Jihadist online communication and Finland Leena Malkki and Matti Pohjonen Translated from Finnish Internal security | Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:29 Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:29 Jihadist online communication and Finland Ministry of the Interior, Helsinki 2019 Ministry of the Interior ISBN PDF: 978-952-324-300-2 Helsinki 2019 Description sheet Published by Ministry of the Interior 23 August 2019 Authors Leena Malkki and Matti Pohjonen Title of publication Jihadist online communication and Finland Series and publication number Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 2019:29 Register number SMDno-2018-45 Subject Internal security ISBN PDF 978-952-324-300-2 ISSN PDF 2490-077X Website address URN http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN: 978-952-324-300-2 Pages 90 Language English Keywords extremist movements, online communication, radicalisation, terrorism Abstract This study investigates jihadist online communication related to Finland in 2014–2018. In particular, it examines the visibility of Finland and persons connected to Finland in jihadist communication and investigates what kinds of content persons living in Finland have produced and disseminated online. During the investigated period, jihadist online communication related to Finland was more prevalent than ever before. Finns were mentioned in ISIS materials, and persons living in Finland produced and disseminated jihadist content in the Finnish language. This reflects the broader development of the jihadist activities connected to Finland. The amount of content must not be exaggerated, however, as the amount of content and online activities connected to Finland were still relatively minimal when compared internationally. Over the past three years, jihadist online communication has migrated to closed platforms, as technology companies actively removed public content inciting people to violence. This means that openly jihadist activity online has largely slowed down for the time being, and this is also the case with content related to Finland. Jihadist online communication, however, has not ceased entirely. The study found signs that jihadist online communication is still occurring via closed, encrypted channels. The study was carried out together with the Jihadism in Finland study. Publisher Ministry of the Interior Publication sales/ Distributed by Online version: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi Publication sales: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:%20978-952-324-300-2 http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/ http://julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi/Etusivu Kuvailulehti Julkaisija Sisäministeriö 23.8.2019 Tekijät Leena Malkki ja Matti Pohjonen Julkaisun nimi Jihadistinen verkkoviestintä ja Suomi Julkaisusarjan nimi ja numero Sisäministeriön julkaisuja 2019:29 Diaari/hankenumero SMDno-2018-45 Teema Sisäinen turvallisuus ISBN PDF 978-952-324-300-2 ISSN PDF 2490-077X URN-osoite http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2 Sivumäärä 90 Kieli englanti Asiasanat ääriliikkeet, verkkoviestintä, radikalisoituminen, terrorismi Tiivistelmä Tutkimus käsittelee Suomeen liittyvää jihadistista verkkoviestintää vuosina 2014⎼2018. Siinä kartoitetaan erityisesti Suomen ja Suomeen liittyvien henkilöiden esiintymistä jihadistisessa viestinnässä sekä sitä, millaista aineistoa Suomessa asuneet henkilöt ovat tuottaneet ja levittäneet verkossa. Ajanjakson alkupuolella Suomeen liittyvää jihadistista verkkoviestintää oli enemmän kuin koskaan aiemmin. Suomalaisia esiintyi Isisin aineistoissa, ja Suomessa asuneet henkilöt tuottivat ja levittivät jihadistista aineistoa myös suomeksi. Tämä heijastaa Suomeen liittyvän jihadistisen liikehdinnän yleistä kehittymistä. Aineiston määrää ei tule kuitenkaan liioitella, sillä Suomeen liittyvän viestinnän määrä oli edelleen kansainvälisesti katsoen verrattain vähäinen. Viimeisen kolmen vuoden aikana jihadistinen verkkoviestintä on siirtynyt suljetuille alustoille, kun teknologiayritykset ovat aktiivisesti poistaneet avointa väkivaltaan yllyttävää aineistoa. Tämä tarkoittaa, että avoimen jihadistisen verkkoviestinnän aika on tällä erää myös Suomeen liittyvän aineiston osalta pitkälti ohi. Suomeen kytkeytyvä jihadistinen verkkoviestintä ei ole kuitenkaan todennäköisesti täysin tyrehtynyt. Tutkimuksen yhteydessä havaittiin merkkejä siitä, että sitä saattaa edelleen olla suljetuilla ja salatuilla kanavilla. Tutkimus on tehty samanaikaisesti Jihadistinen liikehdintä Suomessa -tutkimuksen kanssa. Kustantaja Sisäministeriö Julkaisun myynti/jakaja Sähköinen versio: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi Julkaisumyynti: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2 http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/ http://julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi/Etusivu Presentationsblad Utgivare Inrikesministeriet 3.4.2019 Författare Leena Malkki och Matti Pohjonen Publikationens titel Jihadistisk webbkommunikation och Finland Publikationsseriens namn och nummer Inrikesministeriets publikationer 2019:29 Diarie-/ projektnummer SMDno-2018-45 Tema Inre säkerhet ISBN PDF 978-952-324-300-2 ISSN PDF 2490-077X URN-adress http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2 Sidantal 90 Språk engelska Nyckelord extremiströrelser, webbkommunikation, radikalisering, terrorism Referat Undersökningen behandlar jihadistisk webbkommunikation som gäller Finland 2014⎼2018. Den kartlägger i synnerhet hur Finland och personer med anknytning till Finland förekommer i den jihadistiska kommunikationen samt hurdant material personer som bott i Finland har producerat och spridit på webben. I början av tidsperioden förekom det mer jihadistisk webbkommunikation som gällde Finland än någonsin tidigare. Det fanns belägg på finländare i ISIS material, och personer som bott i Finland producerade och spred jihadistiskt material också på finska. Detta reflekterar den allmänna utvecklingen av jihadistiska rörelser med anknytning till Finland. Man ska dock inte överdriva mängden material eftersom mängden kommunikation som gäller Finland fortfarande var rätt så liten internationellt sett. Under de tre senaste åren har den jihadistiska webbkommunikationen övergått till slutna plattformar i och med att teknologiföretag aktivt har raderat material som öppet uppviglar till våld. Detta innebär att tiden för öppen jihadistisk webbkommunikation för den här gången till stor del är över också i fråga om material som gäller Finland. Den jihadistiska webbkommunikation som är förknippad med Finland har dock antagligen inte helt tystnat. I samband med undersökningen upptäcktes tecken på att den kan finnas kvar i stängda och krypterade kanaler. Undersökningen har gjorts samtidigt med undersökningen Jihadistiska rörelser i Finland. Förläggare Inrikesministeriet Beställningar/ distribution Elektronisk version: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi Beställningar: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-324-300-2 http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/ http://julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi/Etusivu Contents Executive summary .......................................................................................... 11 1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 13 1.1 Research topic and objectives .................................................................................... 14 1.2 Previous research ....................................................................................................... 17 1.3 Data and methods ....................................................................................................... 18 1.4 Limitations of the study................................................................................................ 21 1.5 Research ethics .......................................................................................................... 22 2 Jihadist online communication as an international phenomenon ............................................................................................ 24 2.1 Jihadist online communication and the changing media environment ........................ 24 2.2 Al-Qaeda ..................................................................................................................... 28 2.3 Al-Shabaab ................................................................................................................. 30 2.4 ISIS ............................................................................................................................. 32 2.5 Jihadist online content and violent radicalisation ........................................................ 38 2.6 Future trends in jihadist online communication ........................................................... 41 3 Jihadist online communication and Finland ......................................... 43 3.1 Finland in jihadist movements’ key online content ...................................................... 44 3.1.1 References to Finland in jihadist online magazines................................... 44 3.1.2 References to Finland in jihadist videos .................................................... 50 3.2 Jihadist online content produced in Finnish or by persons with a link to Finland ........................................................................................................................ 54 3.2.1 Militant jihadists ......................................................................................... 56 3.2.1.1 Facebook ............................................................................ 56 3.2.1.2 Twitter ................................................................................. 61 3.2.1.3 Ask.fm and other online forums .......................................... 64 3.2.2 Producers, disseminators and translators ................................................. 67 3.2.2.1 Activities of @Mujahid4life account on Twitter .................... 68 3.2.2.2 Hussein al-Maadidi’s writings .............................................. 69 3.2.2.3 An-Nida ............................................................................... 70 3.2.2.4 Writings on Islamtieto website ............................................. 75 3.2.2.5 Dissemination of radical religious material of a more generic nature ............................................................ 76 3.2.2.6 Jihadist ‘memes’ and other visual content .......................... 79 3.2.3 Telegram and encrypted channels ............................................................ 81 4 Conclusions ............................................................................................. 82 4.1 Key findings ................................................................................................................. 82 4.2 Significance of jihadist online communication for Finland ........................................... 84 4.3 Needs for further research .......................................................................................... 