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Observations and recommendations for local collaboration on referral mechanism of persons of concern in local multi-stakeholder collaboration for preventing violent radicalisation

Report on experiences of the state of play of multi-professional Anchor work in case management practices and referral mechanisms for people of concern

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Abstract

In August 2017, a series of stabbings took place in Turku. The perpetrator was sentenced for murder and attempted murder committed with terrorist intent. Because of this incident, a decision was made to investigate how referral to services has been organised in cases where the police do not target any measures at a person and he or she is referred to services provided by a municipality or an organisation. The aim was to clarify the processes, assess the current state of cooperation and identify development needs. A further aim was to find out how cooperation with religious communities has been organised and how it should be improved. The report includes a description of the current state that is based on interviews with local operators as well as recommendations for further work. In addition, the report describes the systems of the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom and compares these to the situation in Finland.

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Turussa tapahtui elokuussa 2017 puukotus, jonka tekijä tuomittiin terroristisessa tarkoituksessa tehdystä murhista ja niiden yrityksistä. Tapauksen johdosta päätettiin selvittää, miten palveluunohjaus on järjestetty tilanteissa, joissa poliisi ei kohdista henkilöön toimenpiteitä ja hänet ohjataan kunnan tai järjestöjen palvelujen piiriin. Tavoitteena oli selkeyttää menettelyjä sekä selvittää yhteistyön nykytila ja kehittämistarpeet. Lisäksi selvitettiin, miten yhteistyö uskonnollisten yhteisöjen kanssa on järjestetty ja miten sitä tulee kehittää. Raportti sisältää nykytilan kuvauksen, joka perustuu paikallisten toimijoiden haastatteluihin sekä suositukset jatkotoimiksi. Lisäksi valmistelun yhteydessä tutustuttiin siihen, miten asia on järjestetty Alankomaissa, Tanskassa ja Isossa-Britanniassa. Raportti sisältää näiden maiden järjestelmien kuvausta sekä arviointia suhteessa Suomen tilanteeseen.

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I augusti 2017 skedde det en knivhuggning i Åbo. Gärningsmannen dömdes för mord och försök till mord i terroristiskt syfte. Med anledning av det inträffade beslutade man att utreda hur hänvisningen till service har ordnats i de situationer där personen inte är föremål för polisens åtgärder och där hen hänvisas till kommunens eller organisationers tjänster. Målet var att förtydliga förfarandena samt att utreda nuläget för och behoven av att utveckla samarbetet. Dessutom utreddes det hur samarbetet med de religiösa samfunden har ordnats och hur det ska utvecklas. Rapporten innehåller en beskrivning av nuläget som grundar sig på intervjuer med lokala aktörer samt rekommendationer om fortsatta åtgärder. I samband med beredningen tog man dessutom reda på hur ärendet har ordnats i Holland, Danmark och Storbritannien. Rapporten innehåller en beskrivning av systemen i dessa länder och en bedömning i förhållande till situationen i Finland.

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Contents

Introduction 9

1 Introduction and objective of the Rajapinta Project 12
1.1 Background and objectives of the project 12
1.2 Concepts and definitions 14

3 How the prevention of violent radicalisation and case management of people of concern have been arranged through local cooperation 17
3.1 The local structures of prevention of violent radicalisation 17
3.2. Case management in the practical preventive work on the local level 19

4. The reviewed local operators and their roles in the prevention of violent radicalisation and the case management of people of concern 22
4.1 Anchor teams and multi-professional teams 22
4.2 The role of civic society organisations and religious communities in the prevention of violent radicalisation and the case management of people of concern 24
4.2.1 Description of the third sector actors 24
4.2.2 Description of religious communities 25

5. Observations about case management, the challenges and promoting factors 27
5.1 The current state of local cooperation and the Anchor activities 27
5.1.1 The current state: Anchor activities, prevention of local violent radicalisation and case management 28
5.2 The current state of local cooperation and civic society organisations 31
5.2.1 The current state: awareness of the prevention of violent radicalisation and local cooperation within civic society organisations 32
5.2.2 The current state: civic society organisations and case management 33
5.3 The current state of local cooperation and religious communities 34
5.3.1 The current state: awareness of the prevention of violent radicalisation and local cooperation within religious communities 35
5.3.2 The current state: parishes and case management 36
5.3.3 The current state: prayer rooms and case management 37

6. International experiences and operational models 39
6.1. The multi-professional operational model in the Netherlands and experiences from Haarlem 39
6.1.2 Experiences and good practices from the Netherlands: 41
6.2 The Danish model and the national centre of expertise 42
6.2.1 Experiences and good practices from Denmark 44
6.3. The UK's experiences on the exchange of information: Multi-professional teams in the Greater Manchester Area 45
6.3.1 Experiences and good practices from the UK 46
6.4 Observations on the comparison of the Finnish, Dutch, Danish and British practices 46

7. Observed challenges and recommendations for further work 49
7.1 Recommendations for the Anchor activities 49
7.2 Recommendations for the development of local cooperation 51

Annexes 54

INTRODUCTION

The report of the Safety Investigation Authority on the Turku stabbings (Investigation report 7/2018) describes problems related to referring violently radicalised people and people at risk of radicalisation to services that can support them to disengage from violent activities and to stop the radicalisation process. The report underlines that violently radicalised people and people at risk of radicalisation are not the sole responsibility of the police but the common responsibility of authorities, both on the local and the national level. Civic society organisations and religious communities have relevant expertise and services that can be a resource to preventative work, and therefore, they should be also involved in the work.

Challenges of case management are especially evident in situations where the police cannot target individual with any measures, but there is a need to connect a person with support services provided by a municipality or an civic society organisation. In some cities multi-stakeholder cooperation is more successful than in others. This is because processes for referral to services are highly diverse and often they are unclear, and not all people that play a key role in referral process have the information they need. Even within the same area, information about the processes is not always available to everyone who encounters vulnerable people in connection with their work. For the so-called persons of concern and their inner circle, the availability of timely services and information to help them to disengage from violence may be very critical. Timely referral of individuals is crucial part of prevention of violence and supporting well-being of the individual. Successful prevention has positive impact to wider society.

Every severe act of violence, especially if there are several victims and it is related to violent radicalisation or terrorism, changes our conception of the safety of the Finnish society, weakens our sense of security and affects the environment where we live.

The Ministry of the Interior launched the Rajapinta ('Interface') Project to investigate the current state of case management, to review good and functional practices and to

find out how the work should be developed. The report also looked at cooperation with religious communities and how the religious communities can support people of concern, their inner circle and local communities in a wider sense. In local level cooperation it is central to also develop practices that brings together authorities, civic organisations and religious communities.

The Rajapinta Project describes the existing good practices and the challenges that the Finnish professionals working with prevention face in Anchor activities (a multi-professional early intervention model), civic society organisations and religious communities as well as in cooperation with various actors. The project included study visits to the Netherlands, Denmark and United Kingdom that have intensively developed local cooperation with authorities and created cooperative, explicit and transparent practices for referring people of concern to the necessary services.

In Finland, the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The work involves various actors, including local authorities, civic society organisations, researchers and representatives of communities. The outputs and recommendations of the report will be considered in developing the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, and especially in the preparation of the new National Action Plan that began at the beginning of 2019.

The Rajapinta Project report is prepared by Milla Perukangas, Senior Specialist, and Tarja Mankkinen, Chair of the project steering group and Head of Development, Police Department, Ministry of the Interior. Tarja Mankkinen is responsible for coordinating and developing the prevention of national radicalisation and extremism. The report has been presented to the management of the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior.

A steering group was established to support the investigation. It was chaired by Tarja Mankkinen and the members included Timo Kilpeläinen, Police Inspector at the National Police Board, Pekka Heikkinen, Police Inspector at the National Police Board, Habiba Ali, Project Coordinator, Finn Church Aid, and Oussama Yousfi, Radinet/Vuolle Settlement. The broad expertise and support of the steering group have been critical in the design and preparation of the project. The Rajapinta Project has cooperated with the joint project of the University of Eastern Finland, the National Police Board and the Ministry of the Interior that has prepared a manual for the Anchor model. This cooperation has contributed important competence and perspectives to support the project work. We especially want to thank the project group for the Anchor manual that consists of Matti Airaksinen, Chief Inspector, National Police Board, Tanja Moilanen, researcher at the University of Eastern Finland, and Mari Kangasniemi, researcher at the University of Turku.

The knowledge and experience of the Anchors who participated in the Rajapinta Project was critical for the implementation of the project. The Anchors provided information about the Anchor activities and multi-professional competence and about cooperation arrangements with civic society organisations and religious communities. In many cities, resources for the work are scarce but the motivation is strong. The work of the Anchors demonstrate that the feeling of doing meaningful work is a huge asset for both the worker and the group. Motivation should also be fostered and cared for. That is also an important recommendation of this report.

The religious communities, Christian parishes and Muslim prayer rooms interacted with during the project provided their competence and valuable experience on encounters and building of trust. In addition, the participants included civic society organisations that often work at the interface of people and various actors and play an important role in supporting the work of the authorities.

Chapter 3 of the report describes how prevention of violent radicalisation and case management of people of concern has been arranged through local cooperation. It also introduces the various actors and their roles. Chapter 4 presents observations of the current state of case management, the challenges and the factors that promote successful case management. Chapter 5 describes how similar activities have been arranged in the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Chapter 6 presents development targets and recommendations.

1 Introduction and objective of the Rajapinta Project

THE RAJAPINTA PROJECT LOOKS AT THE CASE MANAGEMENT OF PEOPLE OF CONCERN AS PART OF THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM

1.1 Background and objectives of the project

In August 2017, a series of stabbings took place in Turku, and the District Court sentenced the stabber for an offence committed with terrorist intent. The perpetrator withdrew his appeal before the Court of Appeal and the sentence is final. This was the first crime in Finland against life and health where the sentence was based on the Act concerning offences committed with terrorist intent that entered into force in 2003.

