

# National counter-terrorism strategy

Internal security



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Abstract On 15 September 2009, Minister Anne Holmlund set up a working group to formulate Finland's National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The strategy was designed to define and clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various authorities involved in counter-terrorism action, and the possible coordination of such action as might prove necessary. The working group also had the task of setting national objectives covering the roles that authorities in different sectors were to have in combating terrorism and the factors leading to it. In addition, the working group was to weigh up the current terrorism situation, make a threat assessment and examine potential future trends in terrorist activity. Having done this, the group was to set out the key operational principles and identify areas where the law needed to be amended. The group's term of office ran from 1 October 2009 to 14 January 2010.			
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## Introduction

The Government Security and Defence Policy Report 2009 states that the likelihood of terrorism against Finland is low. However, it also asserts that since the possibility does exist, it is important that Finland make preparedness arrangements and draw up a national counter-terrorism strategy.

This strategy and the Security and Defence Policy Report both follow the premise that the threat of terrorism is with us and the recognition of the importance of preparedness arrangements in Finland.

The close link between internal and external security becomes particularly evident in the fight against terrorism. This strategy provides an overview of the terrorism situation in Finland and Europe, existing legislation and arrangements that have been made by the authorities. Building on the current situation picture, the strategy then goes on to propose concrete and timetabled measures to step up the work on combating terrorism.

Finland must be prepared for terrorism as part of its general preparedness while taking due account of the distinctive features of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Terrorism and related situation assessment can change quickly as the underlying causes of terrorism or terrorists' methods change. In addition to immediate and likely threats, the authorities must be prepared and have plans in place to monitor and counter any new threats on the horizon.

In addition to national preparedness, Finland takes an active part in international counter-terrorism cooperation. Due to the global nature of terrorism, cooperation is necessary both between authorities and at a wider international level – particularly within the EU – on different areas of security. Internationally, both practical operational cooperation between authorities and political influence within the framework of international law are essential.

In Finland, the police have the primary responsibility for combating terrorism. However, the capability to effectively fight terrorism requires continuous and consistent cooperation not only between all security authorities but also other authorities and a wide range of other actors.

Cooperation between authorities is essential to counter-terrorism in order to make best possible use of the counter-terrorism resources available to the authorities and relevant organisations. We can meet the challenges of counter-terrorism by taking advantage of the cooperation that already exists between authorities and of their general preparedness arrangements. Here too we must rely on Finland's special strength – efficient and effective cooperation between authorities.

The underlying theme of this strategy is to maintain the high level of state activity and to further develop cooperation and coordination.

The actions of the authorities must also be consistent and appropriately transparent in the field of counter-terrorism. Respect for the rule of law, democracy, fundamental rights and good governance in Finland concerns us all. In some cases, the internal situation may contribute to the development of social ills that manifest themselves in disturbances and a sense of insecurity. Problems must be identified and addressed before they become the causes of or pretexts for violence.

The actions of the authorities alone are not enough to ensure internal security. To ensure Finland's internal and external security, political decision-makers, national and local authorities, civil society and the business sector must work together to combat violence and its root causes. In view of this, the basis of this strategy is to prevent terrorism by tackling and addressing the root causes of terrorism.

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# **1 General information**

## **1.1 Definition of terrorism, Finnish legislation on terrorism, and national and international guidelines**

There is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism. Terrorism usually involves violence or the threat of violence to achieve certain goals and to cause disorder or fear. Finnish legislation provides for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and the imposition of penalties. In addition, the Government has laid down guidelines on counter-terrorism and called for its further development.

The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Action Plan both set out counter-terrorism priorities for Member States to take into account. The United Nations (UN) has elaborated a total of 16 universal conventions and protocols against terrorism. The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism is an instrument which deals with counter-terrorism while taking full account of the legal protection for individuals. Finland is actively involved in the development of international regulation on counter-terrorism. Finland considers it important that the legal protection for individuals is ensured as international regulation on counter-terrorism becomes more extensive.

## **2 Terrorism situation in Europe and Finland**

### **2.1 Terrorism situation in Europe**

The threat of terrorism facing Europe is complex. The most significant terrorist threat to Europe comes from al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. In recent years, however, most of the failed, foiled or successfully executed terrorist attacks have been committed by separatist groups.