88 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 9 TO THE READER The development of jihadism in Finland has sparked a heated debate in recent years, especially in the context of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Efforts to prevent violent extremism have expanded considerably in the 2010s. Consequently, the demand for evidence-based information on jihadist activity specifically related to Finland has increased strongly. This report commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior was produced to meet this knowledge need, in particular regarding jihadist online communication. While its specific purpose is to support the efforts to prevent violent extremism in Finland, the authors hope that it will also be of more general interest to readers among the wider public. This report was produced concurrently and by the same research group as the report titled Jihadism in Finland, which analyses the general development of jihadist activity in Finland in the 2010s. The authors would like to extend their warmest thanks to all those who were interviewed for the report and who assisted in its writing in different ways. Our thanks go to the steering group led by Tarja Mankkinen (Ministry of the Interior). The group's comments were a great help in different stages of the study. The members of the steering group were Marko Juntunen (University of Helsinki), Timo Kilpeläinen (National Police Board), Marja Tiilikainen (Migration Institute of Finland) and Oussama Yousfi (Radinet). We would also like to thank our research assistants Fairuz Muthana, Taru Tervahauta and Lauri von Pfaler as well as our colleagues who commented on the draft reports at different stages. Leena Malkki and Matti Pohjonen University of Helsinki, Centre for European Studies March 2019 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 10 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 11 Executive summary This study focuses on jihadist online communication in 2014–2018 from the perspective of Finland. In particular, it examines and analyses the visibility of Finland and persons connected to Finland in jihadist online communication and investigates the types of content persons who are or were living in Finland have produced and disseminated content on different online platforms and channels. The report focuses on jihadist material that was openly available online during this period. It also contains a section describing the development of jihadist online communication more generally, thus helping to put observations in a broader international context. Up till the early 2010s, Finland was conspicuous by its almost total absence from jihadist content. This situation changed in the early stages of the conflict in Syria, at which time jihadist online communication became more prolific in Western countries. Around the same time, Finland also became visible in international jihadist discussions for the first time. During the early years of the conflict, the volume of jihadist online communication related to Finland was higher than ever before. This volume should not be exaggerated, however, as the quantity of online communication linked to Finland remained relatively small by international comparison. Finland has been mentioned and persons coming from Finland have appeared a number of times in ISIS publications and videos. Persons originating from Finland have mainly featured in stories and videos intended for the Western public in a wider sense. In ISIS publications, Finland is also cited as one on the long list of the organisation’s enemies and a heathen country where orthodox Muslims are not understood. References to Finland in jihadist groups’ publications have been few and far between, and they do not add up to a clear picture of Finland as an important target. It is likely that ISIS has used persons from Finland in jihadist publications and videos mainly to target its communication at broader Western audiences. Numerous persons originating from other Western countries also appear in similar stories and videos. These stories and videos offer a new point of comparison, however, which may make identification with jihadist activity seem more natural also in Finland. At this stage, the actual impact this has ultimately had on the development of jihadism in Finland should be considered as an open question. In addition to established jihadist groups, jihadist online content has also been produced independently by their supporters. Many of those who have travelled to Syria and Iraq from Finland have been active on the social media. In addition to everyday messages typical of social media discussions, this activity has included PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 12 reporting on local conditions, responding to questions, and also encouraging others to go to Syria or Iraq. The communication has also contained some threats against Finland and, for example, against Shia Muslims. While the preferred channels for these activities appear to have been Facebook and Twitter, such content was also found on other discussion platforms. Persons who are and were living in Finland have disseminated and, in some cases, also produced jihadist content in the Finnish language. The majority of the content available and distributed outside the social media, including on websites and in blogs or online discussion forums, has been translated from other languages. The volume of Finnish content has been quite modest, and as far as we can conclude, it is unlikely to have attracted a large number of readers. The volume of open jihadist online communication has dropped significantly in the last three years, as technology companies have started actively deleting content inciting or advocating violence. Apart from a few exceptions, the content discussed in this study is no longer available online. The golden days of open jihadist online communication are now mostly over, and this also applies to content related to Finland or provided in Finnish. While online content related to Finland has almost completely disappeared from public platforms, this does not mean that it no longer exists elsewhere. As disseminating such content publicly has become more difficult, jihadist online communication has moved to closed and encrypted channels. The study found signs indicating that jihadist content related to Finland has been shared and interaction associated with it has also occurred, and may occur still, on these closed and encrypted channels. The impact of jihadist online communication on Finland is not limited to content directly linked to Finland, and content in which “Finland is mentioned” in some way is not always automatically the most significant for Finland. Online communication is produced in countless other languages, and it is frequently also consumed in languages other than the audience’s native language. Rather than living in the same country, the producers and consumers of jihadist online communication typically are part of the complex online milieu of international movements. Interpersonal relationships, even highly significant ones, may be established through online communication. This possibility may facilitate attachment to jihadist activity, especially for people for whom it is difficult to find persons with a similar ideological predisposition close by. At the same time it should be noted that, according to research findings, face-to-face interaction still almost always plays a significant role in recruitment to jihadist activism. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 13 1 Introduction In his book titled The Management of Savagery (2004), Abu Bakr Naji 1, a key strategist of modern jihadism, declared that the global jihadist movement should exploit the new opportunities provided by new media to wage psychological warfare against Western countries. This book has provided extensive inspiration for the current wave of violent terrorism.2 Around the same time Abu Musab al Suri, one of al- Qaeda’s strategic thinkers, also proposed in his book The Global Islamic Resistance Call a new type of information warfare, in which communication technology would be used to spread the message of the movement and drum up support for it.3 It is likely that the general public is more familiar, however, with the new generation of jihadist communication as violent videos and online recruitment by ISIS encouraging young people to Syria and Iraq have gained wider publicity.4 The new opportunities offered by the social media have had a crucial impact on the development of jihadist activity in Europe. Content inciting violence that can be easily accessed on the Internet and the possibilities for interaction offered by the social media are considered one of the reasons for thousands of young people travelling to the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. The new communication channels have also been used in numerous terrorist attacks in an attempt to amplify the psychological shock effect of violent attacks by such means as social media campaigns and live streaming on Facebook.5 While the countermeasures of the authorities and technology companies have succeeded in reducing the volume of jihadist content publicly available online and on the social media in recent years, terrorist organisations have also shown an ability to 1 In this report, Arabic names and terms have been written with the established spellings used in the news. For terms that do not as yet have established spellings in Finnish public discussion, the spellings used in English research literature have been selected. For names that organisations, media or persons use of themselves (such as foreign fighters’ noms de guerre), the spelling preferred by the relevant party is used. 2 See Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Cambridge, Mass.: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 2006), https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of- savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf. 3 See e.g. M.W. Zackie Masoud, "An Analysis of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “Call to Global Islamic Resistance”, Journal of Strategic Security 6, no 1 (2013), 1–18. A good general review of relevant academic literature can also be found in Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Nick Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on online radicalisation: A Literature Review 2006–2016 (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017). 4 Charlie Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: Quilliam, 2015). 5 Maura Conway and Joseph Dillon, Case study: future trends: live-streaming terrorist attacks (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/Live- streaming_FINAL.pdf. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 14 adapt their operating methods to the rapidly changing digital media environment. Encrypted messaging services, including Telegram, have grown in popularity as means of distributing content and recruiting supporters.6 Researchers have also warned of the increasing use of the “darknet” in planning violent attacks and disseminating online communication supporting them.7 Historically, Finland’s role in international jihadism has been marginal. This has also been true of jihadist communication, whether we mean references to Finland, the volume of content produced in Finnish, or the role of persons living in Finland who have produced or disseminated content. In recent years, however, there have been indications of a change in this situation. While Finland’s role remains clearly marginal, persons who have lived in Finland have been seen in ISIS videos and publications, for example, and jihadist content has been available in Finnish on the Internet. The purpose of this research project was to examine the links between jihadist online communication and Finland. This is the first study on the subject conducted in Finland. The report also aims to serve as a more extensive introduction to the development of jihadist online communication for those who are not yet familiar with the discussion and literature on this topic in the Finnish context.8 The study was commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior with the purpose of supporting efforts to prevent violent extremism. It was produced simultaneously with the study on jihadist activism and Finland presented in the report Jihadism in Finland and carried out by the same research group. 