In the Turku stabbings, two people were killed and eight were injured. The behaviour of the perpetrator had raised concern in his inner circle even before the violent act. The police had been tipped-off. However, this did not lead to any actions that would have stopped his radicalisation and prevented the crime. [1]

The radicalisation process of the perpetrator progressed and resulted into an act of violence that shocked the entire country. After the crime, the question of if it **would have been possible to connect the perpetrator with support measures and services that could have stopped the radicalisation process and prevented the violent act?**

1 The development and background that led to the case have been described in detail from various angles in the investigation report of the Safety Investigation Authority; Turku stabbings on 18 August 2017, P2017-01, Safety Investigation Authority.

The background and the course of events in Turku are described in detail in the report published by the Safety Investigation Authority in June 2018. The investigation report describes the radicalisation process that led to the act of violence and the difficult life situation of the perpetrator that had lasted for a long time during which the problems in his life cumulated. At the time of the event, the perpetrator had received a negative asylum decision. He also had a weak social support network and poor future outlook and he had displayed negative behaviour for a long time and had himself asked to see a psychologist. In addition, the perpetrator met a person who strengthened his connection to ISIL propaganda and ideology, and the propaganda rapidly gained importance in his mind. It should be noted that there is a substantial amount of information about this gradual radicalisation process that sped up towards the end because people in his inner circle and close environment had noticed a change in his behaviour, state of mind and ideology. This concern was also reported to the police. According to the Safety Investigation Authority's report, we know that this report did not lead to any actions that could have prevented the act of violence. Neither was the perpetrator referred to services that could have supported his disengagement from violent thoughts and stopped the radicalisation process.

The violent act in Turku was not prevented but the accident investigation report provides important information about the fact that there were several points of time when intervention would have been possible. It is the responsibility of the authorities to implement measures that will help to prevent similar events in the future. Experience on the Turku incident offers important information and helps to prevent future incidents more effectively. In addition, the description of the events demonstrates that no single party could have intervened in the situation alone and that cooperation between various actors is a necessity.

In the Turku incident, the perpetrator was an asylum seeker. In practice, there are more people of concern in all population groups in Finland that cause a high threat of violence. They do not share a common profile, and their background, the reasons behind the threat of violence and their age vary greatly. The reasons for their behaviour are diverse. One possible reason is violent radicalisation, when a motive to use violence based on beliefs and ideologies. The Turku stabbings demonstrated how significant and wide impact on society and the sense of security this kind of violence has. Direct effects on the life of the victims, survivors, their families and the people who helped them were enormous. The act also had a wider impact on society. After the incident, hate speech and hate crimes against visible minorities and especially against the members of the Muslim community have increased [2]. The incident and following hate speech and hate crime has had a wide

2 Poliisin tietoon tullut viharikollisuus Suomessa 2017 (Hate crime known to police in Finland in 2017), Jenita Rauta, publication 131 of the Police university College, 2018.

impact on people's sense of security, especially among the Muslim communities and other visible minorities.

One of the recommendations of the Safety Investigation Authority's report is that we should create clear and coherent operating models to allow timely referral of people of concern to appropriate services by increasing cooperation between the authorities and civic society organisations[3]. To implement this recommendation, the Ministry of the Interior launched the Rajapinta Project in spring 2018. The project looks at the current state of the case management of people of concern and the existing practices and collects information about factors that promote successful case management, good practices and challenges for further work. The project has also studied the current practices in different countries.

THE REPORT WILL GATHER THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION

- information about the current state of case management and cooperation in connection with people of concern (PoC) who have a high risk of violent behaviour
- information about factors that promote successful case management, customers referral to services and cooperation and factors that make these more challenging
- descriptions of identified good practices and cooperation models

The report includes recommendations, identified based on the gathered information, to provide solutions for the challenges and to remove obstacles.

1.2 Concepts and definitions

Violent extremism

Violent extremism refers to using, threatening with, encouraging or justifying violence based on ideological grounds. Violent radicalisation is a process through which individuals resort to violence or the threat of it, urge someone to commit acts of violence or justify it based on ideological grounds.

Violent radicalisation is a process through which individuals resort to violence or the threat of it, urge someone to commit acts of violence or justify it based on one's own view of the world or on ideological grounds. In Finland, forms of extremism include far-right,

3 Turku stabbings on 18 August 2017, P2017-01, Safety Investigation Authority.

far-left and religiously motivated violent extremism. Prevention and measures are developed to prevent all three.

Ideology is a shared worldview that stems from attitudes about groups of people, the world, religion, relations between people and states, human dignity, what is sacred and what is profane as well as corresponding beliefs that constitute a moral compass for an individual.

Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in Finland

In Finland, systematic work has been done to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism since 2012 when the first National Action Plan was approved. The next National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was completed in 2016, and it describes the key responsible parties and their roles as well as the key preventive measures. External assessment of the action plan began in November 2018, and the new programme will be prepared during the first half of 2019.

Violent radicalisation and extremism have become more visible in Finland and in other European countries. Violent extremism has a broader significance to society and its members than single actions because it creates division and increases the sense of insecurity. The supporters of violent extremism and violent extremist groups seek attention for their operation and their message to strengthen the image that a lot of people think alike the members of these groups. This can be seen, for example, in the discussion that takes place in social and traditional media and in content that encourages and idolises polarisation, hate speech and violence.

According to Finland's national strategy, the prevention of violent radicalisation is based on broad cooperation between different authorities, civic society organisations and religious communities to make use of all competencies that are significant for this social issue. In preventive work, the focus is on the local level and close to the people, where prevention and early intervention take place in practice. Violent radicalisation and extremism are seen as both a social problem and a security problem.[4]

The prevention of violent radicalisation refers to the specific measures focused on those groups and individuals who run the risk of becoming radicalised. Prevention will target all forms of violent extremism in Finland. These include the violent far right,

4 Finland's approach is similar to the Nordic approach, which also views violent radicalisation and extremism as both a social and a security problem. See for example Preventing extremism in Nordic Countries. Mapping. Rambol, 2017.

the violent far left and the violence used by radicalised alternative social movements, religiously motivated extremist violence as well as individual actors.

The Ministry of the Interior publishes annual situation overviews of violent extremism that take a closer look at the forms of violent extremism and their development in Finland. These situation overviews can be found on the website of the Ministry of the Interior.

People of concern (PoC) refers to people who are known to the police, other authorities or individual citizens and whose behaviour or life situation raises particular concern of violence. Helping of people of concern and management of the situation calls for joint crime prevention measures of several authorities on the local level. The aim of these measures is to prevent crime and culmination of the people's behaviour.

3 How the prevention of violent radicalisation and case management of people of concern have been arranged through local cooperation

3.1 The local structures of prevention of violent radicalisation

According to Finland's national strategy, prevention is based on broad cooperation between different authorities, civic society organisations and religious communities to make use of all competencies that are significant for this social issue. This report looks at case management from the view of the responsible authorities, civic society organisations and religious communities on the local level.

National operational framework

Under the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (2016), it has been decided to create nation-wide efficient and functional structures and procedures to prevent violent extremism and radicalisation. The aim is to ensure that every part of the country has the necessary resources and permanent structures to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism, in a scope required by the local situation. The operation focuses on cooperation between the police, and especially the multi-professional Anchor teams that operate in connection with police departments, other authorities and civic society organisations, particularly at the transition point where a person transfers from the service of one authority or civic society organisation to the service of another authority or civic society organisation. Special consideration is given to situations where the person transfers from the services provided by the police to services provided by a municipality or an civic society organisation. The prevention of violence, violent radicalisation and extremism and the case management of people of concern call for broad cooperation. No single authority or other operator has the necessary resources or tools to successfully prevent the threat of violence nor support needs related to these people alone.

The structures of local cooperation and different levels of operation are described below. In practice, the areas reviewed in the Rajapinta Project and the existing structures correspond to the minimum level and basic level local operation described in the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. Elements of high-level operation are present in areas that cooperate with civic society organisations and religious communities.

Levels of local operation

Minimum level. The multi-professional Anchor teams[5] that operate in connection with all the police departments serve as a point of contact and as responsible actors for cases of violent radicalisation and extremism in the region. The Anchor teams organise necessary training for regional authorities and other actors to ensure that they know who to contact. The minimum level is suitable for small communities and localities where violent radicalisation and extremism occurs at the individual level. It is important to note, however, that the threat of violent radicalisation and extremism also exists in smaller towns. School massacres, massacre threats and individuals that become 'self-radicalised' over the Internet and travel to the conflict areas in Iraq serve as examples of this.

Basic level. In addition to the Anchor activities, municipalities and regions have local cooperation teams or cooperation networks for the prevention of violent extremism. Under the first National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism approved in 2012, local cooperation teams were established in Helsinki, Tampere, Turku and Oulu. In addition to the civic society organisations that participate in the Anchor model, the team comprises authorities and actors that participate in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism or are able to provide related special competence and expertise. Source: the National Action Plan.

Figure 1



5 More information about the Anchor model can be found at: ankkuritoiminta.fi

3.2 Case management in the practical preventive work on the local level

Figure 2 STAGES OF CASE MANAGEMENT IN LOCAL COOPERATION



Figure 2 presents an operational model of case management at the local level. The multi-professional Anchor team and the background organisations, NGOs and religious communities participate in the local cooperation.