Separatist terrorist activities are orchestrated mainly by the Basque terrorist organisation ETA and Corsican terrorist groups but also by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Irish Real IRA (RIRA) and Continuity IRA (CIRA), as along with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The attacks committed in Europe by these organisations cause relatively small numbers of casualties. Most of the attacks are targeted at infrastructure; they are directed against the police, military targets, political targets, and occasionally against the private commercial sector. Separatist groups are also known to seek cooperation partners outside Europe. Violent groups in the North Caucasus have become more active and may be extending their operations to Russia.

Random terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland have not managed to spark a new spiral of violence or to wage, at least not so far, a coherent terrorist campaign. At the same time, the disarmament of Protestant unionist groups continues. The PKK reportedly still commits minor crimes or acts of violence in Europe, usually in connection with demonstrations. In addition, the PKK is active in raising funding and carrying out other support activities in Europe. With the help of a support network extending to Europe, the LTTE's activities have focused on collecting money from Tamil migrants through criminal means.

The number of terrorist attacks committed by extreme left-wing groups advocating violence has increased to some extent, particularly in Greece, Spain and Italy. Motivated by a commonly shared goal, extreme left-wing terrorist groups have established connections across state borders. In some European countries, the levels of left-wing terrorism and violence have been increasing, together with the number of anarchist demonstrations and level of political unrest. Also right-wing extremists have recently committed isolated violent acts in Germany.

Terrorism motivated by extreme religious beliefs is considered to represent the greatest threat mainly because the attacks and plots carried out so far have shown that those making them intend to inflict mass casualties. In Europe, the number of people linked to terrorism motivated by extreme religious ideologies is still high; this becomes evident in the number of people arrested in Belgium, Spain and Germany, for example. In addition to international political factors, national factors such as possible negative attitudes

towards ethnic minorities or their religious beliefs, or the lack of a coherent migration policy, may contribute to the level of threat remaining high. European terrorism motivated by extreme religious beliefs is strongly connected to conflict areas outside the EU. Pakistan, Afghanistan and, within the last twelve months, Somalia have replaced Iraq as primary conflicts in which extreme radicals want to participate.

The role of Yemen as a new conflict area became apparent in January 2009 when al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was formed by a merger between al-Qaeda's Saudi and Yemeni wings. The regional and global threat posed by this new group manifested itself in the failed terrorist attack on a passenger flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day in 2009. Many of the recent terrorist acts or attempts made in Western countries and motivated by extreme religious beliefs are linked to Yemen. There is a danger that Yemen will emerge as a new staging post for radical organisations, and this would have a long-lasting impact on international security.

Throughout Europe, there are signs of small groups and individuals taking violent action as a result of becoming radicalised. The underlying causes of this phenomenon include a feeling of alienation from the rest of society among second or third generation immigrants, a sense of rootlessness, social exclusion, and on top of all this, the activities of active recruiters. Recruitment and radicalisation in Europe take place, for example, in reception centres, educational institutions, prisons, and various meetings or gatherings such as sports camps. The use of the Internet as a tool for radicalisation is continually increasing. Online recruitment and radicalisation take place mainly on websites to which access is controlled. In particular, recruitment for violent activities is now taking place in meetings closed from outsiders, not so much at public events.

The operational capabilities of al-Qaeda's core group are deemed to have deteriorated as a result of air strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has not succeeded in its attacks in Europe since 2005, but there have been many disrupted terrorist plots. Now the organisation is thought to be keeping itself in the public eye through propaganda and expanding its network by joining forces with regional terrorist organisations. It is also believed that al-Qaeda is continuing to hatch terrorist plots against Muslim governments and Western targets. It has named certain European states as its primary targets.

Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group with links to al-Qaeda that is battling to overthrow the Somali government, has succeeded in persuading supporters in Europe and the United States to take part in the fighting and to attend terrorist training camps in Somalia. Those travelling to Somalia for reasons of nationalism are not considered to represent a significant threat upon their return. A far greater threat is posed by returning activists who went to Somalia to join the international holy war to gain combat experience.