1.1 Research topic and objectives In this report, we use the term jihadist online communication to refer to the object of the study. The study focuses on (Salafi) jihadist communication which accepts the use of violence and the actors and networks producing and disseminating it. In short, 6 Ahmat Shehabat and Teodor Mitew, "Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing Platforms and ISIS Content Distribution Tactics", Perspectives of Terrorism 12, no 1 (2018), 81– 99. 7 Gabriel Weinmann, “Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web”, Perspectives of Terrorism 10, no 3 (2016), 40–44. 8 Useful works on the topic in more general terms include Christina Archetti, Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, Radicalisation and Media: Connectivity and Terrorism in the New Media Ecology (London: Routledge, 2011); Anne Aly, Stuart Mcdonald, Lee Jarvis and Tomas Chen, Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet (London: Routledge, 2016). PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 15 jihadism in this report refers to the activity and ideology of such movements as al- Qaeda and ISIS. For a more extensive discussion of the history, objectives and worldview of jihadist movements and their relationship with a number of other phenomena, see the report Jihadism in Finland. In this context, online communication refers to communication intended to promote jihadist ideology and/or to support actors and networks disseminating it. The study focuses on content of this type, particularly on the Internet and social media. In academic research, the term violent online political extremism is often used to describe such content.9 This includes the communication of violent movements themselves as well as content sympathetic to such movements produced independently by their supporters. Jihadist movements engage in many types of activities online, including fundraising. However, this study only focuses on that part of communication which is targeted at a wider public or supporters and which thus presumably strives to attract more extensive attention to the movement’s activities, or to recruit more people to violent activity or otherwise support it. In other words, rather than analysing the internal communication of jihadist groups (related to planning attacks or coordinating their activities, for example), the study focuses on communication that has been publicly available online. The analysed content includes communication between supporters which is easily visible to outsiders (e.g. threads under open social media accounts). In keeping with the commission, the objective of the study is to map the online communication of jihadist movements and networks with particular reference to Finland, as well as to explore the way in which this communication has changed in recent years. As this is a highly international phenomenon, the report also contains an extensive background section, which describes the international development and main features of jihadist communication in more general terms. The focus on Finland means that particular subjects of the study are a) content produced in or translated into Finnish, b) participation of persons who live/have lived in Finland in producing and disseminating content, and c) content that discusses Finland, Finnish society and politics, and persons who live or have lived in Finland. The study also contains analyses of the type of jihadist content relevant to Finland that has been discussed in Finnish-language media. 9 See e.g. the VOX-Pol network’s description of the term “violent online political extremism: www.voxpol.eu/about. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 16 The key questions of the study are:  How have Finland and Finnish people been discussed in jihadist online communication?  What type of content has been produced and disseminated by persons who live, or have lived, in Finland? Which channels have been used for this?  What were the key messages of the produced and disseminated content? What type of images were used in the communication? How does the communication discuss issues and events that relate to Finland in more general terms?  In keeping with the commission, the main focus of the study is on the period 2014–2018. It also looks at a few preceding years, during which the publicly available content was more prolific and/or easier to find. The study mainly concentrates on Finnish and English content, which has the potential to reach the widest target audience in Finland. The study also contains a more limited discussion of content published in other languages.  Persons living/having lived in Finland refer to all inhabitants of Finland, including the so-called native Finns. Numerous people of Finnish birth and with Finnish roots have participated in jihadist activism in Finland in general as well as in jihadist online communication.  The study does not take a stand on what should be done about jihadist online communication. Neither does it deal with the detailed content of the communication and, for example, the way in which persons who travelled to Syria and Iraq themselves justified the reasons for their decisions and their religious and political views. An earlier study already exists on the latter theme.10 The objective of this study was to provide an overview of jihadist online communication linked to Finland. 10 Marko Juntunen, Karin Creutz-Sundblom & Juha Saarinen, Suomesta Syyrian ja Irakin konfliktikentälle suuntautuva liikkuvuus. Publication series of the Government’s analysis, assessment and research activities no 43/2016. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 17 1.2 Previous research While jihadist communication emerged more extensively as a topic of public discussion in Finland along with the media visibility attracted by ISIS, the roots of this phenomenon go back to the time before Internet and social media use became widespread. Examples include tapes used to spread the sermons of spiritual leader Khomeini during the Iranian revolution, which contributed to the formation of the ideological foundation of the Islamist revolution in the country.11 Al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri also became known in the 1990s and 2000s for distributing videos and tapes among their supporters and, through them, also to international news channels.12 When talking about jihadist communication today, however, we usually refer to the more widespread use of the Internet and social media for jihadist movements’ communicative purposes. Research in this topic has been exceptionally active in the last five years. Studies have looked at the media use of different jihadist movements (especially al-Qaeda and ISIS) and its role in their activities, including spreading religious doctrines, dissemination of educational and teaching materials, information acquisition, fundraising, planning of attacks, recruitment of fighters and attracting new supporters.13 Research in jihadist communication has drawn from the theories and methods of a number of different disciplines, including political research, criminology, history, sociology and media research. Research in this subject has been particularly active in the United States, the Great Britain and France, where jihadist activity has had a more prominent role in both public discussion and policy-making than in countries such as Finland. No research that maps this phenomenon from the Finnish perspective has so far been conducted. Research in jihadism and Finland has in general been virtually non- existent. References to jihadist communication in Finnish publications have so far been almost exclusively limited to some comments issued by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service and news items published when Finland has been cited or persons who had lived in Finland have appeared in jihadist communication. 11 Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution (St. Paul: Minnesota University Press, 1994). 12 Flagg Miller, The Audacious Ascetic: What the Bin Laden Tapes Reveal About al-Qaʿida (London: Hurst & Company, 2015). See also Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad: The Internet as Al Qaeda's Catalyst for Global Terror”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no 1 (2010), 10–23. 13 See e.g. Aly et al., Violent Extremism Online. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 18 It has also been typical of research in jihadism in Europe in a broader context that it either focuses on such activity at the international level or looks at developments mainly in those countries that have traditionally had the strongest jihadist networks (especially France and the Great Britain). Research in countries on the periphery of this activity (such as Finland), on the other hand, has been far less active. Studies in which jihadist communication is examined from the specific perspective of a certain country have also been few and far between. For these reasons, this study is rather exceptional in the field of academic research. 1.3 Data and methods Researching jihadist movements is rarely easy because violent groups are unwilling to reveal details about their activities to outsiders. Researching jihadist communication intended for the general public is slightly easier, as it focuses on the very part of the movements’ activity to which they wish to draw attention. When we move from the content of the communication to its producers and its methods of dissemination, however, we soon encounter the data challenges typical of research in jihadism. Jihadist online communication had its short golden era around the period extending from 2013 to 2015. In the early years of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, jihadist communication on the social media proliferated rapidly, and especially pro-ISIS content was widely and quite openly available on such channels as Twitter and Facebook. This offered researchers unique possibilities for studying the content and social networks, as the authorities paid much less attention to this content in the early days than they did only a few years later. During this period, researchers were able to collect unique primary data on the activities and communication strategies of different jihadist movements on a much larger scale than ever before. The situation has since changed significantly, as much more stringent monitoring of social media content has been introduced, and authorities and technology companies have become very quick in removing content inciting violence. This is why content from the years of prolific jihadist social media communication is no longer publicly available, and new content is equally difficult to access. New content continues to be published and disseminated on the social media with new profiles, but this content is removed as soon as it goes up, and consequently it is not only difficult to find for research purposes but also relatively insignificant, given its short life span. Rather than ending completely, however, jihadist communication in the online environment has increasingly moved to closed, encrypted channels. Forming a PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 19 comprehensive overview of the content and users of these channels is extremely difficult. In order to follow the types of content and uses found on these encrypted channels, profiles covering the researcher’s identity and profession and often also active participation in the discussions are required. This raises difficult questions in terms of research ethics and requires high amounts of time and resources.14 Monitoring social medial discussions has thus been a full-time job for researchers in this field for many years. Such understanding and experience acquired over the years has been quite essential for an ability to follow the discussions in the current, rapidly changing jihadist media environment. The restricted access to the content has been a particularly acute challenge when studying jihadist online communication related to countries like Finland, as in these cases the volume of content is low to begin with. Not only is the content more difficult to access but its use is also hampered by the fact that technology companies have imposed more stringent practices on sharing open data with researchers. Previously, social media content was much easier to access as it could be downloaded directly through the application programming interfaces (APIs) of different social media companies (including Twitter or Facebook). This method allowed for the collection of large-scale social media data for research purposes. In practice, it meant that public social media content could be downloaded automatically, for example from Twitter or Facebook, using different search words without having to first save the content manually as screen captures or in other ways and going through it post by post. This has now become considerably more difficult, hampering especially the acquisition of the large data sets important for research purposes and the use of research methods requiring larger data sets.15 The following data were used in this study:  Social media profiles – this includes Facebook profiles and Twitter activity of fighters who left Finland for Syria and Iraq. Whereas a small part of this content is still available online, most of it came from the researchers’ personal archives. The researchers also had access to social media content collected by Sara Rigatelli, an Yle reporter, who has actively followed the accounts of foreign fighters. 