People of concern and prevention of violence

A common trait of people of concern is that their behaviour or actions raise concern that they might resort to violence or be a threat to other people and society. Often, the inner circle, people close to them, are the first to notice their worrying behaviour. Police operation and goals related to people of concern have been described in the national strategy for preventive police work[6].

Violent radicalisation and extremism are examples of concerns related to violence. People of concern have different backgrounds and reasons for the increased risk of violent acts but in addition to the victims and their loved ones, implemented acts affect a larger group and often the entire society. The authorities are aware of hundreds of people of

6 ENSKA. Poliisin ennalta estävän työn strategia 2019-2023 (Strategy for preventive police work 2019–2023). Sisäinen turvallisuus (Internal security). Ministry of the Interior publications, 3/2019.

concern who have spread geographically all over the country. These people that have a lower threshold for violence and therefore cause a threat of violence do not belong to any particular or single population group. They can be found in all social and age groups. The aim of the operation is to ensure that the people who are attracted to severe violence and are able to commit violent acts can be identified and connected with the necessary services in time. This is a shared responsibility of the authorities and society.

Worrying behaviour can be caused for different and diverse reasons, such as factors related to a difficult life situation and mental health. While prevention of crime is considered to be police work, it is important to develop cooperative case management of people of concern because the police cannot single-handedly prevent violence. Cooperation with authorities and other actors is important in cases where a person or their behaviour raises concern in the environment but the police do not have the authority to act. Cooperation helps to identify, assess and prevent threats of violence. This is critical for the safety of the person in question, their inner circle and the entire society. Severe acts of violence also have a broad impact on people's sense of security.

The aim of the investigation is to promote development of an operational model for the case management interface between the authorities, communities and civic society organisations. Without clear and agreed upon operational models, there might be a gap between the various authorities and the offered services. Often, these people are in a situation where they are not able to seek help themselves or do not understand that they need help. That is why we need strong case management.

Case management refers to actions that are needed to connect the person in need of help to the necessary support services. In practice, case management is a process to identify and assess the customer's need for support, to identify the necessary support services and to refer the person to support services. The attitude and work ethic of individual public officers can have a central role for successful results. If the person is not able to seek help, the public officer must be active and refer the person to a place where they can get help. To this end, professionals working in case management need information about services that are available and offered also outside their own organisation.

The effect of support measures partially depends on whether the customer's needs are identified and whether the customer is referred to support services in a timely manner and in such a way that they voluntarily want to get help. In other words, the process involves cooperation with the customer. The encounter with the customer makes a big difference in whether the case management is successful and whether the person commits to the support services and is motivated. From the viewpoint of preventive work, successful case management can significantly reduce the threat of violence, address the root causes of worrying behaviour and prevent development leading to heightened violence. Preventive work looks at the complete picture of factors affecting the wellbeing

of the individual and, on the other hand, the threat of violence. Preventive work has become more multi-professional both in Finland and on the international level.

The Finnish Anchor model is a local multi-professional model studied in this report

Anchor activities are multi-professional work where the police, a social worker, a health care professional (often a psychiatric nurse) and a youth worker work together. The work is targeted to the prevention of crime committed by children and young people (under 18-year-olds) and to the promotion of their wellbeing. In the case of violent radicalisation, there is no upper age limit, and adult social services participate in the cooperation.
The Anchor services operate in different parts of Finland. In some regions, several municipalities have signed a cooperation agreement, and the local Anchor provides services for several municipalities. In some regions, the Anchors operate within a single municipality. Anchor activities comply with the joint national principles that have been described in the Anchor manual published in March 2019. At the same time, we have to ensure both locally and regionally that the Anchor activities address the local and regional needs and special characteristics.

From the viewpoint of case management, Anchor activities have a central role. They represent different authorities and are therefore multi-professional, making case management more flexible than when, for example, the police refer customers directly to municipal services. Because of the multi-professional nature of their work, the Anchor workers have a wider perspective of the customers' situation and problems than an individual authority.

The Ankkuritoiminta.fi website provides information about services

The Ankkuritoiminta.fi (Anchor activities) website was published in January 2019. It is aimed at professionals, young people and their loved ones when the young people experience difficulties in life. Anchor activities bring together multi-professional competence and provide young people and their families more comprehensive support and routes to services.

The website is aimed at professionals, families and young people, and it provides information about available support services.

The Ankkuritoiminta.fi website contains:

- Contact information of all Finnish Anchor teams
- Information about Anchor activities and customer work
- Information about topical themes, events and training
- A databank

4 The reviewed local operators and their roles in the prevention of violent radicalisation and the case management of people of concern

4.1 Anchor teams and multi-professional teams

We interviewed seven Anchor teams and, those included, a total of nine multi-professional working teams. In the district of the Southwest Finland Police Department, the Anchors in Turku, Pori, Salo, Loimaa and Rauma participated. In the districts of the Häme Police Department and the Päijät-Häme Police Department, the Anchors in Lahti and Hämeenlinna participated. In addition, we reviewed the UHKAT ('Threats') function of the Oulu Police. It has developed a targeted operational model and multi-professional cooperation for working with people of concern. The report also includes a multi-professional team in Tampere that has developed, together with the local cooperation network for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, an operational model for the case management of people of concern together with authorities and civic society organisations.

Description of Anchor activities and a general operational model

Since the end of the 1990s, Finland has developed a multi-professional Anchor model that allows early intervention when the wellbeing of young people is at risk. When young people are involved with criminal activity and substance abuse, the aim is to break the cycle of crime early on by addressing the causes, not just the consequences. In some cities, the Anchor model has also been used to address domestic violence and violence in close relationships. According to the National Action Plan, the Anchor model has also been used to prevent violent extremism and radicalisation since 2016. The target group is under

18-year-old young people involved in criminal activity. In case of violent radicalisation, there is no upper age limit. In case of minors, the parents are also involved.

According to the 'one-stop-shop' principle, Anchor activities are carried out by a team that consists of a police officer, a medical social worker and a health care professional, usually a psychiatric nurse. In some areas, the youth services are also involved. When working with young people, the team members offer their own expertise in a coordinated manner. The competence and services of their background organisations can be used to support the customers. The teams work in connection with police departments but each member belongs to their own background organisation. These background organisations pay for the wages of the appointed team member, and their supervisors are responsible for guiding and monitoring the activities. From the point of view of young people and families, multi-professional cooperation enables individual, timely and coordinated low-threshold support. All police departments run Anchor model activities but there are differences in the professional composition of the teams, for example. According to the ankkuritoiminta.fi website, approximately 60 municipalities are involved in Anchor activities.

Figure 3



This figure is borrowed from the training material for the current Anchor manual project of the National Police Board, the University of Eastern Finland and the Ministry of the Interior. It represents the tasks of the Anchor professionals in customer work and the cooperation of the Anchor workers. The Anchor manual will be published in March 2019 and it will guide the work of the Anchor teams.

Special preventive police work, criminal intelligence and analysis, the UHKAT function, the Oulu Police Department as an example

The task of the UHKAT function under the Oulu Police Department is to assess and prevent the threat of violence and to assist people of concern to get help, regardless of their age. Oulu is one of the regions where this report reviewed preventive work and multi-professional cooperation. The task of the UHKAT function, led by the Oulu Police Department, is to assess the threat of violence caused by people of concern and to assist them to get help in cooperation with health and social services, cooperation partners and third sector services. The experience of this work has been very positive.

4.2 The role of civic society organisations and religious communities in the prevention of violent radicalisation and the case management of people of concern

Civic society organisations and religious communities as assets for local cooperation

Civic society organisations and religious communities reach people in all life situations, and they are experts on how to encounter people. Activities based on civic society organisations and communities reach people that the authorities cannot reach. In a difficult life situation, people often seek guidance and counselling in their close environment, from someone they know and trust. Services offered by civic society organisations and religious communities often have a lower threshold than services offered by authorities. One of the reasons for this is that these people are often a part of their close environment and everyday life. The third sector also has competence and knowledge that the authorities do not, and this can be used to support their work.

4.2.1 Description of the third sector actors

We interviewed civic society organisations that cooperate with the Anchor activities in the same areas where these Anchor teams work. Information about cooperation partners was submitted by the Anchors. In some cases, we interviewed civic society organisations that were aware of the preventive work but did not cooperate with the Anchor in practice. The interviewed civic society organisations mostly work with crisis and family work provided to young people, and they offer general support and services to families and individuals in a difficult life situation. In the areas where these civic society organisations are involved in violence work or in preventive work targeted to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, these activities were taken into account. Such civic society organisations include, for example, the Reach Out services provided by Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, Radinet/Exit services provided

by the Vuolle Settlement, Via Vis anti-violence services and the MuVenna project of the Muslim Youth Forum in Turku. Several civic society organisations offer local activities and services based on the national action model in several towns. In some towns, they operate in close cooperation with the authorities. The cooperation can be based on cooperation agreements, and the civic society organisations can be a part of the municipality's service network as service providers. These kinds of services are offered by, for example, the Victim Support Finland, the Finnish Association for Mental Health, crisis centres and family counselling centres. All operators provide low-threshold support in various crisis situations and difficult life situations.

The roles and strengths of civic society organisations in preventive work and case management

Civic society organisations provide special services that play a key role in the prevention of violent extremism. People who are interested in extremism and have joined these kinds of groups do not usually trust the authorities, and it is easier for them to seek services provided by civic society organisations. Civic society organisations provide services that help in disengaging from violence, mentoring and other care services that promote breaking free from ideologies which approve violence. In addition, civic society organisations serve as a route for nonviolent social influencing and inclusion and provide an opportunity to be heard. Civic society organisations offer crisis and counselling services, which support coping in difficult life situations, positive life changes and wellbeing. Civic society organisations can either provide the service themselves or connect customers with services provided by others.