The number of Europeans travelling to conflict areas has increased in many European countries; it is noticeable that violent radical groups operating in these countries have close links to conflict areas. This becomes evident not only in the movement of people

between conflict areas and Europe but also in the form of logistical support, such as the maintenance of the financial resources of terrorist organisations and the provision of forged documents to them.

## **2.2 Terrorism situation in Finland**

At present, there are no signs that any European separatist or political terrorist organisation will pose a real terrorist threat in Finland in the near future. However, it is not out of the question that Finnish citizens might become victims of terrorism abroad, for example in areas where terrorist organisations seek to target a country's tourist industry. It is also possible that efforts may be made from Finland to finance terrorist organisations operating abroad. It is also possible that Finland could be used a staging post or rest area.

Terrorism motivated by extreme religious beliefs and practised by al-Qaeda and likeminded groups is the most serious form of terrorism threatening Europe and Finland. The level of the threat varies from country to country, although it has become generalised to some extent. More and more often, extremist groups make threats against countries involved in crisis management operations. The groups making the threats do not necessarily need to have the capability or the resources to carry them out. Once they have drawn attention to the intended targets, threats uttered may often be carried out by others, for example violently radicalised individuals. A threat against one EU Member State may also affect other Member States.

So far, Finland is not considered a target country for terrorism, and the immediate terrorist threat against the country or its citizens is low at present. However, factors have emerged that could affect the level of the threat in the future. These factors include Finland's participation in international crisis management operations and the increasing number of people in our country that are linked to terrorism in conflict areas.

Illegal entry into Finland takes place mainly across its European Union internal borders where border checks have been abolished. From a terrorist threat assessment perspective, this involves both short-term and long-term risks. People linked to terrorism might try to use illegal routes of entry. It is possible that Finland could be used as a staging post or rest area, or for arranging funding for terrorist networks operating in their countries of origin or other countries across the world.

The Finnish Muslim community is moderate and acts as a counterforce to such religious radicalisation that might lead to the support of violent action. The number of second and third generation immigrants who may be vulnerable to radicalisation is growing in Finland. So far, there are no visible signs of wide-scale radicalisation leading to violence. However, there are certain ethnic groups whose members, either in small groups or individually, support violent groups operating abroad. There are also signs

that efforts are being made to find new supporters for this kind of activity in places such as reception centres where immigrants are vulnerable to radicalisation.

There is a danger that Finland may be seen as an easy operating environment for people and networks supporting terrorism, who as a result may seek to use our country as a staging post for terrorist activities. It is known that there are people in Finland who have active contacts with bodies practising terrorism.

There are indications that actors in Finland are involved in supporting terrorist networks operating abroad. Terrorist support activities are connected with groups with ethnic backgrounds, and with conflicts prevailing in their home countries. It is possible that some of the money sent by various means from Finland is used to support terrorist activities. Legal charitable associations can be abused to raise or move funds for terrorist groups. Proving such illegal use of funds is, however, difficult. Terrorist support may also be logistical, for example sending material assistance or using the country as a rest or transit area for people involved in armed action. It is also possible that people living in Finland participate or are seeking to participate in resistance struggles in their home countries or that they are trying to recruit other people to take part in armed conflicts.

There are obvious present and future threats against the embassies and other interests in Finland of those countries that have been identified as terrorist targets. Major international events organised in Finland, such as summits, sports events and conferences, are also potential targets for terrorist attacks.

The Danish cartoon crisis is a good example of how a European country can quickly become a target for hatred among radical groups. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility of such unpredictable crisis arising in Finland, too.

## **3 Current state of counter-terrorism**

### **3.1 Preventing violent radicalisation**

Effective cooperation between authorities and civil society helps to prevent people from turning to terrorism by tackling the factors driving terrorism that can lead to violent radicalisation and recruitment into terrorist groups. Inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue is being promoted at international and national levels. Human rights, equality in all its forms, democracy, social inclusion and acceptance of multiculturalism all serve to prevent social exclusion. The authorities are striving to combat racially motivated crimes and to increase equality and tolerance.

