Mika Aaltola, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Juha Käpylä and Ville Sinkkonen (eds.) BETWEEN CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: Making Sense of America’s Evolving Global Engagement January 2018 Publication series of the Government’s analysis, assessment and research activities 3/2018 DESCRIPTION Publisher and release date Prime Minister´s Office, 31.1.2018 Authors Mika Aaltola, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Juha Käpylä and Ville Sink- konen (eds.) Title of publication Between Change and Continuity: Making Sense of America’s Evolving Global Engagement Name of series and number of publication Publications of the Government´s analysis, assessment and research activities 3/2018 Keywords United States, domestic politics, foreign and security policy, defence, trade, transatlantic relations Other parts of publication/ other produced versions - Release date January, 2018 Pages 163 Language English Abstract This report investigates the evolution of America’s global engagement. In particular, it examines both the longer-term trends and the more immediate dynamics that affect the global role of the United States. The report first considers domestic developments as well as strategic debates, to provide a context for understanding the potential changes and continuities in American foreign and security policy during and beyond the unfolding Trump era. The intention is to shed light on the evolution of US global engagement and national interests in terms of the future of international order, great-power relations and the strategic setting of Northern Europe. Within this global framework, the analysis also contributes to the understand- ing of Finland’s broad security environment. In their first year, President Donald J. Trump and his administration have stressed competition between states, shifted US focus to hard power, emphasised the conditionality of alliance commitments, shown a preference for bilateral transactions, and paid less attention to America’s core liberal values. Neverthe- less, in practice the US has been less disruptionist than initially feared. In particular, it remains committed to NATO, continues its engagement in the Asia-Pacific and Afghanistan, combats transnational terrorism and views China and Russia as strategic competitors. Yet, the oscillation between change and continuity has alarmed America’s allies and partners. A transat- lantic “waiting game” has emerged, defined by the need to pursue both strategic patience and selective sector-based proactivity. This publication is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research for 2017 (tietokayttoon.fi/en). The content is the responsibility of the producers of the information and does not necessarily repre- sent the view of the Government. KUVAILULEHTI Julkaisija ja julkaisuaika Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 31.1.2018 Tekijät Mika Aaltola, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Juha Käpylä ja Ville Sinkko- nen (toim.) Julkaisun nimi Between Change and Continuity: Making Sense of America’s Evolving Global Engagement Julkaisusarjan nimi ja numero Valtioneuvoston selvitys- ja tutkimustoiminnan julkaisusarja 3/2018 Asiasanat Yhdysvallat, sisäpolitiikka, ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, puolustuspoli- tiikka, kauppapolitiikka, transatlanttiset suhteet Julkaisun osat/ muut tuotetut versiot - Julkaisuaika Tammikuu, 2018 Sivuja 163 Kieli Englanti Tiivistelmä Tässä raportissa tarkastellaan Yhdysvaltojen globaalin roolin muotoutumista ja siihen vaikuttavia pitkän ja lyhyen aikavälin kehityskulkuja. Raportti analysoi USA:n sisäpoliittisia prosesseja, maan roolista käytäviä strategisia keskusteluja sekä ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan kehitystä. Lisäksi työssä tarkastellaan Yhdysvaltojen suhdetta kansainväli- seen järjestykseen, keskeisiin suurvaltoihin ja Pohjois-Euroopan turvallisuusympäristöön. Selvitys pyrkii lisäämään ymmärrystä Yhdysvaltojen toimijuuden vaikutuksista Suomen laajemmassa strategisessa toi- mintakentässä. Ensimmäisen vuotensa aikana Donald J. Trumpin presidentinhallinto on korostanut edeltäjiään enemmän valtioidenvälistä kilpailua, sotilaallisen vallan merkitystä, kumppanuuksien ehdollisuutta sekä kahdenvä- lisiä transaktioita. USA:lle perinteisesti keskeiset liberaalit arvot ovat osittain jääneet taka-alalle. Näistä painotuksen muutoksista huolimatta hallinnon politiikassa on havaittavissa myös jatkuvuutta. Yhdysvallat on esimerkiksi edelleen sitoutunut Natoon, panostaa läsnäoloon Tyynenmeren alueella ja Afganistanissa, jatkaa kamppailua kansainvälistä terrorismia vastaan ja pitää Venäjää ja Kiinaa strategisina kilpailijoi- naan. Vaikka nähtävissä olevat muutokset pysynevät USA:n ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan perinteisen vaihtelu- välin sisällä, ne herättävät huolta sen liittolaisissa ja kumppaneissa. Transatlanttisissa suhteissa on alka- nut ”odottamisen aikakausi”, jota kuvastaa tarve pidemmän aikavälin strategiselle kärsivällisyydelle ja valikoivalle sektorikohtaiselle yhteistyölle. Tämä julkaisu on toteutettu osana valtioneuvoston vuoden 2017 selvitys- ja tutkimussuunnitelman toimeenpanoa (www.tietokayttoon.fi). Julkaisun sisällöstä vastaavat tiedon tuottajat, eikä tekstisisältö välttämättä edusta valtioneuvoston näkemystä. PRESENTATIONSBLAD Utgivare & utgivningsdatum Statsrådets kansli, 31.1.2018 Författare Mika Aaltola, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Juha Käpylä och Ville Sink- konen (red.) Publikationens namn Between Change and Continuity: Making Sense of America’s Evolving Global Engagement Publikationsseriens namn och nummer Publikationsserie för statsrådets utrednings- och forskningsverksamhet 3/2018 Nyckelord Förenta staterna, inrikespolitik, utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik, försvar, handel, transatlantiska relationer Publikationens delar /andra producerade versioner - Utgivningsdatum Januari, 2018 Sidantal 163 Språk engelska Sammandrag Den här rapporten undersöker utvecklingen av USA:s globala engagemang. Den granskar trender som påverkar USA:s globala roll både ur ett längre och ett kortare perspektiv. Rapporten tar först upp utvecklingen inom landet, liksom viktiga strategiska debatter som anger kontexten för att förstå eventuella förändringar och kontinuiteter i amerikansk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik under och efter Trumps presidentperiod. Meningen är att belysa utvecklingen av USA:s globala engagemang och nationella intressen i relation till den framtida världsordningen, stormaktsrelationerna och den strate- giska miljön i Nordeuropa. Inom denna globala ram, vidgar analysen även förståelsen för Finlands säker- hetsmiljö i ett bredare perspektiv. Under sitt första år har president Trump och hans administration betonat hur stater tävlar sinsemellan, förskjutit USA:s fokus mot hårda maktaspekter, poängterat det villkorliga i alliansförpliktelser, betonat bilaterala förhandlingar och gett mindre uppmärksamhet åt USA:s liberala kärnvärderingar. Trots det har USA i praktiken varit mindre splittrande än man först befarade. Framförallt är USA fortsättningsvis enga- gerat i NATO, samt i Asien-Stillahavsregionen och Afghanistan, engagerat i striden mot gränsöverskri- dande terrorism och ser fortfarande Kina och Ryssland som dess strategiska konkurrenter. Det oaktat oroar växlingen mellan förändring och kontinuitet USA:s allierade och partners. Ett transatlan- tiskt ”spel av väntande” har uppkommit, definierat av behovet till att sträva efter både strategiskt tålamod och en selektiv sektorbaserad proaktivitet. Den här publikation är en del i genomförandet av statsrådets utrednings- och forskningsplan för 2017 (tietokayttoon.fi/sv). De som producerar informationen ansvarar för innehållet i publikationen. Textinnehållet återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis statsrådets ståndpunkt TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 PART I: DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY...................................... 10 2. The political culture: competing visions for 21st-century America ............................. 10 3. Institutional and party-political dynamics in the United States .................................. 24 PART II: FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY ..................................................................... 36 4. US foreign policy: the “Trump doctrine” .................................................................... 36 5. Crosscurrents in US defence policy .......................................................................... 45 PART III: MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE ........................................................................ 59 6. The uncertain future of the liberal international order ............................................... 59 7. Global economic co-operation in the Trump era ....................................................... 69 PART IV: NEW GREAT POWER POLITICS........................................................................ 81 8. The US-Russia relationship ...................................................................................... 81 9. The United States and the transforming security environment in Asia ..................... 90 PART V: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE ................................................................. 99 10. Trends in the transatlantic security relationship ...................................................... 99 11. US engagement in the Arctic ................................................................................ 109 12. The US and the security of the Baltic Sea region ................................................. 121 13. CONCLUSION: THE EMERGENT WAITING GAME ................................................... 129 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 139 The lead authors of the substantive chapters PART I 2. The political culture: competing visions for 21st-century America Mika Aaltola and Ville Sinkkonen 3. Institutional and party-political dynamics in the United States Anna Kronlund PART II 4. US foreign policy: the “Trump doctrine” Ville Sinkkonen 5. Crosscurrents in US defence policy Leo Michel PART III 6. The uncertain future of the liberal international order Ville Sinkkonen 7. Global economic co-operation in the Trump era Johanna Jacobsson PART IV 8. The US-Russia relationship Mark N. Katz 9. The United States and the transforming security environment in Asia Bart Gaens PART V 10. Trends in the transatlantic security relationship Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Mika Aaltola 11. US engagement in the Arctic Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola 12. The US and the security of the Baltic Sea region Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Mika Aaltola List of Abbreviations A2AD Anti-Access and Area Denial AB Appellate Body (of the World Trade Organization) AC Arctic Council ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ANWR Arctic National Wildlife Refuge APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation BRI Belt and Road Initiative BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (bloc of countries) CBO Congressional Budget Office CETA EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy CUSPP Center on US Politics and Power DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals DCA Dual Capable Aircraft EDC European Defence Community EDI European Deterrence Initiative EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EMU Economic and Monetary Union (EU) EPA Environmental Protection Agency ERI European Reassurance Initiative ESDP European Security and Defense Policy FISE Finland – Sweden Defense Cooperation FY Fiscal Year FTA Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GIUK Gap Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom Gap GLACIER Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic GOP “Grand Old Party” (the Republican