Generally, civic society organisations have wide networks and they are familiar with the operation and services of the civil society and authorities. Civic society organisations can provide information about available services, build trust towards authorities and connect customers with appropriate services. Participation in activities of civic society organisations can integrate people to society and, consequently, promote inclusion and the sense of belonging.

4.2.2 Description of religious communities

We interviewed religious communities that cooperate with the Anchors or have important competence with regard to the preventive work and case management. Some religious communities are in close cooperation with the authorities, and the youth services of some parishes belong to the Anchor activities. In practice, we had the opportunity to interview parishes of different Christian nominations and Muslim communities. We selected them based on the existing cooperation and the described services.

The roles and strengths of religious communities in preventive work and case management

Religious communities are experts and credible actors in issues related to the interpretation of religion. Authorities may not have the necessary religious literacy or knowledge of the practice of the religion. Religious communities can support authorities in encountering people and provide religious expertise to support the work of the authorities. Religious communities operate close to the people in various life situations and offer spiritual support and guidance. Communities reach people in their everyday lives and their members trust their operation. As a result, they can connect people with services provided by authorities and municipalities and play a bridging role when people do not trust the authorities. Muslim prayer rooms, immigration work and social work of the church have language proficiency and understand the support needs of people in vulnerable situations. This can be used as an asset for developing case management.

Violent extremism or its threat can be targeted to religious communities and their members. Therefore, they may have information about such activities in the region that is essential for its prevention. Religious communities play an important role in strengthening the immunity of communities against messages that encourage violence and they can support the community at the time of crisis.

5 Observations about case management, the challenges and promoting factors

5.1 The current state of local cooperation and the Anchor activities

The Anchor activities are based on the collaborative action of the participating cooperation partners. In some areas, these activities are based on written agreements where the allocated resources, goals of the operation and the target groups have been clearly defined. In other areas, the cooperation, goals of the operation and target groups are based on oral agreements. The majority of the Anchors we looked at connected customers with services offered by civic society organisations and municipalities, and civic society organisations were considered to be cooperation partners in case management. The level of their participation in local cooperation, such as the operation of local cooperation teams[7] in Helsinki, Turku, Tampere and Oulu, and its development varies. Their participation to cooperation is occasional in some cities and systematic in others. Often, this depends on the existing cooperation structures and operational culture between various actors or the networks of the employees. Awareness of other local actors and activities and the availability of suitable civic society organisation partners define their operation. From the viewpoint of the workers, the single factor with the greatest impact on cooperation is the available working time. Almost all of the interviewees stated that a common working space and working hours are important for the effectiveness and development of the activities. Cooperation is targeted to key groups, i.e. mainly to young people. Only in a few cases had the Anchors carried out systematic mapping together with the background organisations to develop cooperation with civic society organisations and to find partners. For example, the City of Turku has prepared a service map to facilitate case management in social and family work that the Anchor found useful.

7 In accordance with the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2012, local cooperation networks were established in Helsinki, Turku, Tampere and Oulu.

In some Anchors, all or part of the employees worked part-time, making it impossible to use their working hours to develop the activities or cooperation. This has a negative effect on the development of the Anchor teams' common tasks, i.e. coordination of activities and local cooperation.

In some areas, stakeholder group work is a central and established part of the operation, and practices are in place. For example, in Hämeenlinna and Pori the Anchors arrange Anchor coffee meetings where they invite parties identified as key stakeholder groups and cooperation partners. Both the Anchor workers and the participating cooperation partners found these stakeholder group meetings important in terms of exchange and dissemination of information and planning of cooperation.

The task of the local cooperation and cooperation networks is to connect local operators, provide more information and promote competence between them and to develop cooperation on the local level to prevent violent extremism. The representatives of the background organisations of Anchor activities often participate in these networks but the Anchor workers are generally not members. Participation of the Anchors in the operation of the local cooperation network would support the work of both the Anchors and the cooperation networks and provide an existing platform for stakeholder group work. This would be feasible in terms of resources and coordination of activities. The available time and resources are limited, which is why the existing structures should be used for local operation, whenever possible. The Anchor teams' awareness of the operation of other actors and the existing cooperation networks varies in different areas. The awareness of networks and participation in them seems to depend on the level of networking, activeness and proactiveness of single employees.

5.1.1 The current state: Anchor activities, prevention of local violent radicalisation and case management

The objectives of the work and customer groups

The national Anchor objectives and customer groups have been taken up in local work to a variable extent. All of the participating police departments provided Anchor activities, including prevention of violent radicalisation, in connection with some police stations, and this is one of the goals of ÿhe operation. There are no national guidelines or a national cooperation agreement to guide cooperation with authorities or guidelines for the Anchor activities. This lack of guidelines leads to large differences in the stakeholder groups, activities and practices within the Anchor work in different cities. A manual is under preparation. It will support coherent development of the Anchor activities in the future. The manual will be published in March 2019.

In practice, the Anchor activities are currently focused on young people with problems, such as crime and substance abuse. Generally, the background organisations become aware of these young people when an offence is reported or a child welfare notification is filed. Anchor customer work is guided by criteria based on which the customers are identified and introduced to the Anchor services. These criteria also vary in different areas, and they are based on various reasons and justifications. Some Anchors only accept under 15-year-old customers who have their first brush with the authorities, some work with under 18-year-olds and some have no upper age limit for people of concern and people with problems related to violent radicalisation. The challenge is how to ensure that all people at risk of violent radicalisation will find out about the Anchor services if people are connected with the services mainly based on their age and a report of offence or a child welfare notification and not their situation or needs. The above customer criteria are suitable for finding young people involved in criminal activities. They are less suitable for the prevention of violent radicalisation because the aim is to intervene before the ideological or belief-based commitment has led to violence. To be able to prevent violent radicalisation, the steering of customers should be supported with local cooperation, and the practices should differ from other target groups. However, the Anchor workers found that the Anchor activities and the related competence are suitable for the prevention of violent radicalisation. This is in line with international experiences that are described in chapter 5.

In accordance with international good practices, multi-professional work is the most effective way to stop the radicalisation process. Violent radicalisation is caused by numerous reasons. This means that different tools are needed for its prevention. It is also important to ensure that the implemented preventive measures do not strengthen the person's identity as a supporter of violent ideologies. This can happen if the measures are too one-sided.

Identification and the significance of stakeholder work in case management

The stakeholder group work performed by the Anchor and the composition of the team have a significant effect on the steering of customers. Young people also find the Anchor through youth services, outreach youth work and mobile Anchor activities. This is particularly common when youth work is part of the Anchor activities, and the stakeholder groups are aware of the existing paths to services. In the future, the Anchor activities will not have an upper age limit for the prevention of violent radicalisation, and linking adult social work with the Anchor activities would benefit both the target group and the prevention of violent radicalisation. This way, the pathways and networks of services for adults would be included in the operation. In some areas, the educational system guides young people to the Anchor services even when no offence has been reported or a child welfare notification has not been made. Concerned family members and loved ones may

also contact the Anchor services. These are important pathways to the Anchor work. They require stakeholder group work and promoting awareness of the Anchor activities. From the point of view of the prevention of violent radicalisation and the principle of early intervention, these practices and the stakeholder group work help to connect customers with the Anchor activities. In many cases, the inner circle, such as the family, friends, school, work or hobbies notice radicalisation and the related changes in ideology and behaviour. As a result, it is important that there is local information of how to contact low-threshold services and that information about support services is available. Case management is supported by a website that was launched in January 2019. The website provides information to young people, parents and professionals. The address of the website is Ankkuritoiminta.fi.

Competence of the Anchors and the presented training needs in the prevention of violent radicalisation in education

Prevention of violent radicalisation is a new feature of the Anchor activities, and the phenomenon is still very poorly known. The interviewed workers noted that awareness of the phenomenon and the customer work has been promoted through national training sessions of the Anchor workers, and this was considered as a good way of promoting common awareness of the subject. The national training sessions also enable peer learning, and the Anchor workers representing different professional groups can share experiences and good practices. This was found to be a good practice. The Anchors which work within the district of the same police department cooperate, and some cities arrange joint development days regionally. The workers found it important that awareness and resources for working with the target group are improved through training. Practices are developed in the same direction, while regional differences in operational environments and resources are taken into account. At the same time, the workers believed that the development of deeper professional competence and expertise requires systematic training and experience from customer work but that cannot be achieved or implemented in every Anchor team. It was considered that practices should be put into local use on the regional level. Thus, regional cooperation between the Anchors, ensuring sufficient competence and arranging the necessary training to support these ends were seen as the responsibility of regional or national operation.

Exchange of information in joint customer work

Multi-professional work is statutory authority work. The legislation related to the individual tasks of the professionals and the legislation related to cooperation must be taken into account in the cooperation of a multi-professional team. From the customer's point of view, the effectiveness of multi-professional work is based on the fact that the customer can get all the necessary support in one meeting where the combined

competence of the various professionals supports the assessment of the situation and the services that can be helpful. Issues related to exchange of information in customer work were raised in this investigation. In different cities and also within the Anchor services, it was unclear what the current legislation on cooperation means in practice and when information can be exchanged and when not. In terms of effective operation, it is important that cooperation is based on the law and that also all the opportunities provided by the law are considered comprehensively. In recent years, the legislation has been amended to facilitate exchange of information but these amendments have not been successfully implemented in all regards. At the moment, the workers do not have practical guidelines for the Anchor activities that clearly describe the legislation related to the exchange of information. As a result, the practices vary, and this can restrict cooperation more than the law and unnecessarily hinder customer work. When these issues come up in practical work, they are inconsistently solved without the necessary support. Common guidelines must be prepared for this work and sufficient training is needed to ensure that all the multi-professional workers are familiar with these guidelines.