14 See e.g. Nico Prucha, “IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via Telegram”, Perspectives of Terrorism 10, no 6, (2010), 48–58. 15 Joe Whittaker, Methodological Problems in Online Radicalisation (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), https://www.voxpol.eu/methodological-problems-online-radicalisation/. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 20  International Twitter archives – The researchers had access to international Twitter archives. The most extensive one of these is TRAC’s Shadows of ISIS data set containing 9.3 million tweets related to ISIS.  Finnish online forums – This part of the data consists of Finnish online forums and websites on which jihadist content was published in 2014–2018 (including An-Nida). Most of this content has also since been taken down, and content stored in the researchers’ personal archives was thus used. The data has been complemented by using archive.org.  Jihadist movements’ own media production – For the purposes of this study, some of the best-known key jihadist online magazines, videos etc. were examined, with a particular focus on ISIS media production directed at Western audiences (e.g. Dabiq, Rumiyah, Al-Amaq, Al-Naba and Inspire).  Videos – the content studied also includes videos. Most of these videos have been or are still available on YouTube or similar video services and in researchers’ archives. The videos were mainly identified on the basis of social media profiles, news coverage and interviews. To support the analysis of the data, the following sources were used in addition to research literature:  Interviews – Interviews with Muslim community members and public authorities, among others, conducted together with the Jihadism in Finland study. Additionally, leading international researchers of jihadist online communication were consulted to find out what aspects linked to Finland have emerged in their data.  Legal documents – The study also examined documents related to court proceedings and criminal investigations to the extent they addressed the suspects’ Internet and social media use.  News content in mainstream media – Features on content and links related to Finland in jihadist online communication found in key Finnish news media were collected for the study. The studies Jihadist online communication and Finland and Jihadism in Finland worked together to acquire this content. The study also included an analysis of how Finland has been represented in the main-stream Arabic-language media in the Middle East. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 21 1.4 Limitations of the study The study aimed to produce as comprehensive and careful an analysis as was possible within the limits of the available resources. At the same time, it is obvious that many gaps in our knowledge remain to be filled by future research projects. The most important limitations affecting the study originate from the difficulties of obtaining data described above. While the researchers had access to a high volume of social media content that is no longer available online, it is unlikely to cover all the content related to Finland that was posted online. In practice, this limitation is relevant to all historical research in which jihadist social media data is used and where it was not possible to collect the data for the needs of the project before the more stringent practices were introduced. The use of archived material creates additional challenges in terms of research methodology, as it only provides a limited sample of social media threads, which often are dynamic and change rapidly. Additionally, analysing social media posts and ‘likes’ based on archived material is much more difficult and restrictive. Another limitation of the study was its focus on openly available content. This means that online communication on closed channels, which today have an important role, was excluded from the study. While research on communication on closed channels is undeniably important, we should at the same time be aware of the fact that the closed channels are a different form of communication also from the perspective of the jihadist movements themselves. The difficulties associated with tracing and following the content described above also apply to the potential audiences of jihadist online communication. Discussions on Telegram, for example, often cannot be followed unless you receive a link or an invitation to the right channels and groups.16 Moreover, these numerous channels and groups are in constant flux. Consequently, the visibility and accessibility of content produced through Telegram, for instance, are essentially more restricted and disseminating such content is more difficult than it was on Facebook and especially Twitter. This has also been noted by supporters of jihadism on Telegram. In practice, stricter monitoring of the social media has driven actors with 16 The channels of the Telegram messaging app are intended for receiving messages, and they can only be used by the administrators of these channels when communicating with their followers. Group chats, on the other hand, are discussions in which all members can participate. Groups further include normal groups (up to 200 members) and supergroups (up to 100,000 members). Additionally, both of these group types may be either public (they can be found by search engines) or closed (channels or groups that cannot be found without a precise address). Telegram also has a chat feature through which the members can engage in encrypted communication. For a useful review of the realities of research related to Telegram, see Mia Bloom, Hicham Tiflati and John Horgan, “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform”, Terrorism and Political Violence (2017). PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 22 ISIS and al-Qaeda sympathies back to closed discussion forums, or their own ‘echo chambers’, which many of them experience as unfortunate. In other words, the use of closed channels has made online communication more fragmented and probably less effective in reaching wider audiences. Furthermore, the communication mostly comprises interaction between those who already are involved in the activities. On Telegram, assessing the number and identities of those following the chats is also made more difficult by the fact that a significant number of subscribers to jihadist channels are likely to be researchers, journalists and intelligence service representatives.17 1.5 Research ethics In research conducted in keeping with academic principles, questions of research ethics must always also be addressed. Careful consideration of research ethics is particularly essential when the research concerns societally sensitive topics. This project follows the research ethics principles of human sciences, as does its sister project on jihadism in Finland. A preliminary evaluation of both projects was requested from the University of Helsinki Ethical Review Board in the Humanities and Social and Behavioural Sciences. In terms of its methods and data, the study involves rather commonplace social science research in many ways. In the use and storage of interview material, principles discussed in greater detail in the report Jihadism in Finland were followed. In addition, the way Internet and social media content should be handled in this report needed to be considered carefully. While the social media and Internet content used in it originally was public and thus openly accessible, in this report all content collected from such sources is discussed anonymously and without revealing information that would violate the privacy of individuals. An exception to this rule is made for persons whose participation in jihadist activism already is public knowledge and confirmed, and persons who have appeared with their real name in openly 17 See e.g. Bart Schuurman, “Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship”, Terrorism and Political Violence (2018); also Deven Parekh, Amarnath Amarasingam, Lorne Dawson, Derek Ruths, “Studying Jihadists on Social Media: A Critique of Data Collection Methodologies”, Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no 3 (2018), 5–23. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 23 available online content produced by them. In this respect, the study follows the established practices of Internet research.18 This report also uses some images to illustrate themes and features associated with jihadist online communication. All images contained in the report have already been distributed widely, and some have also been published by mainstream media. However, we have consciously avoided using the most shocking images (including the brutal communication and execution videos of ISIS). We have also avoided long quotations where including them in the report would not bring added value to the study. These principles are in keeping with the objectives of the study. The purpose of the study is to provide an overview of the relationship between jihadist online communication and Finland, rather than to investigate individuals’ participation in these activities or to engage in detailed textual or image analysis. 18 Annette Markham and Elisabeth Buchanan, “Ethical Decision-Making and Internet Research: Recommendations from the AoIR Ethics Working Committee (Version 2.0)”, Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) (2012), https://aoir.org/reports/ethics2.pdf. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 24 2 Jihadist online communication as an international phenomenon In this Chapter, we look at research evidence related to jihadist online communication in a broader context. We begin by providing a short review of historical background and describe how various jihadist groups have previously used different media forms and channels to promote their goals and ideology. We then discuss the online communication of three jihadist groups that have attracted attention in Finland -- al- Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS --and their special features. Finally, we summarise research findings regarding the role of online communication in radicalisation of persons who become involved in jihadism and provide an overview of the current developments in jihadist online communication and potential future trends. 