Preparedness and comprehensive security

Committee report
Abstract
The committee responsible for this report was set up to prepare a comprehensive report on preparedness in society. The work was based on proposals presented in 2009 in the Government Security and Defence Policy Report which called for a reassessment of the present comprehensive defence approach, the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, the Internal Security Programme as well as their content, arrangements, lines of authority, responsibilities and implementation.

Finland’s preparedness arrangements are in no need of major reform. As the operating environment and threat scenarios change, preparedness must be based on the broadest security thinking possible, that of comprehensive security, and on harnessing the resources of the whole of society. In preparedness, better account should be taken of the stronger role played by the business sector and the significance of non-governmental organisations. Further steps are also necessary to increase co-operation as the reform of the state regional administration and municipalities continue.

The committee aims at eliminating overlaps in operations and improving co-operation. Confidence increases if normal statutory powers are maintained in preparedness and the management of disruptions. Attention is paid by the committee to the development of situation awareness and opportunities to obtain correct, immediate information serving preparedness.

The committee emphasises the principles of representative democracy and considers the reporting procedure an essential instrument to laying down Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines. It is necessary to set a goal-oriented schedule for the preparation of reports. The Government Report on Security and Defence Policy be complemented with a new report of narrower or broader scope, depending on the situation. Adoption of a comprehensive approach to security entails extending the scope of the reports to include the examination of new types of security issues.

The committee proposes that the operating preconditions of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should be strengthened, while recognising the importance of joint meetings between this Cabinet Committee and the President of the Republic. The Minister of the Interior should also become a member of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The committee also proposes that the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should organise open seminars on comprehensive security.

The Security and Defence Committee should be renamed as the Security Committee and be strengthened by broadening its base. The preparation of security affairs should be developed by strengthening the status of the Security Secretariat, under the Security Committee. The committee sees no need to establish a separate security council.

Close cooperation, in line with the committee’s proposals, between the authorities, the business sector, non-governmental organisations and individual citizens bolsters collective responsibility.

Keywords
Preparedness, comprehensive security, Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, Security Committee, Security Secretariat
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TO THE GOVERNMENT

On 17 December 2009, the Government appointed a committee to prepare a comprehensive analysis of society’s preparedness. In line with the Government Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009, the report assesses the present comprehensive defence approach, the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, the Internal Security Programme as well as their content, arrangements, lines of authority, responsibilities and implementation. The committee was to complete its work by 31 December 2010.

Pekka Hallberg, President of the Supreme Administrative Court, was invited to chair the committee and Heikki Aaltonen, Permanent State Under-Secretary, Tiina Astola, Permanent Secretary, Anne Brunila, Executive Vice President, Aapo Cederberg, General Secretary, Tarja Cronberg, Doctor of Science in Technology and Doctor of Social Science, Martina Harms-Aalto, Programme Manager, Antti Herlin, Chairman of the Board, Jaana Husu-Kallio, Director General, Lauri Ihlainen, ministeri (Finnish honorary title), Päivi Kairamo-Hella, Secretary General, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Chief of Defence, Lea Kauppi, Director General, Seppo Kääriäinen, First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Erkki Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland, Outi Ojala, Representative of City Council, Antti Pelttari, State Secretary, Pekka Puska, Director-General, Jaakko Rauramo, vuorineuvos (Finnish honorary title), Rauno Saari, Director General, Anneli Taina, Director General, and Pertti Torstila, State Secretary, were invited as members.

Timo Härkönen, Director of Government Security, Colonel Kim Jäämeri and Olli Lampinen, Preparedness Co-ordinator, were appointed as the Committee Secretaries. Specialist Leena Huovinen and Lauri Holmström, Duty Officer, Government Situation Centre, were further invited as assistants to the committee’s secretariat.

The committee worked under the name of the Hallberg Committee. It convened 19 times and held several hearings. In its analysis of the current system of preparedness, the committee came to the conclusion that no substantial changes were required. In accordance with the assignment, the committee report provides an analysis of preparedness in society and includes proposals considered necessary to improving the current system’s functionality.

Upon the project’s completion, the committee hereby presents its unanimous report to the Government.
Helsinki, 22 December 2010

Heikki Aaltonen
Anne Brunila
Tarja Cronberg
Antti Herlin
Lauri Ihalainen
Juhani Kaskeala
Seppo Kääriäinen
Outi Ojala
Pekka Puska
Rauno Saari
Pertti Torstila

Tiina Astola
Aapo Cederberg
Martina Harms-Aalto
Jaana Husu-Kallio
Päivi Kairamo-Hella
Lea Kauppi
Erkki Liikanen
Antti Pelttari
Jaakko Rauramo
Anneli Taina

Timo Härkönen
Kari Jäämeri
Olli Lampinen
Lauri Holmström
Leena Huovinen
ABSTRACT

Finland’s preparedness arrangements are functional and in no need of major reform. The committee proposes development measures aimed at eliminating overlaps in operations and creating the preconditions for improved co-operation.

Changes in the operating environment and threat scenarios are accentuating the need to examine security from a broad perspective. External and internal security are increasingly interlinked. The committee based its work on the broadest security thinking possible; that of comprehensive security.

As the vulnerability of Finnish society grows, civil society and the business sector’s contributions to preparedness and security co-operation are becoming increasingly important. It is essential that we utilise the resources of the whole of society, from state leaders to local level. Use of such resources must be planned and prepared as a single entity. Close co-operation between the authorities, the business sector, non-governmental organisations and individual citizens yields results and reinforces collective responsibility.

The committee considers that, in preparedness, better account should be taken of the stronger role played by the business sector and the significance of many non-governmental organisations. The security discussion should be as open as possible, thereby increasing general confidence. The committee proposes that the co-operation required for preparedness be increased, while continuing the reform of the state regional administration and municipalities.

The committee emphasises that normal statutory powers should be maintained in the preparedness and management of disruptions. In possible conflicts of authority, the committee is of the view that the Constitution provides the Prime Minister with powers to submit the issue to the Government plenary session for consideration. Attention is paid by the committee to the development of sector-specific situation awareness, and the opportunities of national leaders to obtain correct, immediate information serving preparedness from senior officials.

The reporting procedure is considered a key tool in outlining Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy. The committee proposes that a clear, goal-oriented schedule be set for the preparation of reports on comprehensive security, and that the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy be complemented, when necessary, with a new report of narrower or broader
scope, depending on the situation. Comprehensive security thinking requires that the reports' content be extended to cover the examination of new kinds of security issues.

The committee considers that the operating preconditions of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should be strengthened, while recognising the importance of joint meetings between this Cabinet Committee and the President of the Republic. The committee proposes that the Government Rules of Procedure be amended to make the Minister of the Interior a member of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should organise open seminars on comprehensive security.

The committee proposes that the Security and Defence Committee be renamed the Security Committee, and reinforced through a broader-based membership, by appointing representatives of the business sector and key non-governmental organisations as members, as well as the National Police Commissioner and the Director-General of the Department for Rescue Services at the Ministry of the Interior. Preparatory material for the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should also be compiled, where relevant, by the Security Committee. The committee further proposes that the preparation of security affairs be developed by reinforcing the security secretariat's position and operating preconditions in conjunction with the Security Committee. The committee does not consider the establishment of a separate security council necessary.
PART I: FINNISH SOCIETY’S STRENGTHS AND PREPAREDNESS

1 Introduction

According to the Finnish constitution, the powers of the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are represented by Parliament. The constitution guarantees the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom and rights of the individual, and promotes justice in society. Democracy entails the right of individuals to participate and have an influence in the development of society and their living conditions. The strengths of Finnish society include broad-based voluntary activities, strong local self-government, a democratic system of participation and networking between public authorities and the people, extending from personal and smaller circles to broader themes.

The constitution reinforces civil society and fosters the building of trust in society. This forms an essential foundation in preparing for unexpected situations. The Finnish constitution also establishes the principle of the rule of law, according to which the wielding of power by public authorities must have a legal basis. All public sector activities must carefully comply with the law. Finnish society thus has firmly rooted confidence in the authorities and observance of the nation’s laws.

This forms a strong foundation for preparedness, which in Finland has traditionally involved authority-centred co-operation based on the comprehensive defence approach. Preparedness is widely felt to be an important and well-justified activity in Finland. This is manifested in contingency planning by the authorities, voluntary commitment by the business sector to activities ensuring security of supply, and active participation by NGOs in crisis management.

However, changes in the operating environment have an impact in the structures of government, business and industry, and society as a whole. Changes in Finland’s operating environment, both at national and international level, have highlighted the need to examine preparedness from a comprehensive perspective. The committee set up to examine these issues was to assess how Finnish society prepares itself, maintains its competitiveness and ability to function and safeguards the survival of citizens in all circumstances.

While economic integration, and globalisation in particular, provide new opportunities, they also pose many risks and threats that are difficult to foresee.
The networking of society and increasing dependence on technical systems, especially information technology, has constituted one of the most significant change trends. Factors influencing the population structure include ageing, and on the other hand, internationalisation, immigration and emigration. These must be taken into consideration as factors with an impact on Finland’s competitiveness and the development of the dependency ratio.

Constant legislative and administrative changes, and particularly the state regional administration and municipality structure reforms, have also influenced the need to examine preparedness. As changes occur in the operating environment, it is crucial to ensure the participation of the whole of society in building preparedness and proactive comprehensive security. Viewing comprehensive security as the backbone of Finland’s competitiveness and well-being continues to form the foundation for co-operation between various actors, public authorities, the business sector and NGOs. This is not therefore merely a question of co-operation between various administrative sectors, but of networking the whole of society, of ensuring the continuity of Finland’s approach to preparedness even in the midst of change.

Because Finland’s preparedness arrangements are also well-functioning by international comparison, they require no major reforms. Co-operation between various actors should, however, be constantly developed by streamlining the structure and organisation of preparedness. At the same time, the narrow examination of mandate issues between various administrative sectors should be discarded.

In international comparisons by the World Economic Forum (WEF), Finland has been ranked sixth in terms of overall competitiveness in recent years, and often as first in terms of how well its institutions function. This indicates confidence in the functioning of systems and is consequently a good starting point in improving preparedness.

In 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a country review on public governance in Finland. According to the OECD, Finland’s future success and competitiveness depend on its ability to address challenges by committing to and implementing overall administrative solutions. This requires an ability to achieve and declare a common view of said challenges and available solutions at the level of society as a whole. Furthermore, the country review sees governmental partnerships with citizens, the business sector, NGOs and other interest groups as necessary, in order to meet overall public administration targets in responding to national and global challenges.

Therefore, one of the key challenges the public administration faces lies in finding new ways of operating horizontally across various levels of administration and in co-operation with interest groups. Paying attention to citizen participation is the key when seeking a closer relationship between the administration, citizens and the business sector.
In preparedness, particular attention should thus be paid to opening up the public administration towards the business sector and NGOs, and vice versa. Over the course of the committee’s work, it has become apparent that more attention must be paid to informing citizens, to the activities of NGOs and their participation, as well as to the business sector’s growing stake in general well-being and how Finland is changing as an operating environment. At the same time, preserving functioning co-operation between various organs of government – the basis of our democratic system and representative democracy – is crucial.

The examination of issues related to security of supply has reinforced the view that the emphasis has slowly shifted from emergency stockpiling to securing essential infrastructure and business continuity in trade and industry. Some duties previously handled by public authorities have already been transferred, and some are in the process of being transferred, to the business sector. Such mutual interests are also influencing the development of preparedness structures.

The committee’s assessment focuses on the operational and societal perspectives, as a counterweight to administration-oriented thinking. Furthermore, the aim is to shift the focus in preparedness towards proactive activities, identifying threats and disturbances as early as possible, and rapidly communicating situation awareness. By improving communication, society’s interest can be evoked in matters related to comprehensive security and preparedness, thereby increasing the level of crisis resilience in society.

This committee report is divided into three sections. The first section examines the strengths of Finnish society and its preparedness. Harnessing the resources of the whole of society in preparedness is the key point of departure. Preparedness is therefore a concern of all of society, all the way from state leadership to local level. In addition, the first section examines the need to assess preparedness, the establishment of the committee and the premises for carrying out the assignment. The Government’s Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009 and its parliamentary handling are key documents in this respect. The second section of the report discusses the current system of preparedness, the comprehensive defence approach, preparedness arrangements and their development needs, and the international dimension of preparedness. The third section presents the key proposals outlined by the committee, and the related objectives.
2 The committee’s assignment and work

On 17.12.09, the Government appointed a committee to prepare a comprehensive report on preparedness in society. The memorandum on appointing the committee states that changes in the operating environment, administrative reforms and possible changes in legislation require a comprehensive analysis of preparedness in society during the present Government’s term of office. The memorandum refers to the Government Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009, according to which the committee report shall examine the present comprehensive defence approach, the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, the Internal Security Programme as well as their content, arrangements, lines of authority, responsibilities and implementation. In conjunction with this, the Government report suggests that consideration should be given to establishing a national security council. Thus, the committee’s assignment has been further specified in the Security and Defence Policy Report and its parliamentary handling, which was to be taken into account in the assessment.

The committee was tasked with assessing the current system’s functionality, possible operational overlaps, deficiencies in responsibilities and open questions arising from changes in the operating environment. Mapping out the current system is of major importance as a starting point. The committee’s work is concerned with examining improved co-ordination, clear responsibilities and functionality, on the basis of a broad concept of security. No fundamental changes are required in preparedness structures.

The committee has also taken account of other reforms related to the same theme, such as reports by the committee appointed to consider the revision of the Finnish Constitution, the working group on promoting security co-operation between the public and private sectors, and the working group on military conscription.

The committee decided to call itself the Hallberg committee. Based on a broad view of security, the committee began work from the premise that it is essential to involve the whole of society in improving preparedness. More prominence should be given to the views of civil society, and individual citizens should be kept sufficiently informed of personal preparedness. The committee therefore aimed to use the clearest and most comprehensive concepts possible in its work. Everyone’s contribution is vital to Finland’s security.

As part of its task, the committee examined the structures and steering of preparedness. In this, attention was also paid to co-operation between
the highest organs of government and to developing organisations and responsibilities within the administration. As regards the steering of preparedness activities, the committee looked into the reporting procedure and overlaps in preparedness documents, as well as the document hierarchy. In addition, in line with its assignment, it evaluated the comprehensive defence approach. Here, particular attention was paid to matters related to security of supply, the involvement of the business sector and civil society in preparedness, and further development of co-operation within the public administration.

The preparedness obligation and its justification have also been defined in legislation on preparedness. In accordance with the Emergency Powers Act (1991/1080), the Government, the state administrative authorities, state businesses and other state authorities, as well as municipalities, must ensure that their duties are performed with the least disruption, including in emergency conditions, by means of emergency plans, prior preparation of emergency procedures and other measures.

From the point of view of securing functions vital to society, however, account must be taken of preparedness, crisis management and recovery from crises. Precautionary measures include contingency planning and the related prior preparation, such as training and preparedness exercises. Preparedness measures are aimed at the anticipation, management and after-care of disturbances and emergency conditions. Preparedness is always part of an organisation’s normal operations. During this process, existing legislation is complied with, and planned measures must be based on measures regulated under law.

As noted above, the committee assignment was further specified in the Government’s Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009 and the parliamentary handling of this report. In the following, reference is made to parts of these documents. The introduction to the Security and Defence Policy Report states that the report lays a foundation for all reports, strategies and programmes prepared by the Government on security and international relations. According to the report, these include the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society and the Internal Security Programme.
A report by the Foreign Affairs Committee (UaVM 5/2009 vp) states the following:

“...the committee notes that some of the documents that should be founded on the report have been completed prior to the report’s completion (such as the Internal Security Programme). For this reason, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers it important that the relationship between the Security and Defence Policy Report and other Government reports, strategies and programmes dealing with security and international relations be evaluated when developing the security and defence policy reporting procedure. Structural inconsistency and too much emphasis on a detailed description of the security environment were a problematic aspect of the reports. On each occasion, the report’s preparation has been organised differently, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister’s Office have each in turn been in charge of its preparation. The committee would particularly like clarification of the report’s steering role with regard to the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society and the Internal Security Programme. The Foreign Affairs Committee states that a clearer, tighter schedule should be established for the preparation and parliamentary handling of Government reports on security and defence policy."

“The Foreign Affairs Committee requires that a consistent recommendation on the strategic hierarchy of comprehensive security, and an assessment of the development of the security and defence policy reporting procedure, be included in the report. Parliament requires that the report be developed into a comprehensive security strategy providing balanced guidance for the development of all administrative sectors operating in the field of security.”

The Defence Committee (PuVL 4/2009 vp) states the following:

“Systematic development of the Defence Forces’ activities requires long-term guidelines in the future too. The Defence Committee considers this a central aspect of evaluating the desirability of continuing the reporting procedure. It would, however, be necessary to develop the reporting process. In monitoring the security environment, a four-year time span is too slow and inflexible. Without anticipating the outcome of this analysis, the committee would like to emphasise that the current co-ordination mechanism functions well. Finland is a small country with limited resources. Key actors in various administrative sectors are already represented in several overlapping organisations. For this reason, the focus should be primarily on developing the current operating model, instead of establishing completely new organs. The committee also considers it necessary that further work evaluate whether the term ‘comprehensive defence’ should be changed to better reflect the content in question.”