Party) IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICC International Criminal Court ICS Investment Court System IMF International Monetary Fund INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISDS Investor-State Dispute Settlement ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISR Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action KORUS US – Korea Free Trade Agreement MDR Missile Defense Review MENA Middle East and North Africa region NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NDS National Defense Strategy New START New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation NPR Nuclear Posture Review NSC National Security Council NSS National Security Strategy OCO Overseas Contingency Operations OIR Operation Inherent Resolve OMB Office of Management and Budget PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy PSI Proliferation Security Initiative QDR Quadrennial Defense Review R2P Responsibility to Protect RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership RNC Republican National Committee ROK Republic of Korea SDF Self-Defence Forces (Japan) TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNSC United Nations Security Council USAID United States Agency for International Development USTR United States Trade Representative WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States has led to the widespread perception that America’s global engagement is in flux. The aim in the present report is to shed further light on this assessment by investigating both the longer-term trends and the more immediate dynamics of America’s global engagement. To accomplish this, the following analysis focuses on domestic, political and cultural develop- ments, as well as strategic debates on foreign policy that have a bearing on the potential changes and continuities in American policymaking. The report also zooms in on the formu- lation and execution of US foreign, defence and economic policies in the unfolding Trump era. The eventual aim is to shed light on the evolution of US global engagement and national interests in terms of the future of international order, evolving great-power relations and the strategic setting of Northern Europe, and furthermore, to enhance understanding of Finland’s broad security environment. At present, America’s global engagement is characterised by “change in continuity”. Despite the prevailing climate of political polarisation and uncertainty, the broad parameters of Amer- ica’s global role look to remain within the bounds of the long-term post-World War II bipartisan consensus (which can still accommodate considerable policy variance). First, the US will continue to have an important role in the world. However, the specific modes of this engagement are negotiable. There is contention over the extent to which the US should be a pragmatic arbiter of common global problems or a custodian of principle on a moral mission to remake the world based on cultural signifiers. Second, although the importance of America’s engagement with the world is rarely contested, there is considerable contention over the specific means it should adopt. The choice is fre- quently articulated through the opposition between “hard” (military and economic) versus “soft” (diplomatic, institutional and cultural) means of power. Third, the importance of fulfilling existing international responsibilities and commitments is broadly recognised. Nevertheless, open questions remain over the extent to which these com- mitments should be made conditional on the willingness of allies and partners to engage in more equitable burden-sharing and, relatedly, on the degree to which the US needs to ac- commodate others’ interests by engagement in multilateral forums. The present report comprises five parts, each of which addresses different aspects of this change/continuity dynamic. Domestic Drivers of Change and Continuity In the domestic arena, a climate of deepening political polarisation continues to plague the United States. Tapping into this prevalent trend, Donald Trump has drawn upon polarising politico-cultural resources, two of which – the conservative narrative of decline and the revival of religiosity – have been of particular relevance in articulating his “America First” policy agenda. At the same time, the worldview of President Trump (and some of his advisors) breaks with secularist and liberal traditions, and instead emphasises the need to protect the Christian and European creed of the American way of life. With regard to foreign policy, the administration is thus likely to depart from the time-honoured American tradition of pragmatic arbitration and espouse a “custodian of principle” approach. In the global arena, this carries II the potential of muscular action against potential enemies that threaten the United States and the broader civilisation it purports to be defending. As for the balance of domestic political forces, the 2016 election handed the Republican Party a resounding victory as it gained control of not only the White House but also both chambers of Congress. Such a period of unified government should open up opportunities to advance a substantial conservative agenda at home and abroad. In practice, however, success will depend on the ability of the Trump administration and Congress to co-operate despite the considerable divisions within the Republican Party over ideology and policy questions, partic- ularly when it comes to government spending. With regard to America’s foreign engagement, points of contention have arisen over the balance of investment between “soft” and hard” elements of US power, the future of the Iran nuclear deal, addressing the North Korea threat and, most pertinently, the Trump team’s links with Russia. Intra-party divisions combined with policy contention could therefore render it difficult for the Trump administration to advance not only its domestic initiatives but also its preferred global agenda. Foreign and Defence Policy Broadly speaking, US foreign-policy thought in the post-Cold War era has followed three prominent traditions: liberal internationalism, neoconservatism and realism. Neoisolationism has recently emerged as a fourth alternative, gaining more traction in public debates. Although President Trump has sought to posture himself as an outsider and disruptor, he – like any other policy maker – remains immersed in these broad, historically-evolved sets of ideas that enable and constrain American thinking on foreign policy. Not having explicitly endorsed any of these alternatives, the President (and his foreign-policy team) draws upon – or at the very least takes varying postures against – each of these traditions in his foreign-policy thinking. In its yet evolving form, the so-called “Trump doctrine” toys with neoconservative tropes in laying emphasis on unilateralism over multilateralism and stressing America’s civilisational affinities, although not in the traditional sense of advocating freedom and democracy. There is also a realist strand, most obvious in the build-up of and willingness to use hard power instruments, which suits the administration’s view of the world as an arena in which states compete. Furthermore, the Trump team bows selectively to the isolationist tradition with its transactionalist mind-set, favouring bilateral deals built on ad hoc sector-based bargains. These step changes can still be accommodated within the broad web of traditions of American foreign-policy thought. In the realm of defence policy, there are broad areas of continuity with the past despite the exceptional rhetoric of the President. America’s top defence priorities will be to counter chal- lenges from the revisionist powers of China and Russia, to keep the rogue states of Iran and North Korea at bay, and to tackle transnational threats, particularly from transnational terrorist groups. In addition, US bilateral and multilateral defence ties with Europe and Asia will remain relatively stable, despite some friction over questions of spending levels and industrial coop- eration on defence. Developments in nuclear-weapon and missile-defence policies are also possible, and these have potential implications for the already tense relations with Russia. The prospect of a more serious quarrel between the US and its allies lurks in the background, however, and might be realised if the Trump administration were to be perceived as partly responsible for a major military clash on the Korean peninsula or the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. Multilateral governance The Trump administration’s “America First” policy agenda has been widely interpreted as an expression of a newfound unwillingness on the part of the US to maintain its traditional role III as the leading proponent of the post-World War II liberal international order. Upon closer in- spection, however, it becomes clear that Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency is sympto- matic of the longer-term internal and external challenges faced by the current order, which include the “return of geopolitics”, the negative externalities of economic globalisation and the rise of nationalist populist movements in the broader West. As initially expected, the first year of the Trump presidency has seen America challenge some components of the institutional, normative and economic foundations of the liberal international order, most notably by down- playing the promotion of liberal values and support for key multilateral institutions – the UN in particular – as well as treaties such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris Climate Agreement. These strands of disruption have not led to a full-scale unravelling of the order, however. America’s espousal of its commitments looks to remain firm in the security sphere in particular, although it will continue to press for more equal burden-sharing from allies and partners. Despite calls for Europe to up its game and to show leadership, America’s willingness to maintain sustained support for the key components of the present order remains essential. When it comes to the global free-trade regime, there is widespread concern about the current White House and its “America First” agenda with its emphasis, at least rhetorically, on the negative aspects of globalisation and its focus on America’s bilateral trade deficits. Beyond withdrawing the US from the TPP and initiating renegotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the current administration has also begun domestic processes that review key aspects of the US-China trade relationship. The US could also undermine the World Trade Organization by hampering the functioning of its dispute-settlement system. However, worst-case scenarios of trade wars and protectionist tariffs have not materialised, which points to the diagnosis that the President is, in fact, engaged in a bold negotiating tactic to achieve “better deals” for America. Over time, if not acted upon these tactics might even lose their effectiveness. New Great Power Politics In terms of US relations with the great power competitors highlighted in the 2017 National Security Strategy, surface-level change remains offset by long-term historical trends. In the case of Russia, President Trump, like many of his predecessors, came into office with the intention of improving relations between Washington and Moscow. However, the recalibration of the relationship appears extremely unlikely given the fundamental and persistent differ- ences over various key foreign-policy issues such as Ukraine, Syria, Iran and North Korea, and on-going investigations into Russia’s election interference. The investigation into the Trump team’s possible collusion with Russia during and after the 2016 elections, along with allegations of obstruction of justice, have added another impediment to improving relations. Fears of a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow have thus largely subsided in Europe. However, assertive Russian behaviour and potential negative spill-over from crises in which both Russia and America are immersed