5.2 The current state of local cooperation and civic society organisations

In principle, cooperation in all cities involves some civic society organisational actors, and the Anchor teams are able to connect the customers with services offered by civic society organisations. The participating civic society organisational actors are often familiar to the authorities. They have worked together for a long time and the cooperation is based on existing practices. In some cases, the cooperation is based on an agreement and the civic society organisations participate in customer work. These actors are national civic society organisations that offer victim or crisis support and work with families and young people, such as the Victim Support Finland, which is maintained by the Federation of Mother and Child Homes, the National Church Council, the Mannerheim League for Child Welfare, the Finnish Association for Mental Health, the Finnish Red Cross and the Finnish Federation of Settlement Houses. Also, crisis centres as well as family and youth organisations often participate in the cooperation. In some cases, the cooperation is based on common goals and target groups and established practices, and some civic society organisations cooperate as contractual service providers. For example, in Turku the Anchor cooperates with the Finnish Red Cross, and when young people have committed petty thefts, the meetings with guardians are held at emergency youth shelters. This work has provided a positive experience.

5.2.1 The current state: awareness of the prevention of violent radicalisation and local cooperation within civic society organisations

For the purpose of this report, we interviewed civic society organisation actors that already cooperated with the Anchors. The cooperation was mainly related to either youth work or working with people who experience violence in close relationships. Generally, the civic society organisations found that they needed training and information about the practices for identifying or working with customers affected by violent radicalization and extremism. Civic society organisations in Oulu and Turku are involved in violence prevention work, and the targeted prevention of radicalisation. In Tampere, the civic society organisation members of the local cooperation network were familiar with the phenomenon and had a clearer picture of the cooperation structures but felt that training and development of practices were needed.

Civic society organisations involved in violence work participate in local cooperation in the cities they work in. In Oulu, the forms of violence prevention work by the Vuolle Settlement, such as the Radinet that is aimed for those disengaging from violent extremist ideologies or operation and the Via Vis anti-violence services that address non-domestic violence that takes place outside the home, are perceived important and locally known partners.

Civic society organisations work flexibly and customers are often connected to special services provided by them from a geographically wide area. The services provided by civic society organisations and authorities are voluntary for customer, meaning that engaging with support, is solely based on the customers' consent. Cooperation with civic society organisations and authorities is focused, and sometimes civic society also serves as contractual partner for authorities in the case management of people of concern. In Turku, local cooperation includes the MuVenna project of the Muslim Youth Forum. It supports young people, advances well-being, and prevents radicalisation. Those civic society organisations that cooperate with the Anchors in several cities found that the cooperation and practices of case management vary between different cities. Some civic society organisations offer basic services for the general benefit of people in difficult life situations and for prevention. Their work can support attachment to society and positive life changes. Only a few civic society organisations have special competence on violent radicalisation and the related customer work, and their services are often not available on the national level due to scarce resources. In practice, the civic society organisations' expertise on the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism has been developed with separate funding and their continued operation depends on it. One example of this is the Radinet scheme, no longer funded by the Funding Centre for Social Welfare and Health Organisations (STEA) in 2019. On the national level, the civic society organisations have important centralised special functions and competence but they have low resources. In general, the civic society organisations felt that only limited information

about violent radicalisation and local cooperation is available. In addition, the civic society organisations are able to benefit from cooperation and its added value to varying degrees. Some of the civic society organisations that participated in the cooperation spread more information about their work to other civic society organisations within their own networks and some less. Information is often exchanged and shared orally because communication materials that describes the local operation of communication channels are virtually non-existent.

5.2.2 The current state: civic society organisations and case management

Working with people and providing support services is often part of civic society organisations' basic work, and they have networks and established practices in place for case management. Customers are connected with familiar and trusted services that are assessed to benefit them. In case management, the interface and referral, where the customer transfers from one authority or civic society organisation to another is often the most significant in terms of effectiveness. Close cooperation and clearly defined practices strengthen the coordination of services.

Civic society organisations felt that there are functional models for the cooperation between civic society organisations and authorities and for case management that can be applied more broadly than they are at the moment. Several civic society organisation workers noted that customer encounters and supported guidance are good practices that enforce case management and successfully linking the customers with the services. At the moment, case management between different actors is often considered to be exchange of information, such as handing out a brochure or sharing a website or contact information. Guided transfers and case management mean that in addition to handing out brochures, the referring party lowers the threshold of the service offered. With the customer's consent, the referring party can, for example, call the service and make an appointment on behalf of the customer or escort the customer there. Another proven practice is the VISITOR scheme developed by the Victim Support Finland, where the workers go and work at a police station. The idea is that the best place to reach the customers is to be in the place where the victims come to report the crimes. This model is a good example of strategic communication and cooperation that promote case management. Thanks to this outreach model, both the civic society organisation workers and the employees of the police station become more aware of each other and their work, which generally facilitates case management. Agreeing on the cooperation between various actors and its practices strengthens the shared perception of the work as well as the expectations of the cooperation and the roles of the participants. Cooperation between authorities and civic society organisations is often based on an agreement, particularly when the expertise and services of the civic society organisations is acquired as a purchased service. It is not necessary to conclude a cooperation agreement between

the actors involved in the case management. However, some sort of goal-oriented practice for the development of cooperation and exchange of information that supports the cooperation is considered important for establishing practices.

For example, the local cooperation network in Tampere for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is currently developing, together with its members, a process where people of concern are identified and connected with services. Authorities in different fields are involved in this work, as well as civic society organisations and other actors who provide services. For the purposes of this report, we interviewed members of the local cooperation network. They felt that working and developing together commit the cooperation partners to the operation. It also helps to ensure that everyone is aware of the competence, roles and contact channels of various actors and is able to utilise them to support their own work.

5.3 The current state of local cooperation and religious communities

During the review, the religious communities we met recognised that they were able to contribute to local cooperation and could offer competence and activities for the benefit of the local cooperation. During the interviews, the representatives and workers of these communities noted that local cooperation is important because religious communities are a part of a larger local community and want to participate in solving common problems. To promote common issues and to solve topical problems, religious communities have a lot of existing network-based cooperation between various churches and religions. In many cities, there are existing practices for inter-religious meetings and discussions and a coordinating party that invites communities to discuss topical issues together. This party is often a representative of the local Evangelical Lutheran Church. For example, in Turku the Bishop of Turku invites different churches and religions for regular meetings, and the participants found that these meetings were important and promoted inclusion. Similar cooperation also exists in Lahti, Oulu and Tampere.

Utilisation of the existing networks in target group communication is a good way of increasing the operators' knowledge and awareness of other local operators. Networked cooperation promotes trust and practical cooperation, which is a local asset also in crisis situations. In addition, religious communities and actors participate in the internal networking of the third sector, where information is shared within the civil society, cooperation is developed and support is offered to groups that the authorities cannot reach. One example of this is civic society organisation-based work to support those disengaging from violent extremist ideologies, where the expertise of Muslim prayer

rooms in mentor activities and customer work has been put to use in the prevention of violence justified with religion. This work has involved representatives of the Muslim community from Turku, Oulu, Helsinki, etc.

The level of participation and activity of religious communities in local cooperation varies in different cities and different religions. Religious communities felt that participation in local cooperation with the authorities is mainly based on the initiative of the authorities and along their lines. The most significant factor to promote cooperation was considered to be the authority's knowledge of the religious communities and ability to understand their competence and role in the cooperation. In some cities, such as Lahti, Hämeenlinna, Oulu and Turku, there is close cooperation between several religious communities. The Anchors, in particular, cooperate closely with the local parishes. In the Anchor activities in Hämeenlinna, for example, the key cooperation practice with the stakeholder groups are the Anchor coffee meetings, which bring together professionals and civic society organisations that work with young people. These events are held in the premises of the local parish. In Lahti and Oulu, the Anchor activities and seminars on prevention are arranged in cooperation with the local religious communities, and the authorities can use the parish premises for cooperation, for example. In addition, the available resources of different religious communities vary, and this should be taken into consideration in the practical cooperation arrangements. For example, Christian parishes often have hired employees who can participate in the cooperation in connection with their own tasks. In practice, cooperation with parishes is arranged during office hours when most of the meetings and planning work take place. The activities of Muslim prayer rooms are based on voluntary work and take place mostly in the evenings. Many members can only participate outside their working hours and they are not compensated for their cooperation efforts.

5.3.1 The current state: awareness of the prevention of violent radicalisation and local cooperation within religious communities

The majority of the religious communities we met had limited or no knowledge about the local cooperation for the prevention of violent radicalisation or extremism or the Anchor activities, their goals or the target groups. However, they generally had cooperation with one of the authorities involved in the Anchor activities on other sub-areas. In those cities with a local, permanent cooperation structure, such as a cooperation network that focuses on the prevention of violent radicalisation, the religious communities had poor knowledge about it and rarely participated. Among the investigated cities, these kinds of networks exist in Turku, Tampere and Oulu, and the convener is a representative of the police (Oulu) or of the city (Turku, Tampere).

There are plenty of non-profit activities and networks for voluntary work within the religious communities, and they have close cooperation with ideological associations and are able to take advantage of their activities and expertise, on a case-specific level, to support the work of the authorities. At least in Lahti, Turku, Oulu and Tampere, common training sessions with the authorities have been arranged to increase knowledge and cooperation in the prevention of violent radicalisation. Information about these sessions had not reached the religious communities in all cities. Generally, the communities found that they had a lot to give for cooperation but in practice the development of competence and participation in cooperation requires resources and information about the activities, both of which are scarce.