An analysis will be made to anticipate trends in extremism in society. Prevention of violent radicalisation is the most effective way to combat violent attacks as it stops the radicalisation process even before people gravitate towards such ways of thinking. Identifying and preventing violent radicalisation and illegal extremist activities require broad-based cooperation between authorities. Information gathering is central to the development and targeting of preventive measures against terrorism.

### **3.2 Detecting and pursuing and terrorists**

International and national information exchange and cooperation between authorities helps to identify threats and risks and to address them effectively, with due regard to the aspects of legal protection. Steps will be taken to monitor the activities of those linked to terrorism and to investigate and disrupt terrorist financing.

Activities and crimes against Finland that may threaten the governmental system, social institutions or the internal or external security of the State are to be identified and prevented at the earliest possible stage. What is important in detecting and pursuing terrorists is effective intelligence work and coordination and sound analysis of information. As part of basic preparedness, measures will be taken to ensure that security authorities have sufficient powers to prevent terrorist offences.

### **3.3 Protecting citizens and infrastructure**

The protection of society and its various elements is based on the action taken to maintain a state of society and internal security in which everyone in Finland can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law and a safe society. Measures will be taken to combat fear or insecurity brought about by crime, unrest, accidents, violence or any other unwelcome changes in Finland or the increasingly globalised world at large.

The security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure will be improved. Measures will be taken to protect from terrorist attacks citizens and infrastructure, along with production capacity critical to the functioning of society; this will be done by reducing any vulnerabilities through cooperation between authorities, local actors and the business sector.

### **3.4 Preparing and responding**

The authorities have in place their own contingency and security plans and carry out training and practice exercises based on them. These, together with their readiness systems for operational command and terrorism situation assessment, constitute the basis for the cooperation in saving human lives and property that is central to preparedness. Efforts will be made to minimise the consequences and effects of a potential attack by introducing well-coordinated and effective counter-measures and by responding to the needs of Finnish people who fall victims to terrorist attacks in Finland or abroad.

## 4 Strategic counter-terrorism guidelines and their implementation

### General principles

Terrorist acts cause direct harm to society and citizens. Such acts can also cause long-term and large-scale damage to the functioning of the whole society. It is vitally important for citizens and society at large that terrorist acts be prevented. This requires that the violent radicalisation that leads to terrorism be identified early and its underlying causes addressed. In addition, terrorist undertakings and plans must be prevented, detected and investigated. In Finland, counter-terrorism should be based on the early identification of terrorism-related phenomena and the prevention of terrorist acts.

In Finland, the competent authorities, the business sector and NGOs are working together to prepare for and respond to any unrest. The chains of command and responsibilities of the authorities in such circumstances, including terrorist attacks, are clearly set out in the existing legislation. The extent to which terrorism is taken into account in preparing for unrest, for example in contingency and security planning, varies from one authority to another. Preparedness for terrorism and respond to concrete situations must be part of the authorities' normal preparedness, and both are planned for and implemented within the framework of the normal preparedness and command systems.

### Strategic guidelines

1. Measures will be taken to prevent and combat violent radicalisation. It will be identified at the earliest possible stage. Necessary information will be transferred to the responsible authorities.
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Basis:

In Finland, there are no signs of wide-scale violent radicalisation that is, international experience suggests, often motivated by a sense of social injustice or exclusion. It is evident, however, that there are small groups or individual people in Finland who support violent groups operating abroad. Finnish authorities should seek to promote equality between different social groups and good relations between ethnic groups. In preventing violent radicalisation, the challenge for the authorities is to identify radicalisation among individuals and to respond in a timely fashion to such cases after they have been identified.

Measures:

- a. To prevent violent radicalisation by delivering an effective integration policy. To combat the social exclusion of groups and individuals by ensuring they have equal opportunities to participate in Finnish society, training and working life.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Ministry of Education

Timetable: Ongoing

- b. To increase research, information exchange between the authorities and training related to terrorism and violent radicalisation, with a view to identifying possible developments that may lead to violence. To draw up and implement a training programme for the authorities, with the aim of identifying and preventing radicalisation and related phenomena.

Responsible authorities: **National Police Board**, Security Police, Police College of Finland, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health

Timetable: The training programme will be implemented as soon as it is finalised by the end of 2010.