continue to raise concerns. Although Presi- dents Trump and Putin have both continued to entertain the possibility of improving the bilat- eral relationship, Russian-American relations are now poor and seem likely to remain so. An increasingly assertive and self-confident China poses a growing challenge to US hegem- ony in the Asia-Pacific region. References by President Trump to US disengagement from the region and the proliferation of perceptions that the US is a power in relative decline have raised further expectations of a regional power shift. Despite such harbingers, US engage- ment in the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain, by and large, as laid out by the Obama administra- tion. In an attempt to balance China’s rising prominence, the US will further build up military capabilities and continue its efforts to create a security network in the area. Such efforts will IV include strengthening military ties with allies such as Japan and South Korea, and with stra- tegic partner countries such as India. Support for liberal values, human rights and normative principles, however, are likely to have a less important role than during previous presidential administrations. The United States and Europe It is often argued that the United States and its allies and partners in Europe constitute the most mature example of a security community, wherein the use of force has been replaced with debate and negotiation in settling disagreements. President Trump’s belittling remarks regarding the European Union and his comments on the obsolescence of NATO have raised concerns over the foundations of the transatlantic relationship, including the ironclad nature of the Article 5 security guarantee. Fears have also been expressed about the smooth conti- nuity of transatlantic free trade and the upholding of shared liberal values. However, amidst the apparent turmoil, it should be remembered that transatlantic unity has faced tensions and occasional crises throughout its history and has still endured. In this sense, the Trump admin- istration’s “America First” approach could be seen as merely another American (re)articulation that US interests should matter more within the transatlantic security community. Institution- alised security cooperation, extensive economic relations and shared values are likely to con- tinue guiding the relationship between the United States and Europe, even if uncertainty over the normative and institutional common ground, in particular, raises some concerns for the future. The United States has also recently started to pay closer attention to the transforming circum- polar north. Despite initial concerns, the US under the current administration appears to rec- ognise enduring strategic interests in the Arctic, and continues to engage in practical co-op- eration in the region. However, President Trump has voiced broader views on climate (and energy) policy, multilateral co-operation and America’s relationship with Russia that create strategic ambiguity, which is not likely to disappear overnight. Although the Arctic may not be on the White House radar, these more general policy tendencies have an Arctic aspect and, in the worst-case scenario, might result in “collateral damage” to the enduring elements of US Arctic policy, and regional co-operation in general. The fact remains that comprehensive and constructive US engagement in the region remains important, and has implications for the foreign and security policy environment in Northern Europe. The US has become more interested and has invested in the security of the Baltic Sea region during the past four years. Even though the Baltic Sea is a strategically important regional gateway to the global maritime (and other) commons, and therefore a security concern for the US in its own right, the mounting strategic uncertainty of recent years and an increasing sense of the “return of geopolitics” has drawn it deeper into the region. Given its multiple NATO allies as well as partners (Finland and Sweden) in the area, it is clear that failure to uphold its security commitments would undermine America’s global influence. As a response to the growing strategic uncertainty, the US has ramped up its engagement by supporting new forms of security cooperation, increasing its military presence and intensifying inter-personal con- tacts in the region. These developments began before the Trump era, and highlight broader transatlantic and North European security trends. Despite initial concerns in the Nordic-Baltic region, the current administration seems to have come to the conclusion that supporting its European allies and partners is actually a good deal for the United States in the present geo- political situation. V Coping with Change and Continuity In terms of security and stability in the Nordic-Baltic region and Europe more broadly, the United States remains the “indispensable nation”. The need to engage in and strengthen co- operation across all levels (from high politics all the way to civil society) will persist, regardless of who is at the helm in the White House. Irrespective of the potential for disruption that Trump as a president sui generis presents, there are considerable continuities in America’s global engagement, especially in terms of guaranteeing its military ascendancy, maintaining its security commitments in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, and continuing the battle against transnational terrorism. It is also possi- ble that future US presidents will revert to an American foreign policy that is more traditional in terms of US dedication to the normative, institutional and economic foundations of the lib- eral international order. The foreign-policy pendulum of US international engagement has his- torically swung back and forth between more withdrawn isolationist and more expansive in- terventionist periods, and the Trump presidency may yet turn out to be another chapter that fits into this long-term ebb and flow. It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the United States that emerges at the end of President Trump’s incumbency will not be the same as it was on January 20, 2017. Not only will the surrounding world have changed – more or less dramatically – so will the issue-spe- cific content of the debates taking place within the US over America’s place in that world. For instance, it is highly likely that calls for more equitable burden-sharing within its broad network of alliances, along with a less benign attitude to economic interdependence and globalisation, will persist after Trump’s term(s) in office. Moreover, political polarisation in the country shows few signs of dissipation. In fact, it is possible that divisions will widen not only on the traditional liberal/conservative axis but also along educational, ethnic and racial lines as part of the in- evitable process of demographic change. The more positive possibility is that the Trump pres- idency will provide “lessons learned”, and will foster attempts by future leaders to return to pragmatic arbitration and bipartisanship. It is argued in this report that, in the short term, the Trump presidency offers both challenges and opportunities to Europe more broadly, and Finland in particular. It is becoming increas- ingly clear that President Trump has little time for or interest in engagement in complex or- ganisational forums and long-winded institutional processes. Even if his presidency takes a more traditional turn, this resistance to multilateral solutions and organisations is likely to re- main a mainstay of the administration. In fact, Republican presidents in general have ap- proached multilateral forays with more reservation than their Democratic counterparts. Even if the Trump administration has not been as radical a departure as initially feared, its attempts at reframing America’s foreign and security policy have raised serious concerns, and have led to the emergence of a new “waiting game” characterised by the interplay between expected continuities and newfound uncertainties concerning America’s future direction. Con- sequently, European and Finnish policymakers could benefit from adopting a combination of strategic patience and selective sector-based proactivity to navigate the present situation. As a starting point, Finland and its European partners would do well to remember that aloof- ness is not a substitute for engagement. Despite potential policy and value divergence be- tween the United States and Europe on issues such as climate change and trade policy, there is a need to find avenues of cooperation that can be harnessed to sustain the transatlantic link through the potentially turbulent times ahead. VI On the one hand, the Trump presidency does open up opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation that could be framed as a policy triumph or economic gain for the US administra- tion, which the President could then sell as a victory to his domestic constituents. Illustrative examples include NATO burden-sharing and the development of European defence capabil- ities, as well as efforts to combat the threat of transnational terrorism and devise new ways of countering hybrid influencing. On the other hand, America’s willingness to act as a global leader that maintains a guarantor role in the institutions of the liberal international order has waned, at least for the time being. It is incumbent upon Europeans to take a stand against the United States (as they have in the past) on issues that are of importance to them, especially when America is charting a course that is detrimental to European interests and core values, and to the stability of the interna- tional order in general. In such cases, declaration and policy need to be proportional to the magnitude of the disruptive action. In fact, although the temptation might sometimes be considerable, it would most likely be counterproductive to enter into escalatory public rows with the current US administration. Not only does Trump’s leadership style draw on public spectacles, such high-profile disagree- ments might merely accentuate the “values gap” between the two shores of the Atlantic, or within respective societies. They might also render it more difficult for more moderate actors within the Trump administration and different government departments and agencies to push their agendas forward in Washington, and to cooperate with Europeans. The most important agenda item for small internationally networked states such as Finland is to ensure the US continues to support and defend the fundamental building blocks of the liberal international order. Given the current administration’s “America First” agenda, this pre- sents a conundrum that could be reconciled by looking at each issue of contention on its own terms and utilising the European Union (or other multilateral constellations) as forums in which Finland can seek to defend the building blocks of the rule-based multilateral order. In situa- tions in which America’s policy behaviour compromises Finland’s core principles and values, therefore, it is necessary – in bilateral talks with the US or in cooperation with its European and global partners – to remind the United States how important it is to adhere to legitimate international norms and institutions. The increasingly bilateral bent in America’s foreign policy means that state-to-state – as well as leader-to-leader – contacts may be prioritised more than in the past. Although not condu- cive to important multilateral cooperation, this could open up opportunities through innovative bilateral diplomacy, which would not necessarily have been available during a more traditional presidential administration. On the question of security and trade ventures with the United States, Finland should attempt to drive home the message that US interests will be well served by cooperation: Finland keeps its promises, takes care of its own lot and is willing to engage the US in fair trade that also benefits Americans. This is a message that the US President and his administration