Interdependence of Internal and External Security

Will the operational culture change with the operational environment?

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Abstract

The security environment is undergoing rapid and constant change. Global security issues, such as terrorism and the related recruiting activities, widespread immigration, and cybercrime, exemplify the inseparability of internal and external security. The multifaceted cause-effect relationships and formation mechanisms of these issues, and the constantly morphing interaction, make operating in the security environment even more complex and forecasting its development more challenging. The development requires security actors to examine security in a wider scope, past actor-specific sector borders, and to cooperate more comprehensively and proactively.

In order to respond to these developments, the Ministry of the Interior’s strategic research project on the interdependence of internal and external security has established a more in-depth understanding of the inseparability of internal and external security, and produced development recommendations for improving the operational prerequisites and cooperation of the security actors. The project has been closely connected to the internal security strategy currently being prepared; the key perspectives and development recommendations produced during the project will be taken into consideration in the preparation process. The project implementation has been based on cross-administration cooperation between experts of the Ministry of the Interior and its sectors, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, utilising interviews and workshops. The International Affairs Unit of the Ministry of the Interior has acted as the responsible executor of the project.

The five main levels of development jointly identified during the project process are: 1) development of the usability and shareability of information, 2) definition and shared interpretation of shared interests and goals concerning the security environment, 3) development of flexible cooperation models, 4) improvement of the flexibility of decision-making, and 5) improvement of the up-to-dateness and flexibility of the practices related to the definition of jurisdiction, and preparedness. Each main level includes a description of the development recommendations, the more detailed examination of which will be promoted as part of the preparation of the internal security strategy. The common goal of the development recommendations and the perspectives produced during the project is to promote the development of methods and operating models that better match the current security environment, and their establishment as part of the operational culture.
### Tiivistelmä


De fem huvudnivåer som identifierats gemensamt under projektprocessen är 1) utveckling av möjligheten att utnyttja och dela information, 2) fastställande av gemensamma intressen och mål rörande säkerhetsmiljön samt en gemensam tolkning, 3) utveckling av flexibla samarbetsmodeller, 4) förbättring av flexibiliteten i beslutsprocesser samt 5) förbättring av aktualiteten och flexibiliteten i rutiner relaterade till fastställande av befogenheter och beredskap. Respektive huvudnivå inkluderar en beskrivning av utvecklingsförslagen. Den detaljerade behandlingen av dessa förslag är led i beredningen av strategin för den inre säkerheten. Det gemensamma syftet för utvecklingsförslagen och de synpunkter som tagits fram i projektet är att främja utvecklingen av verksamhetsätt och verksamhetsmodeller som bättre svarar upp mot den nuvarande säkerhetsmiljön och att etablera dessa som en del av verksamhetskulturen.
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1 Description and goals of the interdependence of internal and external security -project

The objective of the Ministry of the Interior’s research project on the interdependence of internal and external security has been to establish an in-depth understanding of the interdependence of internal and external security, which has become closer with the change in the international operational environment, and to prepare concrete action proposals and recommendations for the development of the operational prerequisites and cooperation of the security actors. The project has been closely connected with the internal security strategy currently being prepared. Particular attention has been paid in the preparation of the project to the strategic focus areas brought up in the internal security report, and the interfaces to the examination of the security context comprising both internal and external security. The project has been implemented in cross-administration cooperation between the sectors of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The goals of the interdependence of internal and external security project have been to assess the strengths and challenges of the current state of international operations and, related to this, to analyse the interfaces and interdependence of internal and external security and to create concrete action proposals and development recommendations concerning the links between internal and external security. The project work has reinforced the shared view of the administrative branch of the Ministry of the Interior of international operations as one of the strategic key tasks of internal security, and has drawn up proposals for specifying the key tasks, coordination responsibility, and division of duties and authority related to internal security in more detail, and for reducing the legislative obstacles related to international cooperation.

During the initiation of the project, a goal to define and clarify the terminology related to the interdependence of internal and external security was also set. As the project processing went forward, the goal in question was not considered to be central with respect to the examination of the causes of phenomena in the interface between internal and external security. This does not remove the need to define and clarify the terminology, for example, in connection with the preparation of the internal security strategy.
2 Focus areas and development perspectives that arose based on the project's background materials and expert interviews

2.1 The interdependence of internal and external security based on key policy documents

The interdependence of internal and external security was examined in relation to the emphases and policy definitions of key national and EU-level policy documents in the security context. Particular attention has been paid to the examination of the policy definitions in recent strategic documents – finalised in 2016 – such as the internal security report, the Government’s foreign and security policy report, and important documents finalised previously, such as the Security Strategy for Society (2010). Of the EU policy documents, in particular the emphases of the European Agenda on Security (2015) and the EU Global Strategy (2016) were taken into consideration. The materials used in the examinations are limited, but they do provide a sufficiently accurate idea of the interdependence of internal and external security, and provide a background for the creation of the project’s development recommendations.

The development of the security environment, highlighting the close connection between internal and external security, is a key focus in the internal security report prepared for the first time, commissioned by the current cabinet. The objective of the internal security report is to establish a core frame of reference for overall security, together with the foreign and security policy report, and the defence report that is to be issued later. The internal security report will define the direction of the operations of internal affairs actors and bring up the required measures and prioritisation needs in resourcing and official duties for operating in the new security context.
The internal security report emphasises the dramatic change in the security environment, where internal and external security are very deeply interlaced with each other. The most significant change in security has occurred in the factors affecting Finland’s security beyond its national borders. Major drivers of change in the development of the global security context have been, in particular, the violent extremism in the Middle East and Africa, terrorism and the strengthening of extremist organisations such as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) born in Syria and Iraq, and in addition to these regions, the strong flow of immigrants into Europe generated by wars and insufficient livelihoods in Central Asia. The development of the security environment is also significantly affected by security challenges related to organised cross-border crime, hybrid phenomena, and cybersecurity.

The rapidity and increasing complexity emblematic of the development of the security environment as a whole highlight the importance of internal security and make it more complicated to operate in the security environment. It is critical for the security actors to attempt to anticipate the development and to analyse the related phenomena with multifaceted causations more proactively and comprehensively. Analysing and responding to the development must take into consideration that, in addition to the authorities, responsibility for creating internal security lies with many other parties producing security for society through well-being, such as the business sector, social and health care, and educational institutes. When security operations are examined as a whole, the development and harmonisation of the dialogue between national and international actors and cooperation models are necessary to answer the challenges of security development.

The internal security report lays the foundation for the internal security strategy to be created. The strategy defines the strategic policies and focus areas for internal security based on a wide security perspective. The preparatory work for the internal security strategy emphasises a cross-administration implementation method that creates the prerequisites for the broad integration into the strategy process of perspectives and approaches with a key impact on the security of society. Strategic interior security requires commitment in and ability for in-depth cooperation, in accordance with the broad security viewpoint, with the different authorities, business actors, the third sector, or associations, educational institutes, and several other actors. Prospects of deepening the cooperation between actors affecting security will be taken into consideration during the drafting of the far-reaching internal security strategy and the update of the Security Strategy for Society.
The increasing connection between internal and external security also receives central and crosscutting emphasis in the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Report (2016).

The foreign and security policy context is based on the logic of interdependence of the phenomena, when states and other actors are bound to each other more tightly with multifaceted causations, and depend on each other in their development. Correspondingly, changes in the foreign and security policy context have multifaceted effects on Finland’s internal development, including security development (Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, 2016.)

The strong and continuous change in the security environment is characteristic in both Finland and its neighbouring areas, as in the global perspective. The change factors and actors are becoming more heterogeneous, the mutual interaction and power relationships are changing constantly, and anticipating future development is more challenging than before. As a result of these development dynamics, uncertainty-generating factors in internal security will increase, and the importance of society’s resilience, or general crisis tolerance, increases. As a consequence of the rapidity of the development, information on the variables of the operational environment and the resulting opportunities and threats must be constantly updated and analysed, and there must be the ability to anticipate and, if necessary, adapt the strategic focus points of the operations and the operations themselves, based on this information.

According to the foreign and security policy report, the inseparability of internal and external security is concretised particularly in connection with trends that significantly change the global foreign and security policy operating environment, such as widespread immigration, which combines, in various compositions, the factors generating immigration – strong population growth, differences in standards of living, poor level of human rights and democracy, and military conflicts (e.g. Africa). From the perspective of the recipient country, widespread and uncontrolled immigration involves internal security risks through, for example, terrorism, crime, and radical xenophobic movements. Global risks and threats concerning peace and security, the socio-economic stability of societies, and the state of the environment correspondingly require definition of the problems on a global level, and more varied cooperation with practices suited to rapid change, in order to control and anticipate global challenges cross-cutting society.

The inseparability of internal and external security is also concretised as a consequence of the increasing complexity of the means of warfare. In addition to military means, national interests are advanced by coordinated non-military means of warfare in various combinations, such as political and economic pressure, forms of information and cyber warfare, and other means of hybrid influence, with the combined goal of creating...
pressure, uncertainty, instability, and damage to the stability and safety of the society being targeted. In accordance with the overall security analysis, it is key to identify the early forms of hybrid influence; for this reason, increasing competence is required of the actors in identifying hybrid influences and developing the required capabilities and cybersecurity in cooperation with national and international actors.

The Security Strategy for Society has been prepared from the perspective of securing the vital functions of society, and when examined with this approach in mind, it emphasises the wide scope of the security viewpoint and the increase in the interdependence of national and international dimensions as a result of globalisation (Security Strategy for Society, 2010). Security challenges and threats increasingly cross national borders and have an extensive impact and, correspondingly, comprehensiveness and cross-administration examination are emphasised in the assessment of the development of the security environment. A stronger integration of the different actors in society, such as businesses and non-governmental organisations, is therefore needed for the preparedness of society and the management of disruptions.

Businesses have a central position particularly in the economy, infrastructure, and internationalisation of society, and cooperation focusing on these core functions between the public and private sectors plays a key role in the development of the security of society and the related preparedness. Organisations based on volunteering play an important societal role, particularly in preparedness, implementing security practices and reinforcing crisis resilience. In their areas of competence, these organisations are a major resource complementing the activities of the authorities, and a layer reinforcing the resilience of society, the strength of which culminates in the ability to identify needs on an individual level and to effectively connect to national and international networks.

It is important for operating in the changed security environment that the security actors exercise their influence and work in active cooperation with international actors. In accordance with the National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management (2014), civilian crisis management is one of the key tools of internal security work in an external environment, where experts work in conflict areas to solve global and cross-border security problems (National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management, 2014). The operational environments of civilian crisis management have become more complex and
challenging, and the development of the operational environments highlights the strong interdependence of internal and external security. The primary targets in the operational environment are fragile states, where the reduced operational capacity and legitimacy are a result of, for example, uneven socio-economic development, a lack of democracy and human rights, and the non-functioning of the constitutional state. The situation in these fragile states generates negative development, where the problems escalate into wider conflicts and humanitarian crises with effects reaching increasingly further and wider beyond the immediate birthplace of the problems via widespread population movement, for example. The societal instability and inability to provide security, justice, and economic development supporting the welfare of the fragile states creates a potential growth place for terrorism, organised crime, and extremism, through which the development will have a negative and multifaceted effect on the global security situation.

Civilian crisis management is used to develop, in particular, problem prevention and management competence of the countries in conflict, and to prevent the growth and spread of security problems beyond these regions. Activities during crisis management and its aftermath require a comprehensive perspective in order to fit civilian crisis management together with military crisis management, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid actors so that a sustainable overall impact can be reached for society to become whole and personal security to be achieved. Managing this for civilian crisis management activities requires the actors to have a clear and flexible division of work, coordinated cooperation, and a comprehensive flow of information.

The intertwining of the security of Europe and the conflict areas outside it, and the emphasis on the all-encompassing nature of conflict management are also key elements of the priorities of the European Union Global Strategy (European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

The Security Strategy for Society emphasises the importance of situational awareness shared and jointly formed by the security actors based on essential information and estimates for anticipating, preparing for, and responding to threats and disturbances. Situational awareness in the security development that is more integral to the international operational environment requires rapid and up-to-date information sharing and utilisation in the networks formed of national and international actors. Global security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime, and cybercrime require the development
of a comprehensive information exchange architecture; work on this is currently being expedited at the EU-level, for instance.

Forming situational awareness is supported by situational awareness arrangements in which the expertise of different sectors is combined into a comprehensive depiction of the prevailing conditions, the operational readiness of the different actors, the event chains created by a disturbance or a threat, and information and development estimates integrally related to the event process. Procedurally examined, forming situational awareness means a multi-stage process to organise the surrounding "information space" in such a manner that the collected and analysed information can be interpreted and distributed in a timely and effective manner to the actors who need it. Forming strategic situational awareness, intended for the long-term examination of the security environment, and operational situational awareness supporting the rapid assessment of the situation require systematically created cooperation models and harmonised technical solutions and management at both the national and international level. It is essential that threat and disturbance-related decisions on immediate measures and longer-term development measures required, based on an assessment of future development, can be made based on reliable and up-to-date situational awareness. Up-to-date and effective information exchange and forming of situational awareness are central when combating and preventing the impacts of phenomena such as cybercrime on critical functions of society and reinforcing the resilience of society (Finland's National Cyber Security Strategy, 2013).

The increasingly pronounced transformation of the security environment into a single whole encompassing both internal and external security phenomena is also brought up in European-level key strategic documents, such as the European Union Global Strategy (2016) and the European internal security strategies for 2015–2020 and 2010–2014 (European Agenda on Security, 2015, European Union Internal Security Strategy, 2010). The EU Global Strategy emphasises the closer intertwining of internal and external security. The EU aims to improve its security by, for example, stepping up its fight against terrorism and cybercrime, reinforcing cybersecurity, ensuring the functioning of critical infrastructure such as the energy production sector, and preventing crises and conflicts in fragile states before they escalate into more widespread violence. The current security development requires the actors to have a wide angle of approach and multipartite cooperation in order to meet the challenges.

In June 2015, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council approved the revised EU internal security strategy for 2015–2020, or the European Agenda for Security. The three focus areas of the strategy are:
− preventing terrorism, radicalisation leading to terrorism, and the recruitment and funding of terrorism; reinforced border security; integration of external and internal dimensions related to fighting terrorism;
− preventing serious and organised crime based on the EU policy cycle; and
− preventing and combating cybercrime and promoting cybersecurity.

All three strategic focus areas interlink the internal and external security dimensions with multifaceted causations and require the holistic approach to issues related to internal security emphasised by the Council in its conclusions. Measures considered to be particularly important include improving information exchange and availability; strengthening operational cooperation; more effective prevention and investigation of crimes and terrorist attacks; increasing education, funding, research, and innovation opportunities; and the development and availability of secure information and communications technology.

The first European internal security strategy for 2010–2014 states that internal security and its development is increasingly dependent on the state and development of external security (EU Internal Security Strategy - national follow-up measures, 2014). The strategy emphasises the widespread and all-encompassing nature of internal security, which comprises both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Internal security as a whole encompasses threats affecting the life, safety, and well-being of citizens in a very complex and multi-dimensional manner, including natural and man-made catastrophes such as extreme weather phenomena and widespread forest fires. Due to the mutual causality of the scope and formation mechanisms of threats, multi-level cooperation between the authorities of different security sectors is essential, with a joint approach complementing and reinforcing the ability to guarantee security and stability in an environment where the challenges exceed national, bilateral, or regional preparedness. At the operational cooperation level, this means the development of flexible operational models that enable the realisation of the cooperation-based synergy in the anticipation of, preparedness for, prevention of, and response to security threats, regardless of state borders, differing legislation, and methods of working. Key tools for developing cooperation include threat anticipation through the analysis of future situations and scenarios, systematic planning of countermeasures sufficient with respect to preparedness and review of the consequences, and development of models and practices concerning the operational side of the cooperation, for instance with regard to the operational models of central actors with coordination responsibility (e.g. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, counterterrorism coordinator) and through measures promoting
information sharing and joint investigations and operations. The operations of security actors, including cooperation procedures, are **required to be agile in following and adapting to the rapid change in the security environment**. Flexible methods enable the real-time monitoring of developing changes in the security context, and the taking into account of rising threats and risks that could cause larger-scale security problems as drivers of strategic planning and operations.

### 2.2 The interdependence of internal and external security based on expert interviews

The interdependence of internal and external security-project collected viewpoints and development proposals related to the interdependence by interviewing key security experts representing the internal affairs administration, the Parliament’s Administration Committee, the President’s Office, and university research. According to the experts, internal and external security cannot be divided into separate sectors in the current operational environment; instead, the internal and external security dimensions are intertwined in a global security environment full of interdependencies. Correspondingly, a wide-angle approach and the aim to perceive and assess causations in a multi-faceted manner are essential in the examination of the interdependence of internal and external security, and in this respect, an analysis aiming at exact definitions of security criteria, for example, is outside the focus area of the examination.