- c. To take account of the prevention of violent radicalisation in local security planning.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior** and Ministry of Social Affairs and Health together with local authorities

Timetable: Ongoing

2. Legislation and statutes on information exchange between different authorities should be reviewed in the light of changes in the operating environment and how terrorist offences are planned and committed.

Basis:

The actions taken by the authorities to detect, prevent and investigate terrorist offences are based on law. Terrorist activities and how they are planned and sustained are constantly changing because both terrorist groups and the authorities' counter-measures change. Without constant review, development and updating, our legislation cannot respond to changes in the operating environment. It must also be ensured that the

authorities have the right of access to information and all powers necessary to take preventive action and carry out investigations.

The police authorities consider that the current wording of Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code concerning terrorist financing has led to difficult problems in producing sufficient proof when pre-trial investigations have been initiated. Under the existing legislation, financing the direction and training of a terrorist group and recruitment into such a group is not punishable. Under the Criminal Code, participation in terrorist training is not a criminal act either. Many European Union Member States have criminalised training for terrorist activity.

At present, people working in the social and health care sector do not have the legal right to report, on their own initiative, a person who might be planning a terrorist act and who comes to their attention while on duty. Provisions on the obligations of secrecy and non-disclosure in such situations are laid down in the Act on the Status and Rights of Social Welfare Clients, the Act on Health Care Professionals and the Act on the Status and Rights of Patients. The only exception to this is Chapter 15, section 10 of the Criminal Code, under which the representatives of these professional groups are also considered obliged, on pain of penalty, to report any planned crimes. A planned crime means a plan that has already proceeded a long way in terms of implementation.

The Act on Executive Assistance to the Police by the Defence Forces lays down provisions on the right of the police to receive executive assistance that requires the use of force by the Defence Forces and on the use of military force as part of executive assistance. The Border Guard also has a statutory duty to participate in counter-terrorism and the management of special situations. When performing these duties, border guards have the powers laid down in Chapter 2 of the Police Act. Under the existing legislation, it is not, however, possible for the Border Guard to give such executive assistance to the police that includes the use of military force.

Measures:

- d. To establish what possible amendments need to be made to the legislation on terrorist financing and training and to the legislation on information exchange and executive assistance between the authorities, and to prepare such amendments as necessary.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Defence, Office of the Prosecutor General, Security Police, National Bureau of Investigation and Border Guard

Timetable: The necessary reports will be completed in autumn 2010.

3. Full account will be taken of terrorism-related factors in security and contingency planning.

Basis:

As part of the authorities' security and contingency planning, general preparedness for such incidents as major accidents and difficult rescue operations aims to cover a wide range of potentially serious threats. The special situations set out in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society include those related to terrorism. The distinctive features of such situations that impact preparedness will be taken into account in planning.

In counter-terrorism it is important that authorities take the necessary preventive and operational measures to detect and combat the full range of threats and to protect society and its members from them. It is also essential to prevent dangerous materials and sensitive information from falling into the wrong hands, and to give critical targets adequate protection. Preventive measures include nuclear safety and control carried out by the authorities for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials. Protection measures cover detection (intelligence, analysis, field measurements), which is part of the operational work of the police and other authorities, and control of hazardous substances at the border.

A large number of sites of great economic significance are in private hands, and by law the private sector has its own preparedness obligations, just as the state does. Public-private partnership can reduce the vulnerability of society. Training provided by the authorities enables the private sector to improve the protection of sites through its own security organisations by, for example, drafting and implementing risk-based security plans.

Measures:

- e. To revise the authorities' security and contingency planning processes for the fight against terrorism as necessary in order to ensure that necessary terrorism-related information is available for use in local security planning.

Responsible authorities: **National Police Board**, Security Police, counter-terrorism working group

Timetable: The system will be operational by the end of 2010.

- f. To improve the private sector's preparedness and operational capabilities for dealing with terrorist acts by taking account of terrorism, as a threat scenario, in the situation assessment that is currently being prepared for the business sector in accordance with the Internal Security Programme.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, Security Police, Prime Minister's Office

Timetable: A proposal for the content and practices of the situation assessment will be completed by 30 July 2010.

