Evira's role is to be the national leader of the supervision and prevention of related risks, carry out some of the supervision and laboratory analytics, risk assessments and scientific research relating to these risks.
Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI)	The Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) operates a Safety Weather Service with continuous preparedness for action in CBRNE incidents. The FMI has 24/7 preparedness for calculating the transport of radioactive and hazardous substances in the atmosphere and sea using dispersion models. The FMI acts as the meteorological expert and supports the activities of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in radiation incidents. The FMI provides weather data required by actors involved in incident management, such as the rescue services, the Government Situation Centre and agencies in the administrative branch of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The FMI is prepared for assigning a meteorologist for a liaison and consultation role with STUK in the event of a serious radiation incident. The FMI secures the reception of alerts and the alerting of STUK through the 24/7 Safety Weather Service.
Customs	Customs is tasked with protecting society by, for example, preventing the smuggling of narcotics and other hazardous substances. Customs controls the imports of chemicals into Finland from outside the EU and ensures in a risk-based manner that imported chemicals have been registered appropriately. Customs controls the exports of hazardous chemicals to destinations outside the EU. Customs controls and seeks to prevent the entry of biological pathogens, i.e. animal diseases, to Finland from outside the EU. Customs controls the intra-EU transfers and imports into and exports out of the EU of radioactive materials. Customs controls the imports and exports of nuclear materials (including nuclear weapons) to and from the EU as well as their intra-EU transfers. Customs controls the imports of explosives from outside the EEA. Customs controls the exports from and transit via Finland of explosives classified as armaments.

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