Defining the threats in the current security environment requires an open-minded and creative approach, where the interactions of phenomena affecting security are interpreted using a multi-science approach and the reflection of the interactions in the development of the security environment across the board. The examinations take phenomena with global impacts into consideration across the board, interpreted based on their causality. Phenomena with a significant impact on the global security environment include terrorism, violent extremism, serious organised crime, cybercrime, and hybrid phenomena, where the hybrid dimension threats refer to influencing security by a variety of means with multi-level causations, such as military and political influence and influencing strategic information systems. A hybrid phenomenon is an example of a phenomenon with a significant impact on the development of the security environment, the scale of which has grown with public discussion, although as a phenomenon, hybrid threats have existed for a long time (Salonius-Pasternak and Limnéll, 2015).
The common factor in all the different phenomena in the security context is that they affect all security actors and societal sectors regardless of the observer or the selected angle of approach. Correspondingly, the definition of the acuteness of these phenomena stems from how directly their impacts are reflected in the state and development of internal security. Examination of security-related phenomena must thus take into consideration their interdependence and widespread societal impacts as different dimensions of the same examination space rather than as separate cause-effect chains of events. It is also essential to examine analytically the phenomenon-specific formation mechanisms of the threats and risks, and based on them, to create the most purposeful operational models for responding to the threats and risks, and anticipating the expected development. Development measures along these lines will form the foundation of the recommendation for further development identified in the project. Work performed within the framework of different segments of society, such as business, education, and voluntary organisational activities, must be understood as an important part of the well-being of society and a force maintaining and fostering security.

Many different levels can be identified in the examinations of internal and external security. Conceptually, internal security has meant the national security issues of European countries, and foreign relations have had ripple effects on the state of internal security and its development. With regard to defence policy, the examinations have concentrated on whether the common interface is based on cooperation or more in-depth forms of connection. The interdependence of internal and external security can manifest itself in many different security-related contexts, such as in the examination of child abductions or border-crossing traffic on the Finnish-Russian border. On the other hand, the exact definitions of the internal and external security dimension for an individual citizen are not the focus of the examination; what is important are the security issues in areas with a concrete impact on subjective security, such as the family community, livelihood, education, free time, Internet applications, and so on.

From the perspective of managing the complex overall picture of security, the essential things are the overall importance of activities affecting security and the ripple effect in the production of internal security. The focal point of the examinations is taking care of the overall chain and developing solution models built on a foundation of extensive common understanding. The development needs are connected to information exchange, formation of a shared vision and goals, forming a shared situational
awareness, and fitting operational activities together.

Civilian crisis management operations are an excellent example of concrete security work, in which **multi-sector cooperation based on a common understanding** between national and international actors is central for repairing the societally fragile state of things and preventing the spread of security threats.

In the examinations of the complex security frame of reference and the conclusions drawn thereof, security authorities are required to have **breadth and ability** for perception across the borders of operational sectors and **creative, solution-oriented "out of the box" thinking and action**. Dialogue along the borders of the administrative branches, with the intention of examining the phenomena and responding to the challenges, will, in the long term, inevitably mean the narrowing of the perspective. Action proposals with respect to the development of the operational culture include a **general, more effective awareness** among internal security authorities with respect to the state of society and its development, and the **dismantling of unnecessary silos between sectors and interpretations tied to authority**. These pre-development changes will promote an operational culture, at the core of which lie the **systematic analysis of issues and phenomena, the solution-oriented approach** emphasised in the development of solution methods, and **cooperation across sector borders**.

The cross-cutting element of the measures supporting a new operational culture is the **cooperation between multiple authorities aiming at anticipation and preparedness**, and practices supporting this will continue to be recommended development measures in the future. There is usually a long, systemic link from the response to a security threat to the root causes of the threat’s formation process, and in a systemic-level examination of security operations, this means a **systematic analysis of the points where interventions could affect the development of the situation before the escalation of the threat**. Examination of security threats must take their strong interdependence into consideration (the so-called threats on a tablecloth model: when you pull one edge of the tablecloth, the entire tablecloth moves and you pull the entire tablecloth off the table). Sitra’s “flagging model” (Sitra reports 83, 2014), intended to prevent the development of the marginalisation of youths, is an example of proactive cooperation between multiple authorities. It is based on the identification of the situation of a youth in danger of becoming marginalised as early as possible through observations (“flagging”) made by the key authorities handling the case. By flagging, the authorities indicate their worry concerning the development of the youth’s situation, and the authorities who flagged the youth are brought together to form a shared situational awareness and discuss the solution. In this procedure, the authorities...
cooperate beyond their own, actual field even before the customer's situation has escalated into a set of problems with a wide-ranging impact. This operational model also guarantees the protection of the youth's privacy until the point where several authorities have "flagged" the youth.

The need for cooperation across administrative borders in order to respond comprehensively to challenges affecting the security context requires, in practice, an action proposal that supports unofficial networking and lines of dialogue, such as information exchange teams that are supported by the organisation. Communications and information exchange at different levels are promoted by systematic measures, and the need for a systematic approach is related to, for example, preparedness and the discussions required to build it up – discussions on threats, the models for preparing for them, the approach methods, and their up-to-dateness within and between organisations. Recommended tools for forming shared situational awareness include scenario work and, in addition to trends in the security environment, procedures for identifying and interpreting early warning signals and black swans.

The action recommendation for perceiving the complex security context requires the development of practices supporting joint vision planning and goal setting with respect to strategic planning and operations. Dysfunctionality in the cooperation between different security actors stems from a situation in which the actors do not understand the common goal and are therefore unable to solve the problem together. When making extensive reforms, it is essential to involve different parties across the board in the preparation process, and in particular, the competence potential of business and third-sector actors must be utilised more effectively in the reform endeavours. Linking representatives of economic life to the authorities’ development projects more closely creates a more comprehensive perspective on the interactions of the phenomena and subject matter related to corporate security. The practices of non-governmental organisations doing wide-ranging and societally important work are, as a rule, small and agile, and the strength of these non-governmental organisations is linked to the development of competence promoting everyday security and strengthening of the cohesion of society through communal activities.

Responding to the complex challenges and development of the security context requires the development of practices related to the shareability and usability of meaningful information. The meaningfulness of information is related centrally
to systemic development: only meaningful information changes the system and thus generates development. The examination perspectives central with regard to meaningful, development-generating information are linked to, among other things, the ownership of information, its encryptability and confidentiality, legitimisation of the information (legitimate security), and, when examined in these contexts, operating models and practices with which actors outside the security sector are involved in the discussion on the security context and developments in the field.

The new forms of cooperation and system levels required by security development are unable to form without communication that enables it and generates new meanings. According to Luhmann’s resonance concept, systems are able to react to the development of their environments only according to their own structures (Luhmann, 2004). The complexity of the security environment requires increased sensitivity and an outward-facing way of acting from the security actors in order to achieve a wide-ranging interpretation. A self-referential system could be considered to be the opposite of this way of acting, in which parties outside the system are not systematically involved in the discussion, thus reinforcing the silo mentality. Complexity and multilayer cause-effect relationships must not become justifications for preventing development, and building a new operational culture may proceed, for example, as different combinations of experience gained during operations and innovative work.

Shared situational awareness and interpretation, and understanding of the direction and strategies, can only be built with the help of active dialogue. The role of communications as a strategic component of leadership has traditionally been identified and recognised, but active and interactive communications have not necessarily been the core strengths of security actors. Communication skills will be further emphasised as the world becomes even more complex. In the current form of the security context, the contents, responsibilities, and message transmitting mechanisms of communications carry significant importance, further emphasised in security disruption and threat situations, where communications form an essential part of leadership. In disruption and threat situations, rapidly forming real-time situational awareness and active, multi-channel communications anticipating future developments are a central leadership tool, when preventing the formation of an “information void” and the spread of disinformation in it, based on assumptions and misunderstandings, particularly in social media channels that reach a large number of information users efficiently. Communications officers of the authorities operating in the security sector must take particular care to retain the
believability and reliability of their own communications – particularly in situations in which the communications are focused on digital channels and the role of social media increases. The best safeguard for retaining the impact of one's own communications is an active, open, and bold style of communicating, and the development of practices promoting this kind of communications culture is recommended through the strategic steering of the security actors.

In the rapidly changing security environment, meaningful information must effectively reach the actors who need it, and the security authorities must talk with each other, or exchange information and coordinate their activities. Keeping to the examinations defined by one's own administrative branch prevents the formation of a horizontal observation perspective, meaning that, when viewing things from the bottom of a silo, you cannot gain the range of view of a helicopter when examining phenomena requiring comprehensiveness and when defining the necessary measures (Branders, 2016). Understanding the causal relations of things requires a time investment and, from the participants, motivation for the specification process, as a quick and superficial examination will confirm the interpretation of information carried out within the framework of sector borders, thus reinforcing the silo mentality of the processing and interpreting of information.

Effective information exchange and functioning dialogue between the different security actors, particularly the Finnish Defence Forces, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Police, and the Border Guard, enables up-to-date and future-oriented situational awareness to be formed in a coordinated manner, based on the instances of sector-specific situational awareness formed by the different security actors. The norms covering information exchange must be in order so that, for example, key security actors are able to exchange meaningful information with regard to forming shared situational awareness. With regard to practices concerning the shareability and usability of information, we present a development proposal concerning procedures for restricting information based more on need, so that documents, for example, are not classified as restricted or secret using justifications that are too superficial. These practices often stem from old and established organisational practices, and there is plenty of work to be done on developing the operational culture in this regard.

Up-to-date situational awareness is a prerequisite for the anticipation of development and goal-oriented measures, because future development is assessed through up-to-date situational awareness. In security operations, one must be able to prepare and anticipate. The immigration phenomenon, for example, has proven that joint anticipation at a European level does not yet function.
anticipate, and the extent of the immigration phenomenon, for example, has proven that joint anticipation at the European level does not yet function. The ability to detect and interpret early warning signals is essential for the evaluation of the development of the security environment, such as the development of new security threats, and this requires further improvements in communication, and the formation of shared meanings between the security actors. Risks concerning the security environment cannot be communicated as specifically as threats; correspondingly, they are also more difficult to interpret and take into consideration in decision-making. The development proposal is to strive to understand security more systematically and, correspondingly, to develop security threat and risk management to be more systematic. One of the key challenges in the current operational culture is its detail-focused examination of threats and risks, which fails to provide the all-encompassing perspective required in decision-making.

Society in its current form, and the security context as one element of it, should be seen from a perspective where the borders between internal and external security become blurred, just like the structural differences between the security actors and the sectors. Security issues should, as a rule, be examined as processes and systems, making it easier to place new phenomena and security challenges in the complex overall picture, the "security process chart", and enabling a wider understanding of their causation. This is a so-called intelligent, adaptive, and complex security system (Branders 2016), in which the issue rather than the author is central. The new security system can provide the prerequisites for redefining authority and competence and, in the same overall picture, can help identify phenomena that the security actors have not been accustomed to handling in the same "shared" context. Based on these observations, operating models are presented as a development recommendation that steers the different actors towards preparing adaptive strategies promoting the overall picture.
3 Sources


4 Views of the sectors on the interdependence of internal and external security and development recommendations

In February 2015, the sectors of the Ministry of the Interior made the statements included in this document concerning the interdependence of internal and external security, the international cooperation of the sectors, and concrete development recommendations for the development of the internal affairs administration, taking the interdependence of internal and external security into consideration. The statements have been included in this document in the form in which they were at the time the statements were made (02/2015).

4.1 Summary of the focus areas and development recommendations of the sectors concerning the interdependence of internal and external security

The increased intertwining of internal and external security and a corresponding change in the development of the operations of the authorities responsible for internal and external security are highlighted in the statements of the internal affairs administration sectors concerning the interdependence of internal and external security. Increased immigration, cybercrime, terrorism, violent extremist movements, and organised crime are examples of phenomena that connect the internal and external levels of security to each other in an increasingly multifaceted manner with increasingly complex causation. As a consequence of this trend, the operational environment of the security authorities is undergoing a constant change, and it has become increasingly challenging to anticipate the direction the development will take.
The changed security environment sets new requirements on the activities of the security authorities, with anticipation of the developments in the security environment, and the ability to focus the activities rapidly according to developments in the situation, particularly emphasised. Security authorities are required to monitor global security phenomena and their progression in a more active and systematic manner, and to possess the ability to share situational awareness with the different sectors of society. Indeed, the sectors of the Ministry of the Interior emphasise the importance of increased dialogue and security cooperation with actors creating stability and security in society “from the inside”, such as the business life and representatives of the third sector.

As a result of globalisation and the growing mutual correlation of the phenomena, security threats have become less dependent on the region or location, and the complexity of the development is increased by the actors and the way the combinations behind the threats and crimes become more varied and difficult to perceive. Phenomena affecting the security of states are thus increasingly often connected to international phenomena and trends with complex causations. In the development of cybercrime, for example, the cause and targets of the security threat are located in several different countries and, correspondingly, means for responding to the security threats that are built on national measures, and are thus incompatible with each other, are no longer sufficient to respond to this progression. The ability of the security authorities to respond to cross-border security challenges and threats requires the capacity for comprehensive examination over sectoral borders, and the development of the operational culture through measures focusing on rapidity and flexibility. The reinforcement of this development requires updating the national and international jurisdictions, juridical basis and agreements concerning the information exchange, and information analysis of the security authorities, to better match the changed security environment.

Operating in the changed security environment requires the security actors to make a broad examination of the development and to adapt their procedures to match the rapidly changing and difficult to anticipate development. In order to anticipate and respond to the development, the sectors of the Ministry of the Interior recommend, among other things, the promotion of a positive attitude towards reform in the operational culture, in order to reinforce the innovation and experimentation culture in the internal affairs administration and, correspondingly, to adopt new, flexible practices. Tightening the cooperation between national actors is a prerequisite for the development of uniform security strategies and situational awareness and analysis. The future need for security experts must also be answered through sufficient resourcing in training, research, and development by the sectors. The increasing internationalisation of the mechanisms affecting the development of the national security environment requires the development of the smoothness and effectiveness of processes related to international cooperation. The measures for responding to the development are considered to include the improvement
of shared registers and other practices related to information acquisition, and increased cooperation in areas where security threats form. The development measures will reinforce the internal affairs administration’s ability to anticipate and respond to the increasingly rapid and complex changes in the security environment in the future.

4.2 Police

The interdependence of internal and external security with regard to the police has been described by the National Bureau of Investigation, the Police College of Finland, the National Police Board, and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.

4.2.1 National Bureau of Investigation

The key challenges of international cooperation and views on the connections between internal and external security

Crime and crime prevention have changed significantly during the last ten or so years. With this, the interrelation of internal and external security has transformed, and the border between them has become unclear. The new rise and internationalisation of violent, radical Islamist activity affects the internal and external security of the EU and Finland. The strong development and increased utilisation of information networks and systems, and the related encryption technology, are typical among government intelligence services, criminal and terrorist organisations, radical activist organisations, and individual persons of interest.

From the point of view of an individual state, the state’s internal and external security dimensions can be separated traditionally. The main responsibility for the former is carried by the police, and for the latter, by the military authorities. Cybercrime, hybrid threats, crime taking place on and utilising the Internet, including dangerous individual persons who get examples from abroad and the Internet and who are planning acts of violence, cross-border mobile crime, terrorism and its funding, the “Foreign Fighters” phenomenon, other crime connected to extremist movements, and organised crime (e.g. so-called outlaw motorcycle clubs) are examples of phenomena that do not respect borders but make full use of the possibilities offered by free movement and modern technology.

The rapid and obvious blurring of the border between external and internal threats, and between international and national threats, has already been reflected in the operations of the authorities responsible for security. The law enforcement authorities responsible for preventing internal threats are increasingly engaged in international cooperation to prevent threats from abroad, and the authorities responsible for traditional external
security increasingly utilise information on the state’s internal security threats. This article examines external and internal security mainly from the perspective of crime prevention.

Effective crime prevention requires predictive, up-to-date and analysed situational and crime prevention awareness, rapid response and prevention ability, efficient targeting and joint use of resources, and the ability to operate in an international operational and cooperation environment. The development has set new requirements for information exchange, in particular. In this respect, the keywords are predictability and speed.