The religious communities we met told that they did not know what kind of help was available for people of concern and how these services could be accessed. A few religious communities in Oulu and Turku were an exception to this. The communities were also unsure about the possible consequences of reporting someone, for the reported person or the reporter. Uncertainty about what happens after a report is made raises the threshold of reporting. Violent radicalisation carries a fear of stigma. There is a general concern that instead of getting help, the person of concern or their inner circle or the reporter is stigmatised. Unclear practices and hard to find information increase distrust against the prevention of violence and raise the threshold for reporting concerns or connecting people with services. Both the religious communities and the authorities have provisions relating to secrecy, which regulate who can contact the authorities in case of concern and when and how. In practice, this threshold is very high for priests or theologians who receive information in pastoral care. This extremely tight obligation of secrecy is based on the Church Act that contains provisions on confessional secrecy.

5.3.2 The current state: parishes and case management

In Finland, cooperation between the church and the authorities has long traditions. In many areas, the parishes operate closely with municipal services or the Anchor team when offering spiritual support, family services and youth services. According to our information, participation of the youth services offered by the church in Anchor activities is based on a written agreement in some cities. The parishes have several tasks, and cooperation with the authorities is often based on a certain goal or activity. Their work concerning family and youth services, spiritual support, integration support and crisis work is very professional and often complements the work and services of the authorities. The role of the parishes is often to provide services and to connect their members and the customers they encounter with services. This existing cooperation can be put to use in the case management of customers. Knowledge about the operational culture and activities of the other parties promotes close cooperation with the authorities. The case management capabilities are good if the operators have established cooperation

practices and they trust each other. Awareness of activities and services can be promoted through communication, talking about the activities and services and common operation. Strategic target group communication strengthens local cooperation but it requires information about the target groups and the existing activities.

5.3.3 The current state: prayer rooms and case management

Similarly to parishes, the members practice their religion in Muslim prayer rooms and mosques. In addition to religious teaching and practices, prayer rooms arrange various free-time activities for families and children. The community has an important role in sharing information and gathering people together, and it can be used to easily reach a large group of members that authority communication might not reach. Prayer rooms are mainly based on volunteer work and they rarely have hired staff, which hinders their participation in cooperation. Their scarce resources are generally used for arranging their basic operation. The members of the Muslim prayer rooms are often multi-cultural and there are a lot of immigrant families that are not familiar with the Finnish services system or authorities. Language barriers, lack of information and fear of authorities make it difficult to reach these families and connect them with services. Some of the members come from countries where the authorities are not reliable. These people or their loved ones may have experienced persecution and violence by the authorities. In these countries, the authorities mean trouble. These people may not have experience of basic services or knowledge about their right for services that could benefit them, improve their social inclusion and strengthen equality. While practical work can be successful between various operators, it is often quite random and depends on the individual. It is important to build cooperation relationships and trust towards the authorities in such a way that they are not dependent on a single individual. To avoid this, all Anchor workers should participate in the cooperation with stakeholder groups even if a single person coordinates this activity. The police are often actively involved in mobile work with the stakeholder groups. The visibility of the Anchor team should be utilised to communicate better that the Anchor activities include more than just police work.

The prayer rooms have an important role in the case management of their members and in providing information about the services and the authorities to the members. The communities have plenty of culture and language competence that the authorities lack. Their understanding of the culture and systems of Finland and their members' home countries is a local asset, and they can build a bridge and trust between the members and the authorities. In practice, the Muslim communities support integration as part of their activities ranging from helping with the available services and their use to teaching the Finnish language. The level of cooperation with authorities varies among the interviewed prayer rooms. The interaction is particularly close in Oulu and Turku. The main form of cooperation is that police officers visit the prayer rooms during the evenings or weekends.

They talk about the work of the authorities and answer questions from the community members. This is important work because the members often feel that prayer rooms are safe and the threshold for meeting authorities is low even if they have had poor experiences before.

The UHKAT (THREATS) function and an example of successful communication to promote case management

The importance of communication: People of concern and case management

Making the operation visible and transparent communication increase awareness and trust in the operation.

The interviewed parties noted that they need clear information about who or what party to contact on the local level if they are concerned about a person. Information should be available about the practical consequences of making a report, both to the reporter and the reported person. This would lower the threshold for contact.

As a good practice, the stakeholder groups mentioned the UHKAT function of the Oulu Police Department where different operators cooperate with people of concern. Successful and transparent communication has managed to strengthen cooperation relationships on the local level. All the operators interviewed in Oulu, including the religious communities, had a clear picture of who to contact in these cases. Many of them also had a good general idea of what the operation entails in practice. This knowledge has been increased through target group communication. In practice, they have met a large number of stakeholder groups, which are thought to benefit from the information based on a stakeholder group analysis, and talked to them about their operation. These groups are also able to share this information in their own networks and forward it to their customers. The operation has also been made visible to the general audience through media.

6 International experiences and operational models

The Rajapinta Project studied local operational models for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism and case management of people of concern in Haarlem, the Netherlands, Manchester, the United Kingdom, and Copenhagen and Aarhus, Denmark. These countries were chosen because they have developed local cooperation for the prevention of violent radicalisation for longer and more systematically than in Finland. The starting point was that these three countries have existing operational models and experience that can be utilised in Finland, while taking the local conditions and situations into account. In all three countries, the work is based on a national strategy or action plan that is implemented in cooperation between the authorities and the civil society. In these countries, local prevention has been developed by utilising the existing competence, structures and multi-professional models for the prevention of crime and violence. Multi-professional cooperation ensures that all the necessary competence and information is available. Despite the different societies and legislations, these countries have experienced and solved similar issues that also came up when Finnish prevention professionals were interviewed. International experience demonstrates that preventive work requires cooperation with the authorities on all operational levels: from where decisions about the operation are made and guidelines given to where the practical work with customers takes place.

6.1 The multi-professional operational model in the Netherlands and experiences from Haarlem

Shared responsibility and coordination between the police, the prosecutor and the mayor, tri-agency approach

Haarlem is the capital of the North Holland province in the Netherlands. In Haarlem, the mayor is responsible for the coordination of the prevention of violent radicalisation together with the police and the prosecutor. This is called the **tri-agency approach**.

In this approach, the mayor and the municipality were granted a key role because the municipality is responsible for providing the necessary services for general safety and preparedness and prevention.

It was also thought that interventions that were based solely on the information and actions of the police were not sufficient or successful enough in terms of prevention. Before this approach, the challenge was that various authorities could work with the same person without knowing about each other. The municipalities felt that they did not get enough information about factors that influenced regional safety and were not able to connect people of concern to services in a timely manner. As a result of the previous lack of information and poor coordination, the single actions of different operators were often ineffective. They did not meet the needs of the person in question or were insufficient in the overall situation. The tri-agency approach includes joint decisions on individual cases, and the responsibility for the decisions as well as their implementation and monitoring is shared. The approach ensures sufficient management support for the work on the next level where practical support measures and other measures are implemented. A shared picture of the situation promotes cooperation and sufficiently joins the safety and wellbeing perspectives of the work.

The customer work process and operational model in practice

Based on the tri-agency approach, common meetings are arranged regularly to discuss all cases and people of concern that the authorities are aware of. Based on the common information received from the different parties, the people and their situation are assessed to be able to recommend further routes and services. Several further measures can take place at the same time. A possible criminal investigation does not rule out the need to connect the person to health and social services, for example. In each case, the tri-agency approach decides on the recommendations by consensus. After that, the recommendations are implemented on the next level, under the responsibility of a multi-professional team. On its discretion, the tri-agency approach can consult the experts of the regional Safety Houses when preparing recommendations. The Safety House operation offers centralised special expertise on violent radicalisation and the related customer work, and the customers and their families can be connected directly with these services. Regional Safety Houses and the employed experts provide the local operators training and tools for local customer work.

In Haarlem, the practical multi-professional work is performed in two teams. Similarly to the Finnish Anchor model, a multi-professional team works in connection with the police stations. It is responsible for the practical implementation and monitoring of the

tri-agency decisions. The cooperation represents 20 different actors, each providing different services, such as youth work, family work, child protection, social services, health services, the police, the prosecutor's office, mediation and various civic society organisations. These actors cooperate daily in shared premises as the representatives of their background organisations. They support cooperation with the knowledge and competence of their background organisation as well as services that the people can be connected with. Based on the same principle, the Safety House operation focuses on the prevention of violent radicalisation, and the customers in this target group are referred to the Safety Houses. The operational model and cooperation ensure that the measures are based on up-to-date information. All the necessary tools and competence are available for addressing people of concern, as well as the service network that case management is based on.

Multi-professional cooperation practices

In practice, cooperation in single cases takes place in **joint meetings** where all of the authorities are present in the same room and orally share information about each person in their custody to enable assessment of their background and the overall situation and to tailor the support measures. Most of the cases are forwarded from crime prevention or the tri-agency approach but any cooperation partner can present a case in a joint meeting. When a support plan has been prepared for a person in a joint meeting, organisations are requested to participate in practical customer work, when necessary. The cooperation is based on shared responsibility but a **coordinator** is appointed for each case, and the coordinator is responsible for the implementation of the commonly decided support measures and for **reporting** about them in the joint meetings. In case of crime prevention, the cases are always coordinated by the police. If a crime is not involved, the coordinator is often related to municipal services or organisations.

6.1.2 Experiences and good practices from the Netherlands:

Securing competence and resources

The Netherlands have systematically developed both national and local expertise in prevention in general and in the prevention of violent radicalisation. As part of the Safety House operation, local authorities have been trained to ensure that sufficient basic level expertise on this issue is available in all parts of the country. In addition, the national expert centre supports cooperation between different branches of administration, and its centralised competence and helpline support the work on the local level. National and regional expert support is particularly important for smaller cities where the cases are rarer and who do not have the necessary resources and experience-based practices like the larger cities.