In its statement, the Administration Committee (HaVL 6/2009 vp) notes that it:

“... requires that in future, the topic of internal security should be treated on an equal basis to security and defence policy in the reporting procedure. Furthermore, the committee requires that future security and defence policy reports be divided into various sections, internal security comprising one of them.”
The committee convened a total of 19 times. During its work, in line with its assignment the committee consulted experts in the field of comprehensive security. The committee secretariat consulted heads of preparedness at the ministries.

The committee consulted the following people, listed in order of hearing:

- Risto Volanen, State Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office
- Pertti Torstila, State Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Anne Holmlund, Minister of the Interior
- Kari Rimpi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence
- General Ari Puheloinen, Chief of Defence
- Päivi Kairamo-Hella, Secretary General, Office of the President of the Republic
- Jaakko Rauramo, vuorineuvos (Finnish honorary title), Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure
- Kari Jalas, Dr. Pol. Sc.
- Ilkka Kananen, Chief Executive Officer, National Emergency Supply Agency
- Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Anneli Taina, Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Southern Finland
- Rauno Saari, Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Southwestern Finland
- Tapio Tossavainen, Preparedness Manager, Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment for Uusimaa
- Markku Haiko, Development Manager, Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
- Bishop Eero Huovinen
- Diocesan Secretary Kirsti Poutiainen
- Mikael Pentikäinen, Senior Editor-in-Chief, Helsingin Sanomat
- Lauri Kivinen, Director General of the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE
- Håkan Mattlin, Director General, Ministry of Education
- Mika Rossi, State Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office
- Mikko Paateto, National Police Commissioner, National Police Board
- Brigadier General Mikko Kirjavainen, Border Guard Headquarters
- Lieutenant General Arto Räty, Defence Command
- Commodore Kari Takanen, Defence Command
- Colonel Sakari Wallinmaa, Defence Command
- Lieutenant Colonel Pasi Välimäki, Defence Command
- Teemu Tanner, Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

On 27 July 2010, the committee met with President of the Republic, Tarja Halonen, who extensively examined the issues handled by the committee and
presented her own views on the basic outlines of its work. The committee Chair consulted Prime Ministers Mari Kiviniemi and Matti Vanhanen, as well as Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies. The Chair reported on these meetings to the committee.

3 Utilising the whole of society’s resources in preparedness

The committee based its work on the broadest security thinking possible; that of comprehensive security. Due to their nature, preparing for and responding to wide-ranging security threats requires strong international and national co-operation, as well as prearranged collaborative mechanisms. Preparedness in Finland has traditionally been authority-centred and based on strong co-operation.

Indeed, co-operation between administrative sectors is important, since they usually have only one set of resources, for use in all possible security situations. For this reason, the use and mobilisation of these resources should be planned and prepared holistically. The principle of good governance has fostered trust in the rule of law in Finland. Since preparedness activities extend over a long period of time, the civil service occupies a key position in ensuring continuity of preparedness.

As new threats have made Finnish society increasingly vulnerable, the contribution of civil society and the business sector to preparedness and security co-operation is ever more important. Moreover, growing pressures for cost efficiency are constantly shaping structures and practices within the administration and business sector. Alongside techno-economic development, interdependencies between production, services and the whole of society have increased. At the same time, the trend of focusing on operations related to core competencies has led to a growth in outsourcing and service acquisition from outside an organisation. As a result of this development, the business sector’s importance in securing functions vital to society is constantly increasing.

Situations that threaten functions vital to society often have diverse impacts. Their prevention, management and after-care require the efforts of authorities within various administrative sectors, as well as professionals and volunteers within the private sector. Companies possess and control a significant portion of society’s resources, both under normal conditions and during serious disturbances of normal conditions. However, in modern global markets companies disperse their production chains between several countries and continents, depending on where the required operations are cheapest.
to perform and for which market the company caters. Due to this structural change in the business sector, the state has fewer direct steering opportunities. This development is likely to continue.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role in society by fostering and developing a sense of community, civic education and individuals’ opportunities to have an influence. With regard to NGO activities, particular attention has been paid to their non-profit nature and their direct and indirect benefits to society. NGOs enable the actions of the authorities to be complemented in the appropriate manner, while providing the authorities with the opportunity to target their resources at areas unsuitable for voluntary activities. Moreover, activities within NGOs encourage people to do voluntary work, often on an altruistic basis.

NGOs contribute to society’s material, spiritual and social capital, reinforce public sector activity and fulfil requirements set for public sector activity. When constructing and upholding psychological resilience in a crisis, NGOs occupy a key position. Their independence provides them with their characteristic agility and swiftness. In a crisis situation, they are often the first to provide aid. NGOs and their international organisations, such as the international Red Cross, have existing international contingency and preparedness systems that can also be employed in Finnish conditions. Furthermore, at local level NGOs create stability, a sense of security and trust, thanks to their being well-known, with a position close to the community and individuals. NGOs also gather and transmit information between citizens and authorities.
PART II: A DESCRIPTION OF PREPAREDNESS IN SOCIETY

1 Background and principles of preparedness

1.1 Stages of development in preparedness

The current form of preparedness by central government can be considered as having begun in spring 1977, when a Defence Council memorandum included a new definition of emergency conditions. Alongside a military crisis (war), economic crises and major accidents were defined as “emergency conditions” requiring preparedness. Prior to this, the preparation of society for war was mainly handled by the Defence Forces and special defence organs (advisory boards), while the normal administration took no systematic part in planning and preparation. Liaison officers and military offices run by the Defence Forces had been given representation on the most important national boards. For wartime arrangements under economic defence, a National Board of Economic Defence was established in 1955. The Board was modelled on the National Defence Council of Wartime Economy, in operation between 1929 and 1936.

In 1975, the Advisory Board for Defence Information, a permanent parliamentary committee, was established. The advisory board was preceded by the Advisory Board for Mental Defence in 1964–1975. Work of the Advisory Board for Defence Information is based on a decree enacted in 1975 (1073/75). The Advisory Board for Defence Information is tasked with planning the communication of national defence information in both normal and emergency conditions. It also monitors the development of the Finnish people’s views in matters closely related to national defence. The decree on the Advisory Board for Defence Information is currently under reform, with the aim of issuing a new decree before the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2011.

The purpose of this was that in times of war, normal administrative arrangements and organisations would be replaced by a special national system of commanders/organisations. First to obtain approval, in 1959, was the plan for a nationwide organisation of transport commanders. Finally, on 23 February 1973, the Defence Council confirmed the arrangement prepared by the National Board of Economic Defence, whereby Finland would be divided into 13 centralised national organisations in time of war (guidelines for the division of duties in a controlled economy). However, by only the following year, the legal basis of this arrangement was being questioned. In November
1974, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, responsible for the steering of the National Board of Economic Defence, established a working group to assess the appropriateness of the system.

In its report of 17 October 1975, the working group proposed that account be taken of the needs and requirements of emergency conditions in arrangements covering normal conditions. These principles were confirmed by the Defence Council in its memorandum of 2 November 1982, which also defined co-operation between the Defence Forces and other parts of the administration in preparedness-related issues. The working group also proposed the appointment of special heads of preparedness in ministries, to lead national defence preparations within their respective administrative sectors. Decisions regarding heads of preparedness were taken as early as August 1978, when the Defence Council decided on the appointment of heads of preparedness within ministries and on certain national boards, to lead preparedness arrangements. This provision was confirmed by a letter from the Prime Minister to the ministries, dated 29 December 1978. The heads of preparedness thus entered their posts at the beginning of 1979. In most cases, the permanent secretaries of Ministries were appointed as heads of preparedness, while the permanent secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office was appointed to chair the group.

The first exercise for heads of preparedness at ministries was organised under the Defence Council secretariat in 1981. Civil servants responsible for practical exercise arrangements at ministries were then organised into a system of preparedness secretaries. The system of separate national commanders mentioned earlier was gradually abolished in the 1980s. Steered by the Defence Council and its secretariat, the preparedness system functioned fairly well. By the end of the 1990s, national preparedness had reached a level of quality considered high in international comparisons.

In February 1992, the Defence Council repealed its previous guidelines (1977, 1982) and brought disturbances in normal conditions and crisis situations within the scope of preparedness. This added a new dimension to preparedness, while definitively transferring its administration to the sphere of normal operational responsibilities and powers. On 28 November 1994, an addition was made to the Government Rules of Procedure concerning the activities of heads of preparedness. Drawn up by the Defence Council, the memorandum Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin, 1999 (Contingency planning for disturbances and emergency conditions in society, 1999) modernised previous guidelines and memorandums.

In September 1999, the Prime Minister’s Office set up a so-called defence council working group, tasked with examining the Defence Council’s status and the development of legislation related to its tasks. As the Constitution of Finland (731/1999) became effective, the Defence Council was abolished at the beginning of March 2000. Its duties were divided between the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the Ministry of Defence. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy was also tasked with handling important issues related to comprehensive defence. In addition, the committee considers issues related to the co-ordination of matters falling
within its mandate. Handling matters related to foreign and security policy, and to Finland’s relations with other states, the cabinet committee may convene together with the President. Such joint meetings have become established practice.

The Security and Defence Committee, based at the Ministry of Defence, was established for the co-ordination and preparation of comprehensive defence. Its tasks include the monitoring of changes in Finland’s security and defence policy position and assessing the impact of such changes on comprehensive defence arrangements. The committee also monitors measures taken by various administrative sectors to maintain and develop comprehensive defence arrangements, while co-ordinating the preparation of issues falling within the scope of comprehensive defence within various administrative sectors. The committee may issue statements and take initiatives in matters related to comprehensive defence and issues concerning the reconciliation of such matters.

The Security and Defence Committee assists the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy in matters related to comprehensive defence. This committee has a secretariat based at the Ministry of Defence. A forum of preparedness secretaries, comprising the preparedness secretaries at the ministries and some national boards, assists the secretariat in co-ordinating the preparation of matters. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of co-ordinating the comprehensive defence approach. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy has been assigned the highest political steering responsibility regarding the monitoring and development of the comprehensive defence approach and the co-ordination of related matters.

In line with the comprehensive concept of security and the definition of comprehensive defence, permanent secretaries of all ministries and the Secretary General of the Office of the President of the Republic are involved in the Security and Defence Committee. These arrangements have created better preconditions for the Security and Defence Committee’s steering of development and monitoring of the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society. Permanent secretaries are responsible for leading and monitoring the ministries’ operations, as well as for the preparation and follow-up of targets in their respective administrative sectors. In addition, they take care of preparedness and security within their administrative sectors. In the practical implementation of tasks related to preparedness and security, they are assisted by heads of preparedness and preparedness secretaries, as well as the ministries’ Preparedness Committees.
According to the revised rules of the meeting of the ministries’ heads of preparedness (2007), the purpose of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness is to function as a permanent co-operation body between the ministries, reconciling preparedness arrangements of the ministries and supporting competent authorities, ministries and the Government when necessary, as laid down in the central government crisis management model. Chairmanship of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness was transferred from the Prime Minister’s permanent secretary to the Director of Government Security. At the same time, some ministries reformed their arrangements regarding heads of preparedness. The position, powers and role of heads of preparedness and preparedness secretaries within their ministries varies. The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society of 2006 defines a crisis management model that allows for meetings of heads of preparedness to convene either regularly, or in accordance with the government crisis management model.

Previously, the preparation of civil defence and preparedness, as well as powers associated with emergency conditions, were based on civil defence legislation in particular. Civil defence activities began in 1927 with the establishment of Suomen Kaasupuolustusyhdistys (the Finnish Gas Defence Association). The first civil defence act dates from 1939 (374/1939). It defined civil defence as the protection of the population and its property from destruction caused by war or similar conditions, limitation of the related damage and the alleviation of its consequences. The civil defence act of 1958 was amended in 1990, based on proposals from the civil protection committee, and the construction of civil defence shelters was extended to the entire country.

The current legislative basis of civil defence is included in the Rescue Act. Rescue services, in which civil defence was included, changed considerably with the enactment of the Rescue Act at the beginning of 2004. At the time, the rescue service system maintained by municipalities was changed from a service organised by individual municipalities to a regional system, whereby the country is divided into 22 regions. Responsibility for managing various rescue service duties is shared by the state and regional rescue services. Civil defence duties are defined as the rescue services’ responsibility under the Rescue Act. Various civil defence duties are also specified for municipalities and other authorities. Expertise in civil protection and material preparedness are required under normal conditions too, in major accidents and other serious disturbances. The Government’s proposal (HE 257/2010 vp) on reforming the Rescue Act, with proposals concerning the reform of provisions on civil defence, has been submitted to Parliament.
The system for security of supply was created not only to uphold and develop co-operation between the authorities and the business sector, but also to function as a body for planning economic defence. Activities began with the establishment of the National Board of Economic Defence on 23 December 1955. Over the decades, security of supply has developed from preparing for military crises into securing the business continuity of enterprises and the protection of critical infrastructure, with a strong international dimension. The authorities participate in the planning of security of supply as part of their statutory preparedness duties, and in order to maintain contacts with companies within their own sector.

Although the business sector has no general statutory duty to participate in the planning of security of supply, this is done on a voluntary basis. For companies, preparedness activities have been based on their business needs and on agreements made with clients and the related risk management. In 2008, the targets and organisation for security of supply were reformed. The National Board of Economic Defence was abolished and the Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure was established in its place. The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for administrative steering of security of supply. The system for security of supply forms part of the comprehensive defence approach. This is evident, for instance, in a working economy and infrastructure constituting one of seven essential functions, as defined in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society.

1.2 Comprehensive security as a basis

The security of society faces a variety of threats, both military and non-military. These security threats are intertwined, difficult to predict and give little warning. Changes in the operating environment and threat scenarios have therefore given rise to a need to examine security as broadly as possible.

The comprehensive concept of security comprises security issues which, if exacerbated, may turn into threats that can jeopardise or seriously harm Finland, Finns or the functions vital to Finnish society. Wide-ranging threats include premeditated action such as armed aggression, terrorism or network interference. They can also occur spontaneously, such as widespread failures of the electricity grid, various biological hazards, such as infectious diseases, or extreme forces of nature. The threat scenarios for functions vital to society have been devised with comprehensive security in mind, and provide the basis for contingency planning.
Many of the risks posed to the Baltic Sea coastal states, such as shipping and nuclear safety-related disasters and environmental threats, fall under the rubric of comprehensive security. Furthermore, international organised crime, the narcotics trade and human trafficking, as well as infectious diseases, require preparedness from Finland. In such cases, national and international inter-authority co-operation across administrative sectors becomes increasingly important.
Maritime safety

Strong growth in shipping in the Baltic Sea is a burden on the marine ecology and increases the risk of serious oil and chemical accidents, particularly in the Gulf of Finland. Co-ordination of authority operations, uniform, previously agreed operating principles, and measures aimed at protecting the sea area, will gain in significance in national and international co-operation between authorities, particularly in the Baltic Sea region.

The European Union’s integrated maritime policy will be developed in order to establish a more co-ordinated system for monitoring and information exchange. This will be achieved by bringing together existing monitoring and tracking systems used for maritime safety and security, protection of the marine environment, fisheries control, control of external borders and other law enforcement activities. Within the framework of EU’s strategy for the Baltic Sea, special characteristics of the Baltic Sea region will be taken into account in the implementation of maritime policy. These will include encouraging Russia to commitment to co-operation.

The purpose of integrated maritime surveillance and information exchange is to achieve situation awareness, in support of rational decision-making, of maritime activities that influence maritime safety and security measures, border surveillance, the marine environment, fisheries control, trade and the European Union’s economic interests, as well as general law enforcement and defence. In line with the aforementioned principles, a common information exchange environment for the Baltic Sea region is being developed under the MARSUNO project. In Finland, nearly all maritime authorities associated with the above-mentioned measures participate in the project.

Source: Jarmo Saarinen, West Finland Coast Guard District
The ash cloud

On 20 March 2010, the Eyjafjallajökull volcano began to erupt in Iceland. On 14 April, the eruption began to generate large amounts of ash, with volcanic ash drifting into European airspace due to prevalent winds. For flight safety reasons, airspace was closed in Northern and Central Europe. The ash cloud caused a total air traffic closedown in Northern and Central Europe between 15 and 19 April. In Finland, airspace was closed on 15 April and partly reopened on 19 April. Most European countries reopened their airspaces on 21 April. The volcanic eruption in Iceland was a case of disturbance in which defining overall responsibility for national-level leadership was difficult.

All ministries analysed the situation from the perspective of their own administrative sector, and managed tasks falling within their purview. The competent authority for air traffic was the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi), alongside Finavia participating in operational activities. Moreover, the Finnish Meteorological Institute constantly produced situational information on the ash cloud for the authorities.