Rapidity of change and unpredictability are characteristic of recent developments in the operational environment. This places particular demands on the response readiness of the organisations and also their ability to switch the focus of their operations according to the requirements of the current situation. The police have been able to respond well to challenges caused by the immigration situation, for example. New situations have required both organisational solutions and particularly well-functioning cooperation, both between different police units and in a wider sense.

In today’s information-networked world, internal and external security are almost perfectly intertwined. One of the challenges in evaluating this new security is, indeed, to understand the interconnection of the different levels of security. In the future, cybercrime will pose almost as great a threat as traditional crime, which will also be partially carried out in the network environment to an increasing degree. Cybercrime and its prevention are a great challenge globally. With the increase in its volume, the harm it causes to society is also constantly growing. Jurisdictions, regulations on information exchange – also between domestic actors – and international conventions do not, however, support the prevention of cybercrime very well at all. Crimes carried out and damage coming out simultaneously in several countries also place new kinds of challenges on national legislation. The perpetrators and victims can be in several different countries, and evidence for the crimes must be obtained from servers located around the world.

Various asymmetric threats have risen up alongside traditional threats such as an armed attack by a foreign state, and the means of governmental influence (hybrid influence) have increased. This, in part, blurs the line between serious disturbances during normal conditions and unusual conditions. Identifying the governmental actors and traditional international criminal and terrorist organisations behind these threats, and perceiving their combinations, has become significantly more difficult than before. The internal security authorities must have both the ability to detect the threats and sufficient resources to manage the situation, even if it is of a long duration. As the primary prevention authorities, the police and the Finnish Border Guard must have sufficient situational awareness, the ability and readiness to prevent these kinds of threats before
a possible situation that could be considered to be a crisis, and a national increase in readiness.

The threat of acts of violence and terrorism by individual, radicalised persons is increasing in Finland, too, and an open society is unable to prepare for this to any great degree. Following money flow as part of money laundering investigations plays a key role in preventing terrorism. The monitoring of social media, in particular, must be able to identify, prevent, and react to dangerous individuals planning a crime. Effective Internet surveillance supports the prevention of both terrorism and criminal activities by dangerous individuals.

It is more essential than before that the operations in the current and foreseeable operational environment are commanded effectively. The police force, the general authority responsible for crime prevention, is responsible for this duty. The other authorities participating in crime prevention are also involved in operations in their own fields of speciality.

In addition to crime prevention, the police force plays an important role in the investigation of accidents and major accidents, and the identification of victims, which forms an essential part of this. Globally growing tourism and the resulting increase in the number of accidents involving persons from several different countries have placed entirely new kinds of requirements on police activities. Like crime prevention, these activities also often require operating in another country or several countries, rapid response ability, and functional international information exchange.

**Concrete proposals for action and development**

The judicial basis, and both national and international instruments for proactive crime prevention by administrative means, are lacking, and concrete models must be found for such proactive measures. The obstacles preventing the use of administrative information in crime prevention and crime prevention information in administrative matters must be removed. The strategy for the prevention of organised crime should be continued. With regard to financial crime prevention programmes, for instance, it has been evident that their consistent and long-term continuation, in particular, has made crime prevention work more effective and taken it in an increasingly concrete direction.

The situational and crime prevention awareness function led by the police should be further developed and reinforced in such a way that the function can be used to prevent crimes effectively and in real time, and coordinate the entirety of national and international crime prevention utilising the necessary systems and registers in full. Furthermore, the flow of information must be developed, and obstacles removed
from closer cooperation between the different authorities. Information exchange with, for example, the municipal sector, the business sector, and the third sector should be increased and supported through legislation.

The development of intelligence registers should take uniformity, usability, cooperation among multiple authorities, and the international dimension into consideration. In order to steer crime prevention, there should be a permanent intelligence register and a functional analysis register built into it. The situation is peculiar when national information can be analysed better and more extensively at Europol, for example, than in the homeland.

Privacy protection requirements at national and international levels have become stricter, while the regulation of crime prevention in general has significantly increased. In this situation, the needs of effective and more rapid operations should be ensured, however. It should be possible to dismantle the overemphasis on privacy protection and thus increase information exchange between authorities in order to enhance crime prevention. This becomes an issue in, for example, the prevention of serious acts of violence.

Special attention should be given to attaining closer international cooperation and, in particular, the real-time nature of crime prevention, by bringing up nationally important issues in different forums on the procedural, system, legislation, and agreement levels. In order to further speed up international information exchange, automated models and methods should be developed and utilised.

Particularly in the prevention of cybercrime, but also in other international crime prevention, means of information acquisition should be made easier and quicker by establishing a legal foundation and practical channels that take the requirements set by the new operational environment into account. In particular, the availability of information from foreign service providers (e.g. Google, Facebook, Twitter) should be improved and made quicker.

The focus of crime prevention related to terrorism, extremist movements (including the “Foreign Fighter” phenomenon), and marginalisation should be moved towards proactive prevention.

The requirement for speed and prevention, and the multifaceted nature of the operations, mean that the police should be supported more clearly in their duties of leading and coordinating crime prevention.

In the future, the police should also have, among other things, a more extensive opportunity for task prioritisation and, instead of the so-called mandatory pre-trial
investigation, should have the power to decide what criminal cases to take under investigation at their discretion, which would mean the right of investigation instead of an investigation obligation. This applies to both mass crime and, for example, cybercrime, because not all companies necessarily report crimes to the police due to the publicity resulting from the investigation, for example. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to form the situational awareness important to crime prevention.

In the development of cooperation between authorities related to internal and external security, it is particularly important to take into consideration the other authorities resorting to the police network, operating nationwide on a 24/7 principle.

4.2.2 Police College of Finland

Because taking care of the strategic core duties of internal security, providing key services to the citizens, and ensuring the security of the state in the future requires a wide-ranging internal security strategy, it is necessary to examine the activities of the Police College of Finland from the perspectives of its duties and its action-strategy impact, both nationally and internationally. It is evident that, in accordance with the assumption of the working group, international activities must be considered to be vital for the internal security of Finland and the entire EU.

It is the duty of the Police College of Finland to provide higher education in the internal security sector, with research and culture as the baseline for vocational expert and leadership duties, and to support the professional growth of the actors and promote their lifelong learning. Additionally, its duties include applied research and development work in the service of the planning and development of policing and internal security, and of the teaching at the Police College of Finland. When performing its duties, the College cooperates with the national and international stakeholders of the police. The successful performance of the duties assigned to the College requires that it strives to influence the phenomena and trends in its broad security environment – particularly in the medium and long term – and to support the cross-border and international law enforcement and security authority activities aiming to manage them.

The focus areas defined for the internal affairs administration in the EU and for international affairs include promoting Finland’s operational objectives in the European Union, taking note of the development of the international security situation, preparing for changes in the external security environment, managing migration and control of the external borders, and improving the prerequisites for effective international cooperation. In accordance with the international focus areas of the Ministry of the Interior, the activities of the Police College of Finland emphasise regional cooperation, cooperation
between the EU member states and agencies, cooperation with third countries, and the development of activities.

In accordance with the Ministry of the Interior’s group strategy, the Police College of Finland also supports Finland’s active presence in crisis areas by bolstering the export of security competence and effectively developing the national readiness of the law enforcement authorities and actors for cross-border issues. In accordance with the international strategy of the police, cooperation is emphasised particularly with globally important countries; when it comes to other, third countries, the development of cooperation is focused on countries with which there is assessed to be a special strategic or operational need to cooperate.

The most important means for achieving the above-mentioned objectives are the production of high-level, future-oriented, broad, and adaptive competence particularly for the use of internal security authorities (including sufficient competence in using the instruments, channels, and cooperation methods of the EU and other police cooperation); participation in development work and networks for European and regional cooperation between law enforcement authorities, thus making it possible to obtain international study and work experience; and support for the export of competence and reforms of third-country law enforcement authorities. The research and development activities will involve close cooperation with police and security sector networks and consortiums. The selection of topics is wide, covering projects related to security sector training and job contents, police activities, cooperation between the authorities, and the change in the operational environment. Individual projects have touched upon many key themes in internal security, such as immigration, organised crime, money laundering, corruption, terrorism, and firearms-related information exchange.

It must be stated as a megatrend-level observation, due to both the above and, for example, the EU’s internal and external security convergence, that the internal and external security dimensions and phenomena are irrevocably intertwined. Thus, a clear and somewhat increasing part of the security production system of states belongs – subject-matter-wise – to the external dimension of internal security. However, functions still remain, in both internal and external security, in which the above-mentioned interconnection hardly exists.

The challenges of the Police College of Finland’s duties with regard to international influence and cooperation are realised, on one hand, in the administrative branch’s cross-pressured steering policies, which are derived from strategic focus areas but which are partially short-sighted, and, on the other hand, in the administrative branch’s structures and processes, which are still based on the “order-based” success model. In other words, steerability based on strategic and result-oriented bases is limited by the differences
between the administrative branch’s intent and beliefs, and its structures and operations. Challenges related to these arise particularly from the underdeveloped nature and the timidity for reforms of the administration’s innovation environment and the so-called "experimental culture". On the contrary, the development of effectual international cooperation requires the adoption of a "synergy-oriented" success model.

When broken down into subject areas, at least the following can be seen as the key challenges of international cooperation:

1. **Resourcing and funding of competence exports (support for police reforms); research, development, and innovation projects; and influencing the security environment (internal and external security perspectives) through RD&I activities and the development of competence**

Several potential possibilities for exporting Finnish law enforcement, policing, and education competence have been identified in the sector of international capacity development. Direct interest and offers have been received from prospective recipient states, the foreign affairs administration, and the internal affairs group administration. In practice, the possibilities of exporting competence are diverse with regard to both funding and forms of cooperation. The police department of the Ministry of the Interior and the Police College of Finland have jointly developed a model for taking goal-oriented activities, promotion of national interests, the efficient use of resources, and the potential possibilities into consideration as a whole. The model has been utilised since 2013, but the resourcing dialogue and decision-making related to the matter have not yet been carried out.

Internal and external security have converged, so this connection should be taken into consideration when attempting to influence the working programmes of the EU funding sources and the national resourcing of RD&I projects related to the subject matter. On the other hand, deliberation on the subject matter and the resourcing of the projects should ensure that funding is also directed in a balanced manner to the examination of those functions and phenomena that are mainly part of either internal or external security. In internal security, possible topics could include security in scarcely populated areas, local security cooperation, or everyday crime.

2. **Partial discreteness of development policy and internal security**

Development policy targeted at third countries, particularly the EU neighbourhood policy and other countries from which crime originates, must be connected within wider development activities of Finland’s internal security, where both medium and long-term objectives are clearly taken into consideration. The law enforcement authorities must
be able to work and develop the necessary security structures and solutions jointly with the authorities of the target countries. The security cooperation must aim at both the development of the target countries' own capacity and mutual trust and crime prevention cooperation.

3. Development of national preparedness for crisis management and influence in the decision-making of the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) sector

The police and, in particular, the Police College of Finland have a clear needs-based role in the development of national preparedness for civilian crisis management in cooperation with the Crisis Management Centre. Almost half of Finland’s civilian crisis management experts are police officers. However, the administrative position of the Crisis Management Centre is not appropriate with regard to the objectives of its activities. In addition to this, the further development of cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior in identifying the policing competence needs of civilian crisis management missions would further improve the correspondence between demand and supply, although significant steps have already been taken in this direction.

According to the Police College of Finland’s vision, the college is a top-level police school and a valued member of the European higher education community. The competencies of the college are used in a variety of ways to maintain the security of society. Achieving this objective also requires a more open and stronger utilisation of the police and law enforcement sector in the handling of and preparation for external threats to internal security and the related countermeasures.

4.2.3 National Police Board

Demarcation of internal and external security

In accordance with the Security Strategy for Society, functions vital to Finnish society are the management of Government affairs, international activity, Finland's defence capability, functioning of the economy and infrastructure, the population's income security and capability to function, psychological resistance to crisis, and internal security. From the point of view of the state, the state's internal and external security dimensions are traditionally separated. Primarily, law enforcement authorities such as the police take care of internal security, and external security is dealt with the military authorities.

According to the Internal Security Programme, internal security is a state of society in which everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the judicial system and a safe society without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disturbances, accidents, or
phenomena or changes in Finnish society or the increasingly international world. In turn, the external security of the state can be endangered by all endeavours that have a harmful impact on the rights or interests of the state, or the relations between Finland and foreign powers.

The concepts of internal and external security can change unpredictably, and an unwavering line cannot be drawn between them. It is a question of perspective: the concept of internal security is strongly built on the viewpoint of individual people, while the concept of external security emphasises a governmental perspective that is, first and foremost, related to the autonomy of the state. The law enforcement authorities responsible for preventing internal threats are increasingly engaged in international cooperation to prevent threats from abroad, and the authorities responsible for traditional external security increasingly utilise information on the state's internal security threats.

From the perspective of the police, drawing a line between internal and external security is more difficult than before, due to the constant change in crime and the entire operational environment: criminal phenomena, such as terrorism and violent radicalisation, information network crime, the infiltration of organised crime into business life and the structures of society, and illegal immigration, create challenges to maintaining internal security. With regard to external security interfaces in particular, the social and economic impacts caused by various crises (Ukraine, Georgia, the Arab Spring, Syria, and natural catastrophes) further escalate the crises without regard to national borders. Geopolitical instability increases and conflicts spread and last for years, affecting the internal security of the EU member states.

The activities of the authorities are steered by the European Union, the several strategies it produces at various levels, and the emphasis on the development of criminal justice: EU regulations are not always a good fit for the Finnish judicial system. As a result of the challenges facing public finances and the deficient central government finances, the expectations linked to criminalisation and strategies do not match the frameworks of the authorities and their practical operating conditions. It is sometimes challenging to combine basic and human rights with the regulatory framework governing the activities of the authorities.

In the (internal) security sector, the police force follows the focus areas of the EU Policy Cycle. In the autumn of 2014, the National Police Board confirmed that its focus areas with regard to the future internal security strategy are: 1) measures against organised crime, 2) prevention of cybercrime, 3) counterterrorism, and 4) prevention of illegal immigration. The means mentioned in this context include better information exchange and cooperation with third countries.
Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is a large part of the competence of the member states, which means that the exchange of intelligence, for example, largely takes place between the intelligence and security services, for which cooperation with the law enforcement authorities must be improved. Information exchange and management play an essential role. The challenge will be to utilise the European Police Office (Europol) and Interpol effectively in the exchange and analysis of (crime) intelligence, if the member states exchange information through other bilateral and multilateral channels. The possibilities of Eurojust must also be utilised better (for example, using common investigation teams).

Many threats of terrorism are directed at the member states from outside the EU, which emphasises the importance of cooperation with third countries (e.g. Turkey and the western Balkans), and border security. In the countries where terrorism originates, it must be possible to influence the conditions and to support developments decreasing recruitment into the ranks of the terrorists. When it comes to the EU’s external borders in particular, risk-based operations must be developed in order to allow sufficient control of border traffic without compromising the smoothness of travel (Entry/Exit, Smart Borders, PNR). Although we prepare for the consequences of terrorism, the focus of international cooperation must be on the prevention of violent radicalisation and having an impact on the causes of terrorism. Therefore, all member states must utilise the experience and education offering of, for example, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in order to identify the phenomenon widely and to be able to influence it. The prevention must emphasise cooperation between the authorities and the third sector, and must find the models best suited to the conditions in Finland.

In 2014, the EU prepared an updated strategy for preventing radicalisation and recruitment, and guidelines related to the strategy. Their implementation must be immediately begun at EU level and in the member states, and the progress of the measures must be monitored. Communications at a strategic level should be similar in the different member states in order to achieve better results.

An attempt must be made to weed out the funding of terrorism, and this requires broad international cooperation. The Internet plays a key role in terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. Internet service providers and individual persons play an important role in intervening in terrorist materials. The EU-level cooperation already initiated with, for example, the larger service operators (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, etc.) must be continued, and the best practices must be shared among the member states.

Regardless of the growth of the Foreign Fighter phenomenon and the Paris attacks, there is no need at the EU level for new instruments (except the so-called EU-PNR Directive, which should be finished post-haste); instead, the focus should be on the full utilisation
of the current means (e.g. SIS II, FP Travellers). In international cooperation, even more attention must be paid to amalgamating the internal and external security measures, and cooperation between institutions operating in these sectors must be increased.

Organised crime, cyber issues, and, in particular, the development/problems of cross-border information acquisition

Crime and crime prevention have changed significantly during the last ten or so years. With it, the interrelation of internal and external security has transformed, and the border between them has become unclear. The new rise and internationalisation of violent radical Islamist activity will affect the internal and external security of the EU and Finland. The strong development and increased utilisation of information networks and systems, and the related encryption technology, are typical among government intelligence services, criminal and terrorist organisations, radical activist organisations, and individual persons of interest.