Local cooperation structures and coordination

In the Netherlands, strategic cooperation between the municipality, the police and the prosecutor's office and the tri-agency approach ensures that the management is committed to act and the people involved in practical work have the management's support and the necessary resources and competence are shared. Management cooperation supports exchange of information and extends the cooperation culture to the implementing level. The consensus principle related to both the tri-agency approach and single cases strengthens the implementation of decisions. Addressing people of concern is based on a common picture of the situation, which facilitates the sharing of the coordination responsibility and the cooperation with organisations.

Agreements that facilitate exchange of information and cooperation, which lay out the principles for the exchange of information, legislation that permits the exchange of information as well as the practices and goals of the operation serve as the foundation for cooperation in the Netherlands. When the documents are available, single employees have a clearer picture of their own powers and the powers of others involved in the cooperation. The cooperation is always based on common goals and practices, and defining these goals and practices offers the cooperation partners a base for the discussion of practical challenges.

6.2 The Danish model and the national centre of expertise

Like in Finland, the prevention of violent radicalisation in Denmark is based on a multi-professional model developed previously for the prevention of young people's crime and the gained experiences. In Denmark, local work is performed by the SSP, which is similar to our Anchor model. It involves the police, the education system and the health and social services. Similarly as in the Anchor model, the challenge of the prevention of violent radicalisation lies in linking expertise with the existing operation and in specification of the target groups. In Denmark, the prevention of local violent radicalisation is promoted as part of the basic work. The necessary competence in addressing violent radicalisation is promoted and supported locally by Info Houses, which have expertise on this area and support the basic work. The customers can be referred to the Info House, when necessary. At the Info House, the police and the municipality work together and coordinate mentoring, which is part of the specialised operation, to support customers and families that try to disengage from extremist movements or ideologies. At the same time, the Info House maintains a picture of the regional situation and works together with the national level. Coordination of the collaboration between SSP and the Info House is based on the following model: a local coordinator serves as a contact point for the Info House, which

also offers training for the coordinators. The aim is to ensure that every city has the basic skills necessary for the SSP's work and the resources for customer work, and they can utilise the centralised expertise or operational models of the Info House or connect the target group with it, when necessary. The Info House operation involves a larger group of operators than in the basic work of the SSP. In addition to the police and child protection, it includes employment services and adult social work, for example. The Info House operation includes threat assessments and customer plans that are prepared together. The SSP participates in their implementation on the local level.

The national centre of expertise to support the municipalities and local work

The national Centre for Prevention of Extremism provides information to support national and local work

In 2017, a national Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism was established in Copenhagen. Prevention of extremism had been developed for approximately ten years in Denmark, and the new centre was established based on the created competence and expertise. The task of the centre is to support national and municipal work to prevent violent extremism and to produce information and tools to support the operation. The centre has four functions and employs approximately 14 experts. Information for concerned families and loved ones is available on the centre's website. The website provides basic information about the phenomenon as well as the different forms of extremism and their identification. A section for families and the inner circle describes how to identify the need for help and who to contact when concerned about someone. The section also describes what happens after a person has been reported and what kind of support is available. The provision of correct information and promotion of awareness facilitate prevention because people are better able to identify the signs of radicalisation and are not afraid to report these and know where to refer people of concern.

The services and functions of the centre

The national centre has four functions, described below.

1. Counselling and expert support
   The counselling service is aimed for municipalities, professionals and the general public. The counsellors support the municipalities in the development of the prevention of violent extremism. Based on the received information, the centre has contacted all municipalities. The initiative can come from a municipality or the centre.

2. Development of methods and tools for consistent work
   The centre has developed different tools, such as a toolkit for municipalities. This toolkit includes information and a description of an operational model for arranging the prevention of radicalisation and the supportive structures as part of local security planning, for mapping cooperation partners and for launching cooperation with various stakeholder groups. The centre has developed an assessment tool for municipalities that can be used to assess the possible radicalisation of a person. The method is designed to be used at an early stage, which makes it different from other assessment tools. The experts visit the municipalities, when necessary, to support the processes.

3. The analysis and research department
   The research department produces research-based knowledge of violent radicalisation and tools for assessing the effectiveness of prevention. It is extremely important that preventive measures are based on research information and that the operation is developed based on correct and up-to-date information. Violent radicalisation and the different forms of extremism are social phenomena, and their background factors and forms vary and change. Up-to-date analysis of the phenomenon and the related factors is important on the national, regional and local level to ensure that the operation meets the needs of the changing operating environment and the related needs.

4. Civil society
   One sub-area of the work of the national centre of expertise is to support civil society operators and to strengthen their participation in the preventive work. Unlike in the Finnish and Dutch models, Danish civic society organisations have not supported authorities in the customer work related to people of concern. They have a lot of activities that support inclusion and the sense of community, and the aim is to unite these activities with local work through cooperation. The centre is preparing a manual for the basis of the cooperation between civic society organisations and municipalities.

6.2.1 Experiences and good practices from Denmark

Regional Info House system supports local operation

In Denmark, the local prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation is based on the same principle as in Finland: the preventive work follows the existing structures (cf. the SSP and the Anchor), and their existing competence and networks are utilised. A regional Info House system has been established to support them, and the Info Houses have centralised special expertise on the prevention of violent radicalisation. This system

eliminates the problem created by the fact that operators on the local level do not have the necessary expertise for the prevention of violent radicalisation.

Centralised support for municipalities

In Denmark, the national centre is responsible for supporting the municipalities in the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation. The experts of the centre come from different backgrounds and have competence and knowledge from various fields. The municipalities know who to contact, when necessary. The centre gathers information about good practices and the situation and needs of the municipalities, making it possible to take necessary development action proactively. The operation of the centre is based on interactive work with the municipalities.

6.3 The UK's experiences on the exchange of information: Multi-professional teams in the Greater Manchester Area

Through the new counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST, approved in the summer of 2018), the United Kingdom strengthened the exchange of information between the security and intelligence agencies and the municipalities. The aim of this new strategy is to ensure that the municipalities receive timely information about people of concern in their area and about families and people returning from the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria, for example. In the UK, the police have led the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The improved exchange of information aims to offer the municipalities the opportunity to participate in the work at an earlier stage and to integrate municipal services more closely with the prevention work. A new model is being piloted in Manchester where the municipalities lead the local prevention of violent radicalisation but also receive more targeted information to support their work. The current legislation on the exchange of information did not have to be amended to enable this operation. It is more of a question of a new operational culture. Two Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) teams have been established in Manchester. They address all cases that benefit from a multi-professional approach, make an overall assessment of the person's and the inner circle's need for support and connect them with municipal services. One team specialises in social and health services for minors and another team on adults. The MASH teams have centralised expertise and competence on radicalisation. They have the right to receive information about people of concern but their target group is larger than violent radicalisation. The aim is to provide multi-professional assessment and case management for all persons and families in need of support. The MASH teams monitor the implementation of the customer plans and are able to monitor the effectiveness of the case management.

6.3.1 Experiences and good practices from the UK

A common picture of the situation – security authorities and the municipality

In the UK, violent radicalisation and extremism has been prevented systematically since 2005. So far, the security authorities have been in charge of the preventive work but responsibilities and tasks have also been assigned to municipalities. Today, the prevention is strengthened in the pilot towns by improving the exchange of information and a common picture of the situation. The idea is that a municipality cannot effectively prevent violent radicalisation and extremism unless it has enough information about the situation within its area. The aim of the situational picture is to ensure that effective prevention takes place on all sectors of the municipality. For example, authorities that let municipal premises for various events can prevent civic society organisation of events that promote division and extremist ideologies if they know who or what parties are involved in this kind of operation. This information helps to prevent heightened local tensions and to limit the operation of violent extremist movements.

6.4 Observations on the comparison of the Finnish, Dutch, Danish and British practices

Based on the gathered information, it can be noted that, compared to Finland, the prevention of violent radicalisation on the local level is much more developed in the comparison countries. In Finland, the cooperation with civic society organisations and religious communities is closer. In Finland, mainly the Anchor model corresponds to some of the local structures that the comparison countries have developed. However, the Anchor activities have only recently been developed systematically in both the basic work and the prevention of violent radicalisation.

Multi-professional operation and utilisation of the existing structures have been key principles in the development of the prevention of violent radicalisation. For example, in Denmark the SSP operation already started in the 1990s, and the prevention of violent radicalisation was added to its tasks later. In the United Kingdom, the multi-professional approach is being developed strongly with the aim of closer integration of the municipal services.

The exchange of information between authorities has been found to present a great challenge in several countries. In the countries studied in this report, the problems related to the exchange of information have been largely solved. In Denmark, the exchange of information is based on an Act on crime prevention that entered into force in the 1990s. According to this act, exchange of information is allowed for the purpose of crime prevention. There is a similar law in the UK that has long enabled cooperation with the

authorities on the local level. In the Netherlands, no significant problems with exchange of information were brought up, and the local cooperation is very close. Cooperation is an established approach in preventive work, which made it easier to recognise personal information that was only shared with the people involved in the matter.

Based on the received information, it appears that the problems with exchange of information are often related to how the preventive work is perceived and how well-established it is. In Finland, prevention is considered to have low significance, at least when looking at the allocated capacities and resources. Legislative means are often emphasised in the public discussion, even when they mainly have an effect on the situation after the crime has been committed. It can be estimated that countries where the threat and fear of crime and recent violent radicalisation are bigger than in Finland have been forced to considerably develop their preventive work, which might have underlined its importance.