2.1 Jihadist online communication and the changing media environment The development of jihadist online communication has followed the opportunities offered by a changing media environment. While the digital media environment has undergone dramatic changes in the last few decades, so have the communicative practices of jihadist movements. The development of jihadist online communication can be roughly divided into four phases based on the platforms and types of communication which have been prevalent.19 Rather than being mutually exclusive, however, these phases have often overlapped. Many platforms created earlier have continued to operate, including websites or online forums, while the social media or encrypted messaging services have emerged as key forms of communication. The earliest phase in jihadist online communication comprised so-called static websites, which were the most common form of online communication for jihadist movements in the early 2000s. These sites offered movement leaders a means to disseminate their message wider than what would have been possible before the proliferation of online communication and the social media. The sites were often hierarchic, however, and they mainly served as a platform for distributing textual content (e.g. ideological pamphlets, religious sermons and reports from war zones) and a channel through which the leaders could disseminate their message to those outside the inner circle. The early websites did not offer similar extensive 19 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on Online Radicalisation, 38–49. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 25 opportunities for acting anonymously or participating in personal discussions as online forums and especially the social media did later on. The websites were also relatively easy to supervise, and they were vulnerable to the countermeasures of authorities and service providers.20 The next phase saw the introduction of online forums. They enabled two-way interaction between activists in jihadists movements and those interested in the movements. Online forums also allowed supporters to talk to likeminded people around the world and thus create more extensive global networks around ideological aspirations. In particular, the possibility for anonymous communication provided by online forums facilitated group activities in online environments. Online forums created completely new opportunities for building a feeling of togetherness among the ‘virtual’ community. Anonymous communication, on the other hand, made it possible to safely discuss topics that could otherwise lead to countermeasures, especially in cases where the identity of the participants involved in the discussions would be revealed to authorities.21 Unlike the early static websites, many of the discussion forums had content not only in Arabic but also increasingly in English and other Western languages. This allowed the movements to spread their communication and activities more widely in the international context and especially among Muslims living in Western countries. The use of online forums and chatrooms associated with them reached its peak in the mid-2000s. For example, many themes and strategies that later took on a key role in jihadist online communication, including “open source jihad”, (providing supporters with encouragement and guidance in carrying out attacks on their own devices without direct links to the movements’ leaders) originate from discussions on such forums. While the earlier static websites served rather as the official communication channels of movement leaders, these online forums contributed to removing the prior elitism and hierarchies of jihadist communication by making it available for ordinary supporters and discussions between them.22 Blogs were another version of these online platforms supporting discussions, which were used to disseminate jihadist content especially by individual persons. Since the mid-2000s, in particular, blogs and content management systems that facilitated their 20 Meleagrou-Hitchens and Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on Online Radicalisation, 39–40. 21 See also Thomas Hegghammer, “Interpersonal Trust on Jihadi Internet Forums”, in Diego Gambetta (ed.) Fight, Flight, Mimic: Identity Signalling in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 22 Aaron Zelin, The State of Global Jihad Online (Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation 2013); see also Akil Awan, "Radicalization on the Internet? The Virtual Propagation of Jihadist Media and its Effects", The RUSI Journal 152, no 3 (2007), 76–81; Meleagrou-Hitchens ja Khaderbhai, Research perspectives on Online Radicalisation, 40–42. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 26 creation, including Wordpress, offered for many supporters an easy and often anonymous way of setting up websites and sharing content through them. The third phase, or more widespread social media use in the activities of different groups, brought along significant changes. Especially the rapid spread of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube use since the 2010s offered unprecedented opportunities for reaching larger audiences anonymously, with smaller resources and faster than what was possible a few years earlier. Facebook and the new possibilities for chatting and sharing content facilitated the creation of new types of connections between those interested in the ideology and supporters who were already active, which in its turn enabled the dissemination of information to new audiences and target groups. Twitter offered a similar possibility of spreading a message rapidly to a large audience while also providing for the interested readers links to other content providers on the web where material was still available. YouTube also enabled the effortless dissemination of visual content, including videos, as well as an opportunity to discuss the videos in the comments.23 As ISIS supporters travelled to Syria and Iraq, this opened up more new possibilities for online interaction. Supporters from around the world were able to share the movement’s content more widely across the globe and personally recruit new supporters on social media platforms. ISIS media production (videos, memes and newsletters), in particular, became known for its diverse ways of producing different types of content and targeting it at a variety of countries and audiences.24 Social media use reached its peak in 2013–2015. While social media continues to be used quite commonly for this purpose, extensive countermeasures have made it much more difficult to share jihadist content, especially in English. Today, jihadist communication has been fragmented across a number of channels, which in many cases are encrypted and not publicly available. Telegram messaging service have become a particularly popular platform for communicating with supporters and disseminating content, whereas supporters of jihadist movements have also used other similar encrypted messaging services, such as SureSpot, Kik, Wire, Signal and WhatsApp. Two new trends have also emerged in this phase, which differ from the ways in which jihadist groups have previously operated online. The first one is the so-called virtual plotter activity, in which fighters of a movement based in Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan have been able to coordinate attacks in Western countries 23 See Gabriele Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media, Research Series 2 (Washington, D.C.: Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014). 24 See e.g. Charlie Winter and Dounia Mahlouly, A Tale of Two Caliphates: Comparing the Islamic State’s Internal and External Messaging Priorities (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2018), https://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/A-Tale-of-Two-Caliphates-Mahlouly-and- Winter.pdf. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 27 via Telegram.25 Good examples of these are high-profile terrorist attacks in Europe in recent years, including the attack at the Christmas fair in Berlin and live streaming of murders of priests in Normandy in 2016. As far as is currently known, ISIS was at least partly involved in the virtual plotting of both attacks.26 Another current trend is the increased use of content sharing platforms (such as justpaste.it, sendvid.com, dump.to) and the so-called grey web for disseminating content in order to evade countermeasures taken by authorities and companies. Rather than spreading content, social media channels including Twitter and Facebook (and increasingly also the messaging services Telegram and WhatsApp) now primarily serve as portals through which those who are interested can be guided to actual jihadist content. This content, in turn, is increasingly dispersed over different platforms which are more difficult to access and which usually cannot be found without a precise address.27 Jihadist content can thus be hosted on these platforms without attracting wider attention. The storage of jihadist content is thus fragmented over numerous different platforms, and the content is difficult to delete permanently, as it can be rapidly re-posted at a different address.28 So far, we have discussed jihadist online communication as one homogeneous entity in this Chapter. In fact, there are significant differences between the online communication of jihadist groups depending on their goals, regional aspirations and resources. The history, politics, culture and media environment of their operational areas have to some extent influenced the means and objectives of their online communication. This makes it difficult to present more precise generalisations regarding a large-scale phenomenon which is linked to different movements operating in diverse conditions, such as Boko Haram in West Africa, al-Shabaab in Somalia, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines. We should also emphasise at this point that, when discussing the development of jihadist online 25 See e.g. Rukmini Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots From Afar", The New York Times, 4.2.2017; Amarnath Amarasingam, “An Interview with Rachid Kassem, Jihadist Orchestrating attacks in France”, Jihadology, 18.11.2016, https://jihadology.net/2016/11/18/guest-post-an-interview-with-rachid-kassim-jihadist- orchestrating-attacks-in-france/. 26 See e.g. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, “Virtual Planners: a Critical Terrorist Innovation”, War on the Rocks (2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/isils-virtual- planners-a-critical-terrorist-innovation/. 