New security threats, taking increasingly diverse forms, require various types of co-operation-based preparedness. Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines take account of changes in the global operating environment, in accordance with the comprehensive concept of security. Globalisation requires goal-oriented, consistent and proactive action, as well as the capability to react swiftly to changes in the environment.
Influenza A(H1N1) virus

In 2009, the influenza A(H1N1) virus caused a pandemic, the end of which was declared by the World Health Organisation WHO in August 2010. The influenza ("swine flu") started to spread through Finland in the latter half of 2009, causing the death of approximately 50 people by February 2010, with an estimated 100,000 infections. On 24 April 2009, the Government Situation Centre received news of virus' spread in Mexico. Shortly afterwards, the Finnish embassy in Mexico contacted the Situation Centre directly, reporting on the situation on site. The Situation Centre further informed the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, which initiated measures of its own. Among other measures, a pandemic co-ordination group was set up at the Ministry and tasked with co-ordinating operations together with the heads of preparedness, in joint consultation within the administration. Other ministries also took action in accordance with their pandemic plans.

Nowadays, external and internal security are increasingly interlinked. Open intersectoral collaboration and partnership arrangements with NGOs, companies and other non-state actors are further emphasised. Public authorities, the business sector and NGOs co-ordinate their contingency plans in view of various crises, thus enabling prompt use of every actor’s resources in any security situation. However, the Government is responsible for ensuring that this operational model functions in all situations. Finland’s view of comprehensive security has been concretised in the threat scenarios and operational principles laid out in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society of 2003 and 2006, and in the Security Strategy for Society 2010.

National and international co-operation guarantees interoperability, cost-effective development and competence management. Wide-ranging co-operation provides for the internationalisation of Finnish competence and expertise. National networking particularly develops competence and a sustainable and comprehensive infrastructure. Networking raises society’s crisis tolerance and security of supply. Close co-operation between the authorities, the business sector, non-governmental organisations and individual citizens yields results. It also reinforces the will to defend the nation and bolsters collective responsibility.

The committee believes that it would not be expedient to define comprehensive security in specific detail; the concept has been defined extensively enough in the Security Strategy for Society. Moreover, providing the concept with a precise, watertight definition would go against its broad nature. Natural change occurs within predefined threat models, as a result of which new kinds of threats emerge. Although, in accordance with the comprehensive concept of security, the committee has taken various security situations and threats
into consideration, focusing on more serious security issues and reinforcing communal preparedness was more pertinent to its work.

1.3 The comprehensive defence approach

The comprehensive defence approach is a result of decades of development and a key constituent of Finland’s national security. Based on co-operation and a broad security perspective, comprehensive defence requires the co-ordination and drawing of expertise from various administrative sectors. Coordination is required, for instance, when monitoring changes in the security environment and analysing the repercussions of such changes, in building and maintaining resources, in preparations and exercises related to preparedness, as well as in the employment of resources required in crisis management. In line with the division of duties between ministries, the Ministry of Defence is in charge of co-ordinating the comprehensive defence approach.

As defined in the Government Rules of Procedure (262/2003), section 16, the mandate of the Ministry of Defence covers the co-ordination of comprehensive defence. The explanatory memorandum to the Government Rules of Procedure considers comprehensive defence to encompass

“...all military and civilian functions by which Finland’s sovereignty and the living conditions and security of its citizens are safeguarded against any external threats, threats from other nations, or any other threats.”

The memorandum states that co-ordination of the comprehensive defence approach involves

“...synchronising measures of the public sector — that is, the Government, State authorities and the municipalities — and the private sector and voluntary activities by citizens, in order to maintain functions vital to society under all circumstances.”

Development of the comprehensive defence approach began in the Defence Council in 1958, gradually evolving into the current concept of comprehensive defence. In other respects too, the Defence Council had a key position in the preparation and planning of comprehensive defence and the related legislation.

According to the comprehensive defence approach, all authorities, the business sector and non-governmental organisations should jointly prepare for all situations, on the basis of a common mission statement. For its part, the Defence Council also furthered the expertise of those in charge of comprehensive defence, aiming to ensure more efficient co-operation between responsible actors by issuing a recommendation on the establishment of national and
regional national defence courses. In addition, the Defence Council steered the development of security of supply and defence information, as part of the comprehensive defence approach.

In addition to the Defence Council, parliamentary defence committees also participated in the development of comprehensive defence. They highlighted the strong connection between comprehensive defence and foreign policy, expanded on and specified the concept of comprehensive defence, and reinforced its position as a guiding principle of preparedness. The second parliamentary defence committee proposed that it should be possible to complement and reform the comprehensive defence approach, when such actions are necessitated by changes in the security environment.

Responsibilities related to comprehensive defence have been laid down in laws and decrees. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy prepares important matters concerning comprehensive defence and its co-ordination. Each ministry and respective administrative sector is responsible for tasks related to comprehensive defence.

Development of the comprehensive defence approach has influenced legislation and its application, thereby creating preconditions for safeguarding the independence of the state and the livelihood and security of citizens against diverse, wide-ranging threats. The comprehensive defence approach also involves the principle of securing the authorities’ powers to manage their duties, by means of legislation, in both normal and emergency conditions. This forms the foundation of the Strategies for Securing the Functions Vital to Society and the new Security Strategy for Society. These strategies form the basis of the practical implementation of the comprehensive defence approach and the development of preparedness throughout society.

For competent actors within the system, the comprehensive defence approach has formed a kind of network, within which they are responsible for contingency planning within their own area of responsibility, as defined under legislation. Thus, the comprehensive defence approach can be described as an arrangement for co-ordinating such activities. At the same time, the comprehensive defence approach also steers these preparations through defined objectives and principles, such as democracy, cost-efficiency and legitimacy. Indeed, the approach has provided a suitable, renewable foundation for national security. Addressing security from a comprehensive perspective has proven highly suitable for the management of wide-ranging threats.

The Defence Council comprehensively monitored and steered the implementation and development of the comprehensive defence approach,
covering preparation of the report, national defence training, security of supply and the preparedness of various administrative sectors. When the Defence Council was abolished, its tasks were divided between the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the Ministry of Defence. Matters related to comprehensive defence, such as the Government Security and Defence Policy Report of 2001 and the Government resolutions on securing functions vital to society from 2003, 2006 and 2010, have been handled by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and prepared by the Security and Defence Committee. Although the report in question is a Government report, it should be noted that the President has also been involved in the reporting process. In further development of the comprehensive security approach, it is therefore necessary to ensure arrangements that enable the comprehensive handling of security matters at the highest political and administrative levels.

2 Political guidance of preparedness

2.1 The reporting procedure

In the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, the parliamentary dimension of security and defence policy was strengthened through parliamentary defence committees. Committing political actors to defence development, particularly with regard to material capabilities, was a key objective. After the third committee’s work (1980–1981), this process was deemed too cumbersome. A lighter procedure was chosen by the parliamentary council for defence policy (1986) and the preceding defence policy committee (1990). With the end of the Cold War and Finland’s membership of the European Union, the security policy debate changed in Finland.

In the mid-1990s, this development led to the creation of the security and defence policy reporting procedure. The first Government report was submitted in 1995. Focusing solely on security policy, this report included no separate defence policy guidelines. In their current form, security and defence policy reports have been issued in 1997, 2001, 2004 and 2009. The reporting procedure has thus become a key tool in outlining Finland’s security and defence policy.
Section 44 of the Constitution of Finland prescribes that the Government may present a statement or report to Parliament on a matter relating to the governance of the country, or its international relations. Unlike consideration of a statement, no decision on confidence in the Government or one of its Members can be taken during consideration of a report.

In accordance with section 23 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, government statements and government reports are presented to Parliament and tabled for a later session, in which they will be considered off the agenda. The report is then referred to a committee for preparation. After handling the report, the committee requests Parliament’s opinion on it, following which Parliament determines the final content of its opinion.

In addition to parliamentary handling and approval of government reports, Parliament’s opportunities for participation have been increased by setting up a parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group, comprising Members of Parliament from various parties (including the opposition). Since the 2004 report, the monitoring group has also participated in the report’s preparation process. In their consideration of the 2009 security and defence policy report, the parliamentary committees stated the following:

The Foreign Affairs Committee (UaVM 5/2009 vp) notes in its report that

“The reports should place greater emphasis on the Government’s security and defence policy objectives and measures taken to meet these objectives. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Committee would like clarification on the report’s guiding role regarding the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society and the Internal Security Programme.”

In addition, the Foreign Affairs Committee has stated the following:

“Adopting the comprehensive concept of security as the premise for the Government reports on security and defence policy has represented a significant change, in terms of content, which has gradually gained ground. Along with the adoption of a comprehensive concept of security, the steering impact of the security and defence policy reports has also begun to focus on the administrative sectors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Interior. However, no clear definition of the concepts of comprehensive security and new threats has been provided, which conflicts with the politically potent, useful nature of such definitions. Particularly with regard to so-called new threats, in its current form the report is imbalanced in terms of describing the security environment, and drawing up guidelines based on such a description.”
In its statement, the Administration Committee (HaVL 6/2009 vp) notes that

“Measures aimed at developing internal security receive less attention and have a secondary position in the Government. This may be partly attributed to tradition, in which the adoption of a comprehensive concept of security is a relatively new development. In particular, action and implementation plans missing from the report constitute a problem from the internal security point of view. The Administration Committee requires that, in the future, the topic of internal security be treated on an equal basis to security and defence policy in the reporting procedure. Furthermore, the committee requires that, in the future, the security and defence policy report be divided into various sections, internal security comprising one of these.”

The Defence Committee (PuVL 4/2009 vp) states the following:

“... the name 'monitoring group' is misleading, as the group’s activities are clearly parallel, or even anticipatory, with respect to the actual reporting process. The monitoring group prepares its own evaluations of Finland’s security environment and the group’s recommendations are expected to have an influence on the content of the Government report. The monitoring group’s preliminary opinions, on matters that were supposed to be brought up only when presenting the report, have been heard in public. Differences in views or focus areas between the monitoring group’s report and the Government report may therefore constitute a problem.”

The Government report begins with an overview of the international situation, followed by an appraisal of how changes in it may affect Finland. These are followed by guidelines for the security and defence policy. The final chapter shows how these guidelines will be implemented in practice, to improve Finland’s security. While the report provides a very extensive description of security issues from the perspective of various administrative sectors, only the Defence Forces are presented with capability requirements.

Due to the dualistic nature of the report, Parliament has varying views as to which committee should issue a report on the Government report. The security and defence policy reports of 1995, 1997 and 2009 were handled by the Foreign Affairs Committee, whereas the 2001 and 2004 reports were assigned to the Defence Committee.

A Government outline issued every four years on developments in the Finnish security environment covers a long time span, rendering it too slow and inflexible. In four years’ time, unexpected changes may occur (for instance, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the global financial crisis), rendering the report less topical and its assessments less precise.
On each occasion, the preparation of the report has been organised differently, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister’s Office have been in charge of preparation in turn. In addition, the President has had substantial involvement in the reporting process. The Security and Defence Committee co-ordinated the preparation of the 2001 defence and security policy report. Working groups were set up for the preparation of the 2004 and 2009 reports. The various bodies involved in this preparation have brought their own administrative sector’s views to the process, rendering it difficult to avoid repetition and overlaps. In order to ensure a more structured, co-ordinated preparation process, more broad-based preparation is required, across the administrative boundaries of ministries.

With regard to the reporting procedure, the Foreign Affairs Committee (UaVM 5/2009 vp) notes in its report that

“…a clearer, tighter schedule should be established for the preparation and parliamentary handling of Government reports on security and defence policy. The report should be submitted to Parliament so that parliamentary handling can take place in the second parliamentary session of the parliamentary term at the latest. A tighter procedure would also render the report’s guiding impact more effective. In its current form, the report’s structure is too heavy and it has become too extensive for civic information purposes. The Foreign Affairs Committee considers it a structural deficiency of the latest report (2009) that Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines have not been presented in a consistent, clear manner. Parliament requires that the report be developed into a comprehensive security strategy providing balanced guidance for the development of all administrative sectors in the field of security, including resources.”

2.2 Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society

The most important functions of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy are safeguarding Finland’s independence, territorial integrity and society’s basic values, advancing the security and well-being of its citizens and sustaining the functioning of society. The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society is a Government resolution that provides grounds for securing these objectives. Even by international comparison, the strategy provides a unique way of comprehensively handling and steering preparedness. Many countries have shown interest in this Finnish concept and are developing their own security strategies in the same direction.

The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society is the Government’s steering document for the ministries. For its part, the strategy gives tangible form to the security and defence policy report and complements other steering
documents issued by the Government, dealing with various aspects of security. The strategy therefore forms a common basis for preparedness and crisis management for all actors in society. The Government resolutions of 2003 and 2006, on securing the functions vital to society, define such vital functions and the responsibilities of various administrative sectors in safeguarding them.

The comprehensive, intersectoral perspective is also emphasised in the resolution revised in 2010. Based on co-ordination by the Security and Defence Committee, the resolution was updated to reflect anticipated near-future developments in Finland’s security environment. An intersectoral writing group was set up for the updating process, in order to ensure that account is taken of the views of various administrative sectors and other actors. The reviewed resolution of 2010 pays specific attention to the international dimension, as well as to the role of the business sector and non-governmental organisations in society’s preparedness. Furthermore, greater emphasis is given to the role of the municipalities and the impact of the regional state administration reform. The revised strategy is to be adopted by the Government in December 2010 and named the Security Strategy for Society.

The Security Strategy for Society is a Government policy document for ministries, dealing with how to manage preparedness-related matters in each administrative sector, what matters are of particular importance to society in terms of preparedness, the preparedness targets of each administrative sector, strategic tasks, and how to achieve them. Ministries are responsible for handling matters in their own administrative sectors, through legislative and other means and in such a way that the Government’s intentions, as expressed in the resolution, are fulfilled.

The Security Strategy for Society has been drawn up from the perspective of vital functions of society to be safeguarded under all circumstances. Such functions are intersectoral functional entities vital to society that must be secured at all times. The Security Strategy for Society describes these functions and defines their desired statuses. According to the Security Strategy for Society 2010, Finland’s vital functions are:

- Management of Government affairs
- International activity
- Finland’s defence capability
- Internal security
- Functioning of the economy and infrastructure
- The population’s income security and capability to function
- Psychological crisis resilience
The security strategy also describes vital functions and threat models that endanger their continuity. The 2010 strategy includes thirteen threat models, instead of the previous nine. These threat models have been drawn up with the aim of taking better account of our society’s vulnerability. The models are intended to better serve the risk analysis work carried out within both the administration and the business sector. The threat models are:

- Serious failure in power supply
- Serious disruptions in telecommunications and information systems (cyber threats)
- Serious disruptions in transport logistics
- Serious disruptions in the community infrastructure
- Serious disruptions in food supply
- Serious disruptions in the financial and payment system
- Liquidity problems in public finances
- Serious disturbances in the health and wellbeing of the population
- Major accidents, extreme forces of nature and environmental threats
- Terrorism and other crime posing a threat to society
- Serious disturbances in border security
- Political, economic and military pressure
- Use of military force

As the threat models indicate, the security of the state faces various threats which may involve non-military aspects. As a key objective, the state should therefore have the capability to respond, at a sufficiently early stage, to events influencing security and possible signs of such events. Securing vital functions is based on sufficient, long-term development of capabilities, their timely and flexible deployment, and the ability to harness capabilities already deployed.
In order to render threat models more concrete, and in support of further threat analysis by various actors, the strategy identifies disruptions and disturbances, i.e. a threat or event endangering the security of society, its ability to function or citizens’ living conditions and security, at least momentarily or regionally. Disturbances may occur both under normal conditions and in an emergency situation.

Disturbances occurring under normal conditions will be managed using the authorities’ normal statutory powers or resources. Systems and preparedness measures established under normal conditions create the foundation for action in an emergency situation. Similarly, arrangements created for emergency conditions can be utilised in managing disturbances under normal ones. However, managing a situation under emergency conditions may require additional powers or resources. More extensive or closer co-operation and communication between authorities and other actors is usually required for the management of such situations. Some types of disturbances may be related to several threat models, depending on the point of view, the source of threat, or its repercussions. For each of these disturbances, primary responsibility for preparedness has been assigned to a certain ministry.

*Source: Ministry of Defence*
The Security Strategy for Society harmonises and co-ordinates preparedness in various administrative sectors. The strategy is aimed at avoiding overlaps when developing resources, while preventing a situation where capabilities necessary to securing functions vital to society are left undeveloped. In addition, the strategy is used in informing citizens about government-led measures taken to reinforce the security of society and the population. Moreover, the strategy functions as a way of mediating information for international co-operation partners, on the foundations of Finnish thinking and policy on security in society.