Cybercrime, crime taking place on and utilising the Internet, cross-border mobile crime, terrorism and its funding, the "Foreign Fighters“ phenomenon, other crime connected to extremist movements, and organised crime (e.g. so-called outlaw motorcycle clubs) are examples of phenomena that do not respect borders but make full use of the possibilities offered by free movement and modern technology instead.

Today, internal and external security are thus almost completely intertwined in the world of information networks. One of the challenges in evaluating this new security is, indeed, to understand the interconnection of the different levels of security. Various asymmetric threats have arisen alongside traditional threats, which, in part, blurs the line between serious disturbances during normal conditions and unusual conditions. Identifying the governmental actors and traditional international criminal and terrorist organisations behind these threats, and perceiving their combinations, has become significantly more difficult than before. The rapid and obvious blurring of the border between external and internal threats, as well as international and national threats, has already been reflected in the operations of the authorities responsible for security. The law enforcement authorities responsible for preventing internal threats are increasingly engaged in international cooperation to prevent threats from abroad, and the authorities responsible for traditional external security increasingly utilise information on the state's internal security threats. However, this memo has examined external and internal security mainly from the perspective of crime prevention.

Effective crime prevention requires predictive, up-to-date, and analysed situational and crime prevention awareness, rapid response and prevention ability, efficient targeting and joint use of resources, and the ability to operate in an international operational
and cooperation environment. This development has placed entirely new requirements on information exchange in particular, with predictability and speed as the keywords. Effective leadership of operations is even more essential than before in this kind of operational environment. The police force, which is the general authority responsible for crime prevention, is responsible for this duty. The other key authorities participating in crime prevention are also involved in the operations in their own fields of speciality.

It has become a problem that the national development of legislation lags behind the quickly changing operational environment, in which crimes and damage can take place at a rapid pace in several different countries, the perpetrators and victims can be in several different countries, and evidence for the crimes must be obtained from servers located around the world.

In addition to crime prevention, the police force plays an important role in the investigation of accidents and major accidents, and the identification of victims forms an essential part of this. Globally growing tourism and the resulting increase in the number of accidents that may involve persons from several different countries have placed entirely new kinds of requirements on police activities. Like crime prevention, these activities also often require operating in another country or several countries, rapid response ability, and functional international information exchange.

**Cooperation between the police and judicial authorities**

In Finland, the division between judicial and law enforcement authorities has not traditionally been considered to be as steep as elsewhere in Europe. In Finland, recent developments in the implementation of the instruments of international cooperation have had the effect of international cooperation in crime prevention becoming more prosecutor-driven. The cooperation between the police and the judicial authorities in Finland has traditionally been close and functional, so that the decision-making related to operations has been the responsibility of the police, with the exception of certain coercive measures. Internationally, the police force, in the role of a judicial authority, with the right to issue requests for information and depositions covered by strict legality and quality control, has been our strength. It is not reasonable to take examples in this work from countries where the corresponding cooperation does not exist, or where barriers have been built between the judicial and police authorities. According to the observations, the artificial insertion of the European model into our system has increased formality and rigidity in the handling of matters. Should this prosecutor-oriented model be implemented, it would result in decreased prerequisites for information exchange and would slow down information exchange. Changes in this direction should be resisted.
**Information exchange and information availability principle**

In the prevention and discovery of crimes, and in their investigation, it is absolutely critical to supply real-time crime intelligence from one law enforcement authority to another. The prerequisites for information availability should be improved, and the reliability and speed of information exchange increased where possible. The means for this are the utilisation of the principles recorded in the multi-year programmes and, at the EU level, also the better utilisation of EU agencies. Nationally, the dismantling of obstacles hindering information exchange can continue.

Identifying the backgrounds and connections of the perpetrators immediately at the beginning would be of key importance, and for this, crime intelligence accumulated in each member state is needed. Significant progress has been made in this regard at EU level over recent years, through the reinforcement of Europol's role and the expansion of the use of the SIENA channel; however, the full utilisation of these possibilities continues to remain a key challenge at EU level. Finland has been actively involved in the so-called ADEP project, the objective of which is to promote automation that, in part, advances the information availability principle (the EPRIS project was rejected by the Commission after a feasibility assessment).

The availability principle is served by, for example, the Swedish Initiative, Prüm cooperation, and the possibilities offered by Europol. It also remains to be seen how the future Eurojust cooperation develops, what the decision on the European prosecutor will be, and what its significance will be. Both offer tools, if they are implemented sensibly at EU level and nationally, however. The speed of information exchange is central to the improvement of the prerequisites for information exchange. When the parties can reliably identify each other, and the standards for information processing work, the protection of basic rights can also be guaranteed and the use and disclosure of information monitored. The expansion of the use of Europol's SIENA system will speed up information exchange and improve the availability of information. Processing rules for Europol information can be used to limit both the information's purpose of use and its disclosure. The rest of the world can be reached through Europol. The Schengen Information System can be used to quickly and reliably get large masses of information for use by the authorities. These separate international information systems cover different types of information, subject-wise, and geographically different areas, but they complement each other.

The principle of information availability and the dismantling of obstacles hindering information exchange between the authorities should be continued. Future challenges are the utilisation of PNR information, the significance of the Eurodac system, and the information of the VIS system. When the information exchange is implemented with clear rules and through sufficiently centralised structures, the parties will not have trouble
identifying each other, and there will be no doubts concerning the information's right purpose of use.

**Crime prevention cooperation and enhancement of information exchange with third Countries**

In police cooperation with third countries, lower-level cooperation relationships at agency and ministry level have been actively concluded recently, and initiatives have been received from numerous countries and agencies. The latest examples of cooperation relationships are Serbia and Nigeria and, of initiatives, Georgia and Belarus. Significantly more determined and goal-oriented operations are required in concluding these cooperation relationships. It would also be essential to identify key actors in third countries, and to conclude bilateral cooperation relationships starting from the national operational needs of crime prevention.

**Concrete proposals for action and development for the police**

The police force considers the following practical measures to be the best practices for the improvement of internal and external security from the perspective of the police:

Particularly in the prevention of cybercrime, but also in other international crime prevention, means of information acquisition should be made easier and quicker by establishing a legal foundation and practical channels that take the requirements set by the new operational environment into account. The availability of information needed from service providers should be further improved and expedited, bypassing the slow and rigid judicial assistance procedure. Particular attention must then be paid to safeguarding basic rights, however.

The judicial basis and both national and international instruments for proactive crime prevention by administrative means are lacking, and particular attention must be paid to them.

In order to further speed up international information exchange, automated models and methods should be developed and utilised.

Privacy protection requirements at national and international levels have become stricter. In this situation, the need for effective and more rapid operations should be met, however.

The situational and crime prevention awareness function led by the police should be further developed and reinforced in such a way that the function can be used to
prevent crimes effectively and in real time, and to coordinate the entirety of national and international crime prevention utilising the necessary systems and registers in full.

The development of intelligence registers should take uniformity, usability, cooperation between multiple authorities, and the international dimension into consideration.

Special attention should be given to attaining closer international cooperation and, in particular, to the real-time nature of crime prevention, by bringing up nationally important issues in different forums on the procedural, system, legislation, and agreement levels.

The focus of crime prevention related to terrorism and extremist movements (including the "Foreign Fighter" phenomenon) should be moved towards proactive prevention.

Due to the rapidity requirement, prevention, and the diverse nature of operations, clearer support should be given to the management and coordination of crime prevention, which are the duties of the police.

Active participation is required in international security work and police affairs in the EU and other international forums. The purpose is to have a proactive influence on both the legislation and the activities, and to proactively adopt the best practices nationally, sufficiently connecting them to international activities. With regard to civilian crisis management, police participation in international civilian crisis management is ensured. The development of third countries' own security capabilities will increase the safety of Europe and its neighbouring areas. Offering internal security resources for use by EU operations outside the borders of the EU will also create stability in the EU area.

Information exchange will be improved between third countries, in the EU, and at national level. At EU and national levels, it must be ensured that sufficient authorisations and information systems exist for the purposes of information exchange, for example, and that the information of all EU agencies is available to law enforcement. Analysis is always connected to information exchange. In connection to information exchange, the implementation of the PNR Directive is ensured with regard to the police, and the construction of the PIU centre led by the National Police Board is realised (the PNR project). International judicial assistance poses a special challenge.

With regard to police affairs, a commitment is made to the strategies and action plans of the EU’s Home Affairs police and criminal justice sector, and to implementing them nationally in a purposeful and effective way. Ensure that the national steering documents for the police sector (terrorism, cyber, organised crime, illegal immigration) are always synchronised at EU level as a rule.
Operational cooperation with third countries: for the police, create possible permanent operational structures that are currently missing. Utilise the PTR concept in such a manner that, in the future, EU strategies are also synchronised with the PTR function. (Close connection between border control and police work, the Baltic countries, Russia, Finland/Estonia as a particular focus versus the African immigrants in Southern Europe.)

Nationally: synergies in the duties and authorisations of the security authorities: the relationships between the duties and authorisations of the security authorities should be analysed in a controlled manner. There is currently some overlap, and not all actors among the authorities possess a precise awareness of them. Preparing for hybrid threats also requires this demarcation. Be an active influence in the overall security field as well.

Economy: are synergies, for example, used efficiently, avoiding unnecessary and redundant work? The relationship between the duties and funding of the security authorities must be carefully reviewed between the authorities and internally to the authorities (the police). Examples of concrete measures are the visibility of this in the police strategy (vision of the leadership), centralisation of premises and support functions, and, with regard to the police, the long-term budget planning currently included in the strategy, taking into consideration the use of resources, staggered equipment procurement, and so on.

The organised crime strategy will be updated. An attempt will be made to increase the availability of administrative information to the police. Focus on decreasing the financial prerequisites for organised crime and confiscating the proceeds of crime.

Prepare the cyber action policies for the police (in sync with the EU level): the police should perceive the cyber environment as an opportunity and resource, through which online services are offered to the police’s customers, and through which the police’s internal systems and tools work and the information acquisition authorisations and cyberdefence tasks are done. For its part, the police force commits to developing research and training in this field.

Update the counterterrorism policies of the police (in sync with the EU level). Further develop concrete means for preventing violent radicalisation, such as the threat assessment tool of the police developed in 2013-2014.

Ensure that police units are aware of the up-to-date issues in fighting illegal immigration. Participate actively in the return of illegal residents to their country of origin.
4.2.4  Finnish Security Intelligence Service

Key proposals

Safeguarding the order of Finland as a state and as a society, and identifying and preventing any external and internal threats endangering them, is the purpose of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. One of its key duties is to produce strategic information on the operational environment for the use of security policymakers.

The purpose of the information acquisition priorities of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is to steer information acquisition serving national security, connected to the prevention of projects targeting Finland’s sovereignty as a state and of crimes. A mechanism has been created for the annual definition of the information acquisition priorities, allowing the confirmation of the external and internal threats or phenomena that can be deemed to decrease national security. An endeavour to improve the acquisition of up-to-date information related to Finland’s foreign affairs and security policymaking lies behind the mechanism. The information acquisition priorities are defined under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, which directs the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.

Taking the tighter-than-before intertwining of phenomena related to internal and external security into consideration, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service should have the possibility to acquire intelligence supporting the decision-making of the country’s top leadership and concerning external security threats abroad as well. It would be a matter of acquiring, from persons and information systems, information necessary to prevent projects that endanger national security.

The administrative status of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service changed at the beginning of 2016, when the agency was moved directly under the Ministry of the Interior. Regardless of the change in the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's administrative status, it will be ensured that, in the future, cooperation between the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the police, and other authorities in national security matters, and the related information exchange, remains at a good level and continues to be developed.

The development of competencies related to security intelligence activities connected to the interface of external and internal security should be taken into consideration more intensively in cooperation with both domestic and foreign authorities. In particular, this should include cooperation in training related to information acquisition and analysis.
The views of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service on the connections between internal and external security

On concepts

In the police organisation, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, operating as a national unit, is responsible for preventing threats to national security. According to Section 10 of the Act on Police Administration (110/1992), it is the duty of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service to combat projects and crimes that could endanger the order of Finland as a state and as a society, or the internal or external security of the state, and to investigate such crimes. It must also maintain and develop the overall preparedness for preventing activities endangering national security.

The Internal Security Programme defines internal security as a state of society in which everyone can enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the judicial system, and a safe society without fear or insecurity caused by crime, disturbances, accidents, or phenomena or changes in the Finnish society or the increasingly international world. According to the final report of the parliamentary police committee (1986), the external security of the state may be endangered by all endeavours with a harmful impact on the rights or interests of the state, or on relations between Finland and foreign powers.

The concepts of internal and external security can change unpredictably, and an unwavering line cannot be drawn between them. It is a question of perspective: the concept of internal security is strongly built on the viewpoint of individual people, while the concept of external security emphasises a governmental perspective that is, first and foremost, related to the autonomy of the state.

Internal and external security in the operations of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service

The operations of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service take place at the juncture of internal and external security. The common feature of the crimes and projects prevented by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is that they are targeted at Finland’s sovereignty as a state. This is obvious in the case of crimes against the state and treason, but the same idea is also present in the criminalisation of terrorism. According to the Criminal Code, the perpetrator has a terrorist intent if their purpose is to force the government of a state to do, tolerate, or not do something, or if they endeavour to wrongfully overthrow the constitution of a state. Of the crimes with international connections that the Finnish Security Intelligence Service should prevent, particularly acts related to terrorism and illegal activism usually involve concrete acts against citizens, and thus have an impact in the core area of internal security.
With internationalisation, the line between external and internal security has become increasingly blurred. Defining threats and risks depending on region or locale is increasingly difficult due to the cross-border nature and interdependence of economic, technical, and social systems. Today, the factors posing the most serious threat to the security of Finland are often connected to events outside Finland. Thus, the consequences of a threat that is of foreign origin and that comes into existence abroad may be realised in Finland more easily than before. A common characteristic of external threats to national security is that it is increasingly difficult to identify and tell apart the governmental and non-governmental actors behind them. For this reason, it is nowadays more challenging to anticipate the threats.

The threats can be roughly divided into those of a civilian and military nature. Key security threats of a civilian nature can be considered to include at least international terrorism, covert intelligence operations by foreign powers targeting Finland and its interests, attempts to distribute weapons of mass destruction and dual-use products, and international organised crime of the type that attempts to influence public decision-making or infiltrate state structures. In recent years, cross-border spying taking place in information networks, in particular, has become a serious threat. Such activities enable the centralised acquisition of large amounts of information, which may cause irreparable damage to the security and interests of the target state. Sabotage and falsification of data in information networks are also significant threats.

With regard to counterterrorism, the increase in the number of persons of interest, which is estimated to continue, is a key driver of change. While the number of persons of interest has increased, several factors that have previously protected Finland from terrorism – including its impartial and less visible role in international politics, social cohesion, and the lack of significant immigrant communities from conflict areas – are disappearing. Connections between Finland and terrorist operators abroad have increased. Foreign networks of radicals have started to create connections to and recruit followers from Islamist networks established in Finland. The changes in the operational environment of counterterrorism are discussed more extensively in the national counterterrorism strategy.

The activity of intelligence operations by foreign intelligence services in Finland have returned to a so-called Cold War level. Technical intelligence operations in information network environments have risen alongside and in support of intelligence operations based on personal sources; detecting and preventing them is difficult.

Illegal activism has increasingly moved into information networks. The use of anonymous services as forums for threats, hate speech, and extreme opinions has become more prevalent. Threats are made increasingly and more easily against both members of the government and other public persons.
As a consequence of the general globalisation trend, the security issues of individual states have become international in nature. In practice, the phenomena threatening the security of Finland and their background factors are, without exception, connected to events and trends outside our country, which are difficult to perceive to a certain degree. Due to the cross-border nature of the security issues, the need for analysed international security intelligence has grown significantly. Effective security intelligence related to global threats requires more diverse means and approaches. This poses new kinds of challenges to the information acquisition and analysis activities of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service.

The key challenges of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's international cooperation

Acquisition of intelligence from abroad

The operational environment of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is decidedly international. In order for the Finnish Security Intelligence Service to be able to perform its mandated duties, it must acquire a sufficient amount of foreign intelligence pertinent to Finland's security situation. The acquisition of information is based on the international bilateral and multilateral confidential information exchange among security and intelligence services. Cooperation with the national authorities of different countries is complemented by the information exchange with the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre.