27 See e.g. Shehabat and Mitew, "Black-boxing the Black Flag”, 81–99; also Maura Conway at al., "Disrupting Daesh: Measuring the Take-down of Online Extremist Material" (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), http://www.voxpol.eu/download/vox-pol_publication/DCUJ5528-Disrupting- DAESH-1706-WEB-v2.pdf. 28 The site justpaste.it, for example, is in practice run by a single person, which makes it more difficult to monitor its content on a large scale, unlike on such channels as Twitter or Facebook. Carmen Fishwick, “How a Polish student's website became an ISIS propaganda tool”, The Guardian 15.8.2014. https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/isils-virtual-planners-a-critical-terrorist-innovation/ https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/isils-virtual-planners-a-critical-terrorist-innovation/ PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 28 communication, the focus in this Chapter is on developments and movements which have played a key role from the perspective of Western countries. In the following section, open communication and publicly available content in the network of jihadist movements is illustrated in greater detail by discussing the media production of three such movements -- al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS. In case of Al-Qaeda, perhaps the best-known example is the online magazine Inspire produced by the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), through which the organisation has sought to spread its ideology in Western countries and respond to large-scale military operations against the movement’s leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, has developed its video and radio production in Somali to support the movement’s activities in Somalia, and its media production in Swahili particularly for Kenya. Content produced by this group has also been spread online in other languages outside Somalia, among other things to recruit more followers.29 The media production of ISIS, however, has been the best known and largest in scale. While the international attention attracted by ISIS is undoubtedly to a great extent based on its military success in the areas of Syria and Iraq, it is equally due to the shocking videos produced by the organisation and the new and versatile way of using the social media for sharing content and attracting foreign fighters to the area. ISIS’s media production and especially its innovative use of digital media are considered the prototype of the new forms of communication by armed groups, which many other groups have striven to copy. 2.2 Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda has traditionally played an important role in the development of jihadist communication. Whereas ISIS has in recent years been a forerunner in the tactical use of violent videos and social media, al-Qaeda was a pioneer of Internet use, especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the contemporary practices of jihadist online communication were inspired by al-Qaida’s strategic thinkers who discussed the role of the new media and the Internet as part of the global jihadist movement’s activities. The group's twenty-year strategic plan (2001–2020), “Military 29 See e.g. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher and James Sheehan, Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence ICSR, 2012). See also Christopher Anzalone, “The Resilience of al-Shabaab”, CTC Sentinel 9, no 4 (2017), 13–20. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 29 Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants”, describes the group’s aspirations to increase its global influence. A key element of the strategy was so-called electronic jihad, which meant the strategic use of the Internet in raising jihadist awareness, recruiting new supporters, training, fundraising and the groups’ activities. For example, Yemen-based Anwar al-Awlaki, who was born in America and who inspired a number of attacks in Western countries, spoke about the need to create a new generation of ‘Internet jihadists’, who could spread the message and content of al- Qaeda, mobilise supporters and incite them to carrying out terrorist attacks through the Internet.30 Al-Qaeda’s online communication around the mid-2000s was regarded as having three objectives. The first objective was creating online libraries and archives used for collecting and sharing the movement’s key religious, ideological and military material. The second one was creating a platform through which the message of militant ideologists, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, could be disseminated widely. The third objective was developing jihadist websites and online forums, through which jihadist ideological discussions would be possible, activities could be planned and a spirit of togetherness could be built.31 Content sympathetic to Al-Qaeda has been spread online through a number of channels. One of these is As-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media Publication established in 2001, which has operated as the official media production organisation of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has also often been linked to the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), which has produced large amounts of jihadist material and also translated it into Western languages, including German, English and French. It has also published such online video series as the one titled Voice of the Caliphate used in attempts to spread the organisation's message outside mainstream media channels since 2005. Both of these were particularly active in 2001–2007, although they have remained operative until recent years.32 The best-known form of al-Qaeda communication directed at the Western public probably is the aforementioned Inspire magazine, which first came out in 2010 and which was primarily disseminated as an electronic version online. Among other things, the magazine contained Osama bin Laden’s speeches and detailed instructions on how, for example, the movement’s supporters could participate in carrying out attacks 30 See e.g. Carl J. Ciovacco, “The Contours of Al Qaeda's Media Strategy”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no 10 (2009), 853–875; or Haroro Ingram, “An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's Propaganda War”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no 5 (2016), 357–375. 31 See e.g. Rudner, “Electronic Jihad”, 10–23. 32 Steven Stalinsky, The Rise And Fall Of Al-Qaeda’s ‘Al-Sahab’ Media Wing And Its American Architect (Memri & Cyber-Jihad, 2017), http://cjlab.memri.org/analysis-and-special-reports/the- rise-and-fall-of-al-qaedas-al-sahab-media-wing-and-its-american-architect/. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 30 in Western countries without major military resources or coordination by the movement’s leaders. Incitement to such activities, known as “open source jihad”, was one of the magazine's key themes. Encouraging this type of violent activities was part of al-Qaeda’s adjustment to the military defeats it experienced after 2001 (including in Iraq and Afghanistan) and the restrictions they created. This operating method has later been developed further by other jihadist movements, including ISIS, especially following losses of areas held by the organisation in recent years. The screen capture below from issue 13 of Inspire in 2014 is a good illustration of how such open source jihad operates. Figure 1. Screen capture from al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine which, among other things, contains instructions for making bombs and avoiding airport security checks 2.3 Al-Shabaab When al-Shabaab was established in the mid-2000s, its main purpose initially was to engage in regional fighting in Somalia. The group's early-stage communication mainly consisted of official bulletins and military reports, which were disseminated on different websites and news channels. This early-stage material was mainly produced in Arabic, and it contained descriptions of military operations and acts of violence. Al- Shabaab also started producing content in Somali as early as late 2006. From the start, al-Shabaab also used websites in its communication, especially when targeting Somalis living outside the country. This purpose was served by such discussion forums as Ansar al-Mujahideen. The group soon started consciously using PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 31 media production as part of its aspirations to centralise power to itself. As the war continued and became more demanding, videos were also produced in an attempt to recruit foreigners and particularly expatriate Somali fighters to support its regional war efforts. Content production was coordinated by such groups as Echo of Jihad Center for Media (Markaz Sada al-Jihad li-l-l'lam), which has also been linked to al-Qaeda and the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), an organisation which supports the jihadist cause in more general terms.33 By 2009, the media production of this group had advanced considerably. It comprised audiovisual content and radio broadcasts produced in many different languages. In addition to French and English content, the group produced a magazine called Gaidi Mtaani, which mainly came out in Swahili but also contained English articles and through which the group attempted to recruit fighters, especially among the Muslim minority in East Africa. Many of the videos and other content produced by al-Shabaab contained themes typical of the global jihadist movement’s communication, including reports on military victories, criticism of Western countries’ actions (for example, in connection with the controversy related to the Mohammed cartoons published in Jyllands-Posten), descriptions of idyllic life in areas ruled by al-Shabaab, and recruitment and training of new supporters. The screen capture from the Gaidi Mtaani magazine (issue 4) illustrates al-Shabaab’s communication strategy. In the article shown in the image, the magazine offers its own version of the attack at Westgate shopping mall, which took place in Kenya in 2013. Other channels linked to al-Shabaab include or have included Al-Kataib Media Foundation which, among other things, produces various videos and bulletins about attacks, and Al-Katain News Channel, which broadcasts news about Somalia from the group’s perspective, especially for audiences outside Somalia. Radio al-Andalus serves as the group’s official radio channel within Somalia, and other media channels linked to the movement include al-Furgan Radio and Media. Shahada News Agency concentrates on disseminating information about the group's military actions and attacks. Such news networks as Somali MeMo and Calamada, which also continue to operate online, support the group. Al-Shabaab additionally has its own Twitter accounts which, particularly in 2009–2013, disseminated content sympathetic to the group. These accounts also became famous for being used for live tweets during the attack at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013.34 33 See e.g. Christopher Anzalone, Continuity and Change: the Evolution and Resilience of Al- Shabab’s Media Insurgency, 2006–2016 (Hate Speech International: Investigating Extremism, 2016), https://www.hate-speech.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/email_722762_Readers.pdf. 34 See e.g. David Mair, “#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no 1 (2017), 24–43. See also Anzalone, Continuity and Change, 11. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 32 Figure 2. A screen capture from al-Shabaab’s Gaidi Mtaani online magazine reporting on the attack at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi Al-Shabaab’s media production started to wind down after 2010, however, at which time the group also experienced large-scale military setbacks. Since it joined al- Qaeda, multilingualism and communication targeted at international audiences have been increasingly stressed in al-Shabaab’s communication strategy. Its main purpose appears to be to recruit fighters and support from abroad as the movement has lost control of areas in Somalia and its activities have again taken on the characteristics of guerrilla warfare. Regardless of its losses, however, al-Shabaab remains active. Among other things, the group carried out another attack in Nairobi in January 2019 and continues to produce online content in order to boost its status. 