Jointly with the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness, the Security and Defence Committee is responsible for monitoring the Security Strategy for Society. These monitoring activities produce information for the Government on whether resources are properly allocated, in order to secure functions vital to society and to continuity in its functioning. In addition, monitoring enables the co-ordination of the strategy’s updating and development measures related to comprehensive defence. The Government decides on the strategy’s updating.

Through the Security Strategy for Society, preparedness of the ministries has been successfully harmonised and tools have been provided for risk management and contingency planning conducted by companies and municipalities. Several municipalities use the strategy in support of their contingency planning. For companies, the threat models outlined in the strategy provide a basis for risk analyses and business continuity planning. Among non-governmental organisations, for instance, the Finnish Red Cross and the National Defence Training Association of Finland utilise the strategy in planning and carrying out their activities. The core contents of defence courses are based on the Security Strategy for Society and the principle of comprehensive defence.

### 2.3 Government decision on the targets of security of supply

Security of supply is guaranteed in Finland through an extensive co-operation network, encompassing various sectors of trade and industry, various administrative sectors and industry organisations. In Finland, there is a long tradition of partnership between the public and private sectors. Indeed, a great deal of preparation is based on co-operation between public authorities and the business sector, through voluntary agreements.

Since the 1980s, the Government has regularly set general development objectives for security of supply. The latest Government decision on this was issued in 2008. According to the decision, the general objective is security of
supply based on the international markets. Preparedness measures secure infrastructure crucial to the functioning of society and the continuity of critical production in all situations.

The decision depicts the worst-case scenario for security of supply as a crisis situation in which the capability to produce critical articles and services, or obtain them from abroad, is temporarily disrupted. Other key threats endangering society’s economic functioning include disruptions in electronic information and communications systems, failures in energy supply, serious disturbances in citizens’ health and ability to function, as well as natural and environmental disasters. The level of security of supply will be dimensioned so that citizens’ living conditions and ability to function, as well as the functioning of society, can be maintained during serious disturbances under normal conditions and in emergency conditions, including in a state of defence.

The decision on the targets for security of supply defines focus areas for near-term development. These are divided into securing critical infrastructure (energy grids, ICT systems, transportation logistics, financial systems, water supply and other community infrastructure, construction and maintenance of infrastructure) and securing critical production (food supply, energy supply, health care, manufacturing supporting national defence, the export industry). Each category has been assigned individual, sector-specific targets.

2.4 Internal Security Programme

Internal security is a state of society in which everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law and a safe society, without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disruptions, accidents or any other phenomena arising in Finnish society or our increasingly globalised world. Internal security also involves preparing for major accidents, as well as other disruptions occurring under normal conditions.

The Internal Security Programme is a Government resolution specifying key priorities, objectives and measures for the intersectoral development of internal security. The Government issued a decision concerning the programme in 2004 and 2008, with the latter setting the objective of Finland being the safest country in Europe by 2015. The programme deals with the following areas:

- Improving safety in the home, during leisure time and when moving around
- Improving the security of immigrants and ethnic minorities
- Reducing violence
- Boosting competitiveness by improving business security
- Preventing major accidents and disasters
- Border security
- Preventing illegal immigration and ensuring customs security
- Preventing human trafficking and the related crime
- Fighting organised crime
- Preventing cybercrime and risks related to using the Internet
- Combating terrorism, preventing illegal action by extremist movements and violent radicalisation

The Internal Security Programme was prepared and is being implemented through broad-based co-operation between authorities at central, regional and local levels, and within non-governmental organisations and the business sector. A ministerial group on internal security steers the programme’s implementation and evaluates trends in internal security, including on a broader basis. The ministerial group will be assisted by the Internal Security Programme Steering Group in steering the programme’s implementation.

The Internal Security Programme will be jointly implemented by the authorities, NGOs and the business sector. The authorities will ensure that the objectives defined in the programme are achieved and its measures implemented as part of normal operational and financial planning and performance guidance. The programme has strengthened co-operation between various actors and created a framework for co-operation enabling the intersectoral preparation and implementation of issues. Its implementation and results are monitored on a regular basis; the implementation of defined measures has largely proceeded as laid out in the programme.

3 Legislation on preparedness

Provisions concerning preparedness are divided into legislation on normal and emergency conditions. The authorities’ duty to prepare for emergency conditions is based on section 40 of the Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991). Under this provision, the Government, the state administrative authorities, state businesses and other state authorities, as well as municipalities shall ensure, by means of emergency plans, the prior preparation of emergency operations and other measures, that their duties are performed with minimum disruption, including in emergency conditions. Preparedness for emergency conditions is managed, supervised and co-ordinated by the Government and by each Ministry within its administrative sector.
The purpose of the Emergency Powers Act is to secure the livelihood of the population and the national economy, to maintain legal order and constitutional and human rights, and to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of Finland in emergency conditions. According to the Emergency Powers Act, the following constitute emergency conditions:

- An armed attack against Finland, as well as war and the aftermath of war;
- A serious violation of the territorial integrity of Finland and
- the threat of war against the country;
- War or a threat of war between foreign countries
- and a serious international crisis implying the threat of war and requiring immediate action to increase Finland’s defensive readiness, as well as other specific conditions outside Finland but with a comparable effect, if they may pose a grave danger to the foundations of national living conditions and well-being referred to in section 1(1);
- A serious threat to the livelihood of the population or the foundations of the national economy, brought about by the hampered or interrupted import of indispensable fuels and other energy, raw materials and goods or by a comparable serious disruption of international trade;
- A catastrophe

However, the above-mentioned circumstances constitute emergency conditions only if the authorities cannot control the situation using regular powers.

The Government’s proposal for a new emergency powers act (HE 3/2008 vp) has been handled by Parliament, which opted to defer a decision until after the next parliamentary elections. The proposal concerns the enactment of a new emergency powers act, which would repeal the current act of the same name. This reform is aimed at bringing the Emergency Powers Act in line with the requirements of the Constitution. Furthermore, the purpose is to update the provisions on the authorities’ statutory powers in emergency conditions. The new law would change the decision-making procedure regarding the application of the Emergency Powers Act, such that the use of powers, as laid down in the Act, would be authorised by government decree rather than a presidential decree. Prior to issuing this provision, the Government must jointly declare with the President that emergency conditions prevail in the country. Parliament will take the final decision on the validity of the commissioning decree and how long it remains in force.

Only minor changes are proposed for provisions concerning preparedness under the Emergency Powers Act. It is proposed that preparedness duties be enacted under section 12 of the Act, in a similar way, content-wise, to section
40, subsection 1 of the Emergency Powers Act. According to section 13, concerning the management, supervision and co-ordination of preparedness, preparedness would be managed and supervised by the Government and each ministry within its own sector. Preparedness would also be co-ordinated by each ministry in its own sector. The new emergency powers act does not propose the co-ordination of preparedness by the Government, but only refers to other legislation, such as section 10, subsection 3 of the Government Rules of Procedure (the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries and the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness), and section 16, subsection 3 (co-ordination of comprehensive defence).

According to section 23 of the Constitution of Finland, necessary, provisional exceptions to basic rights and liberties, as provided for in legislation, are possible in the case of an armed attack against Finland, or in the case of an emergency that poses a threat to the nation and is, under law, considered as serious as an armed attack. Provisional exceptions such as those defined in section 23 of the Constitution of Finland must be compatible with Finland’s international human rights obligations. In its report on the constitutional reform of 2000, the Constitutional Law Committee states that the enactment of new, purely national laws deviating from the Constitution should be avoided, and exceptive acts should be resorted to only in highly exceptional cases and for compelling reasons.

In order to safeguard the independence of the state and maintain legal order, defence of the state can be rendered more efficient and security reinforced by declaring a state of defence by presidential decree and parliamentary consent (State of Defence Act 1083/1991). The presidential decree on declaring a state of defence can be issued for a certain period of time, not exceeding three months. It must mention the provisions to be implemented, and if they are not implemented nationally, their regional scope of application. The implementing decree must also be immediately submitted to Parliament for consideration. If Parliament so decides, the decree must be repealed. If the decree has not been submitted to Parliament within one week of its issuance, it shall lapse.

During a state of defence, the State of Defence Act (1083/1991) is in force alongside the Emergency Powers Act. The Emergency Powers Act will be applied only in so far as no other provisions have been issued in the State of Defence Act in case of war. The State of Defence Act is an exceptive act for times of crisis that regulates official powers when war is waged on Finland, and in violent internal conflicts with a serious impact on maintaining public order and aimed at repealing or changing the system of government as laid down in the Constitution.
The Rescue Act (468/2003) lays down core obligations regarding planning and other preparedness activities in civil defence. Section 50 of the Rescue Act lays down provisions concerning preparedness in civil defence. Civil defence preparations conducted under normal conditions include planning and training for emergency conditions, construction of protective structures, maintenance of management, surveillance and alert systems and telecommunications, as well as preparing for evacuation, rescue operations, first aid, care for the population and clearance and cleaning activities. Specific powers exercised by the rescue services under emergency conditions are laid down in the Emergency Powers Act. The Government’s proposal for a new rescue act has been issued on 19 November 2010 (HE 257/2010 vp).

The purpose of the Security of Supply Act (1390/1992) is to safeguard economic functions and the related technical systems considered crucial to the livelihood of the population and the national economy and national defence (security of supply). General objectives for security of supply have been set in the Government’s decision (539/2008), defining the level of preparedness while taking account of the minimum needs of the population and the necessary trade and industry, as well as national defence.

Emergency conditions may necessitate resorting to exceptional measures as laid down in the State of Defence Act and Emergency Powers Act. In accordance with these Acts, under emergency conditions exports and imports may need to be regulated, production necessary for the defence of the state steered, transports and traffic monitored and regulated, temporary labour obligations issued and the population evacuated from areas where special military defence action is urgently required due to an attack or similar act.

4 Preparedness arrangements

4.1 Decision-making and co-operation between highest organs of government

According to the Finnish constitution, the powers of the State in Finland are vested in the people, who are represented by Parliament. Legislative power is exercised by Parliament, which also decides on central government finances. The President and Government, whose members must have the confidence of Parliament, exercise governmental power. Judicial power is exercised by independent courts of law. The division of governmental duties and parliamentarianism also form a constitutional foundation for preparedness arrangements.
Parliament monitors Government activities and policy in many ways. Tools for parliamentary control include interpellations, written parliamentary questions, parliamentary question times for oral questions, topical discussion, reports and communications and Prime Minister's announcements. Ministers have the right to be present and speak during plenary sessions of Parliament.

In accordance with the Constitution, the President of the Republic takes decisions on the basis of motions proposed by the Government. If the President does not take a decision in accordance with the Government’s motion, the matter is returned to the Government for further preparation. The Government enacts the decision following its final approval by the President. The President of the Republic will accept the Government’s or a minister’s resignation upon request. The President may also dismiss any minister upon the Prime Minister’s proposal. Should the Government or any minister cease to enjoy the confidence of Parliament, the President is required to dismiss them without any request being presented to do so.

When the President of the Republic is prevented from carrying out his or her duties, these are assumed by the Prime Minister or, if the Prime Minister is also incapacitated, by the Minister acting as Deputy Prime Minister. The President decides on matters of war and peace, with the consent of Parliament. When necessary, the President issues a decree concerning statutory powers in accordance with the Emergency Powers Act and State of Defence Act. This decree is prepared and presented to the President by the ministry to which the introduction of such powers is most necessary to managing its administrative duties.

As laid down in section 128 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. The President makes decisions on military orders and military appointments as provided by an act (section 58). The President decides on matters related to military orders, referred to in section 31, subsection 1 of the Act on the Defence Forces, upon their presentation by the Minister of Defence, and other military-order related matters upon their presentation by the Chief of Defence. On his or her own initiative, or upon a representation by the Minister of Defence, the President may refer a matter concerning a military order for consideration by a Presidential session of the Government. In such a case, the President will decide on the matter upon its presentation by the Minister of Defence, without seeking the Government’s opinion. The Chief of Defence is entitled to attend such sessions and express his or her views. With respect to military orders involving the Front Guard, the President takes decisions upon representations by the Minister of the Interior, in accordance with the Act on border guard administration.
On 10 May 2010, the Ministry of Defence set up a working group tasked with the preparation of a proposal on new provisions concerning the decision-making procedure with respect to military orders, under the Act on the Defence Forces. The working group is to draw up its proposal, on amending the Act on the Defence Forces, in the form of a government proposal and submit its report on 31 March 2011 at the latest.

In accordance with section 93, subsection 1 of the Constitution, Finland’s foreign policy is managed by the President of the Republic in collaboration with the Government. Under subsection 2 of the same section, the Government is responsible for the national preparation of decisions to be made in the European Union and takes decisions on the related measures. Close co-operation between the President and Government is required for the management of foreign policy. In accordance with section 93, subsection 2 and sections 96 and 97 of the Constitution, Parliament also participates in the national preparation of decisions to be made within the European Union, with the Grand Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee occupying the main role.

The co-operation obligation, as prescribed under the division of powers concerning international affairs, requires that the President and Government provide each other with appropriate and timely information on matters relevant to foreign policy. When formulating Finland’s stance on foreign and security policy matters of moment within the European Union, the Government must closely co-operate with the President of the Republic, in order to ensure the uniformity and consistency of Finland’s foreign policy. The Constitutional Law Committee (PeVL 36/2006 vp) is of the opinion that the joint meeting of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy is a viable and appropriate forum for such co-operation. Co-operation practices vary, depending on the stage of preparation and importance of the matter. In matters of far-reaching significance, the President must consult the entire Government. In situations requiring urgent decisions, it may be sufficient for the President to contact the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy or an individual minister, chiefly the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or another minister responsible for the preparation of the matter in question.

In accordance with section 65 of the Constitution of Finland, the Government has general authority in matters concerning governmental and administrative duties. In accordance with the principle of parliamentarianism, the Government must enjoy Parliament’s confidence. The Government contributes to decision-making by the President of the Republic and presents recommendations to the President. As laid down in section 67 of the Constitution, matters under
the Government’s authority are decided on, either at plenary meetings of the
Government or at the ministry in question. The Government comprises the
Prime Minister and a requisite number of other ministers. These ministers are
accountable to Parliament for their official actions. Each minister participating
in the handling of a matter in Government is accountable for the decision,
unless they have submitted a dissenting opinion for the record.

A Government plenary session can be convened as necessary on every day of
the year, at any time of the day. Members of the Government are responsible
for keeping the other organs of government, Parliament and the President
of the Republic, sufficiently informed on the handling and content of matters
falling under their authority. Co-ordinated schedules for the preparation of
decisions and decision-making form the backbone of co-operation between
various organs of government. In exceptional situations, this schedule will
be adjusted, while ensuring that all persons responsible have a genuine
opportunity to familiarise themselves with the matter under consideration.

In accordance with section 66 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister leads
the Government and oversees the co-ordination of the preparation and
consideration of matters falling within the Government’s mandate. Each ministry
is responsible for the preparation of matters within the Government’s mandate
and the appropriate functioning of administration in its own administrative
sector. Ministries are led by a minister. Responsibility for ensuring that each
administration functions appropriately also covers the steering and monitoring
of administration under the ministry in question. In this way, the parliamentary
nature of ministerial administration extends downwards to lower administrative
levels.

In practice, the Government has an established way of operating that ensures
that all members of Government have the same verified information in all
situations, as required to manage their tasks appropriately and bear ministerial
responsibility. For sharing information, the Government also has other forms
of co-operation, such as informal cabinet meetings, cabinet evening sessions
and cabinet committees. Like her predecessors, the current Prime Minister has
the group of government party chairmen, the Quartet, in support of decision-
making.

In accordance with the Government Act, section 23, the Government has
cabinet committees for the preparation of foreign and security policy, European
Union affairs, finances and economic policy. The members of these cabinet
committees must be members of the Government. More detailed provisions on
the duties and composition of cabinet committees are issued in a government
The Prime Minister chairs the informal cabinet meetings and cabinet evening sessions. They also convene at the Prime Minister’s invitation. The Prime Minister’s special adviser serves as secretary at these sessions. Each cabinet committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. Cabinet committees have secretariats that operate under the guidance of the Chair. In practice, the secretariats are also steered by the ministries responsible for each sector. Secretariats are in a key position in convening cabinet committees, since they follow topical affairs and monitor the progress made in preparation processes. The secretariats put forward proposals on the need to convene. Cabinet committees meet at established times on a weekly basis.

In practice, the meeting of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, as provided in section 24 of the Government Act, has become an important part of the preparation of matters falling under the sphere of foreign and security policy.

4.2 Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy

The duties of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy are defined in section 25 of the Government Rules of Procedure (VNOS 262/2003). According to this provision, the committee prepares important matters related to foreign and security policy and other matters concerning Finland’s relations with other states, as well as related internal security matters and important matters pertaining to comprehensive defence. The committee also handles issues related to the co-ordination of matters falling within its mandate.

The committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its other members are the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a minister designated by the Government to handle matters falling within the mandate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, and a maximum of four other ministers designated by the Government. The Minister of the Interior attends meetings of the committee when the matters at hand concern issues within his or her mandate. Any other minister may also take part in the consideration of a matter by the committee, when issues within his or her mandate are involved.
Joint meetings of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy have become regular practice. When the President attends, he or she chairs the meeting. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs serves as the committee’s secretariat. In addition, the Director of Government Communications attends meetings of the committee and provides information on decisions taken in line with instructions from the Prime Minister.

The committee convenes once or twice a month, usually on Fridays after the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs and the presidential session. As the meetings deal with topical issues in foreign and security policy, the meeting agenda and schedules are not usually known far in advance. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for preparing foreign and security policy decisions, and plays a key role as the secretariat of the committee and in preparing the agenda. Handling of matters at committee meetings is based on memorandums drawn up by responsible ministries. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy has also organised seminars related to the preparation of certain themes.

4.3 Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs

The duties of the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs are defined in section 26 of the Government Rules of Procedure (VNOS 262/2003). The committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its members include the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and three other ministers, two of whom are designated by the Government, while the third is the minister under whose mandate the matter in hand falls. If necessary, the Government may designate a further minister as a member of the committee. All the other ministers may also take part in meetings of the committee.

A matter is presented to the committee by the minister within whose mandate the matter lies. The Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs prepares matters to be decided within the European Union and brought to the committee by either the Prime Minister or the minister under whose mandate the matter in hand falls, or if the matter’s consideration by the committee is otherwise considered appropriate.

Secretarial services for the committee are provided by the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs. Minutes are taken of the meetings. In so far as the matter is not considered by the Government and is not confidential, these
minutes are immediately made public. In addition, the Director of Government Communications attends meetings of the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs and provides information on decisions taken, in line with instructions from the Prime Minister.

In addition to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs, the Government has two other statutory cabinet committees, the Cabinet Finance Committee and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. The Cabinet Finance Committee is tasked with exercising advance financial control. The committee prepares matters of notable economic significance or which otherwise require the opinion of the Cabinet Finance Committee. The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy handles matters related to overall economic development and economic policy, the main development outlines of the public finances and other issues requiring economic policy measures, as decided by the Prime Minister.

4.4 Preparedness by central government

Finland has a long tradition of preparing for disturbances and emergency conditions. Over the decades, through co-operation between authorities and companies, systems of preparedness and response capabilities have been created that are versatile and well-functioning, even on an international scale. Nevertheless, the structures and systems within our society’s operating environment have undergone significant changes in recent decades. As the scope of public administration has reduced, many tasks previously handled by the authorities have shifted to companies and state-owned companies that base their operations on economic principles. Moreover, nearly all functions of society increasingly depend on functioning energy systems, as well as telecommunications and information systems. Consequently, such changes pose new challenges to preparedness in society.

There have been constant changes in the international operating environment. However, networking with other states and Finland’s stronger international position have increased our preparedness opportunities. Preparedness now encompasses new ways of operating. At the same time, the internationalisation of business has resulted in weaker self-sufficiency in some respects, as many functions important to security of supply, as well as material stocks, have moved beyond Finland’s borders.

Preparedness arrangements for emergency conditions will be based, as closely as possible, on functions and the division of powers under normal conditions.
As noted in chapter three, preparedness for emergency conditions is managed, supervised and co-ordinated by the Government and each ministry in their respective administrative sectors, in accordance with the Emergency Powers Act. At each ministry, the permanent secretary, assisted by the head of preparedness, is responsible for preparedness within the administrative sector in question. Elsewhere in central government, the director general or the head of institute bears the main responsibility for ensuring a well-functioning agency or institute.

For co-ordinating the ministries’ preparedness for emergency conditions, ministry officials who have been designated heads of preparedness convene regularly in a Meeting of Heads of Preparedness. These meetings are chaired by the Director of Government Security from the Prime Minister’s Office. Meetings concerning central government crisis management are chaired by the head of preparedness of the ministry within whose mandate the matters related to the situation’s management mainly fall (competent ministry).

In addition to the Security and Defence Committee secretariat, the core of the secretariat of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness comprises representatives of the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who manage this task alongside their own duties. In addition to the aforementioned, a broader composition of the secretariat includes the preparedness secretaries from all ministries, who manage the task alongside their own duties. Officials from various ministries who are members of the secretariat serve as experts in their respective administrative sectors and as contact persons for matters discussed in the meetings.

At the moment, co-operation between the Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness and the Security and Defence Committee, in monitoring the Security Strategy for Society and in preparedness and the planning of exercises, is based on the Security and Defence Committee secretariat also forming the core of the meeting secretariat. Until now, the Chair of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness has presented matters covered at the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries, but not those covered at meetings of the Security and Defence Committee. This procedure has been in line with the meeting practices of the Security and Defence Committee, because committee members present matters at committee meetings, naturally with the help of the relevant experts.

Threat management requires the application of procedures that are familiar to and practiced by all actors involved in preparedness and the management of disturbances. The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society of 2006 described the central government crisis management model for the first time. In conjunction with the 2010 Security Strategy for Society, the development
of crisis management has been under discussion and experiences gained from activities and exercises have been analysed. National organisations, whose activities focus on preparedness, must be more closely involved in the planning of national preparedness and operational exercises.

Situation awareness is a key area for future development. The Government needs to obtain situational information rapidly. Furthermore, competent authorities at various administrative levels require better situation awareness in support of their activities. At the same time, preconditions must be created for supporting various organisations and the business sector. Situations will be managed proactively and sufficient resources employed immediately. At Government level, when necessary the competent ministry will manage activities and co-operation between ministries. The competent authority will manage operational activities. Intersectoral co-operative bodies will support the competent authority.

4.5 Preparedness at regional level

In recent decades, regional state administration has been under constant reform, rendering co-operation between various actors and the development of preparedness more difficult. As the regional administration reform took effect in 2010, new regional state administrative agencies (AVI) and centres for economic development, transport and the environment (ELY) were established. These agencies and centres occupy a key position in preparedness activities at the level of regional administration. There are six regional state administrative agencies in mainland Finland, handling tasks related to permits, supervision and legal protection that previously belonged to the state provincial offices, regional environmental centres and occupational safety and health inspectorates. Some services were transferred to the ELY Centres, established at the same time.

The regional state administrative agencies promote the implementation of basic rights and legal protection, access to basic public services, environmental protection, environmental sustainability, public safety and a safe and healthy living and working environment in their respective regions. These agencies are responsible for the co-ordination of preparedness in the regions. They also arrange the related co-operation, co-ordinate contingency planning, organise regional defence courses, support the municipalities’ contingency planning, arrange preparedness exercises and promote security planning in regional and local administration. Steering of various sectors within regional administration is the responsibility of the respective ministries.
Decisions on staff working in branch offices are made by the regional state administrative agency.

Source: Ministry of Finance
Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment
Head and branch offices

Regional division
15 regions of operation
- Lapland
- Kainuu
- North Karelia
- Ostrobothnia and Central Ostrobothnia
- South Ostrobothnia
- Central Finland
- North Savo
- North Karelia
- South Savo
- Pirkanmaa
- Satakunta
- Southwest Finland
- South Karelia and Kymenlaakso
- Kanta-Häme and Päijät-Häme
- Uusimaa and East Uusimaa

Head office
- All three main areas of responsibility: Business and industry, labour force, competence and cultural activities; the environment and natural resources; and the required number of services in the transport and infrastructure area of responsibility

Further division in regions
9 operational regions
1. Lapland
2. North Ostrobothnia, Kainuu
3. South Ostrobothnia
   Ostrobothnia
   Central Ostrobothnia
4. Central Finland
5. North Savo
   North Karelia
   South Savo
6. Pirkanmaa
7. Satakunta
   Southwest Finland
8. South Karelia, Kymenlaakso
9. Uusimaa, East Uusimaa,
   Kanta-Häme, Päijät-Häme

Source: ELY Centres, communications services
Regional state administrative agencies provide expert assistance to municipalities in matters related to preparedness and the municipality’s contingency planning. In addition, the regional state administrative agencies support the competent authorities and, when necessary, co-ordinate their activities when the authorities are managing security situations in the region. In order to promote regional preparedness, regional preparedness committees, led by the director-generals of the regional state administrative agencies, have been established. These committees have wide representation from all key actors in the region and the regional administration. Such actors include the municipalities, the police and rescue services, the Border Guard, the Defence Forces, the hospital districts, the emergency response centres and various organisations, such as the Finnish Red Cross.

The regional administration reform and its impact on preparedness activities by the Finnish Red Cross

The organisation’s opportunities for co-operation with the regional state administrative agencies and ELY Centres are only beginning to take shape. It is therefore hoped that the transitional period of regional administration reform will soon be brought to a conclusion, with good practices continuing as soon as possible.

The Red Cross has continued its co-operation, initiated when the provinces still existed, on preparedness committees and working groups. The preparedness committee provides a viable opportunity for organisations to exchange preparedness-related information with various actors. Genuine interest by the authorities in working group co-operation with the Red Cross is viewed very positively; it is hoped that this will strengthen, despite structural changes.

The regional aspect is emphasised in contingency and security planning conducted in co-operation between NGOs and authorities. The boundaries of Red Cross districts currently encompass different municipalities to regional boundaries, for instance. As a result of the regional-level aggregation of key authorities, such as the police and rescue services, in the planning of preparedness activities the districts’ operational areas do not enable efficient co-operation with the authorities.

In future, volunteers’ activities in support of authorities should be made official by means of written contracts. In this way, issues such as personnel changes would not endanger the position of volunteers in preparedness activities.

Under normal conditions, the preparedness committee is responsible for co-ordinating regional contingency planning between various authorities. Co-ordination of preparedness should be based on risk analyses, drawn up for each region, and threat assessments of accidents. During disturbances and emergency conditions, the preparedness committees can be convened to discuss the resolution of the crisis or disturbance. Nevertheless, the regional administrative authorities have no role in crisis management itself, with the
exception of the previously mentioned co-ordination task and some other duties under their responsibility, as laid down in special legislation. Regional state administrative agencies transmit information in support of operative, political and administrative decision-making by the municipalities, regional administration, other central government functions of the ministries and competent authorities within the region.

There are 15 ELY Centres, and their tasks consist of those of the former employment and economic centres, regional environmental centres, road districts and the transport departments and the departments for education and culture in the state provincial offices, as well as the functions of the Finnish Maritime Administration. Within their regions, ELY Centres are responsible for implementation and development tasks related to the environment and natural resources, transport and infrastructure, business and industry (including agriculture), use of labour, immigration, education and culture, on behalf of the respective ministries. ELY Centres are also responsible for the related preparedness and crisis management. The director of the ELY Centre is assisted by a person co-ordinating preparedness planning (preparedness secretary). The ELY Centre for Uusimaa hosts a joint head of preparedness for ELY Centres, who provides expert assistance to the other centres and ensures that their preparedness activities are managed efficiently and in line with the relevant standards.

4.6 Preparedness at municipal level

As laid down in the Constitution, Finland is divided into municipalities, whose administration is based on self-government by their residents. In the beginning of 2010, Finland had 342 municipalities, out of which 326 were in mainland Finland and 16 in the Åland Islands. Municipalities provide basic services to their residents. The most important services are social and health care, education and cultural services, and environmental protection and technical infrastructure. In local government, the municipalities occupy a key position in preparedness and the management of disturbances. This is because, under normal conditions too, municipalities bear the main responsibility for the organisation of basic services and other functions vital to society.

In accordance with the Emergency Powers Act, municipalities must ensure, by means of emergency plans, prior preparation of emergency operations and other measures, that their duties are performed with minimum disruption, including in emergency conditions. This is based on preparedness forming part of normal activities. Actors responsible for preparedness and the management
of disturbances are also responsible for managing the municipality’s obligations and operations and ensuring the continuity of operations. The Emergency Powers Act also contains provisions that allow for exceptions, issued by a Government decree, to some obligations laid down in the Municipality Act, such as postponing municipal elections or transferring decision-making power from the municipal council to the municipal executive board.

STEERING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN CENTRAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN VARIOUS SECURITY SITUATIONS

Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities

The level of preparedness within municipalities varies greatly. Some have up-to-date, well-prepared emergency plans. Preparedness of municipalities is led by municipal managers alongside the municipal executive board, as laid down in legislation. Should disturbances arise, the municipal manager is responsible for arranging co-operation in support of the competent authority, as well as for
managing the operations as a whole and securing financial resources within the municipality’s area. Co-operation between leading municipal officials is usually organised by way of a management group, which also forms the core of the basic organisation for preparedness and disturbance management. The management group is not an organ in the same sense as defined in the Local Government Act, but is responsible for co-ordinating the preparation and implementation of matters. In the case of disturbances, the management group supports action by competent authorities, using resources controlled by the municipality.

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local council and other organs consisting of senior elected officials</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal duties. Role is emphasised in long-term crises.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipal manager</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is responsible for the overall management of the situation, co-operation between competent authorities, arrangement of financial resources and participation of senior elected officials.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation organ of competent authorities. Other specialists may be invited (e.g. police).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local competent authorities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Each authority is responsible for the management of the situation within its own mandate.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities

Rescue services are municipal safety organisations. As the current Rescue Act became effective in 2004, the rescue services system maintained by municipalities changed from a service organised by individual municipalities to a regional system, with the country divided into 22 rescue service regions. In addition to the rescue authorities, the social and health authorities and environmental health authorities number among the important competent authorities in various disturbance situations.
With respect to the preparedness of municipalities, and in a wider sense, their security management as a whole, factors to be taken into account include various new trends in local government and services, such as changes in municipal and service structures and in municipal service provision. Municipalities are becoming larger in size, while the number of municipalities is decreasing. As a result of the Restructuring of Local Government and Services Project (PARAS), the service structure of municipalities is changing, with service duties being transferred from individual municipalities for joint handling by several municipalities. Service provision is also organised into companies or transferred entirely to private operators. This will result in a decrease in service provision under the direct control of individual municipalities. Consequently, individual municipalities will have fewer opportunities for direct control over the management of disturbance situations. Preparedness for them will be on a weaker footing, since each service provider is responsible for its own preparedness.

For their part, the municipalities also attend to the general safety of their residents. Security in municipalities comprises several factors and aspects. In addition to municipal emergency plans and ensuring undisturbed continuity of operations, the aim is to provide living conditions based on which municipality residents feel secure. Furthermore, co-operation networks at local level, which, in addition to municipal actors, involve regional state authorities, congregations, educational institutions and representatives of the business sector and organisations participating in local government service provision, play their own role in creating safety and managing disturbances.

4.7 Situation awareness

Reliable situation awareness, the competent authority’s understanding of what happened and factors that influenced the event, and an assessment of possible alternative developments in the situation, are an absolute prerequisite for decision-making and the management of a situation. The competent authority bears operational responsibility for the management of the situation, while the state leadership must be informed at a sufficiently early stage. In a networked, globalised society, it is essential to obtain information on the surroundings, what is happening and how this influences our own activities. Decision-makers at all levels must possess analysis-based, verified and appropriate situation awareness, or a situation picture, since they are expected to swiftly provide statements and bear political responsibility.
Situation awareness is one of the key foundations of decision-making at all levels of management. For more extensive international operations and for the Government to carry out its general foreign and security policy duties, it is important that operational authorities provide the state leadership with rapid and sufficient information on the situation and measures taken. Situational information obtained by the Government does not entail that it will interfere with operational activities. The Government may, in turn, hold information on foreign and security policy, for instance, that has not been available to operational management. For this reason, the flow of information from the Government to the authorities is also important.

Security Strategy for Society 2010:

Appropriate and rapid situation awareness, based on correct information and assessments, is emphasised during disturbances when decisions must be taken which may have a very broad impact.

According to the Security Strategy for Society, the Prime Minister’s Office is tasked with maintaining the situation awareness of the Government. In line with its assignment, the Prime Minister’s Office compiles an anticipatory, real-time situation picture to support decision-making and communications by the Government and to increase situation awareness on issues related to the security of the state and society. The Prime Minister’s Office combines information from various administrative sectors and reports to the Government on this basis. However, this procedure has not abolished the responsibility of ministries and ministers to inform the state leadership in matters related to their respective administrative sectors.

Situation awareness activities at governmental level began in 2003, on the basis of a Government resolution on the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society. In early 2005, the first situation awareness co-ordinator began to organise the collection of information from various ministries and authorities and to co-ordinate co-operation between different ministries, mainly the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence, for drawing up reviews on matters important to the security of the Finnish state and society. A monthly thematic report on topical security issues gathers information and assessments from various security authorities into a thematic entity, including key conclusions. These reports are primarily produced for the Prime Minister, President of the Republic, members of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the Minister of the Interior.
For the continuous provision of information to the Government and the authorities, a Government Situation Centre was established in September 2007. On call around the clock, in its current form the Centre employs eight people. The Government Situation Centre is also responsible for alerting the Government, permanent secretaries and heads of preparedness, and convening sessions, meetings and negotiations held at unusual hours on account of disturbances or crises. In addition, the Situation Centres serves members of the Government in matters related to close protection.