International cooperation procedures in the service of crime prevention must be kept separate from international intelligence cooperation. Their significance in the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's purview is minor. One key reason for this is that the target persons of crime prevention carried out by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service usually act on behalf of a foreign state, often as its officials, against the interests of Finland. The state benefiting from the crime will not, in practice, assist the state – such as Finland – that is the target of the crime in preventing, uncovering, or investigating said crime.

No legislation exists on the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's information acquisition abroad. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service's information acquisition is based on the use of authority related to the prevention and uncovering of crime in accordance with the Police Act. It can use this authority only within Finnish borders. In practice, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's information acquisition from abroad is based on its international intelligence cooperation, monitoring of open sources, and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's own liaison activities.
Security and intelligence service cooperation

Since Finland became independent, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and its predecessors have been in extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign intelligence and security services. This cooperation helps ensure the acquisition of foreign intelligence necessary for maintaining the security of the state, for use by Finland’s competent authorities. Due to the general globalisation development of security issues and the resulting emphasis on foreign intelligence, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service has in recent years systematically expanded its international cooperation network so that today, it can be considered to cover the intelligence and security bodies of countries essential to Finland’s security.

The security and intelligence services cooperate both bilaterally and through various multilateral forums. What is significant for Finland and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service in this cooperation is that, as a rule, security and intelligence services cooperate only with their foreign counterparts instead of with the police and other law enforcement authorities.

The bilateral cooperation between security and intelligence services often takes place on a case-by-case basis, and is based on meeting the operational interests of the parties involved. The cooperation usually concerns a concrete threat that could impact both states if it materialised. The forms of cooperation include information exchange between the parties and coordinated intelligence acquisition operations. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has a cooperation relationship with around 80 foreign security police, security service, and intelligence service authorities.

The importance of multilateral security and intelligence service forums as information exchange channels has increased with the internationalisation of the threats and phenomena being prevented. For the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the form of international cooperation with the longest history is the network of Nordic partner agencies, under which the agency heads and the managers of the different operational sectors meet regularly. In addition, expert meetings are arranged for the purpose of sharing and analysing information concerning all Nordic countries. The Nordic countries also have established cooperation in preparing strategic assessments of phenomena and threats.

The Finnish Security Intelligence Service has been a member of the so-called Bern Club, primarily consisting of security services, since the 1990s. This cooperation developed into the security services' cooperation forum Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), concentrating on counterterrorism, of which the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is also a member.
The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) is an organisation compiling information from the civilian intelligence services and civilian security services of the member states. Its duties include supporting the EU's policymakers with expert and timely information. EU INTCEN itself does not gather intelligence, and it does not have the authority to, for example, use coercive measures; instead, the intelligence analyses and situational awareness it produces are based on the intelligence supplied by the civilian intelligence services and civilian security services of the member states. The division of competence defined in the Lisbon convention is in the background, according to which national security issues are within the competence of the member states. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service works in cooperation with EU INTCEN.

In recent years, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service has had short and long-term liaisons stationed in Finnish embassies in certain countries outside Europe, where they have diplomatic status with the resulting rights and immunities. The liaisons of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service participate in the prevention of external threats to the security of the state, for example, by maintaining contacts with the authorities of the country in which they are stationed, as well as with the authorities of other countries represented there. The activities of the liaisons are based on the application of the provisions of the Act on the Processing of Personal Data by the Police, concerning international information exchange by the police.

### 4.3 Finnish Border Guard

**The key challenges of the international activities in the border security sector**

Border security covers border control, the monitoring and safeguarding of territorial integrity, and the maintenance of readiness for national defence.

The key challenges of the international activities in the border security sector can be divided into three categories, which are: 1) challenges related to the change in the operational environment, including diverse threats; 2) challenges with institutions; and 3) challenges with several actors.

*Change in the operational environment*

The change in the external and internal operational environment has a direct impact on international cooperation and its focus. It also has a direct impact on the implementation of border security and the available resources. International cooperation and the believable maintenance of national border security go hand in hand. Today, the operational environment is changing rapidly, and the changes have become more
unpredictable. For this reason, obtaining and allocating necessary new resources often involves a delay. Indeed, the importance of international cooperation has increased due to global threats and crises.

The threats related to border security have become more diverse. From the perspective of border security, hybrid threats comprise a wide spectrum of threats, starting from illegal immigration in peace time, cross-border crime, foreign fighters and terrorism, and ending in political-military pressure and, even further, the use of military force. Governmental actors are often behind the hybrid threats. The changed threats require new procedures and practices, and cooperation with several actors. In peace time, the importance of cooperation with internal security actors is emphasised in the maintenance of border security. In an escalated political-military pressure situation, close cooperation with the defence administration is essential.

Preparation for the prevention of threats requires ensuring that the border security systems work and are available (e.g. registers), and also requires readiness to, for instance, protect certain sites.

Recent events show that, in some situations, there is a need to influence external security using internal security means and vice versa. In both cases, reinforcing border security is an important element in the selection of measures, including the use of EU-wide and national registers and the improvement of cooperation between authorities.

**Challenges with institutions**

Matters related to border security are regulated by EU regulations, including the operations of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The regulations are approved based on a proposal made by the Commission to the Council and the EU Parliament, through an ordinary legislative procedure. In the field of legislation, the proactive influence to the Commission during the preparation of the regulation, and the influence to the other member states and to the Parliament during the negotiations play a key role. The resources are insufficient for continuous influence, which means that the influence must be correctly timed and targeted. Otherwise, Finland will be unable to achieve its objectives.

Influence is important particularly because the institutions have limited knowledge of practical border security issues.
Challenges with several actors

The maintenance of border security involves measures taken in the countries of origin and transit, cooperation with the authorities of the neighbouring countries, measures taken on the external border, and measures taken inland. Border security is maintained at the land and sea borders and at airports. The number of cooperation partners is very large, both nationally and internationally, and they vary by border type. The challenge is greatest at the sea borders and in the sea area, where there are more than 300 actors at European level, for example, more than 100 of which are related to border security. Border security matters are discussed in different forums, some of which are responsible for internal and some for external security. The role of EU agencies is also increasing in the field of external security.

Connections between internal and external security

Border security operations in all of their forms occur at the interface between internal and external security and thus form an integral part of both. Among other things, the recent events in Ukraine and Estonia confirm that the relations between states are immediately evident on the borders of the state. On the other hand, the interfaces between border security operations on the Mediterranean Sea, such as Triton/Poseidon Sea, and crisis management operations, such as EUNAVFOR Sophia/Nato, in the fight against illegal immigration and prevention of human trafficking, are interconnected. The operational areas and the objectives of the operations overlap, making the connection between internal and external security clear.

Illegal immigration, cross-border crime, and hybrid threats cannot be effectively intervened in or the border security maintained without cooperation with the countries of origin and transit, neighbouring countries, and national authorities.

The role of border security is emphasised in crisis management operations, and is nowadays always a part of the operation. International (worldwide and EU) and national support projects in third countries include a border security component.

Border security is maintained to the last before the crisis escalates into a military crisis. It is important for the prevention of hybrid threats that, during the so-called grey state, the authorities operating at the interface of internal and external security have comprehensive competencies and cooperation channels with national authorities and those of neighbouring countries.
Matters to be taken into consideration in the operations

Operating environment
Together with all relevant actors, ensure that each authority has up-to-date and sufficient situational awareness. Utilise the situational awareness established by EU agencies and institutions (Frontex, Europol, EASO, EEAS, etc.) to a larger degree than before. Support endeavours to improve the creation of a shared risk analysis at EU level and, based on this, at national level. Utilise the experience of other countries in responding to diverse threats and utilising modern technology.

To the extent possible, target the resources available for international operations in a coordinated manner in such a way as to best secure Finland’s interests.

Take care of contingency planning and preparedness for various situations, including resources, tools, and competencies.

Institutions
Influence legislation so that it safeguards international cooperation and participation in various cooperation projects and operations. With regard to border security, the decision-making threshold for participation in international cooperation is not raised. The national competent authority must be the competent authority in international cooperation as well.

Finnish experts should be brought into important and influential positions in the institutions, where they will have an opportunity to exert influence on the contents of the legislation during its preparation, and to introduce the practices of the institution to border security competence. The border security competence of the EU delegations must be reinforced in third countries. Ensure continued competence in national organisations.

Confidential relations are established with the institutions’ most important representatives with an influence in the matter, and they are supported in their work. Influence is exercised in a more planned and targeted manner.

Actors
Ensure that the duties, competencies, and division of responsibilities of the authorities are clear with regard to international cooperation in the future, and that the decisions and international measures required by the change in the operational environment, such as participation in various operations, can be rapid. The responsibility for the decision-maker
and/or presenting officer must be unambiguous and must follow the current division of responsibilities in all threat situations.

Recognise the key cooperation parties both internationally and nationally, gain their commitment, and utilise their competence in order to achieve the objectives. Prioritise cooperation and, in addition to bilateral cooperation, aim to find horizontal and/or thematic cooperation partners for the government, such as regions, countries, and organisations.

4.4 Emergency Services College

A concise description of the key challenges of international cooperation, and concrete action and development proposals

From the perspective of the emergency services, international cooperation is made more difficult by country-specific differences in the organisations and management systems of the emergency services, in legislation, and in the concepts related to security. As an example of these concepts, it is somewhat difficult to find an international equivalent for the Finnish concept of civil defence (“väestönsuojelu”). Furthermore, some countries have their own special legislation for situations that, in Finland, correspond to social disturbances during normal conditions or a disturbance during normal conditions. These differences are emphasised in situations where Finland needs to ask for international assistance for rescue operations or, correspondingly, in a situation where we should send assistance abroad.

Significant problems in international cooperation are involved in international conflicts that result in a threat to national security, vital functions of society, and the sense of security felt by citizens. Sub-government terrorist organisations, states, or alliances between states can be the background actors in conflicts. Preparing for these security threats requires measures taken by several authorities and organisations. Criminal organisations are also part of this group, but the disturbances caused by them are more clearly within the purview of the police than the above.

Some of the challenges are related to concerns about the sufficiency of resources. The need for international cooperation both in education (professional education and continuing professional education) and in research and development is clear. The declining economy creates problems and necessitates a balancing act in choosing the focus areas of the operations. According to the performance target document of the Emergency Services College, we have high-quality and improving educational services, the continuity of which must absolutely be secured. The other matters brought up in the
performance target document also have a direct impact on internal security with regard to the emergency services and also the activities of the Emergency Rescue Centres.

At the organisational level, there are significant challenges facing the cooperation between the emergency services and the CMC and its development, particularly related to internal security. Know-how and experience in establishing forces for international tasks should be utilised when planning the internal security strategy. The matter – the interdependence of internal and external security – has been considered in the project in the right direction. When examining the current activities, the line between internal and external security is artificial, because the activities are nevertheless similar and use similar tools. Funding and budgeting pose a challenge to the cooperation.

In the field of education related to the emergency services, it is our view that international activities could be of help in finding new procedural solutions. This could be realised by, for example, being involved in various projects and programmes deemed to be useful and in which we would also have something to give to the other actors. Here, too, we come up against the limitations caused by financial resources. On the other hand, the development of international activities by specifically utilising our training area and competence could produce financial resources through further business education, for which there is clear demand in Central Europe.

Views on the connections of internal and external security, and concrete proposals for action and development

The Government Report on Security and Defence Policy (2012) states that the external and internal security of states is increasingly intertwined with the increase in global interdependence. The report does not, however, specifically define external security; neither is it defined in the government resolution on overall security (2012). Instead, the resolution defines both internal security and overall national defence. The website of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that the border between external and internal security is disappearing with the new security problems and cross-border threats.

From the perspectives of professional education in emergency services and ERC activities given by the Emergency Services College, and from the perspective of preparedness training, there are clear connections between internal and external security. Emergency rescue activities that are the responsibility of the emergency services, the closely related civil defence activities, and the civil defence tasks defined in the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols have a close, although in some sense indirect, connection with external security. Effective preparation for incidents and threats coming from outside the borders of the state (international terrorism and other influences on internal security from abroad, armed conflicts/war) require the emergency services, as an internal security
actor, to carry out both proactive preparations to ensure the prerequisites for protecting the population and to maintain the readiness of the emergency services. The connection and interdependence with external security and with the actors responsible for external security (particularly the Finnish Defence Forces) is necessary to maintain effective civil defence arrangements. The role of the emergency services and other traditional internal security authorities (the police and the Finnish Border Guard) is thus important in limiting the consequences of threats from abroad and in the operations made necessary by the threats. According to the view of the Emergency Services College, the visibility and publicity of the emergency services should be significantly increased; today, the police and the Finnish Defence Forces are emphasised in the activities, while the publicised role of the emergency services is smaller than their true value.

Looking at the issue from a wider perspective, external and internal security also have a connection in that catastrophes and complex crises occurring in areas near Finland/Europe may have direct or indirect impacts on internal security and the duties of the internal security actors, as in the case of a serious environmental accident in the Gulf of Finland, or a nuclear power plant accident in the areas neighbouring Finland, or the crises in Ukraine and Syria (uncontrolled growth in the number of legal and illegal immigrants).

The Ministry of the Interior and its administrative branch thus play a key coordinating role in serious situations caused by external security threats requiring the protection of the population and critical infrastructure, and the maintenance of public order and safety. A report should be prepared on the management systems of the emergency services in EU countries; plans should also be drawn up on a practical level for participating in international emergency rescue operations in Europe, and for accepting international assistance in cases of major accidents and disruptions. The threat and risk assessments should be harmonised at national, regional, and local levels. Under both emergency conditions and in widespread disruptions in normal times, a situation may occur in which civil defence is required; indeed, the guidelines on the management system of civil defence should be updated. Legislation and guidelines should be developed so that the emergency rescue authorities would have the authority to obtain the information necessary to maintain overall situational awareness and to coordinate operations during disruptions in normal times, where the population or functions vital to society are threatened by an accident. The prerequisites for coordinating emergency rescue operations should be ensured in order to prepare for disruptions where the impact reaches the area of several different emergency services. From the perspective of developing coordination between emergency service areas, there is cause to consider whether regional leadership is required. There is cause to further develop the reporting to the Ministry of the Interior.
4.5 Crisis Management Centre

Description of the key challenges of international cooperation

The Kuopio-based Crisis Management Centre is a competence centre for civilian crisis management and international emergency services. Its main duties are training experts for international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding and international emergency service missions, recruitment of experts, responsibility for logistics and materiel readiness, and research, publishing, and project activities related to the field. The Crisis Management Centre acts as the national command centre for all experts sent on civilian crisis management and international emergency service missions, and is responsible for all operations related to national readiness. The Crisis Management Centre is a national actor, the operational area of which is strongly international.

The field of international crisis management is undergoing a constant change. The international community, particularly the European Union, has assumed and continues to assume a role in crises located further and further from Europe, and is increasingly multidimensional and challenging due to, for example, the conditions and the security situation. It seems evident that the focus of civilian crisis management is moving to Africa and, should the situation allow, also to the Middle East. The changes in the focus of participation and the increasingly diverse missions require the countries and competence centres participating in civilian crisis management to have the ability to adapt to the prevailing conditions. The National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management (2014, vision) states that Finland is a frontrunner in civilian crisis management. The Crisis Management Centre must therefore be able to adapt to new challenges in a proactive manner. This requires continuous, open-minded examination of the duties, organisation, and activities of the Crisis Management Centre, and the ability to adapt rapidly to the requirements. This is also emphasised in the international emergency rescue service missions (the EU Civil Protection Mechanism; Voluntary Pool).

With the change in the crisis management sector, the maintenance of international situational awareness is highlighted. The international cooperation of the Crisis Management Centre faces the challenge of limited situational awareness, which limits the ability to predict future situations and, on the other hand, makes it more difficult to develop activities.

The recruitment of Finnish experts for international duties, and therefore international cooperation, faces the challenge of the Finnish candidates having to compete for the duties with other international applicants. The expected ramping-down in stages of the EU’s largest civilian crisis management operations – EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL Afghanistan – and the resulting reduction in positions open for application will, in the future, mean increased competition for the different positions in EU-led civilian
crisis management operations. Getting experts for operations requires international cooperation, as the organisation who announces the open position will make the selection.

Anticipating the need for experts for international operations faces the challenge of what kind of know-how and background is expected from the experts: this also affects planning for training the experts to be sent on future missions and the selection of the experts to be trained. The training also faces the challenge of having to meet the varying needs of the operations, for example in accordance with the requirements set by the EU and the UN. This requires continuous monitoring and agility to implement changes and, on the other hand, also sufficient financial resources. Cooperation is also necessary with national actors so that synergy benefits can be achieved with other Finnish security sector actors through training arranged in Finland.