2.4 ISIS In recent years, ISIS has become known for its diverse media strategy drawing on new types of digital media techniques, through which the group has tailored its message to the needs of different audiences and maximised the recognisability of its PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 33 “brand”’.35 The production and use of shockingly violent videos has been part of ISIS’s communication strategy for some time. ISIS’s predecessor, Muntada al-Ansar, published a video showing the execution of Nick Berg, an American businessman, already in 2004 as revenge for the Americans’ actions in Iraq.36 Since 2012, ISIS’s media production has comprised films, videos, social media activity, newsletters and a monthly magazine that has been available both online and through smartphone apps. Unlike earlier jihadist communication, which often consisted of long speeches and religious sermons, ISIS videos have been more visually ambitious, of higher quality, and clearly intended to appeal to younger audiences. Many cinematographic and graphic techniques, images and filming styles adopted from games, and dramatic means of expression aiming to make the message easy to adopt and appealing to different target audiences are used in the group's media production. The screen captures below and on the following page from a film titled ‘Flames of War’, which appeared in English in 2014, are a good illustration of this ‘Hollywood-style’ visual look often intended for Western and young audiences.37 Figure 3. A screen capture from an ISIS video reflecting the high-quality visual look of the group’s videos 35 See e.g. Haroro Ingram, “Three Traits of the Islamic State's Information Warfare”, The RUSI Journal 159, no 6 (2014), 4–11; Haroro Ingram, “The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no 6 (2015), 729–752. 36 See e.g. "Zarqawi' beheaded US man in Iraq", BBC News 3 May 2004. 37 See e.g. Meira Svirsky, “ISIS Releases ‘Flames of War’ Feature Film to Intimidate West”, Clarion Project 21.9.2014. https://clarionproject.org/isis-releases-flames-war-feature-film-intimidate- west/. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 34 Figure 4. A screen capture from an ISIS video in which the group’s military might is highlighted visually with special effects and using several different camera angles The longest-standing ISIS media organisation is Furqan Foundation for Media Production, which continues to operate and produce many types of material (CDs, DVDs, posters, official statements). This media machine has been expanded several times, for example through Al-I'tisam Media Foundation and Ajnad Foundation for Media Production. The latter mainly focus on audio communication and nasheed songs. In addition, Al Hayat Media Center tends to target its communication at Western audiences, and it produces content especially in English, German, Russian, and French. It has also published the magazine Dabiq, which has attracted a great deal of attention in Western countries, and its successor Rumiyah. These magazines mainly feature ISIS’s content in which textual material predominates (e.g. stories of foreign fighters and interpretations of religious texts). ISIS also publishes the newspaper Al-Naba in Arabic. The news agency Amaq is ISIS’s official news channel, which disseminates the organisation's news through different channels, including Telegram and mobile apps. The group also has an official radio channel, Al- Bayan, which broadcasts news of the group’s activities in a number of languages. Semi-official or unofficial media organisations, including Al-Batār Media Foundation, have also been linked to ISIS. While these organisations that support jihadismin a broader sense have produced plenty of pro-ISIS material, they have not been considered a part of ISIS’s official communication machine. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 35 ISIS’s communication channels differ from each other regarding the type of content and target audiences. The Arabic communication of Al-Naba, for example, consists mainly of news stressing the practical aspects of building an Islamic state and daily war news. Dabiq and Rumiyah, on the other hand, are mainly intended for the international audience, and they contain articles emphasising the global dimension of the jihadist fight and in-depth discussions on ideological topics.38 The diagram below describes the highly multidimensional media production linked to ISIS.39 Figure 5. A diagram illustrating the structure of ISIS’s media production40 Several different themes and narratives can be perceived in the content of ISIS's media production. The suffering of Sunni Muslims and especially children caused by Western countries’ war efforts in the Middle East is a common theme. These stories strive to appeal to Muslims globally. Another frequent theme is highlighting the group’s achievements and military power. This content often has pictures of dead soldiers, military patrols, training camps and battles. Their purpose is to raise a fighting spirit among sympathisers and attract new adventurous supporters to join the fight. It can also be thought to aim for a psychological effect by instilling fear in opponents. 38 Winter and Mahlouly, A Tale of Two Caliphates. 39 Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’. 40 Diagram from Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’, 16. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 36 An aspect of ISIS’s media production that has attracted a great deal of attention in Western countries is so-called brutal communication, through which the group has attempted to instil fear in its opponents, convince its supporters of its capabilities, and provoke its local enemies and the international media to pay attention to its activities. The best-known examples of these probably are the execution videos, in which a man nicknamed Jihadi John speaks in English directly to Western audiences, with the obvious intention of provoking media attention in the West and getting Western countries to react to the group’s cruelty and violence. The use of English language and European fighters on the videos is further intended to emphasise the idea of ISIS as a dangerous enemy also within Europe, as its activities are not limited merely to the regional conflict in Iraq and Syria. This brutal communication often stresses the cruelty of ISIS and uses dramatic visual techniques, creating the image of a strong military might that does not hesitate to use any means against the infidels. The screen capture from an ISIS execution video below is an example of how ISIS creates an image of itself as a mighty opponent relentless towards its enemies. Figure 6. A screen capture from an ISIS execution video as an example of the group's brutal communication41 As a counterbalance for communication focusing on violence and the suffering of Sunni Muslims, content depicting normal life in areas ruled by ISIS has also been produced. Harmonious life in a society organised according to the principles of Islam is specifically presented as a contrast to violence. The content repeatedly shows 41 A screen capture from Dashiell Bennett and Polly Mosendz, "New ISIS Video Reportedly Shows the Execution of British Hostage", The Atlantic 13 September 2014. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 37 images of happy children, well-functioning infrastructure and agriculture. It also often contains encouraging descriptions of fighters who have moved to Syria and Iraq from around the world to serve ISIS.42 The screen capture below is from a video titled ‘Islamic State Caliphate Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’, which was published by ISIS in August 2014 and which shows images of daily life under ISIS in Syria. Figure 7. A screen capture from an ISIS video titled ‘Islamic State Caliphate Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’ depicting daily life under ISIS ISIS has also been active on the social media, where it has shared plenty of content in different forms and recruited supporters. These activities were particularly prolific in 2013–2015, a period in which researchers who charted the group's activities on Twitter found tens of thousands of pro-ISIS accounts around the globe.43 Not all of them were directly linked to ISIS. Research indicates that in the pro-ISIS online milieu, many types of actors playing different roles can be identified, including militants and active producers and distributors of content (disseminators), supporters (jihobbyists) and passive consumers supporting the ideology (fan boys).44 In practice, this has meant that content supporting ISIS was produced and shared not only by the organisation’s own media activists and production machine but also a large unofficial 42 Winter, The Virtual ‘Caliphate’. 43 John M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter (Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings,The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, 2015). 44 See e.g. Jarrett Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2008); Joseph Carter, Shiraz Maher and Peter R. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation - ICSR, 2014). PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 38 network of supporters that emerged around it, which produced a great number of ‘fan videos’, memes and other content typical of social media inspired by ISIS but to a great extent outside its control. Extensive countermeasures against ISIS and the social media profiles supporting it have since greatly disrupted pro-ISIS online communication.45 A situation not unlike the Whack-a-Mole arcade game has emerged between those setting up Twitter accounts and those closing down extremist accounts: accounts supporting ISIS are taken down as soon as they appear on the social media.46 In 2015–2016, for example, Twitter closed down 125,000 accounts supporting ISIS. In recent years, only sporadic activities have been observed, especially in Arabic or key Western languages.47 In 2018, Twitter declared itself the winner of this Whack-a-Mole game, as its innovations allowed 94% of accounts supporting terrorism to be closed down automatically, and 74% of these accounts had already been taken down before they had time to disseminate a single message.48 While Twitter undeniably was a key communication channel for ISIS earlier, this does not necessarily hold true any longer. Whereas Twitter continues to play a role as part of the more extensive media environment linked to ISIS, the organisation’s activities have found refuge in messaging services, such as Telegram, in which hundreds of different channels and groups have existed since 2016. Their content is often in Arabic, but material has also been translated into many Western languages. ISIS’s official media production also continues to be published on Telegram. 2.5 Jihadist online content and violent radicalisation Communication and interaction online and on the social media have many purposes for jihadist movements, and the opportunities offered by a changing media 45 See e.g. John M. Berger, Nazis vs. ISIS on Twitter: a Comparative Analysis of White Nationalists and ISIS Online Social Media Networks (Washington, D.C.: GW Programme on Extremism, 2016), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS%20Final_0.pdf. 46 See e.g. Joseph Karam, Twitter, ISIS and Social Media Whack-a-Mole (Foreign Policy Association, 2016), https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/02/09/twitter-isis-social-media-whack- mole/; also Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh. 47 In 2016, Twitter announced it had taken down 125,000 accounts sympathetic to ISIS during the year. See e.g. Danny Yadron, “Twitter deletes 125,000 ISIS accounts and expands anti-terror teams”, The Guardian 5.2. 2016. 48 See Natasha Lomas, “Twitter claims more progress on squeezing terrorist content”, Techcrunch 5.4.2018, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/05/twitter-transparency-report-12. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 39 environment have influenced the movement's development in many ways. Many of these goals and influences have already been touched upon above. To conclude this Chapter, however, it is apt to discuss one of them in a broader context: the assumed role of social media communication in radicalisation. The potential for so-called online radicalisation has been discussed many times in recent years, also in Finland: the possibility that a person adopts a jihadist mentality through the Internet and, consequently, starts independently planning violent attacks. While this threat of a person sitting at a computer alone, without attracting anyone’s attention, and being radicalised enough to carry out violent attacks is a cause for concern from security authorities’ perspective, research findings indicate that such cases are rare. Online communication has undeniably changed jihadist activity in many ways. A link between the number of violent attacks and the widespread use of the Internet is difficult to prove, however. A study that analysed terrorist activities in 1990–2011 showed that increased Internet use has not resulted in growing terrorist activity. Research has shown that few of those who have carried out violent attacks alone can be regarded as having been radicalised exclusively based on online content and discussions. Research findings also indicate that the likelihood of attacks carried out by those who only communicate online with persons with a similar ideological predisposition is smaller than for those who additionally have had social contacts with such persons in real life.49 A great deal of research has been conducted in violent radicalisation in recent years. In this context, the role of jihadist online communication in the process of radicalisation has also been analysed. There are strong indications that Internet and social media use should always be seen in relation to activities offline. The social media complements rather than replaces social relationships in the real world.50 On the other hand, Internet use may reinforce ideas already held by a person and complement existing social networks.51 According to a theory, online communication is like a virtual glue binding together ideologically likeminded jihadist actors, also 49 See e.g. Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviour of Lone-Actor Terrorists”, Journal of Forensic Sciences 59, no 2 (2014), 425–435. 50 See Paul Gill, Maura Conway, Emily Corner and Amy Thornton, What are the Roles of the Internet in Terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015). 51 See e.g. Ines von Behr, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon and Anais Reding, Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism (Brussels: Rand Europe, 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR453.html. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 40 those who do not have strong ties or links in the non-virtual world.52 Internet and social media platforms have thus served as a ‘jihadisphere’, which has enabled jihadist communication inciting violence to spread across the globe faster and more extensively than what was possible before the Internet or the social media existed. Supported by these observations, academic research has increasingly rejected the ‘internet-centric’ approach in favour of a more all-round analysis of the social networks and relationships online. The new approach sees Internet and social media use as part of complex interaction between online and real-world offline activities. Radicalisation is the sum total of many factors, and social networks play a key role in it. While the Internet may lead people more easily and faster than before to movements and actors that incite violence, they do not replace personal contacts. In most cases, transition towards actual acts of violence or acceptance of such acts can happen more easily only when personal contacts with activists in violent movements have been established. The Internet and social media thus serve, above all, as channels for establishing contacts that are significant in violent radicalisation and in forming personal relationships that play a key role in it. The initial contact between individuals interested in such ideas and active supporters may take place on social media channels, including Twitter or Facebook, or currently more often on Telegram or even online gaming platforms and the chatrooms associated with them.53 In this initial phase, however, the participants usually merely share ideological and religious material. Only when the interested individuals move on to more restricted discussion channels and begin to communicate with active members of violent movements in person are they offered material directly inciting violence and urged to participate in the groups’ violent activities. At the same time, interpersonal relationships may be established, which often play a key role in participation in violent acts.54 52 See e.g. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty- First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Marc Sageman, “The Next Generation of Terror”, Foreign Policy 8 October 2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/the- next-generation-of-terror/. 53 Seamus Hughes, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Bennet Clifford, "A New American Leader Rises in ISIS", The Atlantic 13 January 2018. 54 John M. Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy”, CTC Sentinel 8, no 10 (2015), 19–23. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 41 2.6 Future trends in jihadist online communication What, then, does the future of jihadist online communication look like from a researcher’s perspective? Attempts to disseminate jihadist content online will certainly also be made in the future, as jihadist activity is not expected to subside either in Western countries or globally over the next few years. The forms of online communication and the platforms used for it are likely to develop in pace with the potential offered by advancement in communication technology and the Internet also in the future. Various users find their way to evolving technologies and platforms and changing modes of using them without delay, and jihadist activity is no exception. In the last twenty years, jihadist online communication has moved from websites and forums to the social media and encrypted messaging services. Similarly, the future trends of jihadist online communication will continue to reflect the more large-scale changes in the digital media environment. Perhaps the most important trend is related to the more widespread use of encrypted channels not only in society in general but also for disseminating jihadist content in particular and in the activities emerging around it. As a result of countermeasures taken by the authorities and technology companies, it has been obvious for some time now that jihadist communication cannot operate on public sites or on conventional social media as it did before. These activities will become even more difficult as technologies for the identification and extensive deletion of content based on new systems helped by artificial intelligence advance.55 This means that jihadist content is likely to move increasingly to the so-called deep web or darknet, where it can still be hosted in large quantities and, if necessary, shared with those who show an interest. In addition to the public Internet, a great volume of content and many websites exist which are either password protected or cannot be accessed by search engines. Studies show that this ‘deep web’ is much larger than the publicly available Internet, and it provides many services that are not in the search engines’ registers, including several content sharing platforms. In addition, there is the ‘darknet’, which can only be accessed by means of software that automatically removes all identifying data of the user (including the computer's IP address). As this section of the web is very difficult to access and monitor, it is also used for unlawful commerce and dissemination of illegal content (e.g. child pornography). Researchers’ initial findings 55 Facebook reports that it already removes approx. 99% of content related to terrorism, mainly by using algorithms. “Facebook’s AI wipes terrorism-related posts”, BBC 29 November 2017. PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 42 indicate that these encrypted sites are increasingly used to also spread jihadist content or to recruit supporters.56 This does not mean that jihadist actors would be expected to abandon the use of the public Internet. As we have already seen, the first contact between supporters and members of violent movements is still often established on the public Internet. It is highly probable that the publicly accessible communication channels will continue to serve as a meeting point of this type, from where interested persons are rapidly directed to the darknet and/or encrypted channels, however, on which more active communication and recruitment can take place. In addition, the darknet may serve as a new clearing house for jihadist content, always finding a new alternative place to be accessed from as content is taken down. Researchers have recently speculated how such terrorist groups as ISIS will adapt to the extensive countermeasures of the authorities and technology companies. A transition to decentralised online platforms is predicted to be one of the potential trends. Researchers have warned that especially communication platforms based on new blockchain technology, such as Riot, will offer new ways of operating outside official monitoring, also for jihadist groups. It is still too early to say how common the use of such innovations will be in the future.57 56 Nikita Malik, Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption, the Darknet, and Cryptocurrencies (London: Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism at the Henry Jackson Society, 2018), http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in- the-Dark.pdf. 57 See e.g. Lorand Bodo, Decentralised Terrorism: the Next Big Step for the so-called Islamic State (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2018), https://www.voxpol.eu/decentralised-terrorism-the-next- big-step-for-the-so-called-islamic-state-is/. https://www.voxpol.eu/decentralised-terrorism-the-next-big-step-for-the-so-called-islamic-state-is/ https://www.voxpol.eu/decentralised-terrorism-the-next-big-step-for-the-so-called-islamic-state-is/ PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:29 43 3 Jihadist online communication and Finland Historically, Finland has had a marginal role in the multidimensional jihadist online milieu described above. For example, a comprehensive study of ISIS’s global Facebook networks published in 2018 only contained a few sporadic references to Finland.58 International research in jihadist (online) communication in general makes few references to Finland. This Chapter focuses on online content that is or was available between 2014 and 2018. Producing a corresponding analysis concerning the period before the conflict in Syria and Iraq would not have been very meaningful. References to Finland, in particular, in key jihadist publications and speeches have been few and far between. The first such reference known to this group of researchers dates back to 2008: Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leading al-Qaeda figure, announced that al-Qaeda will not “attack Brazilian tourists in Finland or the Vietnamese in Venezuela.”59 Al-Zawahiri used this example to stress that rather than being random, the group’s attacks were part of its carefully considered strategy for the group’s communication with its enemies. In other words, Finland was cited as an example of a country where it would not make strategic sense for al-Qaeda to carry out attacks. Another reference that also attracted media attention in Finland at the time dates back to 2011; on a website supporting jihadism, a person called Abu Suleiman al-Nasser praised a recent attempt for an attack in Länsi-Pasila and a firebomb attack at a petrol station in Tapaninvainio (both in Helsinki). He also incited attacks against Finnish troops in Afghanistan. While this threat attracted attention in Finland, it was ultimately not particularly exceptional or significant. Similar threats against the troops of other Western countries have been rather commonplace. Soon afterwards, another (non- jihadist) actor claimed responsibility for the attacks in Pasila and Tapaninvainio, with a lot mo