During the last two years, international contact point functions have been centralised in the Situation Centre. These functions are arranged on the basis of international agreements imposing obligations upon Finland (EU, UN, NATO) and on that of contractual decisions of the Council of the European Union, according to which Finland must arrange an alert and service point that fulfils international requirements, and from which necessary measures to provide and receive assistance can be initiated. The Government Situation Centre currently functions as Finland’s national contact point for information exchange under the EU’s crisis co-ordination arrangements, and under emergency service and certain NATO and UN alert arrangements. The transfer of civilian crisis management alert and on-call duties in Finland, to the Government Situation Centre, has already been decided on alongside the internal affairs administration. This project will be completed during 2011.

In recent years, the Government’s centralised information-sharing and situation awareness activities have been under development. There has been a need for the ministries and authorities to enhance the compilation and sharing of the situation picture within their own administrative sector and field of operations. This may have led to partially overlapping work in various situation centres. Each ministry develops its situation awareness activities from the perspective of management of its own administrative sector, while taking account of the needs of the Government’s common situation picture. For this reason, these activities as a whole are not managed in the most appropriate way.

Thematic reporting to the Government has been criticised on account of failing to provide sufficiently justified conclusions or any assessment of impacts on Finland’s security. The reports are compiled from material produced by various administrative sectors, for the purpose of thematic reporting. This material contains information that has already been transmitted by the ministry or agency in their own reports within their own organisations, and to interest groups. The core information in the thematic report is therefore already known to some recipients, for whom the reporting does not bring sufficient added
value. The content, choice of topics and co-ordination of anticipatory reports thus require further development.

4.8 Communications

The communication capability of authorities therefore requires the planning of their own arrangements, reserving and training personnel and making co-operation arrangements. Emergency plans must include sector-specific communications plans covering disturbances and emergency conditions. Among other issues, this plan must define the communications responsibilities of authorities, exceptional channels and means of communication, and contacts with the mass media and other key stakeholders.

The media industry and communications are undergoing a transitional phase, stemming from technological advances and the global reach of the Internet. While the Internet has turned the media global, it has also facilitated the dissemination of disinformation. The information society provides citizens with many opportunities to have an influence in crisis situations. However, easy and rapid sharing of information also poses a risk, since flawed or harmful information can be disseminated through social media, for instance. For this reason, from the point of view of the authorities as well as various companies and communities, it is important to strengthen and support official channels of information as a way of disseminating accurate information.

Particularly in the early stages of a crisis situation, the reliability of news is essential. Radio, television (especially the teletext service) and the Internet occupy the most important position in early-stage communications. As the crisis continues, the extent of information provided becomes more significant, since it can be obtained from various sources. Moreover, it is important to be familiar with media-use habits among citizens. The perceived importance of electronic news sources varies according to the time of day or the day in question, as the broadcast schedule has been designed to fit everyday routines. In terms of time and location, the Internet and mobile connections are more flexible. However, great differences in their use remain between population groups. Continuous effort is being put into narrowing these gaps. In a prolonged crisis, the importance of continuity in communication increases.

The Finnish Broadcasting Corporation YLE is under a statutory obligation to transmit public notifications by the authorities, further specified by decree, and to be prepared to run television and radio broadcasts in emergency conditions. In accordance with the Act on Radio and Television Operations (744/1998),
broadcasters are obliged to transmit notifications from the authorities, of which the entire population or residents of a specific area need to be rapidly informed. Such information must be published as such, without delay, in the online publication or programme in question.

Through contingency planning and preparedness for emergency conditions, television and radio broadcasters must ensure that their operations continue with as little disruption as possible, in both emergency situations and disturbances under normal conditions, as laid down in the Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991). In addition, television and radio broadcasters are also obliged to transmit information from the authorities to the public free of charge, if so deemed necessary in order to save human life or protect property, or to safeguard the functioning of society. More specific provisions can be issued by government decree. Such provisions may concern television and radio broadcasting operations necessary to saving human life, or for the management or security of society, or to ensure the operational capability of the business sector.

Not all population groups can be extensively reached through radio or television; for this reason, other electronic media are required in crisis communications. For instance, issuing an alert at night is a special problem that the media are unable to address. Instead, various media can jointly provide preliminary information through extensive coverage. Reaching and informing the growing number of people with a foreign background is a challenge.

Many different kinds of media already exist for crisis communications purposes. For instance, the creation of an open-access citizen portal for crisis communications is already under way. With respect to natural disasters, the analysis of information on the catastrophe and mobile communications are being developed under the LUOVA project. The results are likely to be applicable in improving night time communications, for instance. In addition, informal communications by citizens through social media, among other channels, provides new opportunities for sharing information and experiences through services other than those of the traditional media. In working life, occupational health and safety organisations can provide assistance in informing the working community.

A more open procedure is required in security policy debate and for the preparation of documents guiding preparedness. In chapter 2.2 below, the committee proposes that the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy organise broad-based seminar-type events focusing on security policy topics. Such discussion could further open up security policy to the general public,
helping them to achieve a better understanding of the issue as a common cause.

4.9 Security of supply

Security of supply refers to the capability to maintain economic basic functions in society that are vital to safeguarding the livelihood of the population, the functioning and security of society and the material prerequisites of national defence during serious disturbances and emergency conditions. In Finland, an essential component in the concept of security of supply is the operational reliability of systems deemed critical to society. Finland’s geopolitical position, climate conditions, long distances and sparse population pose various challenges to our security of supply. Finnish security of supply activities are therefore rather advanced in comparison to other EU member states.

Finland has a well-developed national economy that forms the basis of security of supply. If the economy is balanced and competitive, security of supply rests on a strong foundation. From the perspective of society’s overall interests, security of supply is best established when economic and industrial policy measures support the safeguarding of the population’s livelihood, society’s ability to function and the basic requirements of national defence. Society is developed in a holistic and balanced manner, with economic, social and environmental measures supporting the enhancement of resilience towards disturbances and improvement of security of supply.

The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for the development of security of supply and co-ordination of the related preparedness measures. However, each ministry develops security of supply within its own sector. The National Emergency Supply Agency, established in 1993 for the centralised development and maintenance of security of supply, operates under the Ministry for Employment and the Economy. Within the Agency, there is a Council for Security of Supply, as well as clusters and pools that serve as permanent co-operation bodies in a similar way to a committee, handling the general task of steering, co-ordinating and monitoring preparedness in their own sectors. The Council for Security of Supply is responsible for the maintenance and development of contacts with key co-operation partners, monitoring the status and development of security of supply, and putting forth proposals for measures. Financing for the operations of the National Emergency Supply Agency and the Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure is provided from the Security of Supply Fund, which is not included in the State budget. A
security of supply fee is levied in conjunction with energy taxes and credited to the Fund.

Various sectors’ dependence on technical systems has become an increasingly central factor in security of supply arrangements. International markets and networking are also of growing importance to national security of supply. However, because the market mechanism is insufficient to ensuring security of supply in all sectors, special measures are required. Some sectors vital to the functioning of society require legislation obliging companies to ensure the continuity of their operations. The prerequisites for the operations of companies providing services to the administration, security authorities and other companies, and which are deemed important in emergency conditions, must be ensured in all security situations. Key production factors to be secured include the energy transmission and distribution grids, ICT systems, transport logistics systems and water and food supply. As concerns health, the Finnish Red Cross Blood Service plays a key role in Finnish crisis preparedness.

National measures are still being taken to prepare for the most serious crises. Security of supply has placed more emphasis on strengthening and securing basic infrastructure, instead of stockpiling. This development is due to the transfer of a large part of public authorities’ duties to the business sector, as a result of privatisation. In Finland, private sector ownership of critical infrastructure is growing on a constant basis, having already reached around 70–80%. Although Finland has a long tradition of public-private partnership, co-operation with the business sector needs to be constantly developed, in order to increase the opportunities for national steering.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN SECURITY OF SUPPLY ACTIVITIES

National Emergency Supply Agency
Board

Council for Security of Supply

Food supply
• Primary production pool
• Food industry pool
• Trade and distribution pool

Energy supply
• Energy production pool
• Oil pool

Financial systems
• Finance pool
• Insurance pool

Transport and logistics
• Air transport pool
• Surface transport pool - regional commissions
• Maritime transport pool

Health care services
• Public health pool
• Water pool

Information society
• Electronics pool
• Printing industry pool
• Mass communications pool
• Communications networks pool
• Information technology pool
• Regional pool - TIVA commissions

Companies of strategic importance to the security of supply (approx. 2000)
• Chemical industry pool
• Construction pool - regional commissions
• Technology pool
• Textile industry pool
• Forest industry pool
• Plastic and rubber industry pool

Source: National Emergency Supply Agency
4.10 Psychological resilience to crisis

Psychological resilience to crisis is maintained by means of social cohesion, communications, education, protection of cultural identity and heritage, spiritual activities, the will to defend the country and civic activities and collective responsibility which reinforces crisis resilience. Psychological resilience is expressed in the determination to defend the independence of the state and sustain the livelihood and security of the population under all circumstances. The build up of psychological crisis resilience begins at birth. Parenting, the school system and military service, for instance, play an important role in creating such resilience. The crisis resilience of society is therefore based on balanced individuals with good psychological tolerance of crises.

The growth of new media and the decrease in the use of traditional news and information channels pose new kinds of challenges in terms of maintaining and reinforcing both a sense of community and psychological crisis tolerance. Particularly in a crisis situation, there is a need to strike a balance between the correctness and reliability of information and the speed of communications. In a networked world, anyone can share information through social media. Nowadays, no one has hegemonic control over news.

However, the sense of community is endangered by social exclusion and differentiation, as well as growing individualism, leading to an increasingly mosaic society. Consequently, trust in society is weakened. The lonelier people become, the weaker their resilience to crisis.

Reinforcing trust capital is essential in building people’s ability to tolerate and survive the emotional pressure created by security situations. There is often talk of social capital, with mutual trust at its core. This means that people trust each other, including people they do not know. Trust in other people increases the sense of security.

Trust is therefore connected to our basic sense of security. It is assumed that by strengthening social capital and social activities, citizens’ sense of security will also improve. For this reason, societal measures promoting voluntary activities in general, and civic activities related to preparedness in particular, are important to the ability to survive in a time of crisis. Moreover, securing continuity is important, since a sense of continuity creates a sense of security. In preparedness, continuity is based on a clear division of powers, well-rehearsed operating models and trust in adhering to common principles.

Social capital often refers to social networks, co-operation, utilising resources together and co-ordinating activities. The concept is frequently used to explain
the success and well-being of societies, communities or individuals. For instance, social capital is considered to ease social interaction and improve the flow of information. In this way, it enhances the whole of society’s ability to function, democracy, the economy and administration. Social capital can therefore be seen as one of a nation’s success factors, expressed as the “community’s way of doing things”.

Corruption, its type and extent is one way of measuring social capital within society. In the Nordic countries there is little corruption, which indicates that normal market mechanisms and practices can be relied upon in economic activities. Indeed, safety networks provided by the welfare society have fostered general trust in the economy, which increases the ability to take risks, flexibility and innovativeness, and the maintenance of economic dynamism, thereby improving the country’s competitiveness. From the perspective of social cohesion and social capital in Finland, it is important that gaps in well-being do not become too large. This means combating social exclusion and poverty, while promoting sustainable social development in general.

The Nordic countries have also traditionally had an active civic society, where trust in one’s fellow citizens has had a clearly broader basis than elsewhere. In this way, they have been able to maintain general trust in society. However, a decrease has been detected in civic activity, participation and co-operation. This is weakening society’s social capital and, consequently, the prerequisites for common preparedness arrangements. Nevertheless, recent studies indicate that a new wave of volunteering is emerging, with a strong value base of collective responsibility and readiness to help. Crisis situations may rouse a latent sense of community among the population. This may be manifested through an exceptional sense of solidarity, such as the desire to help strangers by way of practical action. Therefore, even a latent sense of community may nurture the population’s psychological resilience to crisis. In any case, it is important that as many people as possible possess basic aid skills, such as completed first aid training, since such skills increase the readiness to respond and function, even in surprising situations.

The strengths of Finnish society and the characteristics of its administration form the foundation of preparedness. In accordance with the comprehensive defence approach, Finland has a low threshold for co-operation between actors in various sectors, and long traditions in, for instance, national defence, security of supply and crisis management, based on close co-operation between the public and private sectors.
5 International dimension of preparedness

5.1 The European Union

Membership of the European Union is integral to Finland’s security policy. Drawn up in 2008, the EU Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy takes note of new challenges, such as the information network and energy security, in various ways. The EU has issued a directive aimed at protecting European critical infrastructures (2008/114/EC), with the purpose of securing infrastructures serving at least two Member States. Furthermore, the directive aims at agreement on the procedures by which critical infrastructures can be identified and designated.

The European Union is currently preparing a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, in order to prevent and minimise the damage caused by infrastructure disturbances or failures. Finland is an active participant in the Programme’s implementation, since strengthening EU security is in Finland’s best interests. In addition, the EU is also preparing a programme to secure functions vital to society in Europe, whose purpose is to prevent and minimise disruptions and the resulting damage.

In accordance with the solidarity clause (SopS 66 and 67/2009) of the Lisbon Treaty (2009):

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by Member States.

A request for assistance can be presented by the political authorities of the Member State in question. In the implementation of the solidarity clause, mutual assistance between Member States refers to the provision of executive assistance across national borders, executed by any authorities of Member States acting according to the wishes of the Member State requesting assistance. Most functions are civilian, such as police and rescue missions, possibly supported by the deployment of soldiers or defence force equipment in an assistive role. As concerns civilian measures, and depending on the situation, the case may also involve sectors other than the Ministry of the Interior.
With respect to civilian functions, the current legislation is thought to provide a firm foundation for implementing the solidarity clause. In providing assistance, various existing mechanisms based on bilateral or multilateral contractual co-operation structures, and the co-ordination mechanisms created under EU auspices, can be utilised. These mechanisms facilitate efficient and flexible utilisation of resources already at the disposal of Member States, in cases requiring the application of the solidarity clause.

The Finnish Government has examined the prerequisites for implementing the solidarity clause. In addition, the Finnish Defence Forces are viewed as being well-prepared to assist other authorities in receiving foreign assistance and providing support to other countries, especially in Finland’s neighbouring areas. Furthermore, it has been recommended that, as part of preparedness arrangements, the organisation of leadership and the division of responsibilities be evaluated with reference, for example, to liability for damage. In terms of civilian operations, Finnish legislation provides for the provision of assistance, but the potential use of force in implementing the solidarity clause would require legislative changes in relation to police and border control authorities and the Defence Forces.

Under section 12 of the Act on the Defence Forces, a decision to provide assistance to another state is taken by the Ministry of Defence, upon the request of the competent Ministry, after consulting the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. If the project is extensive and an important principle is at stake, or if the significance of the matter otherwise requires, a decision on participation by the Defence Forces is taken by the Government in a general session. If providing such assistance is of major foreign policy importance, the decision is taken by the President of the Republic. The Defence Forces may provide assistance in the form of equipment, materials or expertise, but not military force.

The Government Security and Defence Policy Report 2009 states that Finland will act in accordance with the solidarity clause and establish the necessary capabilities to provide and receive assistance.
In its report (UaVM 2/2006 vp), the Foreign Affairs Committee states the following:

“No artificial limitations or criteria should be imposed within the European Union with respect to the implementation of the solidarity clause; each situation should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.” Even if the clause’s practical implementation would chiefly comprise cooperation between the rescue and police authorities, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers it important that all resources, military included, of Member States be made available for implementation of the clause. The committee also pointed out that the Union’s crisis and emergency co-ordination arrangements would be naturally suited to the implementation of the solidarity clause. Furthermore, the committee underlined that no overlapping structures should be established.”

Arrangements for the Union’s implementation of the solidarity clause are by a decision of the Council (TFEU 222 (3) article) acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The mutual assistance obligation included in the Lisbon Treaty aims to reinforce solidarity among Member States and bolster their commitment to developing the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The mutual assistance clause of the Lisbon Treaty (2009):

If a Member State falls victim to armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States have an obligation to aid and assist it by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and co-operation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

The clause’s content, and its relationship to Finnish legislation, is addressed in detail in the Government Bill concerning approval of the Lisbon Treaty (HE 23/2008 vp, p. 104, 105, 112, 113, 158 and 159), which states, among other things, that, from the Finnish point of view, the European Union’s obligation to provide mutual assistance is of great importance politically and as a matter of principle, while further enhancing the central role of the EU in Finnish security policy.
According to the Finnish view, the mutual assistance obligation is directly binding on the Member States, and its application does not require a decision at Union level. This obligation surrenders no authority to the Union, leaving it up to each Member State to decide on provision and forms of assistance. At EU level, no debate has been initiated on how the assistance obligation will be implemented, nor have Member States given much thought to the meaning of the mutual assistance clause. On the other hand, the fact reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty, that all Member States belonging to NATO (21) implement their collective defence under the auspices of NATO, has an influence on the issue. The European Union lacks common defence planning and structures.