In project, research, and development work, the greatest challenge for the Crisis Management Centre in international civilian crisis management cooperation is related to finding suitable international partners and implementing the cooperation. Research also requires sufficient financial resources, which emphasises seeking external funding and access to international project funding application processes. The challenge is to customise the research and project themes in such a way that they are topical and meet international and national needs. The results achieved also need to be distributed widely among the target groups, which requires continuous and wide-ranging monitoring of the activities of international actors in the field, and participation in these activities.

Views on the connections between internal and external security

In Finland, the Crisis Management Centre is an international actor, one of the key duties of which is to implement the European Union’s common security and defence policy in accordance with Finland’s interests, under the governance of the Ministry of the Interior. The activities of the Crisis Management Centre concentrate on deploying Finnish experts on international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding, and international emergency rescue service missions. Although the Crisis Management Centre’s field of operations is worldwide, the majority of its activities take place within the frameworks of the European Union’s civilian crisis management and emergency rescue service operations, and of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE. A significant number of the EU’s civilian crisis management operations aim to develop and reinforce the police, the rule of law, and border security in their target areas, so Finland’s participation in international civilian crisis management missions is part of an EU-wide approach to responding to various internal security threats, such as terrorism, cross-border crime, and other serious and organised crime.
In accordance with the European Union’s Internal Security Strategy, it is important to increase the participation of the law enforcement authorities and judicial, freedom, and security sector bodies of the member states in civilian crisis management operations. The European Union’s decision on civilian crisis management operations to be established, just like requests from the UN and the OSCE for experts for civilian crisis management and peacebuilding operations, affect how Finland’s – and thus, the Crisis Management Centre’s – international cooperation is built up. The same applies to participation in international emergency rescue service missions. The connection between external and internal security is an important factor in defining the work of the Crisis Management Centre, and the CMC is a unique international actor with activities that experts can use to improve their knowledge and skills on international missions, to support Finland’s internal security and the actors responsible for it. The national experts sent by the Crisis Management Centre on international missions are expected to increase the national capability to respond to national security challenges linked to threats from outside Finland. The possibility of this occurring is excellent, as around 50 per cent of those sent to expert secondments have positions in the organisations responsible for the internal security of Finland (the emergency services, the police, the Finnish Border Guard, Customs and the Ministry of Justice).

Experts sent by the Crisis Management Centre handle civilian crisis management duties in precisely those areas that project security threats into Europe and further into Finland, allowing them to amass a very high level of knowledge and understanding of the problems in the crisis area, their causes, and the possibilities for resolving them. At the same time, working on international missions increases their knowledge of the international actors and builds contacts with them. This supports information exchange and possibilities of cooperation between EU actors, promoting the work carried out at the interface of Finland’s internal and external security.

In addition to civilian crisis management tasks, the readiness and capabilities created by the Crisis Management Centre for international emergency rescue service missions reinforce national internal security, as this readiness (such as search and rescue equipment and know-how for rescuing victims buried in rubble) can also be used domestically, if necessary.

**Concrete proposals for action and development**

Putting the knowledge and know-how amassed by experts representing internal security actors on international missions into practice requires cross-administration cooperation. The proposal is to support the creation or updating of the internationality strategies of the organisations responsible for the internal security of Finland. The objective of the strategies must be both to utilise international work experience in reinforcing the
skills and knowledge of the organisations working for Finland’s internal security and to support participation in international missions as part of the career development of their personnel. This can be further supported by recommending the preparation of an implementation plan.

Another proposal is that the internal security strategy currently under development should propose an increase in cooperation between the parties responsible for Finland’s internal security, particularly in advancing the recruitment of experts to be sent on international civilian crisis management, peacebuilding, and international emergency and rescue service missions.

4.6 Emergency Response Centre Administration

The ERC Administration’s views on the interdependencies of internal and external security and the development of cooperation between the security authorities

In accordance with Section 2 of the Government Decree on the Ministry of the Interior, the Emergency Response Centre Administration is under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior. It is the national central agency, governed and supervised by the ministry. However, the operational steering is done jointly with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Governance and supervision are a key duty of a government ministry mentioned in Section 68 of the Constitution of Finland, and each ministry, within its proper purview, is responsible for the preparation of matters to be considered by the government and for the appropriate functioning of its administration. The agency itself is responsible for resolving and arranging its operations and the related administrative and support services.

Emergency response centre operations are not defined in the legislation as a concept, but Section 4 of the Emergency Response Centre Act lays down provisions on the duties of the ERC Administration. According to this, the agency’s duties are the production of emergency response centre services, supporting the related operations of the emergency services, police, and social and healthcare, communications centre duties, initiating measures to warn the population, and other duties related to supporting the operations of the authorities that are purposeful for the agency. In addition to these, the duties of the ERC Administration include developing and monitoring of the duties and procedures related to its field.

Emergency response centre services mean the reception and assessment of emergency calls, and other such calls that require immediate measures by the emergency service, police, or social and health service authorities, and relaying the task in accordance with
the instructions provided by the authorities to the proper authority or the party handling
the duties of the authority according to an agreement.

Emergency response centre operations (112 operations) are among the most vital
functions that have a direct impact on trust in the authorities and society. The ERC
Administration is a key actor in society’s security sector and in the production of
internal security situational awareness. In emergency situations, it is the central hub of
communications and plays a key role with regard to society’s crisis tolerance. However,
the chain is only as strong as its weakest link. For this reason, developing the cooperation
between the authorities will be even more important in the future.

The changing security environment from the ERC Administration’s perspective

In 1991, as many as 133 different public-safety answering points or emergency response
centres operated in Finland, with a total staff of several thousands. With the emergency
response centre reform of the 2000s, 15 emergency response centres were established
in Finland, and today, as a result of the ERC Administration’s restructuring, there are six
emergency response centres.

As the complexity of society increases and the population becomes older, the 112
operations will become even more demanding. Events threatening our security have
become increasingly unexpected and diverse. The role of cooperation between authorities
in the preparedness of society will be further emphasised with the transformed security
environment.

The operational environment has changed both domestically and internationally. Among
other things, digitalisation, changes in demographics and regional structures, technical
development with common information systems for the authorities, and changes
taking place in the authorities will increase the service expectations and productivity
requirements of cooperation between the authorities. The citizens’ sense of security stems
from experiences and notions, and trust in the security authorities being able to react
rapidly and effectively to threats when necessary.

The security of citizens does not depend only on the development of military threats,
terrorism, or organised crime. The functioning of social networks, health care services,
education, employment, public order and safety, and, for example, the management of
daily accidents are more central to everyday life.
The police

The distress of citizens is evident in the spectrum of emergency calls processed by the ERC Administration. The number of police calls related to the protection of life and health recorded in the ERC Administration’s information system has increased by 11 per cent from 2009 to 2015, and the growth appears to be continuing. At the same time, from the perspective of the ERC Administration, domestic violence calls and other calls of an emergency nature made to homes have remained at the same level for these seven years.

Following an emergency call, 51 per cent of the calls relayed to the different sectors (including unprompted calls made by patrols) went to the police. The diversity of police calls also sets special competence requirements on emergency centre work. The savings objectives allocated to the police will create more challenges for emergency centre operations as the number of units in the field decreases, when incidents result in more emergency calls due to increased response times, and the need for advice related to emergencies increases. These factors highlight the importance of cooperation between the authorities.

Lowering the overall response time of the police requires the rapid handling of emergency calls at the emergency response centre, high-quality risk assessment, and successful use of emergency resources for the emergency response. This will result in improved public order and safety, reduced opportunity for crime, an improved crime-solving percentage, prevention of the escalation of situations involving violence, and thus less damage to property and fewer injuries to persons.

Rescue services

The number of accidents to which rescue services have responded has remained at the same level for the last three years. The ERC activities also affect the response time of the rescue services, which, in turn, is a significant factor in the possible escalation of accidents and fires.

Of the missions relayed to the different sectors as a result of an emergency call, six per cent were relayed to the rescue services, including to first responder missions that are part of the purview of the emergency medical services. The cooperation between the ERC Administration and the rescue services faces the additional challenges posed by municipal autonomy on the nationwide steering of the operations and development work and by the fact that a significant number of rescue service missions are carried out by contract fire departments. The currently ongoing rescue services reform project introduces an additional need for active cooperation between authorities.
Health care services

Following an emergency call, 42 per cent of the calls relayed to the different sectors went to the health care services. The total number of health care calls handled by the ERC Administration has remained at the same level for the last four years, but their nature is changing. The number of elderly people living alone is increasing. Increasingly often, those requesting assistance using the emergency number are elderly people who have multiple illnesses and whose request for emergency assistance is caused by nonspecific symptoms for which the health care risk assessment instructions do not provide a clear procedure. At the same time, acute situations must be identified quickly, because an increase in delays may, as a result of various treatments being given too late, cause more expensive treatment processes and longer rehabilitation times, at worst even unnecessary loss of life.

Emergency medical aid missions are integral to protecting the life and health of citizens, and thus place particular competence requirements for ERC operations. An additional challenge has been the right of the hospital districts to decide on their procedures independently.

In recent years, cooperation between the authorities has developed, and this has helped in achieving significant improvements in the procedures and guidelines of the health care sector with ERC operations in mind.

The currently ongoing social and health care sector reform project will bring new challenges that will require good cooperation between the authorities in the future, too.

Social services

Social services are the fastest growing sector in the 112 operations. In the last seven years, the number of emergency calls for social services has increased by 50 per cent; however, it still remains below one per cent of all emergency calls handled by the ERCS.

The increase in the number of social service calls is connected with the ageing of the population and the longer time living at home, and the increase in the number of child protection calls. To ERC operations, social services also appear as a municipal and thus regionally differently arranged function that places challenges on achieving nationwide procedures. However, significant development has taken place for social services over recent years, with ERC operations in mind. This is a result of changes in legislation and guidelines for the sector, which have significantly improved the cooperation between the municipalities. The cooperation with the ERC Administration has shown positive development, and it must be further developed with regard to the future reform of social and health care services.
Despite the slight decrease in the overall number of emergency calls in recent years, the number of relayed missions and the working time spent on handling the missions have grown over the same period. This causes a constant need for prioritisation in the distribution of the ERC Administration's resources. The changes taking place among the authorities place additional requirements on the cooperation between the authorities and its procedures.

High-quality ERC operations continue to be a basic requirement for the sufficiency of the field resources of the other sectors. On an annual level, the handling of almost one million emergency calls, and one million other calls without alerting the authorities, is an essential part of the functioning of the entire chain of assistance.

**ERICA, the common ERC information system for authorities**

In order to develop future ERC operations, the ERC Administration and the other security authorities launched an operations and IT development project (TOTI) in 2008, with the objective of achieving an ERC information system that is nationwide and in the common use of all actors participating in ERC operations (the police, fire and rescue, social and health care, and the Finnish Border Guard). From the start, full-time experts from each authority have been involved in the development of the system, and in the future, the ERC information system will be used from the authorities' own points of use, which enables closer cooperation than before and the sharing of situational awareness among the entire chain of assistance; the new forms of cooperation will also create synergies.

As a nationally centralised and advanced information system, ERICA will enable the ERC operations to be developed and made more uniform and efficient in such a way that citizens can be ensured equal and high-quality ERC services and rapid assistance regardless of their geographical location. At the same time, the operations and resource use of all authorities in the 112 chain can be made more efficient.

**Cooperation in the neighbouring areas and international cooperation between ERCs from the perspective of the ERC Administration**

The ERC Administration works in cooperation with the corresponding organisations in the neighbouring areas, such as the Swedish SOS Alarm, Estonian Häirekeskus, and the ERC system of the Norwegian health care services. In practice, the cooperation has, at this level, been based on mutual comparisons and development of the systems and procedures.

At the operational level, cooperation takes place particularly in Northern Finland, where the Oulu ERC is in daily practical cooperation with both SOS Alarm, handling Swedish ERC operations, and the Norwegian emergency medical service authorities in cross-border
emergency operations, particularly with regard to the emergency medical service units. These operations are based on agreements on health care services.

The police force also cooperates across borders with the other Nordic countries. This cooperation is based on international conventions, EU law, and the national legislation of each country. Furthermore, an agreement on police cooperation has been made between the Nordic countries. This was last revised on 1 October 2012, which affects ERC operations with respect to alerting the authorities. This cooperation is also being developed towards joint patrols and the possible use of common communications equipment, which will likely affect the operations of the ERCs.

In the case of the rescue services, the corresponding cooperation is based on the following agreements, for example: the Barents Euro-Arctic Emergency Response Service Agreement of 2008 (HE139/2011), which covers the areas of the former provinces of Oulu and Lapland; and the agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden on cross-border cooperation during accidents (decree and agreement 21/1992). This cooperation is evident in Haaparanta, for example, where the rescue services of the different countries have equipment in common use.

The entire eastern border is covered by the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation to avert disasters and to prevent their consequences (52/1996). Based on this agreement, the Kuopio ERC and Oulu ERC act as points of contact with the corresponding parties in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations. With reference the agreement in question, the rescue services in the border region can also make their own cooperation agreements with the corresponding parties in the neighbouring country.

The current challenge that the cooperation between neighbouring areas faces is that no intergovernmental agreements exist with Russia for the remit of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. This has come up several times, particularly in the region of Southeast Finland, where traffic accidents have occurred between Vaalimaa and Viipuri. In these cases, it is possible to send a Finnish rescue unit to the accident site but not a health care unit, which has, in some cases, caused confusion when the emergency call has been received in Finland.

The ERC Administration also cooperates with the ERCs of other countries in situations where the emergency call is received in Finland, but the emergency occurs in another country, or vice versa. A separate list of ERC contact number exists for this purpose, currently including most of the countries in the EU area. To a large extent, this cooperation involves matters that are also in the remit of the consul services of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, and the matters are prepared jointly by the ERC Administration and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

**European ERC operations**

There are a total of around 5,000 emergency rescue centres in Europe. On average, there is one ERC for a population base of around 200,000. This is not the target state; the political will has not been found to implement the change required in many countries. Even in a country the size of Sweden, there are 40 different public-safety answering points or emergency response centres participating in the handling of emergency calls in one way or another. In Norway, there are 65 such centres. The report on the Utoya terrorist attack mentions that problems included the lack of an ERC common to all authorities, fragmented situational awareness, deficiencies in information flow between the authorities, and the vulnerability of ERCs that are too small.

The emergency number 112 works in all EU countries, but its implementation varies. In addition to the common emergency number, the authorities can also have their own emergency numbers (e.g. Germany, Norway) that persons in distress can call to request assistance from the authority in question. If other authorities are also needed in such situations, the call is transferred and/or the information is forwarded to the ERCs of the other authorities. In the UK, for example, calls to the common emergency number 112 or 999 are directed to a telephone operator who directs the call to the authority desired by the caller.

The Finnish model, in which the same organisation (the ERC Administration) receives emergency calls for all sectors via a single emergency number, handles the information and uses the same information system to alert all units, does not exist elsewhere in the same form.

**The European Emergency Number Association EENA and the North American National Emergency Number Association NENA**

The European Emergency Number Association EENA is an association established in 1999. Its mission is to promote awareness of the common emergency number 112 and the high-level emergency mission-related services available through it in the EU. EENA acts as a discussion forum for all parties involved in 112 operations, such as the authorities, decision-makers, associations, and commercial actors. EENA has members from more than 80 countries, including more than 200 members of the European Parliament, 15 international organisations, and more than 90 researchers.
The annual EENA conference acts as an international forum of experts, allowing the possibility of exchanging information on the best practices and new innovations. It has been established in these conferences that there are large differences in the development of ERC operations between different European countries, and that Finland is a forerunner in this development.

Each year, EENA grants awards to individuals and organisations that have done significant deeds or achieved excellent results related to the emergency number 112. In 2013, the ERC Administration received an award in the Outstanding National 112 System category. According to the award, Finland’s ERC system is the best implementation in Europe. In addition to Europe, the award in question has resulted in contacts from countries including the United States, China, and Australia.

In 2014, EENA awarded the ERC Administration and the Finnish Police international recognition of good cooperation for the successful rescue of an 8-year-old girl. The Finnish cooperation between authorities is internationally top-grade in many ways, because the interdependencies have been identified and things are done together beginning from the planning stage.

The National Emergency Number Association NENA coordinates the development work in the field in North America. Finland has been brought up often in these seminars as well, and the Finnish ERC operations have been presented at different events in recent years. The networked operating model, the 112 Suomi smartphone application, the cooperation between the authorities, and the training of the ERC duty personnel are topics that have been presented as a model to representatives from the thousands of separate ERCs in North America.