could sell to domestic supporters. The interest of the United States in the Nordic-Baltic region has also increased as the geopo- litical situation in Europe has evolved over the last few years. Although heightened tensions per se are of concern, the situation could also prove fortuitous for Finland if handled correctly. Paradoxically, this may well be the time for pragmatic initiatives and forays vis-à-vis the US. 1 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background This report investigates the evolution of America’s global engagement after the election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the United States. In particular, the study maps out key internal and external tendencies that influence – even beyond one election cycle or single administration – how the US understands its role in the world. It also investigates the devel- opment of US policies in the international arena, and highlights the potential implications of America’s current and future foreign engagement for Europe in general and the Nordic-Baltic region more specifically. In conclusion, a number of rules of thumb are suggested, which Finland as a small but internationally networked and export-oriented state could follow as it (re)formulates its approach to the United States now and in the future. As the results of the 2016 congressional and presidential elections illustrate, the American politico-cultural climate is experiencing profound polarisation. Conflictual cultural dynamics with long historical roots have accentuated the inability of the US political system to govern effectively through pragmatic compromise. The demographic makeup of the United States is also undergoing a historical transformation, as the proportion of ethnic minorities in the pop- ulation keeps increasing. At the same time, perceptions of structural injustice have fuelled a protest mentality among certain sections of society, most notably in the African American community. This belief in the inherent unfairness of the system is also increasingly apparent among Americans of European descent, manifest most recently in the activation of Donald Trump’s voter base in the 2016 elections. Coincidentally, new modes of election campaigning and political mobilisation based on fake news and social-media bubbles, along with suspicions of foreign collusion and influence, are topics of everyday discussion in the US. Although the American economy recovered relatively quickly from the 2007/8 financial crisis, the perception prevails that globalisation has not created equal opportunities throughout the country. Income inequalities are increasingly viewed as an ever-strengthening barrier against social mobility – the realisation of the “American dream” has become increasingly difficult. This sense of economic injustice is reflected in the growth of opposition to free trade. Various multilateral agreements aimed at further liberalising international trade – including legacy items such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and novel trade pacts such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part- nership (TTIP) – have met with resolute criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. In fact, the view that the emergence of transnational supply chains has robbed the United States of domestic job opportunities has become more prominent. This is the case even though the unemployment rate is relatively low and economic growth has been respectable in compari- son to Europe, for example. The 2016 presidential elections reflected these underlying trends. The central theme of can- didate Trump’s campaign was anti-globalisation, and Democratic primary candidate Bernie Sanders was similarly critical of the new free trade pacts. In the run-up to the vote, both Trump and his opponent Hilary Clinton promised improved job opportunities based on supply-side economics. Infrastructure modernisation and defence spending were the two dominant themes on candidate Trump’s agenda. It is likely, given the current Republican-controlled government, that defence spending will increase even if America’s military presence around the world is not significantly altered. In general, it is also likely that the heated debate over 2 America’s global engagement will continue when factions with differing worldviews seek to advance their agendas in Washington. Paradoxically, the desire for robust American engage- ment is growing amongst America’s allies and partners, whereas US willingness to bind itself to global institutions, foster free trade and commit militarily to global hot spots may become increasingly based on conditionality and narrower perceptions of the national interest. Alterations in America’s global role and the foreign-policy interests that underpin it have a bearing upon the future of the transatlantic bond and, by implication, on Finland’s security environment. On the most general level, US foreign policy since the Second World War has been founded on three key pillars: 1. the US remains the central global actor; 2. US power relies on hard and soft components, namely superior military force and economic strength underwritten by legitimate international institutions, astute diplo- macy and cultural influence; and 3. the US retains an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners (Haltzel 2016). Donald Trump has pointedly criticised American allies for free riding on US security guaran- tees. In his view, US allies have not shown sufficient resolve in maintaining their defence capabilities, and US commitments should be contingent on a narrower definition of America’s national interests. Such demands per se are by no means novel. Complaints about Europe’s unwillingness to carry its share of the transatlantic military burden have been voiced at least since the days of the Eisenhower presidency. The Obama administration was no different in this regard, and the former president even alluded to America’s European allies as free riders (Goldberg 2016). Nevertheless, Trump’s comments imply that the United States might have an appetite for more shallow engagement. In a world that the administration characterises not as a “global community”, but as “an arena where nations […] engage and compete” (McMaster and Cohn 2017), President Trump’s America seems to view allies primarily as force multipliers. This sentiment may indicate a shift towards a more realist foreign-policy orientation. At the very least, the Trump administration appears less inclined than its predecessors to stress the cen- trality of liberal-democratic values in America’s engagement with the world. Instead, the Pres- ident’s foreign policy is likely to retain its isolationist and nationalist rhetorical bent – tried and tested on the campaign trail. At the same time, US commitment to multilateralism may be undermined by a more transactionalist approach, the idea being to compartmentalise the in- ternational arena into bilateral relationships – at least in certain sectors. The new administration looks to be altering the mix of America’s global strategic engagement by prioritising “hard power” means, the military in particular, over “soft power” instruments such as public diplomacy, cultural exchanges and foreign aid. Upon unveiling the budget pro- posal for the fiscal year (FY) 2018, Trump’s budget director Mick Mulvaney laid emphasis on the hard-power component. The budget plan would send a message to allies that they were dealing with a “strong-power administration”. The most clear-cut signal in this respect are the cuts and streamlining measures the administration has proposed with regard to various pro- grammes and posts at the State Department and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Trump team has singled out climate-change-related initiatives and foreign aid, for in- stance, as items that rank low on the administration’s agenda. These cuts would be under- taken concurrently with an increase in military spending. Although the budget proposal’s im- pact on the State Department is likely to be watered down in Congress, the message is clear: the Trump administration will focus on restoring America’s international prestige by building 3 up its material power base, not by investing more in programmes intended to increase Amer- ica’s international legitimacy. If one is looking for the lowest common denominator of the US geostrategic vision, the idea of securing access to the high seas and international commerce is the key (Aaltola et al. 2014a). This view, associated with Admiral G. Mahan, contrasts with the mainstream of con- tinental European geopolitics, which emphasises the need to control territory and the strategic resource deposits therein. Although the difference between the geopolitical visions is not ab- solute, the US emphasis on the maritime domain is nevertheless a pragmatic tendency that has prevailed for decades. Freeing up markets and securing sea lanes of communication are among the policies to which the present administration – irrespective of its disruptiveness – is committed. Inside the broad geostrategic vision are multiple doctrines and styles to which different administrations have adhered. Although the magnitude of America’s foreign and security policy shift will ultimately be contin- gent on unfolding internal and international dynamics, and even possible “black swan” events, the climate of uncertainty after Trump’s election has already created uneasiness in Europe. In May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel went as far as to call on Europeans to “take our fate into our own hands” (quoted in Dempsey 2017). Upheavals on the old continent accen- tuate such immediate apprehensions. There is a pressing sense of uncertainty over Britain’s exit from the European Union, while intra-European solidarity has eroded in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, and as a result of differences in opinion on how to deal with migration from the Union’s southern neighbourhood. The geopolitical realities on the old continent have also become more tenuous because of Russia’s aggressive foreign-policy behaviour (espe- cially in Ukraine and Syria), and the use of hybrid influencing. Currently, relations between Russia and the West are arguably at their post-Cold War lowest point. The European security environment is therefore rife with newfound insecurities. To make matters worse, European defence capabilities have deteriorated across the board in the post-Cold War era as a result of chronic underinvestment in national defence throughout the continent. There has been in- creasing realisation in recent years that the trend should be reversed sooner rather than later. In fact, America’s European allies made it clear that they remain committed to the two per cent of GDP defence spending pledge made at NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014. President Trump’s administration took hold of the reins of US foreign policy in a situation in which America is dealing with increasingly complex technological, cultural, economic and se- curity dynamics. Two structural trends are of particular significance. First, the power balance between states is becoming increasingly dynamic. The United States remains militarily as- cendant for the time being, and it still wields considerable soft power. However, in the eco- nomic realm the power balance has been shifting for decades with the rise of the emerging economies in Asia and, more recently, China in particular. The rise of China, together with the role it will ultimately assume in the evolving international order, is among the most significant determining factors when it comes to the development of global politics in the 21st century. The effects of China’s evolving role will not be limited to its immediate neighbourhood: they will be felt globally. The evolution of the US-China relation- ship, the most important bilateral dyad in the international system, will have a great bearing upon the future of the balance of power and the liberal international order, which has served the West well since its