In the countries studied in this report, prevention in general and also the prevention of violent radicalisation was customer-oriented. The aim was to change the course of the customers' lives, and it was the task of the authorities to find the necessary tools. The starting point was that one single authority is not capable of that but when the authorities work together, the number of available tools is significantly higher. When the services of civic society organisations are also included, a wide range of services is available. In Finland, this work has for a long time been largely dependent on the authorities. Those customers who do not fit the target group of any authority are often excluded from the services.

When looking at issues related to the exchange of information, it is important to note that the data protection regulation of the EU covers the entire European Union. It includes provisions on the processing of personal data and its free movement. The aim of the regulation is to strengthen the basic rights of citizens in the digital age. It seems that its interpretations vary in different countries, however. For example, in Denmark the experts told that the practice was to first find out what the legislation allows. In Finland, the interviewed people often noted that the exchange of information and different interpretations of the related legislation were problematic. This is explained by the uncertainty of practices and interpretation of law brought up by the professionals and the lack of guidelines for multi-professional cooperation. Focusing on the barriers speaks of an operational culture where exchange of information is seen to include risks and threats and that these can be considered to outweigh the benefits of the cooperation for the customer. It follows that information is not always exchanged in Finland, even when the law permits and the customer would benefit from it.

Different countries had different views of the responsibility of municipalities and mayors. In Finland, the police are still traditionally responsible for security and are the experts in security issues. Violent radicalisation is both a social problem and a security problem. Prevention is effective only when the security and social measures are combined. In the Netherlands, this has been ensured by making the mayor responsible for the prevention of violent radicalisation together with the police and the prosecutor. This model was considered successful. In the UK, the responsibility of municipalities is increased but, at the same time, it is ensured that they have a sufficient amount of up-to-date information about the security situation and the possible threats.

In the countries included in this report, the structures for the prevention of violent radicalisation are clearer and the uniform practices that guide the operation are stronger than in Finland. In these countries, the allocation of resources and centralised expertise had been arranged in a manner that supports the work on the local and the regional level. In Finland, national cooperation between different authorities, civic society organisations and communities is arranged through the national cooperation group. There are differences between the local and regional cooperation structures and operation. One possible reason is that the effects of violent radicalisation and extremism were more visible in the studied countries than in Finland. Tension at the local level has increased in many areas, the relationships between different population groups are tense and the work of extremist groups is visible to the citizens as demonstrations, patrols and street protests. The minorities feel insecure and they are often targets of hatred and violence. All of these factors provide a breeding ground for extremist groups and increase their support. In Finland, this development has increased in the recent years, and polarisation has become more visible. When violent radicalisation and extremism are seen as a wider issue instead of an individual problem this will strengthen the importance of prevention and the local structures also in Finland.

7 Observed challenges and recommendations for further work

Recommendations for the development of the Anchor activities and local cooperation to ensure successful case management are given below.

7.1 Recommendations for the Anchor activities

The national work that guides the Anchor activities is carried out in cooperation between the responsible Ministries, i.e. the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Ministry of Education and Culture, where the operation is developed and planned on a strategic level. A steering group, which includes the responsible Ministries plus the key agencies, such as the National Police Board and the National Institute for Health and Welfare, has a key role in the development of the national operational model. This report does not study the structures that guide the Anchor activities or their content because the related policies, recommendations and proposals are described in the Anchor manual that will be published in March 2019. The starting point for the recommendations presented in this manual is development of case management, and the recommendations are based on the challenges presented by the practical workers and the key stakeholder groups. The material concerning the Anchor activities, such as the agreements on the Anchor activities, have been considered in the recommendations.

National strategic planning work and local implementation and practical work should be linked more closely

The link between national strategic work and local practical work is considered weak. Those involved in practical work have a limited amount of information about the expectations for the Anchor model, in terms of case management and the prevention of violent radicalisation, for example. The development of the Anchor model on the ministry level and the practical implementation are not sufficiently connected. There is a

danger that the strategic development cannot be put into practice because there are no structures that would ensure exchange of information between the strategic level and the local multi-professional Anchor teams. The professionals find the strategy and objectives of the national work positive but they need support for their practical implementation and guidance and the customer work related to the prevention of radicalisation.

Recommendations:

1. The work that guides the Anchor activities and the structures and the operation that guides the local work should be linked more closely. To this end, we need a clearly defined coordinator who supports the multi-professional work in practice and ensures that the strategic guidance is put into practice.
2. The Anchor workers should be aware of the goals and direction of the operation.
3. Guidelines for cooperation that support the operation should be kept up-to-date and made familiar to all.

Harmonisation of the Anchor activities and setting of goals

The Anchor activities differ significantly in different cities and areas in terms of the participating operators, target groups and customer work processes. At the moment, the operation of some Anchors is based on a local agreement and the established practices among the participants. Some Anchors conclude written agreements that describe the goals of the operation, roles of the operators, responsibilities and target groups. Written agreements are often made when the cooperation covers, and its resources come from, several municipalities.

The existing written agreements on the Anchor activities differ from each other in terms of the goals of the operation and the resources, i.e. the allocated human resources and the addressed issues. The challenge is that it is difficult to develop a uniform operation model if the rationales for action are very different in different areas and cities and the goals are unclear. Ensuring homogeneous quality and coverage of authority services is important also in terms of customer equality (equal access to services provided by the authorities).

Recommendations

4. It is strongly recommended to draw up a written agreement on the Anchor activities that defines the goals and practices and takes into account the guidelines for the Anchor activities.

5. In terms of resources, it would be feasible to conclude one centralised agreement that can be complemented locally, when necessary.

Guidelines for information exchange practices to support the Anchor activities and ensuring that everyone is familiar with the guidelines

With regard to the effectiveness of work, it is important that cooperation is legally possible and that the opportunities provided by law are effectively utilised. At the moment, the workers do not have practical guidelines for the Anchor activities that would specify the legislation concerning the exchange of information and the opportunities it provides for multi-professional cooperation. As a result, the practices vary and this can restrict cooperation more than the law, hinder customer work and prevent access to services. This problem is magnified by the young age of the Anchor target group and the fact that this group benefits the most from preventive services in the long term. When these issues come up in practical work, they are inconsistently solved, without the necessary resources and support.

Recommendations

6. It is recommended that common guidelines are prepared for the Anchor work and it is ensured through training and exchange of information that all multi-professional workers are familiar with the guidelines.
7. Every ministry and agency involved in the Anchor work should prepare guidelines concerning its own administrative branch. Shared perception of the work among administrative branches should be ensured by cooperation.
8. In addition, common training for the Anchors is needed to put the guidelines to practice.

7.2 Recommendations for the development of local cooperation

Capacity building and awareness raising

The prevention of violent radicalisation is a new topic for the professionals, civic society organisations and religious communities involved in the Anchor work. Training and awareness raising between and within these groups should be increased. The national training aimed for the Anchor workers was considered to be of good quality and to support the work. These training sessions have been arranged as part of project work related to preparation. In the future, it should be ensured that training is arranged also

after the project. Regional development days that have been arranged within the district of some police departments have been considered to be a good way to share information and experiences.

Recommendations

9. National training for Anchors should be arranged on a regular basis.
10. The regional training days for the Anchors are a good practice that should be continued and also implemented in areas where there is no cooperation with the Anchors yet.
11. Arranging training with the authorities, civic society organisations and religious communities is a good way of promoting competence and exchange of information, which in turn promotes cooperation between various operators.

Development of strategic communication and communication on authority services as part of operation

The parties interviewed for the purpose of this report noted that factors that promote local cooperation are related to the structures of cooperation, communication and coordination of the operation. Information about the Anchor activities and local structures and activities for the prevention of violent extremism is scarce.

Recommendations

12. Communication that supports preventive work should be systematically improved and implemented as part of local work.
13. With regard to communication, the important stakeholder groups and communication channels should be mapped to allow up-to-date communication on the operation and its goals.
14. The existing local networks should be used to support communication. Communication of the cooperation networks for the local prevention of violent radicalisation and of the Anchor activities should be developed to ensure that information is available and the local cooperation partners can utilise it in their work.

Prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation needs resources

Prevention of violent extremism requires cooperation between the authorities and the civil society as well as competence. The need for preventive work has not decreased

because violent extremist movements and the supporters of extremism have become more visible in Finland, in Europe and beyond. The effects of increased extremism get wide attention in the society and on the local level as increased polarisation and tensions between population groups. People encourage hate and violence in the social media. This development has a large impact on the people's safety and sense of security. It can restrict the freedom of opinion and speech as well as public discussion because people are reluctant to share their views if it can result in hate speech and targeting.

At the moment, the competence related to the prevention of violent radicalisation and the operation of extremist movements is scattered among the authorities, civic society organisations and religious communities. There are no sufficient, established structures for the work. Work is done locally, often at the upper limit of the resources. As a result, preventive work is not sustainable. Resources are needed for capacity building, developing of operations and instilling them.

Resources are also needed for making use of the operation and competence of civic society organisations and religious communities. At the moment, financing is uncertain and difficult to get, and that makes strategic development of long-term work difficult or even impossible.

Enough resources should be allocated to the multi-professional Anchor work to ensure that cooperation between the authorities in different administrative branches becomes established and is possible in practice.

Recommendations

15. It is recommended that financing is granted for civic society organisations and religious communities to enable their participation in the prevention of violent radicalisation as well as development of their work and competence on a sustainable basis.
16. The administrative branches and operators that participate in the Anchor work should ensure sufficient resources to allow long-term work in accordance with the set goals.

Annexes

Annex 1 Description of the case management process, from a tip-off to support



Annex 2 Case management of persons of concern and multidisciplinary cooperation, City of Haarlem, the Netherlands



Annex 3 The Danish model, competence and cooperation

The Danish model



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