**Finnish ERC operations raise interest**

From an international perspective, Finland has an efficient ERC system, and we are in many ways a model country in how to implement the operations. The ERC Administration constantly receives international visitors, and we have actively assisted different countries, such as Sweden, Georgia, Estonia, and Australia, in their own reforms at both strategic and practical levels. Articles on Finnish ERC operations have also been regularly published in global publications in the field.

The ERC Administration has also been requested to submit a separate report on the implemented ERC reform for the use of EENA members. The report was published on EENA’s website in 2015, and it has raised plenty of discussion.
The implementation of ERC operations under the responsibility of one authority has been a particular subject of interest. The Netherlands, for example, is planning an ERC model common to all authorities, but the cultural challenges of cooperation between the authorities are greater there than here. International visitors have also been interested in the ERC duty staff as their own profession, the diverse work of the duty staff, and the related training and its length.

An international review group has visited Finland to familiarise itself with the Finnish ERC operations and perform a peer review of matters related to risk management in Finland. The secretariat of the review group, which was satisfied with what it saw, included representatives of the European Commission, the UNISDR organisation that concentrates on disaster reduction under the UN, and the OECD.

Other international discussions have involved, for example, legislation related to emergency call traffic, the distribution of costs, service provider disruptions, SMS alerts, location systems, and the security level of the technical systems. Furthermore, similar challenges are involved in the implementation of the eCall system or the AML locator model in different countries.

As part of the development of Swedish ERC operations, a proposal was submitted to the government of Sweden in 2013 concerning the implementation of ERC services in Sweden. The measures presented in the report, such as a national ERC service, legislation reform, and the development and harmonisation of the ERC information system, had been influenced by the Finnish model.

**International development work**

All the Nordic countries are currently creating specifications for emergency medical care data. The goal is to create common data specifications for an electronic medical care report for the Nordic countries; in Finland, it will be a part of the KEJO system, which is a field command system in common use by authorities like ERICA.

Common quality metrics can be created based on these common data specifications. In the future, international cooperation will also enable a better comparison of the systems in the ERCs.

The ERC Administration has participated in the EU Commission’s expansion and neighbourhood projects as an expert with respect to the development of ERC operations. The Finnish model for ERC operations has been presented at, for example, the Twinning/TAIEX seminar arranged by the EU Commission and the Georgian Ministry for Internal Affairs, where different EU countries shared experiences on how they have resolved
various issues related to ERC operations, such as emergency location, the integration of ERC services, and the blocking of calls that should not be received by the ERCs. Finland also participated in the expert seminar arranged in Georgia under the TAIEX programme in June 2016. The theme of the seminar was how to establish and share situational awareness with the different authorities in widespread crises.

However, international cooperation is not one-sided for Finland. In Estonia, for example, a new ERC information system has already been deployed, enabling the implementation of a networked operating model. Active cooperation between neighbouring areas has been going on between countries for years, now, and Finland has the possibility to obtain experiences and views on networked ERC operations from Estonia.

**Security cooperation in the future**

The 112 chain, beginning with an ERC, has a direct impact on the services provided to citizens by the police, social and health services, and rescue services. The maintenance of public order and safety, responding to property damage and personal injury, and speeding up the start of medical care reduce costs incurred by delays. The efficient handling of ERC tasks, successful risk assessment, and high-quality use of emergency rescue resources improve the results of the operations of the different authorities.

Digitalisation, for its part, increases the efficiency of security cooperation. Examples of this are the 112 Suomi-application and the Smart Locator-service, which are already in use and have helped, for example, lost persons find their way back to their route without extensive and expensive search and rescue operations by the authorities.

The effectiveness of the urgent support services provided by the ERC Administration promotes occupational safety and the flow of information in situations requiring warnings to the public, for instance. The ability to prepare for various disturbances during normal conditions and unusual conditions has a significant impact on overall security.

Due to changes in the international operational environment, internal and external security can no longer be told apart. The terrorism experienced in Europe can arrive in Finland at any time. Preparations must be made for this eventuality in the operational guidelines and procedures of the security authorities. This will be helped by ERICA, the common ERC information system for authorities, which will aid in creating and sharing real-time situational awareness among all actors.

Obtaining reliable situational awareness of rapidly changing events will, in the future, be increasingly important. In anticipatory situational awareness, information shared by the authorities on their everyday operations, and its analysis as part of big data, is emphasised.
The role of the ERC Administration as the forwarder of initial information to the actors in the different administrative branches and to the general public has continued to increase, and the information system architecture for the security authorities currently being developed will further emphasise this role. The importance of ERC operations will be emphasised even further in the threat scenarios of hybrid warfare and cybersecurity, in which operations will likely be led by the internal security authorities before the competencies of the Finnish Defence Forces are increased through preparedness legislation. Taking the above-mentioned interdependencies into consideration, the ERC Administration must possess the ability to carry out its duties in normal conditions, during various disturbances, and in unusual conditions.

**The Ministry of the Interior’s administrative branch in the field of the security authorities**

The development of ERC operations must be continued in cooperation with the other security authorities so that the service expectations of the general public and the authorities can be met in the form of new service models. The implementation of next-generation ERC services and Finland’s status as a leading country in cooperation between the authorities must be ensured.

In order for the Ministry of the Interior to reinforce its role as the leading security authority, it must exert active influence to make cross-administration cooperation more in-depth and efficient, and to clarify the duties, division of competencies, and coordination responsibilities of the security authorities.

**4.7 Finnish Immigration Service**

The Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) operates at an interesting interface between internal and external security, where foreign citizens entering and staying in the country, and their affairs being processed in the agency, link the above-mentioned security aspects to each other. Persons coming into Finland from abroad may be escaping a threat they are facing abroad, and they may thus bring elements of conflict into Finland as well. Their purpose of coming to Finland can also have the intent of disrupting Finland’s internal security.

The events of the current year in Europe have shown that there is cause for a rapid reassessment of the concepts of internal and external security. There is also an acute need for this reassessment in the immigration sector. Many of the key processes for which the Finnish Immigration Service has development and risk management responsibility are
closely connected with this topic. Multiple citizenship as a risk factor and the radicalisation of immigrants in Finland have been a topic of public discussion.

In recent years, the Finnish Immigration Service has intensely developed the smoothness and production efficiency of key processes related to immigration, international protection, and citizenship. The ability of the UMA case management system deployed in Finland simultaneously in 2010 for all authorities involved in the immigration, international protection, and citizenship processes, to serve all the authorities in handling affairs within their remit, has improved year by year.

Challenges and connections

The Finnish Immigration Service is committed in many ways to operating as part of the common European international protection system and, on the other hand, to being involved in the cooperation between the European immigration services, for example through the GDISC operations. The development of the European Asylum Support Office EASO is strongly evident in the agency’s operations as new duties but, on the other hand, also as new opportunities. A strong developmental aspect of operations is connected to the above-mentioned cooperation, which is welcome and has benefited the agency. The challenge of this kind of cooperation is that the agencies of several other member states are larger and they have better resources for cooperation. Because it has fewer staff, it is more difficult for the Finnish Immigration Service to participate in all available cooperation, even if it is useful; on the other hand, being involved in cooperation requires an investment in activities of a more representative nature that do not directly benefit the agency’s operations. The challenge is that the human resources available for international cooperation tasks are scarce, and the agency has not had an international affairs strategy derived from the objectives of the Ministry of the Interior that would also affect the agency’s performance objectives. The international affairs strategy should also be developed, taking the security aspect into consideration. At this time, participation in international cooperation is mostly governed by the needs of the agency’s operations.

In Finland, the framework of international protection is formed of international agreements and extensive EU standards binding to Finland. The implementation of the regulations between the EU member states is not harmonisation, however, which is a cause of disruption. Examples of this include the deficiencies in the reception conditions in Italy and Greece, which leads to the incomplete implementation of the regulations concerning the processing of asylum applications. In the field of immigration and international protection, the EU’s common regulations, and their success or failure, play a central role. In this sense, the challenges also exist at EU policy level, and the Ministry of the Interior’s immigration department will likely present more detailed views on them.
The conditions in certain countries of origin are the key challenge in international cooperation, as they can prevent a person with no grounds for staying in their country from being returned to their home country. Their return may also be prevented by the home country’s unwillingness to receive a person who has, for example, committed crimes in Finland. In international protection matters, checking a person’s background and verifying their claims of persecution by their home country are difficult and often entirely prevented.

The ability to make return agreements can be affected by not being able to offer a sufficient incentive to the partner to take back their own citizens. Some countries also expect so-called forced returns to be given return support. Return issues also have a significant connection with Finland’s development cooperation. There are obstacles involved with this issue, caused by Finland’s development aid policy. The efficient return to their home country of persons residing in the country without grounds is one element of a believable immigration policy. The need to connect voluntary returns and returns executed by the police in such a way that Finland appears as a single, uniform actor from the perspective of the recipient countries can also be seen as a kind of challenge or development target in the near future.

Operations at the interface of internal and external security also require a presence in the countries of origin of the people coming to Finland. Checking the backgrounds of persons applying for a residence permit in Finland for decision-making, in accordance with the Aliens Act. It is a question of whether the information and documents concerning the permit requirements provided by the persons themselves can be relied on or not. The new internal affairs funds, particularly the ISF fund, include possibilities to fund immigration liaisons in important countries of origin. The European colleague agencies have highly developed ILO operations. In Finland, ILO operations, particularly with regard to the duties of the Finnish Immigration Service, are only beginning to develop. The challenge once again consists of the scant resources and also the fact that, due to the lack of resources, ILO provides services or is expected to provide services to several organisations in Finland, which inevitably leads to some organisations not finding joint ILO operations as beneficial to their operations as others do. The challenge would be to develop ILO operations and establish them in the structure of immigration management, or, on the other hand, to develop a model in which Migri itself could operate abroad and determine the grounds for a residence permit, if necessary. In 2016, the Finnish Immigration Service received funding for the RIO project, in which a rotating immigration official function is piloted.

As stated above, the agency’s remit as such is located in the interface of internal and external security, although its basic duties involve the processing of matters in an administrative procedure. Cooperation with colleague agencies is an important opportunity to obtain information on phenomena, including those affecting internal
security, and the best practices of other countries. The operations of the Finnish Immigration Service involve the processing and storage of a lot of information that could, when properly analysed, have internal security implications. However, the Finnish Immigration Service's own analysis operations are not very advanced and, on the other hand, it cannot concentrate on the security aspect due to its sector. There are no separate resources for analysis, with the exception of investigation into country of origin. In 2015 and 2016, the Finnish Immigration Service started to develop its analysis operations, and it has particularly developed situational awareness of asylum issues. Situational awareness is also developed in cooperation with the police. In order to safeguard sufficient acquisition of information and to ensure the timely flow of information, the National Bureau of Investigation established a centralised function related to the asylum process and supporting crime prevention and security on 1 April 2016, with participation from officials of the Finnish Immigration Service.

Development

The Finnish Immigration Service can develop its international affairs strategy further, taking the internal and external security implications into consideration. Security implications and the need for analysis will be taken into consideration in the development of the information system. HR management and staff competence is developed taking the agency's remit, where the internal and external security implications meet, into consideration. The objective is to support a balanced and realistic professional identity in a sector in which the requirements of providing international protection and implementation of human rights have a simultaneous influence on internal security implications, and in which there has been a constantly increasing need for international cooperation, at least thus far.

As mentioned above, ILO operations, or another presence abroad related to investigating the grounds for residence permits in the immigration administration, need to be developed in such a way that the needs of all actors can be met as well as possible. The Finnish Immigration Service is also planning to develop this issue through the position of a rotating immigration official, implemented as a project possibly partially funded by the AMIF fund.
5 Views established based on the project workshop and recommendations for the development of the operational prerequisites and cooperation of the security actors

The development inputs that arose in the operational context of the interdependence of internal and external security for the development of the operational prerequisites and cooperation of the security actors were processed by means of a cross-administration workshop at the House of Estates on 2 June 2016. A total of 23 experts from the administrative branches of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in the workshop. Based on the workshop process, the focus areas of the development of the operations and cooperation of the security actors in the changed operational environment were determined to be: 1) development of the usability and shareability of information, 2) definition and shared interpretation of shared interests and goals concerning the security environment, 3) development of flexible cooperation models, 4) improvement of the flexibility of decision-making, and 5) improvement of the up-to-dateness and flexibility of the practices related to the definition of jurisdiction, and preparedness (Table 1).

1. Development of the usability and shareability of information

Better availability and usability of key international-level intelligence with respect to the strategic planning of the activities of the authorities and operations has been found to be a key development target compared to the prevailing situation. The concentration of international information within a limited number of security authorities is considered to be a challenge, because the flow and usability of the information among the security authorities is currently not complete enough. In this respect, the availability of international information, and more even communication between the security actors who need the information in their operations, forms an essential development aspect. Practical examples of the security actors' information acquisition possibilities
that have been found to be deficient include the information acquisition possibilities of legislative authorities during the processing of cyberthreats, and ensuring the information acquisition possibilities of national authorities for crimes that were committed abroad.

The national legislation has also been found to limit the possibility of the security actors to obtain information relevant to their operations to the necessary extent, and practical examples in this context include the availability of background information on asylum seekers and information acquisition related to crime prevention. In this respect, the development challenges of the usability and shareability of information are linked to the need to develop national legislation to match the current operational environment.

As a result of the immigration crisis, communication practices have also been found to have improved to some extent, as the more efficient information sharing between the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and the local authorities proves. It is hoped that the improved practices will result in the future development of information exchange in a wider sense, on the scale of the operational culture.

Operating in the increasingly complex security context requires multichannel and rapid information exchange from the security actors in order to establish up-to-date situational awareness that supports anticipation. In addition to official information exchange channels, the importance of unofficial information exchange channels and measures has increased in comparison to development. In order to respond to the development of the operational environment, a key action proposal is considered to be the strengthening of operating models supporting unofficial information exchange between organisations and actors. The development of the operating models must take into consideration both acute changes in the security environment requiring an immediate response, and the monitoring and anticipation of the long-term development of the operational environment. The central government’s staff rotation is a concrete way of reinforcing mutual familiarity and increasing information exchange; it promotes the networking of experts and thus promotes learning that crosses the borders of the organisations’ operating cultures. Developing and establishing cross-administration operating models, such as central government staff rotation, is a route towards a new type of operating culture in the future.

These operating models make the security actors’ familiarity with each other’s expertise more in-depth and lowers the barriers between sectors, which are still considered to be a key element that slows down horizontal information exchange. The best practices in unofficial information exchange, such as expert forums of a “shared interest group” type assembling around a common topic without an official decision in order to meet the challenges of a major security phenomenon, and networks of contacts, increase the familiarity of the authorities with each other and reinforce information exchange.
across organisational borders with the actors who need the information. Reinforcing the practices of unofficial information exchange also decreases the direct dependence on official information organised according to the hierarchy and bound to its structures.

The sectors possess registered information related to their own operational context, and from the perspective of shareability of information, the combination of sector-specific register information with more extensive database pools is seen as a measure worth developing. It is hoped that legislative development will support this development effort in the future. Understanding the importance of the information capital accumulated during security context practices, tacit knowledge, and efforts to improve its usability are also seen as potential key developments in the security culture. Examined at organisational level, it is considered to be necessary to develop the operational culture in a direction where joint discussions are seen as a method of working, and where low-threshold procedures are systematically supported to raise ideas related to the development of the security context at all organisational levels.

In order to promote the shareability and acquisition of information, we propose a more critical and more case-specific assessment of measures that limit the usability of documents. The usability of secret documents is very limited and, correspondingly, the information related to the documents can be utilised only by a small number of actors. Classifying information, and thus limiting its distribution, should be considered in a more case-specific manner and per each party requiring the information. Examined from a solution-oriented perspective, it should be assessed whether it would be more purposeful to classify the information as confidential instead of secret, in order to enable its shareability and usability for key actors on a wider scale. In order to improve the usability of the reports, it is further proposed that it should be possible to add a note to them mentioning that the information presented in the report can be shared with the key actors who need it. Updating the existing distribution lists and a clear definition of the updating responsibility are also seen as a development dimension. These practices aim to promote an operational culture that makes the horizontal transfer of information easier from the source to the key actors who need it in their core operations, without established practices in, for example, classification becoming a central obstacle to sharing information with the parties that need it.