Each Member State is responsible for achieving national preparedness for the obligation’s implementation. Under Finnish legislation, the implementation of the EU obligation of mutual assistance should be placed on an equal footing with any collective defence activity launched under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. An exception to the rule would be situations in which the assistance obligation is applied to offensive measures other than those referred to in Article 51, or in which Finland decided to participate in implementing the assistance obligation by offering non-military assistance.

The EU Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements (CCA) have been designed for situations in which the crisis is so far-reaching, or of such political moment, that addressing it requires the co-ordination of EU measures. The CCA ensures the creation of common EU situation awareness and defines how EU bodies and Member States will co-operate in a situation in which two or more Member States are the object or victim of a disaster or emergency (including terrorism). After consultation with the Member State or States which have fallen victim to the crisis, the activation process is initiated by the holder of the EU Presidency. Operating under the European External Action Service is the EU SITCEN, a key organ of the CCA. In the above situations, information exchange with and between Member States is effected via the CCA website, maintained by SITCEN. This website can be activated at the onset of the crisis, even prior to the launch of the CCA system.

Various EU administrative sectors have alert systems, such as the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) related to food safety, and the Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (RAS-BICHAT) regarding health-related risks.

Furthermore, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has an alert system known as the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), which is managed by the EU Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre.
Via this system, support and assistance can be requested from e.g. Member States, for civil protection tasks. The Commission has also developed a general European rapid alert system called ARGUS, intended for situations similar to those described under the CCA system above. In this matter, cooperation is currently being developed between the Commission and the EU SITCEN. The EU is in the process of developing a Critical Infrastructure Warning and Information Network (CIWIN) for the purposes of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Finland’s national point of contact for the CCA, CECIS and CIWIN systems is the Government’s situation awareness centre.

The EU Political and Security Committee assembles twice a week and, if necessary, can be convened at short notice. A ‘Watch List’, a rough estimate of countries whose (security) development requires closer monitoring, is maintained by the EU.

5.2 Nordic countries

The Nordic Countries are involved in a form of official regional co-operation which ranks among the world’s oldest and most comprehensive. This political co-operation is based on common values and the will to achieve results promoting dynamic development and enhancing the competence and competitiveness of the Nordic Countries. Nordic co-operation is regulated under a range of agreements concerning various sectors. A key agreement regulating the forms and organisation of co-operation is the Helsinki Agreement (SopS 28/1962), signed in March 1962, and amended on several occasions since then. This co-operation agreement between Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark promotes close community between Nordic Countries, uniform regulation in as many sectors as possible, and the practical division of tasks between these countries.

Several ministries and other actors handling preparedness co-operate with other Nordic Countries over the related issues. For example, these countries have made agreements on arrangements concerning the pharmaceutical sector, securing the electricity transmission network, and co-operation in preventing the sea’s degradation by oil or other harmful agents. The ministers responsible for Nordic crisis readiness and civil protection signed the Haga Declaration and gave a joint statement in Stockholm in April 2009. Increasing co-operation over preparedness issues is an example of renewed interest in joint Nordic solutions.
This co-operation includes the following elements:
- Rescue service on the basis of current Nordred co-operation;
- Training and joint exercises, taking account of international exercises;
- Preparedness in the event of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear disasters;
- Crisis communication, with a special emphasis on informing Nordic citizens;
- Use of volunteers in order to intensify the exchange of experiences and enhance preparedness; and
- Research and development focused on finding new co-operation partners.

The Nordic co-operation within the defence sector has deepened significantly in recent years. The Nordic Countries have taken the decision to develop and reorganise their mutual co-operation in such a manner that former, separate collaborative arrangements have been integrated into a single structure (Nordic Defence Co-operation, NORDEFCO). This rearrangement decision was taken at the end of 2009, when Finland was acting as chairman of Nordic Defence Co-operation. Such co-operation covers defence policy and operations, and the development of military capabilities. Military co-operation will be developed within the Co-operation Areas of Strategic Development, Capabilities, HR and Education, Training and Exercises, and Operations. The implementation of new structures and forms of co-operation is presently under way. Although such co-operation will intensify in the long term, many minor concrete steps have already been taken.

5.3 NATO

In accordance with NATO’s Strategic Concept, the Alliance’s core tasks include collective defence, crisis management and the enhancement of international security. NATO has increasingly transformed itself into a broadly oriented, multilateral security policy and crisis management organisation. At the same time, its memberships and partnerships have expanded, now encompassing a network of over 60 countries. NATO has an impact in maintaining and promoting security and stability. While crisis management tasks have become increasingly important to NATO, collective defence remains at the core of the Alliance. Because the volume of crisis management operations is on the increase, the resources of NATO’s partner countries, including Finland and other potential co-operation partners, are needed in addition to those of the Alliance. At present, the biggest NATO operations are the crisis management operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) is tasked with providing support for Article 5 operations, crisis management operations and national authorities of NATO Allies in the event of crisis or disaster, as well as co-operating with partner countries. Civil emergency preparedness falls under national jurisdiction. Via Civil Emergency Planning, NATO provides support for national planning, and aims to ensure that each country has the national preconditions and capabilities required to protect its citizens (for example, in the event of a strike using chemical or biological weapons). The purpose of NATO’s civil activities is, first and foremost, to support the core functions, i.e. the military dimension, of the Alliance. Wide-ranging threats impact on the importance of NATO Civil Emergency Planning, in accordance with the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.

Traditionally, Civil Emergency Planning co-operation has been very open to partner countries. Finland has been an active participant in such co-operation in various sectors. In this way, Finland obtains knowledge of the practices followed by other countries and gains an opportunity for international networking. At the same time, Finland presents its own expertise in internal preparedness planning, putting it at the disposal of NATO and partner countries. Participation in such co-operation supports the development of national preparedness.

NATO has its own emergency rescue service for crisis situations (Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre, EADRCC). In the event of a crisis or disaster, allies and partners can forward detailed requests for assistance via the EADRCC or North Atlantic Council (NAC), but the needs of allies are prioritised. Finland also participates in EADRCC’s multinational decision-making and field exercises. NATO has no centralised security of supply system or common supply security stockpiles.
PART III: COMMITTEE’S KEY COMMENTS
AND PROPOSALS

1 Enhancing proactive preparedness

1.1 Development of co-operation on the basis of comprehensive security

Part II of this report, above, describes the ways in which changes in the operating environment impact on the structures of the public authorities, business sector and society as a whole. It also calls for an examination of preparedness from the perspective of the comprehensive security concept. If, instead of ‘comprehensive defence approach’, we discuss ‘comprehensive security’ on a broader scale, we will obtain a modern and more easily understandable approach to describing various kinds of threats and disruptions.

For this reason, in its proposals, the committee uses the terms ‘comprehensive security’, ‘Security Committee’, and ‘Security Secretariat’. However, the current comprehensive defence approach, which the committee was assigned to review, still serves as an operating model. It refers to the involvement of the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, and the co-ordination of their preparedness-related functions in order to maintain functions vital to society under any circumstances. As a modus operandi, a comprehensive defence approach is progressive even in international terms. Among other things, this comprehensive defence approach is used to designate tasks for the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, and the division of labour between ministries. In using the term ‘comprehensive security’, the committee is not suggesting change in the basic elements of preparedness arrangements or in the co-ordination of comprehensive defence, currently part of the Ministry of Defence’s mandate.

However, as the operating environment changes, the current systems must be made more efficient and preparations must be made for new kinds of disruption that may be difficult to foresee. The purpose is to improve the resilience to crises of society as a whole. Only common resources are available to society. Depending on the severity of the crisis, their utilisation with the greatest possible efficiency can be described as ‘stepless control’ of resources.

The committee sees no significant shortcomings in the present preparedness system. Development measures therefore concern themselves more with
eliminating overlapping functions between authorities and creating the
preconditions for enhanced co-operation. The committee has limited its
proposals to what it unanimously deems necessary changes to the present
system.

First and foremost, the committee is of the opinion that the currently authority-
centric approach should be rendered more transparent. In addition, better notice
should be taken of the business sector’s enhanced role and the importance
of various non-governmental organisations. In practice, various functions
associated with preparedness – the maintenance of security of supply and
operating conditions in the case of economic disturbances in particular – have
been delegated to the increasingly international business sector. Psychological
resilience in crises and the management of various issues at the level of society
as a whole require greater emphasis on the civic perspective and voluntary
activities.

When developing preparedness and streamlining existing structures, we must
therefore aim for ‘a Finnish model of comprehensive security and preparedness’.
We need the most open security debate possible, since this would enhance
general confidence levels. In the institutions responsible for preparedness
arrangements, the public administration must increase its interaction with the
private and business sectors and NGOs. These viewpoints of the committee
have already been reflected in the project for updating the Strategy for
Securing the Functions Vital to Society, involving a change in the name of the
new resolution to ‘Security Strategy for Society’.

1.2 Clarity in division of powers between authorities

When engaging in preparedness planning and taking the relevant action, it
is essential that all of the parties involved follow society’s generally accepted
principles. These include the foundations of democracy and rule of law;
division of social responsibility and maintenance of the division of powers
between authorities, even under exceptional circumstances; cost-efficiency;
co-ordination of measures; and meeting international obligations.

Management of affairs on the basis of normal powers is important, since it
increases confidence in the exercise of public authority. Crisis leadership is
based on the application of valid legislation, with each authority attending
to its own duties. Responsibility for operative leadership therefore belongs
to a competent authority, which requests executive assistance if necessary.
In structural reforms to the public administration, insufficient attention has
been paid to clarity in the division of powers between authorities. In this respect, reforms to the regional state administration, and at municipal level in particular, have come to the fore in the studies conducted by the committee. The committee proposes that, as these reforms continue, the co-operation and co-ordination required for preparedness measures be increased.

Another basic guideline of the committee is that there is no need to develop regulations on specific procedures or command systems for disruption situations. If specific provisions are laid down for each level of threat or disruption, regulations on the related procedures and command systems would also be necessary. Such regulations tend to cause interpretative difficulties and obscure the conventional division of responsibilities between authorities and preparedness arrangements. Intermediate state legislation is bound to render co-operation between administrative sectors more difficult.

In accordance with this basic guideline, responsibility for preparedness belongs to the administrative sector under whose remit it normally falls. For instance, if there is uncertainty about which ministry’s mandate covers a certain issue, in accordance with section 2.3 below, the committee emphasises the Prime Minister’s status and co-ordination obligation.

Emergency powers legislation is in place for emergency conditions. The new Emergency Powers Act (HE 3/2008 vp, EV 71/2010 vp), which Parliament has deferred until after the next parliamentary elections, would repeal the current Emergency Powers Act and update the provisions on the powers of various authorities. In addition, pursuant to section 23 of the Finnish Constitution, in emergency conditions there is provision for necessary, provisional exceptions to basic rights and liberties under an Act of Parliament. An amendment to section 23 of the Constitution was proposed in Government bill (HE 60/2010 vp), submitted to Parliament in the spring of 2010. The Constitution does not provide for any other exceptions in emergency conditions.

In accordance with both the current and proposed new Emergency Powers Act, emergency powers can be exercised only if the authorities are unable to control the situation by exercising normal powers. Even under these circumstances, the committee underscores the importance, in so far as possible, of maintaining a normal division of powers between authorities.
1.3 Access to information and situation awareness

Access to accurate information and reliable situation awareness are the preconditions for situation control and decision-making. Although the competent authority bears operative responsibility in each case, to control the overall situation national leaders require adequate information sufficiently early. Requirements concerning speed of communication have risen to a new level. The social media, network connections, and net forums also set further requirements on speed of communication, as well as on access to accurate and reliable information.

Drawing up reviews of topics of importance to the security of society and the state is also part of such activity. Since several other authorities and levels of regional administration also maintain their situation awareness, the committee has observed the need to render such activities more effective.

The committee considers it important that situation awareness, analysis and reporting on security threats to society and the related preparedness, be rendered more efficient, paying special attention to the integration of information. With respect to the preparedness of society, management of disruptions forms a single entity alongside leadership arrangements in emergency situations. Situation awareness activity and its arrangement at various administrative levels form an integral part of preparedness for a crisis. The objective must be a cost-efficient crisis management system that fits naturally into the administrative sector’s normal activities and that is supported by situation awareness activity.

In situation awareness activity and the related communication, it would be expedient and economical to build activities on organisations and situation awareness centres already involved in such work as part of their official duties, and possessing the required information. Foreign affairs, and interior and defence administrations’ expertise and needs should also be linked to further technical development of the Government’s situation awareness activity and the related arrangements. In this way, we can better respond to the challenges posed by potential emergency conditions and ensure co-operation between administrative sectors. The technical systems to be developed facilitate the dissemination of situation awareness information to various administrative levels and other actors, including the business sector and organisations.

Stand-by readiness and point-of-alert activity, observing the needs of the Prime Minister and the Government, have been found necessary from the perspective of the Government and the President of the Republic. Analysis and reporting, directed at Government members, on security events of current interest require
further development. As the basis for a comprehensive analysis of security situations, information from all key sources should be integrated. This activity should include conclusions drawn on the basis of the comprehensive situation awareness analysis and an assessment of their impact on Finland’s security.

The committee is of the opinion that potential overlaps in situation awareness activity should be identified and eliminated, where necessary. In doing so, the most rational and appropriate use of society’s resources should be ensured. Cooperation has already begun between sectors involved in situation awareness activity, in information exchange and technical system development. Such collaboration should be further developed. In this way, overlaps in future arrangements can be prevented and full use can be made of all available resources.

The key goal in developing potential new situation awareness arrangements involving the national leadership must be that all situation awareness information is sufficiently comprehensive and integrated upon reaching said leadership.

Focusing on the present, situation awareness activity serves the needs of normal operative activities and crisis management decision-making. Foresight covering a longer time span and serving national leaders must be developed through, for example, increased co-operation between situation awareness activity and the Government’s foresight network. Such foresight must project forward over a period of more than a decade. In conjunction with this, we must also take account of the development of so-called horizon scanning activity.

The committee is of the view that the Security Committee, presented later in this report, should consider how best to arrange control of disruption situations and crisis management, as well as closely related situation awareness activities.

Regional state administrative agencies are tasked with the co-ordination of regional preparedness measures and organising the related co-operation. The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defence should jointly and objectively examine the implications of the co-ordination obligation resting on regional state administrative agencies, with respect to the need to maintain regional situation awareness. Again, this should be done with due attention to resources, responsibility for costs and other authorities maintaining situation awareness in the region.
The committee gave thought to the opportunities of the highest national leadership to obtain accurate, immediate information from the most senior security sector officials, in pursuit of comprehensive security. The committee deems appropriate the practice based on which meetings can be called at the behest of the highest national leaders. Such leaders include the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. This involves the participation of leaders of the highest level with respect to so-called hard security, including Chief of Defence, Chief of the Finnish Border Guard, National Police Commissioner, Director of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, Chief of Intelligence of the Defence Forces, and Director General of Department for Rescue Services, who can thus communicate their own views on situation awareness and preparedness. Such a procedure, which enhances communication and collaboration relationships, can improve our preparedness and prerequisites for coping with serious crises. These arrangements would not constitute the founding of a new agency.

2 Highest lines of authority and division of responsibilities in preparedness activity

2.1 Development of reporting procedure

Pursuant to section 44 of the Constitution, the Government may present a statement or report to Parliament on a matter related to the country’s governance or its international relations. No decision on confidence in the Government or a Government Member may be made during consideration of such a report. In other words, the report serves the Government’s need to place issues of importance to the country’s governance or international relations for consideration by Parliament, without reference to the issue of the confidence enjoyed by the Government (HE 1/1998 vp. p. 95; see also PeVL 37/2006) in this relation.

With respect to the public finances, a Government report submitted to Parliament refers to a process directed at the exceptionally long-term development of activities and a search for balance in terms of resources. In this way, savings in resources can be made and the security and defence policy can be distanced from topical political affairs. The five Government reports (1995, 1997, 2001, 2004 and 2009) so far submitted have opened up a perspective extending beyond the government terms in question.

In its review work, the committee was to take note of the statements made in the Government Report on the Finnish Security and Defence Policy of 2009 and during the course of Parliament’s consideration of said report. Firstly, on
the basis of these documents, the committee noted that notions vary on how well the Government report serves as a guideline document. While favourably disposed towards a comprehensive concept of security, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee viewed the report as unclear or rather general with regard to new and indirect threats. The Defence Committee pointed out that, when executed in accordance with the comprehensive concept of security, preparedness is problematic with respect to the Defence Forces’ development. The Administration Committee called for internal security to be treated on an equal basis with foreign and security policy. It also wished to see perspectives developed on civil crisis management.

Parliament has entertained diverse views on which committee should issue a statement on each particular Government report. While the Foreign Affairs Committee did so on the reports of 1995, 1997 and 2009, the Defence Committee commented on those of 2001 and 2004. Since the report of 2004, a Parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group, made up of Members of Parliament from various parties, has participated in the report’s preparation process.