inception in the aftermath of World War II. China has grown more assertive in its near abroad in recent years, and the United States will need to react to these forays sooner or later – a process that began with the Obama administration’s talk of a “Pacific 4 century” and the “rebalance to Asia” (Obama 2015, 24-25; Clinton 2011). Disruptions in rela- tions between Washington and Beijing – brought about through protectionist trade policies fuelled by economic nationalism, for instance – would be reflected in the economic prospects of small open economies such as Finland. Russia, in turn, has sought to reassert its status as a great power by engaging in destabilising actions in Europe and the Middle East (although Moscow considers its actions stabilising). Contrary to early speculation about a grand bargain in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s elec- tion victory, the US-Russia relationship reached its lowest point for over twenty-five years in the spring of 2017. The window of opportunity for such a bargain appears to have closed. The Trump administration is engulfed in a string of investigations – in Congress and by a Special Counsel appointed by the Department of Justice – on Russian influence on the 2016 presi- dential election and the alleged links between the Trump campaign and Russia. Any attempt at a Russia reset in this political climate would be extremely risky for the President. A further bone of contention concerns the US air strikes in Syria after a chemical-weapons attack widely attributed to dictator Bashar al-Assad, a Russian ally. The role of Iran is another contentious point. The Trump administration’s tough talk directed at Tehran stands in stark contrast to Russia’s increasingly friendly relations with America’s long-time adversary. Nevertheless, as an overall tendency the possible reprioritising of bilateral great-power rela- tionships over multilateral solutions by the United States may also have consequences affect- ing the stability and predictability of small countries’ security environments. The second key trend in 21st-century international life is the diffusion of power to non-state actors. These actors include civil society organisations, cities, regions, and dispersed inter- national networks, which exist beyond and below the state level. It has become apparent that the increasing complexity of the interdependent world may also breed new vulnerabilities, as potential sources of disruption grow. In the case of the Trump administration’s first year, the more insidious manifestations of power diffusion have attracted considerable attention. In par- ticular, international terrorism and vulnerabilities created by cyber connectivity have domi- nated the debate. The Trump team has pledged to step up the battle against terrorism, and for the president this has become a struggle between the forces of “good and evil”, and has acquired a dimension of civilizational struggle. In the case of cyber vulnerabilities, the ability of great-power competitors to leverage the cyber domain for political gain has cast doubt on the credibility and resilience of American democracy. 1.2 Research objectives and questions Recent events in the United States and Europe, and in world politics more generally, have created a clear demand for a study that analyses the potential changes and continuities of America’s global engagement. This is particularly relevant for Finland, a small export-oriented country that relies on the predictability provided by the stable rules-based international order pioneered and supported by the United States. The aim in this report is to enhance understanding of the contemporary manifestations and future development of America’s role in the world. Accordingly, the investigation covers both the broader trends and the more immediate dynamics of America’s global engagement. Do- mestic political and cultural developments are analysed, as well as strategic debates that have a bearing on the potential changes and continuities in American policymaking. The re- port also zooms in on the formulation and execution of US foreign, defence and economic 5 policies in the unfolding Trump era. The intention is to shed light on the evolution of US global engagement and national interests in terms of the future of international order, evolving great- power relations and the strategic setting of Northern Europe. Finally, this analysis should also contribute to the understanding of Finland’s broad security environment, facilitate decision- making related to foreign and security policy, and stimulate debate about it in the future. The key research questions that guide the analysis presented in the report are: 1. How do domestic trends and foreign-policy dynamics affect the evolution of America’s global engagement and national interests? 2. How does the US currently formulate and execute its foreign, defence and economic policies? 3. How does America’s evolving global engagement bear upon great-power politics, transatlantic relations and Finland’s broader security environment? 1.3 Research methodology and material The analysis presented in this report was conducted within the broad framework of qualitative research. The methodology adopted is known as triangulation, which is a mode of qualitative research that combines different research material, means of analysis and points of view. The rationale for adopting this methodology is the expected enhanced validity of the research re- sults, given that the analysis does not rely solely on a single data set or the interpretation of one analyst. In the present context, the analysis is based on three forms of triangulation: 1. Research-material triangulation to obtain various relevant pieces of information (gov- ernment documents, expert interviews, statistical data, research literature, expert analyses); 2. Methodological triangulation to generate knowledge based on various means of anal- ysis (conducting interviews, qualitative content analysis of documents); 3. Researcher triangulation to bring together various scholars to analyse the same broad themes. The main research material used for the report consists of policy documents produced by actors in the US. These include, for example, White House policy declarations, strategy doc- uments produced by government departments and agencies such as the Department of State and Department of Defense, as well as Congressional testimonies and bills. This data is com- plemented with relevant research literature, expert commentary and news reporting, which provide background information on and interpretations of the evolution of America’s global engagement. The analysis is further enhanced by interviews and discussions with relevant Finnish, Ameri- can and European experts on the subject matter. In particular, the broad theme of US global engagement was analysed from various perspectives at the main event of FIIA’s Center on US Politics and Power (CUSPP), the 4th Annual Helsinki Summer Session Reimagining Transatlantic Relations in the Trump Era, August 29–31, 2017. The CUSPP Helsinki Summer Session is an interdisciplinary event that brings together researchers and experts from Europe 6 and the United States to discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship.1 During the con- ference, the research team also conducted expert interviews on relevant changes and conti- nuities in US foreign, security and economic policies during the first seven months of Donald Trump’s presidency. In addition, FIIA organised the US research day on May 15, 2017, Un- derstanding Trump: The domestic roots of US foreign policy, during which American and Finn- ish experts also discussed some of the key themes addressed in the current report.2 1.4 Research timetable and team The research project was conducted at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs between January 1 and December 31, 2017. The project was divided into three phases: 1. Phase 1 (January 1 – April 30, 2017): identification and collection of primary research material and relevant research literature (updated throughout the duration of the pro- ject). 2. Phase 2 (May 1 – November 30, 2017): compilation of the analyses and the organi- sation of expert events and interviews; commentary from the project’s steering group. 3. Phase 3 (December 2017): completion of the editorial processing of the report for publication. The programme director of FIIA’s Global Security Research Program, Dr Mika Aaltola led the project. The editors of this final report of the research project include Mika Aaltola, senior research fellows Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Dr Juha Käpylä, and research fellow Ville Sinkkonen. In addition to the editors of the report, the research team included the following current and former FIIA researchers: senior visiting research fellows Leo Michel and Professor Mark N. Katz (George Mason University); CUSPP project director, senior research fellow Dr Bart Gaens; senior research fellow Dr Harri Mikkola; former FIIA senior research fellow Dr Anna Kronlund (University of Turku); and former FIIA research fellow Dr Johanna Jacobsson (IE University). Details of specific contributions are to be found after the Table of Contents above. FIIA research assistants Anna Wikholm and Anu Ruokamo coordinated the research project, and FIIA project managers Marie-Louise Hindsberg, Sannamari Bagge and Kukka-Maria Kov- sky took care of the related seminar and conference arrangements. FIIA’s director of admin- istration Helena Lehtovirta and financial manager Lauri Kaanela dealt with administrative mat- ters. Joan Nordlund MA edited the language of the report, and Inka Reijonen produced the graphical illustrations. In addition to this final report, the project outcomes to date include three additional FIIA pub- lications (2 FIIA Working Papers and 1 FIIA Briefing Paper). 1 For additional information, see the event description on FIIA’s homepage, available at: https://www.fiia.fi/en/event/4th-annual-helsinki-summer-session- decline-of-liberal-rule-based-world-order. 2 For additional information, see the event description on FIIA’s homepage, available at: https://www.fiia.fi/tapahtuma/understanding-trump-the-domestic- roots-of-us-foreign-policy. https://www.fiia.fi/tapahtuma/understanding-trump-the-domestic-roots-of-us-foreign-policy https://www.fiia.fi/tapahtuma/understanding-trump-the-domestic-roots-of-us-foreign-policy 7 1.5 The structure of the report The report is subdivided into five substantive parts. Part I deals with the domestic politico-cultural trends as well as the institutional and party- political dynamics that affect – directly and indirectly – America’s global engagement. Chapter 2 analyses the broader politico-cultural trends in American society and how they are reflected in the leadership mode of Donald Trump and his administration. Instead of relying on the age-old tradition of American pragmatic pluralism, Trump highlights moral differences and the importance of traditional conservative values, European heritage, and the idea of the West as a Christian civilisation. According to this view, the United States should no longer be seen as a multicultural melting pot. Trump draws his legitimacy from an appeal to the exist- ence of a shared, but now lost, communal and moral element in America, which is framed in conservative, populist and reactionary terms. In particular, the current political polarisation in the United States could be said to spring from two long-term trends in American domestic political culture: the proliferation of narratives of decline and the revival of religiosity. These trends play a role in shaping the leadership mode of the Trump administration, both domesti- cally and in relation to America’s evolving global role. Chapter 3 investigates the current situation in America’s political institutions and party politics, with a view to analysing their implications for US foreign policy. In an attempt to shed light on the President’s ability to lead US foreign policy, the chapter explores the enduring constraints of