2. Definition of the common interests and objectives concerning the security environment and a common interpretation

Identifying the key development lines in the security environment, and the definition of the common interests and objectives of the security actors based on this, or shared envisioning, are seen as important areas of development. With regard to interests, it must be determined whether these are sufficiently uniform among the different
security actors in order for the interests to be made concrete in the elimination of the root causes of the problems, such as the immigration crisis, and in taking control of their impacts. In today’s security environment, the experience is, for example, that the connection between development aid and the objectives of the member states does not function in its current form, which is in part a consequence of the internal and external relations of the EU being projected in national level activities.

Defining and weighting the key security threats, and the open-minded examination of potential new security threats, form an essential part of the definition of common interests. The different levels of definition require a broad inclusion of the different actors in society as part of the security discussion, so that the impacts of phenomena with complex causations, as factors generating insecurity in society, can be taken into consideration across the board. Coordinating scenario work that is comprehensively inclusive of the different actors in society, for example, and the insertion of the focus areas brought up during the scenario work back into the strategic decision-making processes, are seen as means of being inclusive.

The essential nature of a common interpretation of the security environment has come up in connection with the phenomena that have had a widespread and central impact on the development of the security environment. The immigration crisis is an example of one of the most central phenomena that caused an intricate challenge to the parties operating in the security context; the escalation of the situation into a large-scale wave of asylum-seekers still proved to be a surprise, although information on and clues to the situation developing into a widespread phenomenon already existed when examined on a longer time scale. The security authorities have formed situational awareness mainly based on the interpretation of their own information, but the formation of situational awareness based on a common interpretation is still considered to be non-existent. In this respect, the development of operational models promoting a common interpretation of the security environment, and its more permanent establishment as part of the operational culture in the security sector, is seen as a key development need in the security context. In this context, a concrete development proposal is put forward, in which the formation of a cross-administration situational awareness analysis is organised in a systematic manner at the Situation Centre of the Prime Minister’s Office, from where it is forwarded to the ministries for further interpretation and processing, and returned from the ministries to the Situation Centre as input. The organisation of this action proposal requires the development of communication models that support the means that individual officials have for sharing information they interpret to be useful widely to the parties that need it. With regard to development, the future target state could be considered to be the creation of a common electronic situational awareness system.
Taking the coordination and responsibility issues of the interpretation into consideration forms an essential part of the development measures related to the interpretation; these are operating models that include a clear definition of the responsibility for interpretation, in addition to implementation measures. In the case of preparing for extensive, nationwide disruptions, for example, a clear definition of the coordination and interpretation responsibilities is considered to be a key issue, based on which the competent authorities can be quickly made operational in the process.

3. Development of flexible cooperation models

When examined at the national level, there is a small number of security actors with clear roles in the operational environment, which has bolstered the development of established cooperation models based on mutual familiarity. Extensive security phenomena with complex causations, such as hybrid phenomena and cybercrime, challenge the traditional operating models with regard to cooperation, and responding to this development requires the development of new cooperation models parallel to traditional procedures.

The development of flexible cooperation structures in the security sector, reinforcing proactive operations, is seen as a key focus area with regard to future development. A transition must be made from point-like cooperation models based on bilateral relationships between organisations towards flexible expert network models that enable the broad-based inclusion of societal actors in security work, including from outside traditional security organisations. The business, social, health care, education, and third sectors are examples of factors that have a key impact on the functioning of society and the level of welfare, and play a key role as forces maintaining societal cohesion, and are thus significant builders of security from within society. Through the different segments of society, the concept of security threats related to everyday life through internationalisation, for example, such as crime and means to prevent it, will expand and form a holistic approach to the complex cause-and-effect relationships of the security phenomena, instead of fragmented information. The inclusion of key segments of society in the examination of security phenomena, and the development of cooperation models with security sector actors based on shared expertise, is considered to be necessary in order to respond to the increasingly complex challenges of the security environment, and to anticipate the focus areas of development.

4. Improving the flexibility of decision-making

Increased flexibility is expected of decision-making in the current developments in the security environment, in which policies and the definition of measures made once per
government term, for example, do not match the development dynamics of the current security environment, which requires a systematic analysis of the development directions and a readiness to respond based on a situation-specific analysis. Based on these viewpoints, the development of operating models increasing flexibility, and their establishment as part of the decision-making process, is seen as a key development measure related to decision-making.

With regard to decision-making, the linking of practical internal security matters with decision-making has been found to be lacking, and reinforcing this connection is seen to be among the essential development targets in the security context. In practice, the deficient link between the operational level and decision-making in internal security has arisen in, for example, civilian crisis management operations, where achieving the operational goals requires taking internal security issues into consideration extensively with regard to domestic decision-making in the crisis area. The strong projection of EU decision-making to national-level decision-making is also found to be a challenge for decision-making.

The high development expectations on decision-making also culminate in the increasingly stronger linking of impact assessment, or anticipation of the impact of decision-making, and follow-up as part of the decision-making process. In the current form of decision-making, the impact assessment has been missing partially or entirely, and decision-making concerning the measures to be taken after terrorist events, for example, is found to have taken place without clear consideration of the contextual practical experiences.

5. Improving the up-to-dateness and flexibility of practices related to the definition of competence and preparedness

The connection points between internal and external security have increased due to global events, but internal and external security legislation and the practices in competence, influence, and preparedness have not developed systematically in this direction. With respect to legislation, it is considered to be necessary to assess whether our national preparedness legislation is sufficiently extensive and up-to-date, when the rapid development of the security environment is taken into consideration in relation to, for example, the security environment that preceded the current preparedness legislation and on which the conclusions concerning the threshold criteria in preparedness legislation are based. Relative to the current development of the security environment, a critical examination is also required of the up-to-dateness of the practices related to preparedness legislation and the preparedness of society in a situation that meets the threshold for the adoption of the Emergency Powers Act. On the other hand, the sectors also see incentives for the development of the up-to-dateness of legislation, as shown by
the legislation review project related to the hybrid threats in the Finnish Border Guard’s remit, currently ongoing in the Finnish Border Guard.

The up-to-dateness of practices concerning the competence, information acquisition, influence, and preparedness of the national security actors has become a subject of examination in security environment development, for example in connection with preparedness for terrorism and responding to hybrid threats. In issues related to competence, the sectors consider it to be essential that sufficiently broad competencies are ensured, so that anticipation and reaction to widespread security threats are possible before the threats escalate. Defining responsibility is an essential element of competence, particularly in new situations in the security environment, for which there are no established solutions and procedures yet. In this context, it could be examined, for example, which security actor’s responsibility are those persons among asylum seekers who have a security or military expert background.

Anticipating the development of the security environment, as well as situation-specific and rapid responses, require, as a whole, flexible practices that enable the most purposeful procedure to be applied based on an interpretation of the situation, including in surprising situations. Practices supporting the status quo do not suit the current dynamics of security development, in which resolving the threats and challenges with multifaceted cause-effect relationships requires an agile and situational way of thinking and resolving matters. The situational application of the most purposeful procedure requires up-to-date communication: deficiencies in register data on passengers (SIS), for example, make the risk-based implementation of special checks of passengers more difficult, while causing unnecessary delays to passenger traffic as a whole.

In these examinations, it is also a question of flexibility of dimensioning; the volume of the wave of asylum seekers has challenged practices dimensioned for small volumes, as the unexpected, large, and simultaneous need for reception centres has shown. Flexible procedures promote the ability and readiness of security actors to act in a proactive manner in the increasingly complex operational environment.
6 Conclusions

The objective of the Ministry of the Interior’s research project on the interdependence of internal and external security has been to establish an organised and in-depth overall idea of the increased dependence of internal and external security, and to produce concrete action proposals to develop the operational prerequisites and cooperation of the security actors to better match the changed security environment. The project’s definitive frame of reference is a process for the preparation of an internal security strategy; the overall interdependence and development perspectives of internal and external strategy formed during the project will be integrated into inputs for this process. The International Affairs Unit of the Ministry of the Interior has acted as the responsible executor of the project, and the focus of its execution has been in cross-administration cooperation among the different sectors of the Ministry of the Interior, and more specifically the police, the Finnish Border Guard, the rescue services, the Crisis Management Centre, the immigration administration, and the Emergency Response Centre Administration, and at ministerial level, between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The key methods for formulating a shared idea and producing development perspectives have been cross-administration workshops and interviews with public officials essential to the project’s subject.

The state of the global security environment in its current form, and the changes that have occurred in it, is projected onto the internal security status and development of states in an increasingly complex and in-depth manner. Internal and external security are intertwined on multiple levels as a complex whole comprising various cause-effect relationships and their combinations. As a result of this development, internal and external security can no longer be told apart. The global security situation is affected by wide-ranging phenomena with complex formation mechanisms, such as terrorism and related radicalisation and recruitment, organised crime, widespread immigration, cybercrime, and influencing security through hybrid phenomena. Common denominators for these heterogeneous phenomena are the complexity of their formation mechanisms, the complexity of their mutual causations, and the extensive nature of their societal impacts.
Examined from Finland’s perspective, the root causes of the phenomena changing the security context, and the forces driving the development, are often located far beyond Finland’s national borders. The widespread immigration into Europe, escalated by the wars in Central Asia and poor subsistence, is an example of a phenomenon that has had a significant impact on the internal security of European countries and that has, through its intensity, challenged the procedures and solutions established in the traditional security environment. The changed situation and the development of the security environment thus require the security actors to possess a processual examination method in order to be able to examine the causes and consequences of the phenomena comprehensively, matching the strategic planning and the adaptation and further development of the operational practices.

The rapidity and increase in complexity that are characteristic of developments in the security environment increase the importance of internal security and require the development of functions to match the changes in the context. Key factors in the development of operations are the systematic and comprehensive examination of the operational context, and a focus on the development of proactive operating models providing broad support for anticipation and preparedness. The objective of the development is to use a systematic analysis of the cause-effect relationships of the phenomena to generate meaningful and long-term information to be used as a tool in strategic planning and in focusing operations. The meaningful information created in the frame of reference of the operational context is based on communication between the actors and the shared meanings produced therein, enabling the creation of a cross-sector shared perspective and an understanding of the security phenomena requiring a broad base of operations. At a concrete level, this means perceiving security extensively as a combined result of the actors producing welfare, stability, and security for society, and the construction of cooperation models and cultural practices based on this foundation.

Corresponding to previous viewpoints, the project process has emphasised the strong integration and commitment of stakeholders affecting the security of society at different levels as part of the broad-based security work. Operations essential to the welfare and cohesion of society, such as the operations of the business, social and health care, educational, and third sectors, affect security and its development with different causations and in many different types of combinations. The ability to combine the expertise and instruments of the different societal sectors in the activities of traditional security institutions is emphasised in the increasingly complex operational environment, where meeting security challenges requires a cross-sector and horizontal way of operating. Corresponding to this examination, the overall chain concept of security based on the systemic examination of the context and its phenomena, and the
development and harmonisation of dialogue and cooperation models between national and international actors, lie at the core of establishing a new operational culture.

Based on the project process, there are five main levels of development proposals concerning the prerequisites and cooperation for activities of security actors: 1) development of the usability and shareability of information, 2) definition and shared interpretation of shared interests and goals concerning the security environment, 3) development of flexible cooperation models, 4) improvement of the flexibility of decision-making, and 5) improvement of the up-to-dateness and flexibility of the practices related to the definition of jurisdiction, and preparedness.

In the information usability and shareability segment, the development proposals are linked to the development of operating models, reinforcing the availability and more equal communication of key national and international information among security actors. Updating legislation on the availability and usability of information to match the transformed security environment was also seen as a key area of development. There has already been some positive development in this segment, as shown by the communication practices improved as a result of the refugee crisis, and it is hoped that these improved practices will promote development in communications in the wider sense of the operational culture.

The importance of efficient and up-to-date communications has increased due to the rapid changes in the security environment. Correspondingly, the concrete development proposals are connected to the systematic development and reinforcement of unofficial information exchange channels and operating models between organisations. The development of the operating models must take into consideration both short-term models focusing on immediate responses, and long-term models supporting anticipation and preparedness. The staff rotation in central government is a successful example of a practice used to develop a cross-sector view of the security work produced by the organisations, promote the networking of experts in different fields, and support learning across the borders of operational cultures, observed in the long term. The cross-administration expert groups of the "shared interest group" type, formed around key security phenomena in a need-based and spontaneous manner, also support resolving acute security challenges in the short term. The development and establishment of operating models of a similar type, suitable for both short and long-term examination as part of the organisational culture, is seen as a key measure that would develop information transfer and familiarity between organisations, and is recommended for the future.

Other concrete development measures promoting information sharing and usability for security actors included the compilation of sector-specific register data into
more broad-based data pools; a more critical examination of practices limiting the availability of documents, based on a means test; and the updating of distribution lists of experts, with clarification on responsibilities for updating. These concrete development recommendations will promote an operational culture that bolsters the horizontal movement of information from its sources to the parties that need it in the development of their key functions.

A shared definition and interpretation of the interests and objectives concerning the security environment are central when examined from the perspective of the formation of shared situational awareness, anticipation, and measures. The development recommendation concerning the definition of common interests is based on the assumption that the security actors must be able to define sufficiently uniform interests in the case of widespread security phenomena, such as the refugee crisis, in order to influence the root causes of the phenomena and to define and agree on the most purposeful procedures. The development and establishment of operational models reinforcing the shared contextual interpretation by security actors, as part of the operational culture, is a concrete development recommendation with respect to forming shared situational awareness that is strategically important for operations. Concrete means for achieving the target state proposed with regard to the project include the development of a shared electronic situational awareness system, and the clear definition of the party that is responsible for the shared interpretation and that directs its coordination.

The development of flexible cooperation models aims to develop forms of cooperation that are of a new type and adaptive, and that support anticipation, alongside traditional forms. At a concrete level, the development means the creation of flexible and network-like cooperation models, through which the broad integration of different societal actors into security work, including from outside security organisations, becomes possible. Key parties in the cooperation include the business, social, health care, education, and association sectors. Cooperation with actors who have a key impact on the welfare and resilience of society enables the broad-based examination of the challenges concerning the security environment, meeting these challenges, and the anticipation of and preparation for future developments.

In the current form of security environment development, it is considered to be advisable to develop procedures that promote a deeper connection between the systematic analysis of the operational environment and response readiness in decision-making. The closer linking of practical issues of internal security as part of decision-making forms a key element in the context of developing the flexibility of decision-making. At a concrete level, the need for development appears, for example, in civilian crisis management operations where the long-term stabilisation of the situation and development of the
crisis area require a comprehensive examination of internal security issues and the inclusion of the responsible actors in short-term operations and long-term development work. Decision-making concerning operations and development must be closely linked to anticipating the impact of the decision-making and a systematic assessment of the effects of the decision-making.

The increased connection points between internal and external security have not, thus far, become concrete in the systematic development of internal and external security legislation, or in competence, influence, and preparedness practices. With respect to legislation, the development needs are related, for example, to the updating of national preparedness legislation to match the current security environment. Competence-related development needs are connected to ensuring sufficiently extensive competencies in order to anticipate broad security threats and to respond to them before the situation escalates. Sufficient competencies particularly concern new security threats for which procedures and models have not yet been established.

The rapidly changing security environment makes it increasingly challenging to anticipate developments, and solutions concerning procedures have to be made more often based on an immediate situational analysis and interpretation. Corresponding to this development, the development recommendation of the project is the development of flexible practices that enable rapid and adaptive procedures and practices, and preparedness for surprising situations. The development of procedures based on situational interpretation requires efficient communications, flexibility in the dimensioning of the resources as needed, and the flexibility to adapt the operations as a rapid response, according to an interpretation of the progress of the process.

In summary, it can be stated that the multi-sector connections between internal and external security and the increasingly rapid changes in the security environment force security actors to anticipate developments, and to analyse in a more proactive and comprehensive manner the phenomena that have complex cause-effect relationships and that affect security. In addition to the security authorities, the responsibility for producing security for society in its wider meaning belongs to many parties producing security for society via welfare and the cohesion of society, such as the business, social and health care, educational, and third sectors. A systematic and analytical overall examination of security operations, and the comprehensive development and harmonisation of dialogue and cooperation models between international and national actors, are necessary to meet the current and future challenges in security development.
**Table 1. Action recommendations of the Interdependence of Internal and External Security research project**

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<td>Common identification of the security environment’s key lines of development, and the common definition of the necessary measures</td>
<td>Development of flexible cooperation models that better support proactiveness and better match the development of the operational environment alongside traditional models</td>
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<td>Update of the internal and external security legislation and practices concerning competence</td>
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<td>Development of national legislation to better match the current operational environment</td>
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<td>Systematic development and harmonisation of agile and situational ways of thinking and resolving matters as procedures for the different security actors</td>
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