Since, upon a proposal by the Speaker’s Council and in accordance with its Rules of Procedure, Parliament decides on the committee to which each particular report should be submitted, and which committees should issue statements thereon, the committee cannot take a stand on this aspect of the procedure. Generally speaking, the committee considers the report a useful instrument, essential to laying down Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines. This reporting method bolsters the democratic system by which the highest state organ, Parliament, decides on the broad outlines of Finland’s security and defence policy.

Each report’s importance as a guideline document depends on its content. The committee’s basic stand on adopting a comprehensive approach to security, and preparing for new kinds of unpredictable threat and disturbance situations, entails extending the scope of the reports to include the examination of new types of security issue. In this way, the reports would provide a better basis, with parliamentary support, for drafting other guideline documents, primarily the Security Strategy for Society and the Internal Security Programme. This would also clarify the hierarchy between these lower-level guidance instruments. Upon extending its scope, the report’s preparation process also requires further development.

The current system, according to which the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy is prepared every four years, is too inflexible in accounting
for changes in the operating environment and the emergence of unexpected threat scenarios. The committee therefore proposes that the reporting practice be developed, by setting a clearly target-based schedule for each report’s drafting process. In addition, the reporting procedure should be streamlined so that, if necessary, the report can be complemented with a new report, narrower or broader in scope in accordance with the circumstances.

Even in this case, based on a report by the relevant committee, Parliament will determine the statement to be issued on the complementary report. Depending on the report’s scope and content, the handling procedure could be faster than now. In other respects, the earlier report would maintain its status. Together with the complementary reports, it would thereby provide the foundations of the Finnish security and defence policy in the same manner as before.

Another instrument is available in the form of a Prime Ministerial announcement, or that of a Minister designated by the Prime Minister, to Parliament on any topical issue referred to in section 45, subsection 2 of the Constitution. Such an announcement is submitted outside the order of the day of Parliament, at a time agreed with the Parliamentary Speaker (Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, section 24). Since Parliament takes no decisions on the basis of the announcement, this procedure is mainly suited to urgent cases.

2.2 The President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy

Pursuant to section 67 of the Constitution, the Government may establish Committees of Ministers for the preparation of various matters. In the State Practice (PeVM 1/1997 vp), Committees of Ministers have played an important role in preparedness issues and the co-ordination of functions in particular. Such a committee may not propose changes to the basic provisions of the Constitution or the Government Act concerning Committees of Ministers. Neither can it therefore propose changes to the mutual division of powers between the national leadership, the President of the Republic and the Government.

As concerns Committees of Ministers, in the above report the Committee has emphasised the status of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The provisions on the Committee’s remit are laid down in section 25, subsection 3 of the Government Rules of Procedure. However, the committee is of the opinion that the prerequisites for this Cabinet Committee’s handling of foreign and security policy issues require reinforcement. Taking cognisance of the comprehensive concept of security and occurrence of disruptions in
internal security, the committee proposes that section 25 of the Government Rules of Procedure be amended in such a manner that the Minister of the Interior becomes a member of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. At the moment, the Minister of the Interior only participates in the committee’s consideration of issues falling within his or her mandate.

In addition, with a view to co-ordinating the division of responsibilities at the highest level, attention should be paid to the importance of joint meetings between the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the President of Republic. Provisions on the possibility of joint meetings, which have become a regular practice, are laid down in section 24 of the Government Act.

So far, no detailed provisions have been deemed necessary on the procedures to be followed at the joint meeting of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee. Such a joint meeting can be called by either the Prime Minister or the President (HE 270/2002 vp). It has been deemed important that the President is able to convene a joint meeting (UaVL 5/2010 vp). In this context, with reference to the view of the Parliamentary Constitutional Law Committee (PeVM 13/2002 vp), the committee points out that this Cabinet Committee is an important organ with respect to co-operation between the President and the Government, as referred to in section 93 of the Constitution. Similarly, during Parliamentary consideration of the Government bill on Amendment to the Constitution (HE 60/2010 vp), it was stated that the joint meeting between the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the President of Republic is a central forum for foreign policy co-operation (UaVL 5/2010 vp).

The committee also takes note of the fact that in the meetings between the President and the Cabinet Committee, urgent matters have rendered it practically impossible to focus on foreign and security policy issues from a broader perspective. Preparation of matters is concentrated in the hands of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and this is still considered appropriate. However, the committee proposes that the preparatory process be supported in such a manner that the Security Committee presented below is also able to gather preparatory material on broader themes.

Emphasising the importance of social debate and general access to information, the committee suggests that open seminar activities on various themes be organised by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The joint meeting of the President and Cabinet Committee could take the initiative in organising such a seminar. In addition to government parties, invitees might
include representatives of the opposition, the business sector and NGOs, as well as researchers from various fields. Such a mode of operating, whereby responsibility for practical preparation is concentrated in the hands of the Security Committee, would promote the adoption of a more comprehensive concept of security, while generating material for preparedness planning and the drafting of the relevant guideline documents. Similar seminar activity should also be arranged by the regional state administration, at regional level.

2.3 Strengthening the Prime Minister’s duty of co-ordination

Pursuant to section 66 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister directs the Government’s activities and oversees the preparation and consideration of matters falling within its mandate. Added to the Constitution to lay the foundations for further development of the Prime Minister’s status, this provision reflects recent development trends (HE 1/1998 vp).

The committee takes note of the goal, set by the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament, to develop lower-level legal provisions in such a manner that the Prime Minister can determine when an issue giving rise to a conflict of authority between ministries, or otherwise concerning Government activities, must be introduced in a plenary session, and upon a submission by which minister (PeVM 10/1998 vp). Accordingly, the Prime Minister’s status has already been adjusted in the Government Act (PeVM 13/2002/HE 270/2002 vp).

Pursuant to section 10 of the Government Act, upon a proposal by the Prime Minister, the Government resolves disagreements concerning the mandates of individual ministries in particular matters. In accordance with section 14 of the same Act, in individual cases matters requiring a decision by a ministry must be referred to a Government plenary session if considered sufficiently far-reaching or important as matters of principle. Referral decisions are taken by the plenary session, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister or the relevant minister. In addition, provisions on the Prime Minister’s duties in arranging a Government plenary session are laid down in section 22 of the Government Act.

In section 1.3 above, the committee emphasises that the enactment of special statutes to address various abnormal conditions should be avoided. In conjunction with this, the committee underscores the powers vested in the Prime Minister by section 66 of the Constitution, and the provisions of the Government Act in other respects.
3 Development of the administrative structure of preparedness

3.1 From a Security and Defence Committee to a more broad-based Security Committee

Established under the Ministry of Defence in 2000, the Security and Defence Committee is tasked, for example, with co-ordinating the preparation of matters falling within the scope of total national defence in various administrative sectors. This committee has a secretariat working under the Ministry of Defence.

The current Security and Defence Committee consists of the Secretary General of the Office of the President of the Republic, the Permanent Secretary of each ministry, the State Secretary of the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs, the Chief of Defence Command Finland, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations of Finnish Defence Forces, the Chief of the Finnish Border Guard, and the Chairman of the Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure. Although, since its establishment, the Security and Defence Committee has been developing its operations into a more broad-based security organ, its current organisation and modes of operation fail to meet the requirements of a reformed administrative structure for preparedness, in accordance with the comprehensive concept of security and the mounting importance of the business sector and NGOs.

The status of the Security and Defence Committee must therefore be strengthened by broadening its base and renaming it the Security Committee. Since this is a permanent organ, consideration could also be given to forms of organisation other than a committee structure. On the other hand, since the committee structure is well-established and the organ’s location under the Ministry of Defence has proven functional, no changes are necessary in this respect. The committee sees no need to establish a separate security council.

In order to expand the Security Committee’s organisational structure, it is proposed that, in addition to current members, at least two representatives of the financial and business world, and two representatives of key NGOs, be appointed to the committee. Furthermore, the National Police Commissioner and the Director General of Rescue Services should be appointed committee members. Following the organisation’s expansion, the committee’s remit would have a clearer focus on co-operation between the public and private sectors and issues relating to comprehensive security. The issues of organisation and chairmanship of the committee, as well as the term of office of members and
expanding duties must be resolved when amending the Government decree on the current committee.

3.2 Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus on co-operation within administration

As a result of reorganisation of the duties and structure of the Security Committee, it will be easier for the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus, as a permanent Government co-operation organ, on co-operation between the ministries and co-ordinating the functions of various administrative branches. To enhance the co-ordination of various matters, when invited, the secretary general of the Office of the President of the Republic could participate in this organ’s activities.

The committee also proposes that the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries maintain contact with the Security Committee. Since Permanent secretaries are members of the Security Committee, a natural opportunity for this exists. If matters serving the preparation of preparedness-related and foreign and security policy issues were concentrated with the Security Committee, the current duplication of functions would be eliminated. This would enable the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus on its duties as the permanent Government co-operation organ.

3.3 Development of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness and the Meeting of Preparedness Secretaries

The committee is of the opinion that the mutual exchange of information and co-operation between the ministries’ permanent secretaries, heads of preparedness and secretaries of preparedness must be improved. Those responsible for preparedness issues must also enhance their collaboration with those of the ministry’s civil servants responsible for matters specific to the ministry, legislation and communication. In such issues, the key role will be played by the ministry’s preparedness committee, which should institute regular and planned activities within each ministry.

The meeting between the ministries’ heads of preparedness, on the other hand, is a central co-operation organ supporting the ministries in security matters. In turn, this meeting’s activities are supported and agenda items are prepared in meetings between secretaries of preparedness. These activities must be co-ordinated by the chairmen of the two meetings.
In matters concerning preparedness, the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness must act in close co-operation with the Security Committee. If necessary, the chairman of the meeting will be invited to attend the meeting of the Security Committee as an expert.

In most cases of disruption, support provided by the meeting between the ministries’ heads of preparedness is sufficient to ensure control of the situation and crisis management capability. On the other hand, more far-reaching disturbances and crises, especially those requiring extra resources, need co-operation at permanent secretary level. When the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness acts as a co-operation organ in crisis management, it is important that the chairman of the meeting engages in close co-operation with the chairman of the Security Committee and Security Secretariat.

3.4 Establishment of Security Secretariat

The committee proposes that the preparation of security affairs be developed, by strengthening the status and operation conditions of the Security Secretariat, under the Security Committee. This can be effected by integrating existing structures. Crossing administrative boundaries, such a preparatory organ can be built upon current foundations, in order to encompass the Security and Defence Committee secretariat, and security experts from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and other ministries.

The organisation and activities of the Secretariat can be developed in line with practical requirements. It is the duty of the Secretariat to provide support for preparedness measures, within various sectors of society in a variety of ways. The Security Secretariat operates under the Security Committee. Judicially, members of the Security Secretariat act as civil servants of the relevant ministry. Regulations concerning the Secretariat and the appointment of its secretary general will be included in the decree on the Security Committee.

3.6 Regional and municipal level

Each municipality will be responsible for preparedness and the range of duties over which it can exercise genuine control. At the moment, some municipalities have inadequate preparedness plans. It would therefore be important to promote co-operation between organisations such as municipalities, regional
state administrative agencies and rescue services. Preparedness at regional and municipal level should be further developed in such a way that rescue services and other organisations working across municipal boundaries play a distinct role. In municipal service production, there are also private service providers acting on a contractual basis.

To enable the provision of support in cases of disruption, common practices must be created, according to which requests for support are transmitted to municipalities and the regional administration. A similar requirement for uniform practices concerns requests for executive assistance, or the provision of executive assistance for municipalities. As concerns municipal activities, the clearest arrangement would be to co-ordinate requests for support from the regional administration to municipalities via a single authority. On the other hand, support required by a municipality, from the regional administration within its own area, could be requested directly from the relevant regional state administrative agency, with the co-ordinating regional state administrative agency being notified of the matter.

To enhance regional preparedness, regional preparedness committees, operating under the chief director of regional state administrative agencies, have been established, representing all key regional administration actors.

During disruptions and emergency conditions, communication and the transfer of information between regional and local administrations must be ensured. In the event of disruptions in the mobile telephone network or other electronic communication systems, each municipality must have immediate access to the authorities’ radio network, VIRVE.

Practices related to maintaining situation awareness must be developed in collaboration with regional state administrative agencies. In the event of a disruption, it should be possible to make the joint situation awareness obtained at Government level available to municipalities. Respectively, it should also be possible to rapidly communicate municipal situation awareness acquired on the spot for general use. Furthermore, when developing preparedness at regional and municipal level, citizens must be able to identify where they belong at regional or local level. In addition, the participation of NGOs in preparedness activity, and the development of common situation awareness, must be secured. Procedures for the dissemination of information within the central and regional state administration must be developed in such a manner that the system also supports the situation awareness of municipalities and companies considered important with respect to functions vital to society. In conjunction with preparedness, the exchange and utilisation of situation
awareness information between systems must be ensured in the appropriate manner. Situation awareness arrangements should be created through co-operative measures between the competent ministries, relevant authorities, municipalities and companies.

3.7 Enhancing the preparedness of citizens

Since tapping into society’s resources is of vital importance to preparedness activity and the management of disruption situations, special attention should be paid to close co-operation between authorities, the business sector, NGOs and citizens. The sense of collective responsibility can thereby be strengthened, which would help to promote voluntary activity as well as civic activity related to preparedness. Accordingly, the committee has taken note of organisations’ importance as part of comprehensive security at all administrative levels, for example when expanding the Security Committee’s organisation.

In the event of a disruption, citizens may also have to act on their own initiative, without assistance from the authorities. With a view to crisis preparedness, citizens’ knowledge and capabilities, and their ability to act in the event of a crisis, are therefore essential from the viewpoint of individual citizens and society. Organisations play a central role in establishing such readiness: several (including the Finnish Red Cross, the National Defence Training Association of Finland, SPEK – The Finnish National Rescue Association, and Women’s National Emergency Preparedness Association) provide security training. The committee considers it important that attention be paid to securing the operational potential of such organisations and the quality and quantity of the security training provided to citizens.

Based on the experience of, for example, the contaminated water crisis in Nokia and the epidemic caused by the A(H1N1) virus, it is clear that crisis communications directed at citizens require development. From the viewpoint of both individual citizens and the community as a whole, communication plays a central role in the management of disruptions. Authorities must be capable of disseminating timely and reliable information on a continuous basis in any situation. This is important to maintaining the confidence of citizens and preventing the spread of unofficial, possibly misleading information. Development is also required with respect to co-operation on such communication between the authorities and various organisations. In particular, the possibility should be examined of utilising the resources and expertise of various organisations in extended disruption situations, where there is a greater need to keep citizens informed.
Efforts could be made to secure greater commitment to preparedness from organisations and communities that play a vital role with respect to comprehensive security. The committee notes the status and importance of the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities as the co-operative organ of municipalities. In the above, the committee also points out that, in working life, the relevant occupational safety organisation in larger workplaces in particular could promote preparedness and access to accurate information.

4 Development of steering of preparedness concerning several administrative sectors

4.1 Security Strategy for Society

The Government has taken a decision in principle on the Strategy to Secure the Functions Vital to Society in 2003, 2006 and 2010. In accordance with the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy, the strategy has been updated under the co-ordination of the Security and Defence Committee. Key adjustments included changing the threat scenarios to correspond to the continuously changing security environment, observation of the growing role of the business sector and NGOs in securing vital functions, and a review of the strategic tasks resting with each ministry. In an integrated manner, the strategy addressed the international dimension within each key strategy sector, rather than as a separate function. In addition, in the update of 2010, the name of the strategy was changed to the Security Strategy for Society. This better describes the strategy’s content, and is easier for both citizens and international co-operation partners to understand.

The committee is of the opinion that the Government’s decision-in-principle on the Security Strategy for Society complements the policies laid down in the Government reports, while providing uniform foundations for preparedness measures undertaken by ministries. All of these are steering measures related to the comprehensive security of society. The committee suggests that the strategy’s formulation continue to be assigned to the Security Committee. In this way, we can ensure that the strategy is reconciled with the Government resolution issued on security of supply targets and with the Internal Security Programme. The committee emphasises that, in order to ensure the practical implementation of strategy work, each ministry must provide strategy guidelines for its particular sector.
4.2 Internal Security Programme

The Internal Security Programme is a Government decision-in-principle, issued twice so far, defining key targets and measures for internal security. The committee considers it important that guidelines concerning key targets and measures for internal security continue to be laid down at Government level. Furthermore, these guidelines should take note of the EU Internal Security Strategy and other EU measures.

In addition, the committee proposes that no concerted effort be made to expand the Internal Security Programme or Strategy into a social policy document, although many functions of various administration branches include an internal security dimension. It is also important that internal security guidelines be based on the broad-based Government Report on Security and Defence Policy, as well as being reconciled with the Security Strategy for Society and other relevant guideline documents.
Further information on preparedness:


The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe.