- g. To introduce more public-private partnership agreements to strengthen cooperation between the public and business sectors within the framework of organisations responsible for security of supply, and to further develop existing agreements in order to improve information exchange between the sectors.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, National Emergency Supply Agency, National Police Board, counter-terrorism working group

Timetable: Ongoing

- h. To introduce tighter controls on CBRNE materials in accordance with the international obligations binding on Finland. To assess the risk-based control and protection procedures for CBRNE materials and of institutions handling such materials and to implement any necessary development measures. To assess the response preparedness of the authorities and to implement any necessary development measures.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, National Police Board, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence, Defence Forces, Customs, Border Guard, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, CBRNE cooperation platform.

Timetable: Both the assessment and development plan will be completed by the end of 2011.

4. State leaders and competent authorities will be provided with a carefully analysed, high-quality and real-time picture of the security situation that clearly identifies terrorism-related issues.

**Basis:**

It should be possible to make use of terrorism-related situation and threat assessments both in national crisis preparedness and decision-making by the state leaders and authorities. It is the duty of the Security Police to combat activities and crimes that may threaten the governmental system, social institutions, or the internal or external security of the State. As part of this duty, the Security Police are responsible for creating a national and international picture of the terrorism situation and making terrorism threat assessments. The situation and threat assessments draw on open source and classified information received from other authorities and on other such information available to the Security Police.

**Measures:**

- i. To have a new counter-terrorism working group assess the terrorism situation on a regular basis. Having done this, the working group may propose measures to be taken by the authorities to step up the work on combating terrorism.

Responsible authorities: **National Police Board**, Security Police

Timetable: Once the working group has been established.

- j. To improve the situation picture, analysis and reporting relating to terrorism and other security threats to society, with particular emphasis on the coordination of public and non-public information.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, Prime Minister's Office and other ministries involved in creating the situation picture.

Timetable: By the end of 2011.

5. Counter-terrorism cooperation between the authorities and related coordination will be enhanced. Counter-terrorism cooperation will be improved and activities better coordinated. Counter-terrorism measures will be based on the latest situation and threat assessments available to the authorities.

Basis:

Terrorism and counter-terrorism - and the underlying causes of terrorism - are of concern to a large number of administrative sectors and authorities. The police have the primary responsibility for combating terrorism. In rescue operations, the responsibility rests with the rescue services, and in maritime situations, with the Border Guard. The Security Police make situation and threat assessments based on criminal intelligence about terrorist offences and other gathering of information on terrorism. The underlying causes of terrorism, violent radicalisation, and questions of preparedness and protection touch several other authorities.

Effective cooperation between agencies and executive assistance arrangements between the responsible authorities in different sectors enable them to respond to trouble in society and address the factors driving it. A terrorist act is an action that represents a significant threat to society, and account must be taken of its distinctive features in all actions of the authorities and cooperation.

Measures:

- k. To replace the current counter-terrorism expert group with a broad-based counter-terrorism working group whose tasks include to coordinate cooperation between authorities and preparedness measures for terrorism-related issues, to make use of expert networks of different authorities in combating terrorism, and to coordinate the implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and related development proposals.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior** + authorities appointed to the working group

Timetable: By the end of March 2010.

- l. To improve the sharing of terrorism-related intelligence between the competent authorities for the purposes of carrying out their duties.

Responsible authorities: **Counter-terrorism working group**, Security Police

Timetable: Since the establishment of the working group.

- m. To prevent high risk persons from settling in Finland by increasing and reinforcing cooperation between the Finnish authorities, including using liaison officers working abroad and drawing on their expertise in immigration matters. To ensure that the authorities dealing with immigration matters are aware of terrorism-related factors and follow procedures enabling the transfer of all necessary information to the responsible authorities.

Responsible authorities: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finnish Immigration Service, National Police Board, Security Police, Border Guard

Timetable: As soon as possible. Training for these authorities will be included in the training programme mentioned above.

- n. To develop, under the leadership of the police, the performance and interoperability of different authorities' special intervention units.

Responsible authorities: **National Police Board**, Border Guard, rescue services, Defence Forces

Timetable: As of 2010.

## Appendice 1: Operating environment and situation assessment