the American political system, the more fluid dynamics of intra-party divisions and the in- tervening potential of public opinion. It is argued that all these factors act as enablers of and constraints on the foreign-policy agenda of the Trump administration. Part II of the report focuses on the current trajectories of US foreign and defence policy. Chapter 4 elaborates on the “Trump doctrine” and its relationship with America’s enduring foreign-policy traditions. The aim is to explore the international implications of the “America First” and “Make America Great Again” slogans, and the extent to which the Trumpian ap- proach departs from US foreign-policy thought and practice in the longer term. Tapping into different traditions of foreign policy, the analysis offers some preliminary insights that shed light on how the current administration envisions US global engagement. Chapter 5 analyses the emerging US defence policy in the Trump era. In spite of persistent turmoil in the domestic political sphere, the vast US defence establishment is engaged in various military activities, including operations in the broader Middle East, the strengthening of the US presence in Europe, and countering possible future crises in North Korea and po- tentially even Iran. The administration is currently in the process of compiling its conceptual framework for these efforts in the form of various strategic reviews – a task that should be complete by early 2018. This chapter investigates the strategic changes and continuities that are likely to emerge from these reviews, and assesses their effects on US defence capabilities and transatlantic partnerships. Part III of the report deals with issues related to multilateral governance. Chapter 6 analyses the uncertain future of the liberal international order. This body of norms, rules and institutions that evolved after the Second World War under American leadership is facing a number of internal and external challenges. These include the rise of anti-globalist 8 sentiments, shifts in the global distribution of power and the growing importance of non-state actors. Such long-term trends are further complicated by more timely factors, of which the uncertainty over US global leadership during the current administration is a key example. From a longer-term perspective, potential trajectories for the liberal international order are considered in the light of the current political situation in the US and globally. Chapter 7 zooms in on the current administration’s international economic policy, with a par- ticular focus on foreign trade relations. For Donald Trump, the 2016 presidential campaign was a showcase for economic nationalism, the core institutions and tenets of international trade bearing the brunt of his rhetorical offensive. Aside from America’s quick exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the launch of the NAFTA renegotiation process, at pre- sent it appears that the new president’s critique of trade practices might be more rhetorical than substantive. However, there are worrying signs in relation to the country’s evolving ap- proach to the core institutions of global trade, the WTO in particular. US attempts to assert its economic muscle vis-à-vis China could also bring negative externalities to bear upon other trade partners. Part IV of the report covers emerging great-power politics. Chapter 8 investigates the relationship between the United States and Russia. Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential elections raised the possibility of an improvement in Russian-American relations, which had deteriorated during the previous eight years despite the Obama administration’s attempt to “reset” them. However, persistent differences between these two great powers have led to recurring cycles of frustrated expectations, of which the current impasse is only the most recent example. Although the US and Russia share certain common interests, it is likely that they will be outweighed by differences on various policy issues such as Syria, Ukraine, North Korea and China, as well as the unfolding Russia inves- tigations. Consequently, the poor state of US-Russian relations will likely endure during, and possibly also beyond, the Trump/Putin era. Chapter 9 explores the US role in the transforming security environment in Asia. There were widely held perceptions at the start of the current presidential administration that US foreign policy would shift dramatically – from “Asia first” to “America First”. Nevertheless, Donald Trump’s early foreign-policy approach to this vital region exhibits significant continuity with Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia” policy. In particular, it appears that America will maintain its strong military presence in the region and hold onto its security commitments. However, it may well expect more from its allies and partners in return. These core continuities are vital not only for maintaining a balance against a rising China, but also for managing the various strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including those in the South China Sea, the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Part V of the report focuses on America’s evolving engagement in Europe in general, the circumpolar North, and the Nordic-Baltic region. Chapter 10 traces current trends in the transatlantic relationship, arguably the most mature example of a security community in the world. Yet, the first year of the current US administra- tion has been characterised by increasingly strained relations between the US and Europe, and commentaries on the erosion of the transatlantic bond have proliferated. However, the relationship has never been problem-free, characterised instead by fluctuating tensions. Nev- ertheless, it has endured because of robust security and economic links, as well as common institutions and a (by and large) shared value base. Currently, in spite of fears raised by 9 Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric, the security and economic pillars of the community show con- siderable resilience. With regard to the value base and commitment to institutions, however, differences between the continents have been brought to the fore. Chapter 11 investigates US engagement in the transforming circumpolar north. Reflecting the broader Zeitgeist, there has been uncertainty about the future of US policy in the Arctic. De- spite initial concerns, the US under the current administration appears to recognise enduring strategic interests in the Arctic, and continues to engage in practical co-operation in the re- gion. That said, there remains the worry that President Trump will advocate certain policies that might be contradictory to the long-term goals and aspirations of international co-operation in the region. These concerns include the President’s critical approach to climate change, his emphasis on bilateral transactionalism as opposed to multilateral co-operation, and the recal- ibration of the relationship with Russia in the absence of a noticeable change in its behaviour. Chapter 12 explores US security engagement in the Baltic Sea region. It first places the Baltic Sea in the global geostrategic context and then considers how the US has responded to the changing balance between the normative/economic and geostrategic pressures that animate its involvement in this region. The US response is examined on three levels of interaction: the institutional, the practical and the personal. On all three levels there are indications of a sig- nificantly more active United States, which through its myriad actions has managed both to reassure its allies in the region, and to draw in Sweden and Finland as closer partners in regional security, thereby enhancing webs of cooperation. The Conclusion presents reflections on the preceding analysis, and ends with some general rules of thumb for Finland in what could be described as an emergent transatlantic “waiting game”. 10 PART I: DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 2. The political culture: competing visions for 21st-century America  The Trump administration has drawn upon polarising politico-cultural resources – the conservative narrative of decline and the revival of religiosity – to frame the tenets of its “America First” policy agenda both domestically and globally.  The conservative narrative of decline focuses on reviving the US national character by emphasising patriotic zeal, civilizational identity grounded on its Anglo-American heritage, and a specifically Judeo-Christian conception of American civil religion.  Conservative Christian themes have become more prominent in American public life. Their proponents view the espousal of (overly) liberal values as a regressive devel- opment for America and Western civilisation in general, and have sought to “restore” Christian values and practices in the body politic.  Drawing on these resources, the worldview of president Trump (and some of his ad- visors) breaks with secularist and liberal traditions, and instead emphasises the need to protect the Christian and European creed of the American way of life. The admin- istration is thus likely to espouse a “custodian of principle” approach in its foreign engagement. 2.1 Introduction Donald J. Trump’s incumbency was forged in an extraordinarily polarising presidential cam- paign.3 As a candidate, Trump turned practical issues into signs of moral difference rather than embracing the American tradition of pragmatic pluralism, which entails turning potentially divisive moral problems into manageable practical issues. As president, instead of engaging in professorial speeches in the vein of his predecessor Barack Obama, Trump has utilised devices outside of the traditional mediascape – Twitter in particular – to persuade people of the presumed existence of a shared, but now lost, communal and moral element in America, framed in conservative, populist and reactionary rhetoric. Time and again, he has shown a propensity to use hyperbole and antagonistic language to attack political opponents. Trump's use of such politico-cultural resources is at times incoherent, and even self-contra- dictory. However, it is also dynamic and can trigger the foundational myths by which a political community remembers and reproduces itself, along with the rites and devotions of this grounding process. Trump’s interpretation of this American “civil religion” or “creed” draws on Christian values, its European heritage, and the idea of the US-led West as a Christian civili- sation. It is an alternative to the globalist understanding of the US as a multicultural melting pot. The American tradition of pragmatic pluralism is therefore under assault in the present political climate of polarisation. People with diverse backgrounds and ideologies are finding it harder 3 This chapter draws upon Aaltola, Mika and Ville Sinkkonen. 2017. “Political culture and the domestic aspects of American leadership: Towards a new version of the Clash of Civilizations.” FIIA Working Paper 95, June 8, 2017. https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/political-culture-and-the-domestic-aspects-of- american-leadership. https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/political-culture-and-the-domestic-aspects-of-american-leadership https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/political-culture-and-the-domestic-aspects-of-american-leadership 11 to engage in issue-based dialogue to solve common problems. The aim in this chapter is to make sense of this impasse in the light of two long-term trends in the US domestic political culture: the proliferation of narratives of decline and the revival of religiosity. These trends play a role in shaping the leadership mode of the Trump administration both domestically and in relation to America’s evolving global role. 2.2 American narratives of doom and gloom All foreign-policy leaders are products of their sociocultural surroundings (Hopf 2002, 37). Domestic ideological contestation is therefore an essential factor to be considered in the de- velopment of the global role of the United States and its evolving relationship with the world. In particular, identity-political dynamics influence the central tenets of American foreign-policy consensus: whether or not the US should have a global leadership role, remain globally en- gaged, and maintain its responsibilities and commitments. According to opinion polls, an increasing number of Americans believe that the US is on the wrong track, or on a declining path.4 Of course, such an alarmist interpretation is by no means new. In fact, Joseph Nye (2015) traces the tradition of American declinism back to the days of the Massachusetts Bay colony in the 17th century, and cycles of declinism have ebbed and flowed ever since, including in the 20th century (Joffe 2009). At present, there seem to be two prevalent and competing formulations of American decline: the liberal and the conservative. The liberal narrative laments America’s incapability of perfecting itself as a lawfully and justly regulated realm with minorities able to voice their opinions. According to this account, the US should strive harder to be a nation of rules and laws. Liberals see the US as a self-perfecting and self-governing community, the key rationale of which should be the struggle to expand justice. The liberal vision also calls for normative consistency in US foreign policy.5 President Barack Obama’s often-repeated phrase “the arc of history bends towards justice” is a good illustration of how just rules should be seen as a starting point for both domestic government and global engagement (Washington Post 2013). Conservative declinism, on the other hand, laments the erosion of the traditional value base of American society as a result of globalisation, immigration and the loss of religiosity along with the overarching liberalisation of individual conduct. The conservative narrative thus fo- cuses on reviving America’s national character in emphasising patriotic zeal, civilizational identity grounded on its Anglo-American heritage, and a particular Judeo-Christian conception of American civil religion. In the sphere of foreign engagement, the conservative vision fore- sees danger in the lack of dynamic and direct action to defend America’s place in the world, even if this comes at the expense of policy consistency. These two views of declinism are competing, contradictory and increasingly mutually exclu- sive. Within both, any deviations from the respective ideals are regarded as signs of decay and political regression. Donald Trump, by and large, subscribes to the conservative declinist narrative, and it consti- tutes a key building block of his threat perceptions. He has highlighted the need to put “Amer- ica First” in its dealings with the rest of the world (White House 2017a), and has drawn paral- lels between excessive liberal or globalist ambitions and America’s domestic and international 4 According to a Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll from July 17, 2016, for instance, 73 per cent “say things have gone off-course” (Zitner 2016). 5 For arguments reflecting the tenets of the liberal declinist view, see for example Ikenberry (2012, 326-331) and Kupchan (2012, 159-166). 12 predicaments (White House 2017b; Stephens 2017). This theme of overextension contains different, but interrelated, variants in the Trumpian trope. Economic overstretch evokes prob- lematic outflows of capital, a global imbalance of trade surpluses, “unfair” free-trade pacts and stifling climate-change regulations, all of which are potentially disadvantageous to the US (White House 2017c; White House 2017d; Ross 2017). There is also a sense of danger that the United States is living beyond its means by stretching its military resources too thinly: consider, for instance, Trump's comments about the need for fairer burden-sharing in NATO (White House 2017e; White House 2017f). Trump has also made strong references to a cultural form of overstretch, meaning the degree of over-extendedness with reference to civic resources such as declining morality and work ethics. The conservative narrative of American overextension tends to link foreign influences with the nation’s political regression. According to this declinist vision, there is a possibility that outsiders will culturally undermine core American values if the US tries to integrate too many people or accommodate the national interests of too many allies (see Kaplan 1994; Huntington 2004, 30-45). The perceived danger is that foreign practices or elements will dilute core American civic beliefs. Trump's comments about “bad Mexicans”, the need to build a border wall and his toying with labelling China a currency manipulator could be viewed in this light (Tennery 2016; White House 2017g; Lawder 2017). In this manner, America’s global role comes to be understood as a function of a “healthy” domestic civil religion. Trump’s rhetoric stressing internal problems and societal ills – a vast drug problem, a high rate of violent crime, the lack of a national direction and mission and a decline in family values – is therefore relevant from the perspective of US global engagement. In the language of decline and fall, these are problems stemming from perceived civil irreligi- osity (White House 2017b; White House 2017h). Trump’s “America First” doctrine maintains that the only way to fix these underlying problems is to avoid global overextension. Interna- tional commitments are thus seen as a function of, or in the worst case detrimental to, do- mestic health. From this standpoint, the new president appears to embody a transitionary figure who will rid US foreign policy of the misinformed strategy of “deep engagement” fa- voured by Obama-era liberals and Bush-era neoconservatives, and place it on a footing in- creasingly favoured by the country’s populace (see Schweller 2017). 2.3 A civilizational focus The narratives of American decline have international implications and tangible conse- quences for America’s preferred modes of engagement and perception of threats. In key speeches both domestically and internationally, Trump has highlighted the concept of “civili- sation” as opposed to much more traditional terms such as human rights, democracy and freedom (White House 2017f; 2017i). Trump’s vision is one of prosperous and secure civilised regions surrounded by enemies, which will ultimately seek access to American territory thereby challenging its culture and endangering its prosperity. The civilised world is the last stronghold against these “barbaric” elements of chaos (Kaplan 1994). Trump often uses lan- guage that suggests signs of contagious hazards – corruption, political violence, drugs et cetera – that threaten to spread to the US from the outside (White House 2017b; 2017h). On the Trumpian world map, international borders and lines of communication from air and sea to cyberspace represent possible vectors for the spread of dangerous “cultural pollution”. For Trump, liberal ideas and institutions represent the wrong types of “cure” for America’s present ills. Primarily, America’s resources need to be used for the defence of the homeland and the “civilised world” as Trump defines it (White House 2017a; 2017b; 2017i). 13 Trump's vision for America’s global engagement and domestic regeneration bears similarities with Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” framework (Rachman 2017; Walt 2017a). In Huntington’s (1993; 2002) view, the international politics of the post-Cold War world would not be dominated by economic conflict or a battle between competing grand ideologies. In- stead, cultural identity would become increasingly salient, and future conflicts in international politics would take place on the “fault lines” between cultural entities called civilisations.6 For Huntington, the most precarious of civilizational divides was between the non-Muslim and the Muslim worlds (Huntington 2002, 255). Some of the advisors President Trump nominated at the beginning of his term, including now- ousted chief strategist Stephen Bannon, senior policy advisor Stephen Miller and National Security Council spokesman Michael Anton, subscribe to this civilizational worldview and frame “radical Islamic terrorism” as an existential threat to the United States (Anton 2017; Smith 2017). Trump’s inauguration speech, reportedly written in part by Bannon, evoked the notion of a civilised world locked in conflict with “radical Islamic terrorism, which we [America with Trump at the helm] will eradicate completely from the face of the earth” (White House, 2017b). In this vein, the task of the new administration is to act as a vanguard in the inter- civilizational battle between the Judeo-Christian West and the “others”. These others include “Islamist extremists” and Iran (White House 2017j), but the category has proven sufficiently fluid also to include other “rogue” regimes such as Cuba, North Korea and even Venezuela (White House 2017k). The Trump administration began putting its civilizational sentiments into practice in the form of an executive order issued on January 27, 2017, banning travel from seven Muslim-majority countries for a period of 90 days (White House 2017l). The order faced legal challenges and was duly frozen by a US district judge in the state of Washington, a verdict upheld by the US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit (Ford 2017). A revised order in March sought to rectify some of the most troubling aspects of the original, exempting permanent US residents and visa-holders, and dropping the reference to the preferential treatment of religious minorities (Thrush 2017). The Supreme Court allowed parts of this revised ban to go into effect in June (Shear and Liptak 2017). However, the Court cancelled oral arguments on the temporary ban, as the administration rolled out a new version that sets different degrees of restriction on travel and immigration into the United States for citizens of Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Chad, North Korea, Iran and Venezuela (White House 2017m; Shear et al. 2017). The Supreme Court allowed this new ban to take effect on December 4, 2017, despite on-going legal chal- lenges (Liptak 2017). The clash-of-civilisations worldview of the Trump administration is not limited to the battle against terrorism and rogue states, however. In fact, there is a strong domestic-politics aspect in the Huntingtonian thesis, according to which immigration is a source of potential decay in the political community. Of particular concern for Huntington (2004, 141) were immigrants “from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies”, a danger intensified by modern forms of communication. As immigrants retain their links to their countries and communities of origin, people from different civilisations come to represent a potential source of decay in America’s collective identity (Huntington 1997, 28-49; 2002, 306). In the worst case, such an erosion of the American creed could ultimately lead the US to rescind its leadership role as the vanguard 6 In his later book, Huntington distinguished between eight such civilisations: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American and, with a caveat, African (Huntington 2002, 45-47). 14 of Western civilisation. In the inter-civilizational battle, this scenario would precipitate an inev- itable decline in the United States as well as in Western civilisation in general (Aysha 2003). Trump’s election campaign approximated these Huntingtonian views, especially in its inflam- matory immigration rhetoric. Although the President’s tone has admittedly softened since his infamous comments depicting Mexican immigrants as sexual assaulters (TIME 2015), he has retained the substantive edge of his attack on immigration in key speeches by framing it as an internal security threat (White House 2017b; New York Times 2017a). He has, for example, issued two executive orders to strengthen border controls and issue penalties to “sanctuary cities” unwilling to aid the federal government in the deportation of illegal aliens (White House 2017n; White House 2017o). Candidate Trump also pledged to erect a wall along the Mexican border, a promise that he still insists on honouring as President, although he has been forced to put his plans on hold in the face of congressional unwillingness to fund the project (White House 2017h; Hulse 2017a; Becker and Cornwell 2017). Trump has also targeted the De- ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme launched by the Obama administra- tion, which has protected the children of undocumented immigrants from deportation. After Trump’s decision to end the programme, Congress was given six months to come up with an agreement on the fate of some 800,000 “Dreamers” enrolled in it (Shear and Hirschfeld Da- vies 2017). Yet, Trump’s offensive is taking place as estimates show a winding down of illegal immigration to the United States, especially via the Southern border. In fact, according to Pew Research Center, since 2009 the number of Mexican immigrants leaving the US has exceeded the num- ber of new entrants (Passel and Cohn 2016; Gonzalez-Barbera and Krogstad 2017). 2.4 Modes of religious leadership According to James Davison Hunter (1991, 44), there are two important groups claiming moral legitimacy in contemporary America. The first comprises the conservatives, or the orthodox, united in their “commitment […] to an external, definable, and transcendent authority”. These custodians of the American creed are priming themselves to lead their people through dra- matic times, and draw their rhetoric from religious fundamentals and authorities. The second group could be characterised as liberals or progressives, whose legitimacy derives from plu- ralist and secularist ideas of modernity. These two groups provide the stock figures of the contemporary American politico-religious scene. The secularist spirit has been under challenge in American political life in recent decades. The roots of these recent developments can be traced to changes that have taken place in American Christianity, especially to the rise of charismatic evangelicalism in mainstream American society. Two competing versions of Christian revivalism developed in the 1960s and 1970s as a back- lash against political disorder and the impression that American society was in disarray. The division became manifest in issues such as legalised abortion and family values, but also reflected the perceived weakening of America’s global position. The conservative wing saw these progressive themes as antagonistic developments that weakened the American Judeo- Christian creed, whereas the liberals highlighted the need for a progressive interpretation of freedoms and rights. Conservative Christian narratives claim that something went wrong in the otherwise pure and righteous US with the spread of liberal, cosmopolitan and globalist ideas (Dochuk, Kidd and 15 Peterson 2014. 3-8). Controversies over expansion of civil rights, the Vietnam War, contra- ception and abortion, together with the HIV/AIDS outbreak, contributed further to the percep- tion that the American Christian way of life was under attack. Christian revivalism was meant to counteract the centrifugal forces of value pluralism, socialism, the mass immigration of non- Christians and globalisation. In the eyes of the Christian right these dangers legitimised the return of openly Christian themes and values to public life. Hence, in the conservative narra- tive, liberal values came to be regarded as a regressive development in Western civilisation. The liberal definition of America was resisted both at home and abroad, such as in the sending of missionaries abroad to preach against the decadence of Western-style liberalism. The religious movement in America also sought to “restore” and “re-establish” Christian val- ues and practices in public life, and started to demand that politicians be openly Christian (Casanova 1994, 158). During the 1980s, mainstream politicians began using increasingly religious language to express themselves, and in politics this type of religious rhetoric fuelled nostalgia for an American golden age that had been lost because of the liberal expansion of rights. This nostalgic yearning for a real but lost America effectively became a sounding board for political populism. At the same time, state secularity has remained a very powerful principle in the US, and the multicultural character of the nation has relied on the separation between state and church. In a similar vein, the liberal secularisation hypothesis has been driven by the desire to turn religion into a private matter (Hadden 1987). The roots of liberal-humanistic civil religion go back to the Enlightenment. It is based on a secular conception of humanity and virtues such as freedom, equality, human goodness, friendship and compassion for distant others. The secular movement opposed established forms of religion, but was not directed against religion per se. This critique of blind faith in the authority of religious institutions and figures could accommodate rational members of secular humanity holding religious beliefs, as long as these beliefs were not irrational or in contradistinction to more secular forms of knowledge. The revival of religious themes in public life means that Christianity has broken away from the private realm and has returned to play an important role in day-to-day politics. Although sec- ularisation is still a trend, it is counteracted by the increasing political influence of themes espoused by the Christian Right. In fact, the US currently seems to be an outlier when it comes to the significance of religion in society at large within the group of economically more developed countries (see Figure 1). This countervailing drift also strengthens the Christian elements in American civil religion. The content of contemporary civil religion is increasingly Christian and less dependent on the values and myths of modern secularity. For example, it has become customary to include an act of prayer, which until only recently was considered a private matter, in the public speeches of American presidents. This has brought a sense of introspection and mystical experience to public speeches (Schmidt 2002, 602). 16 Figure 1: The role of religion in society versus the country’s wealth Source: Pew Research Center (2016b) Against this background, orthodox custodian-of-principle political figures draw on Judeo- Christian themes – such as the Bible, the Holy Land, divine mission, prayer and God. They promote a programme that resists liberal secularism and multiculturalism, and highlights cer- tain American experiences such as its exceptional way of life, divine providence or mission, and the Founding Fathers. Reflecting the themes of the Evangelical movement and the reli- gious right, custodians of principle often refer to the programmatic notion that Christian ideals should guide the public life of the nation. In this context, themes such as pro-life and the freedom to carry guns have functioned as rallying calls, and these political ideals have led to the mobilisation of strong movements, most recently the Tea Party and the Trump campaign. In addition, custodians of principle make frequent Manichean references to a cosmic battle between good and evil. Their relationship with people and states deemed to be outside of or – worse – antagonistic to American-led civilisation is openly hostile. President Trump's custodian-of-principle rhetoric frames Western civilisation and its power in terms of religious values. “America first” conveys the nationalistic message of the US as the land of God’s chosen people. For instance, when he announced the April 2017 cruise missile strike against Assad’s forces in Syria, Trump appealed to the civilised world and, in a profound break from established tradition, blessed not only America but also “the entire world”. The rhetoric that Trump used to justify the missile strike also reflects this mode of cultural leader- ship: “Tonight I call on all civilized nations to join us in seeking to end the slaughter and blood- shed in Syria […] We ask for God's wisdom as we face the challenge of our very troubled world” (quoted in Beckwith 2017). A similar evocation of evil is also apparent in Trump’s call to Arab leaders in Riyadh to step up in the battle against terrorism: “[P]iety to evil will bring you no dignity. If you choose the path of terror, your life will be empty, your life will be brief, and YOUR SOUL WILL BE CONDEMNED” (White House 2017j; capitals in original). 17 It is thus clear that the worldview of president Trump (and some of his advisors) breaks with secularist and liberal traditions. It holds secular values to be idealistic and bleary-eyed, and purports to protect the Christian and European creed of the American way of life. Judging by the use of underlying cultural resources by the Trump administration, its foreign policy is likely to continue adopting the custodian-of-principle approach. 2.5 The polarisation of identity politics The ideological and civil-religious characteristics of the Trump administration emanate from fundamental changes in the general composition of the American political culture. Trump's election victory, and his winning coalition, could be considered a reaction against the under- lying and – according to some observers – unsurpassable demographic trends, which favour a more secularist and multiculturalist interpretation of America. In this sense, Trump’s triumph represents the victory of identity politics over structural trends. This is the case despite statistics indicating a general decline in religiosity in the United States. In a prominent poll, the proportion of agnostics and those unwilling to identify their faith stood at 22.8 per cent in 2014, an increase of 6.7 per cent since 2007 (Pew Research Center 2015). However, the proportion of white born-again/evangelical Christians in the electorate has re- mained at roughly 20 per cent for the last two decades (Pew Research Center 2016a). It has also been estimated that white born-again/evangelical Christians make up 35 per cent of Re- publican Party supporters (Pew Research Center 2016a). When other groups with broadly similar views – namely Catholics and Mormons – are factored in, approximately 57 per cent of the Republican support base is made up of what is often termed the “Christian Right”, constituting a formidable coalition of veritably reliable voters (Marsden 2014, 121). Whereas the role of evangelicals and the Christian Right has expanded in the Republican Party, support for Democrats within these religious groups has declined steadily over the last two decades – before the 2016 election, eight per cent of the Democratic support base com- prised white evangelicals, compared to 16 per cent in 1996 (Pew Research Center 2016a). The secular component of the Democratic base has grown accordingly, from ten per cent in the mid-1990s to 29 per cent in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2016a). Interestingly, the secular shift at the population level has not been reflected in the makeup of the legislature: Congress appears to be profoundly religious, with over 90 per cent of members identifying, at least by declaration, as Christian (Pew Research Center 2017a).7 Related to this dynamic of apparent secularisation is the changing composition of the US population. According to an argument originally coined by John Judis and Ruy Teixeira (2004) in the early 2000s, the demographic changes unfolding in the United States will, in the long run, lead to the advent of a “Democratic majority”. In fact, an independent review panel com- missioned by the Republican National Committee (RNC) to plot a way forward after the 2012 elections between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney recommended making concerted efforts to secure support and new voters from ethnic and racial minorities, as well as from young and female demographic groups, to prevail in future elections (Barbour et al. 2012, 12). Over 26 per cent of those who voted in the 2012 presidential election were